“Crocodiles are the Souls of the Community” An Analysis of Human-Animal Relations in Northwestern Benin and its Ontological Implications by Merz, Sharon
  
“Crocodiles are the Souls of the Community” 
An Analysis of Human-Animal Relations in 
Northwestern Benin and its Ontological 
Implications 
 
 
 
Submitted by Sharon Merz to the University of Exeter 
as a thesis for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy in Anthropology 
In February 2018 
 
 
 
This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright 
material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper 
acknowledgement. 
 
 
 
I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been 
identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for 
the award of a degree by this or any other University. 
 
 
 
Signature: ………………………………………………………… 
  
 
3 
 
 
Abstract 
In this thesis I explore human-animal relations amongst the Bebelibe of the 
Commune of Cobly, in the northwest of the Republic of Benin, West Africa, with 
a focus on how they relate to their tikedimɔmɔnte (true totem(s), literally 
“interdict(s)-true”). I start with an historical review of totemism, the debates it 
generated and how these contributed to the recent ontological turn in 
anthropology. I then explore the theoretical ideas I use for my analysis, which 
include “presencing” and the “ontological penumbra” (J. Merz 2017b; J. Merz 
and S. Merz 2017). Presencing builds on semiotics by explaining how people 
make meaning present through their engagement in and with the world around 
them, whilst ontological penumbras are the shadowy spaces of limbo that affect 
our whole being and that people need to negotiate as part of making sense of 
their engagement with the world. As part of these theoretical frameworks, I 
examine the “onton”, as introduced by Johannes Merz (2017b). Ontons are 
experiential, agentive and relational entities that are the result of presencing 
processes. Ontons, however, cannot be divided into representations (signifiers) 
and represented (signified) as signs can. An engagement in the world between 
different entities in an ontonic and thus nonrepresentational sense necessitates 
my introducing further notions including shared “ontonity” (instead of shared 
humanity) and “ontonhood” (rather than personhood). I demonstrate how these 
theoretical ideas work with reference to human-animal relations primarily 
amongst the Bebelibe in the Commune of Cobly. In order to do this, I provide an 
in-depth, “thick description” (Geertz 1973) ethnography that explores how 
people perceive and relate to animals through hunting, domestication, attitudes 
to eating meat, animal commodification, reincarnation, shapeshifting and 
totemism. As part of my analysis I also examine the impact of Christianity on 
human-animal relations by exploring several incidents involving Christians and 
their tikedimɔmɔnte. 
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Linguistic Note 
Mbelime (formerly known as Niendé or Nyende) is a Gur or Voltaic language 
(Simons and Fennig 2017) spoken by the Bebelibe (sg. Ubielo), the auto-
ethnonym of those who speak Mbelime. For the purpose of this thesis, with the 
exception of the words “Mbelime”, “Bebelibe” and “Ubielo”,1 I have spelt 
vernacular terms according to the Mbelime orthography (J. Merz et al. 2017). 
Although Mbelime is a tonal language, I have not marked tone, as this would be 
meaningless to most readers. 
One of the more challenging aspects of spoken Mbelime, as well as other 
related languages in the region, is that people use the phones [l], [r] and [ɖ] in 
free variation. Following French convention (French being Benin’s national 
language), /ɛ/ should be written as “è”, but is often written as “e” or even “é”; 
whilst /u/ is written as “ou” or sometimes “u” and /ɔ/ is often written as “ô”. 
Consequently Mbelime, Bebelibe and Ubielo have been spelt in a variety of 
ways in literature (Mbèlimè, Mbélimé, Mbèdimè, Mbèrme; Bèbèlibè, Bèbèdibè; 
Bèbèrbè; Oubièlô, Oubièrô, Oubièdô, for example). Further variations of 
Mbelime, Bebelibe and Ubielo result when people mix different conventions. 
Mbelime vowels are pronounced as follows in English: 
/a/ as [ɑ:] as in “daft” 
/e/ as [eɪ] as in “hey” 
/ɛ/ as [ɛ] as in “bed” 
/i/ as [i:] as in “pea” 
/o/ as [ǝʊ] “go” 
/ɔ/ as [ɒ] in “hot” 
/u/ as [u:] as in “blue” 
                                             
1 When writing in Mbelime, these words are written as Mbɛlimɛ, Bɛbɛlibɛ and Ubiɛlɔ. The 
correct French spelling for these words is: mbèlimè, Bèbèlibè and Oubièlo. Otherwise, when 
writing Mbelime words with nominal class markers, the phoneme /d/ is used for the three 
phones [l], [r] and [ɖ]. The phonemes /l/ and /r/ are used for loan words that have them. 
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Each vowel is articulated, including word-final vowels, so /Bɛbɛlibɛ/ is 
pronounced as [bɛ-bɛ-li-bɛ], for example. 
Some Mbelime vowels can be nasal. Nasalisation is marked with a tilde (~) 
under the vowel concerned: a̰, ɛ̰, ḭ, ɔ̰ and ṵ. 
The Mbelime orthography has sixteen consonants (b, c, d, f, h, k, kp, l, m, n, 
p, r, s, t, w, y). Most are pronounced the same as in English, though /s/ is 
always voiceless as in “sap”, /c/ is used for [t∫] as is “chat” and people either 
pronounce the “k” and “p” of /kp/ simultaneously or as “kw”. When a word starts 
with /m/ (as in Mbɛlimɛ), the /m/ is clearly articulated [m-bɛ-li-mɛ]. See also the 
glossary for a full list of the Mbelime terms that I employ. 
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Introduction 
It was 21 June 2013 and my husband and I were in Cotonou, the economic 
capital of the Republic of Benin, West Africa, when the phone call came through 
to inform us that Emile, who was in his late-thirties, had died the day before. 
Emile was the local baker and café owner in the town of Cobly, northwest 
Benin, where we have lived and worked since 2002. The news of his death 
came as a shock. We had seen him only a few days before and nothing was 
apparently wrong. He was a long-standing friend and well respected in the 
community; or so we thought. Back in Cobly we learnt that he had died from a 
burst aneurism in the brain. Nobody disputed the physiological cause of his 
death, but this did not necessarily explain why he died2: Emile had ordered a 
crocodile (Crocodylus suchus)3 killed in April. As we were in England at the 
time, we only learnt about this several weeks after Emile’s death: 
Roland was over this evening and […] related a recent event involving 
Emile. A crocodile that lived in the small reservoir near Emile’s café 
decided to go for a walk. Emile spotted it in the drainage channel in 
front of his café. He wanted to kill the crocodile so he sent for [a friend] 
who has a rifle. Meanwhile, a teenage lad from the Bɛbidibɛ community 
was extremely upset that Emile wanted to kill the crocodile, so he ran 
into town to try and find some people to help him rescue it. When the 
lad returned, [the rifleman] had already arrived and shot the crocodile. 
The lad was so distraught he burst into tears. Roland said that Emile 
should have known better, especially as the crocodile is one of Emile’s 
wife’s totems4 (Journal entry, 5 September 2013). 
                                             
2 Similar to the Azande of South Sudan, death amongst the Bebelibe has two causes, 
referred to as the “ultimate” and “secondary” cause by Evans-Pritchard (1937:71; see also V. 
Turner 1977:191). The ultimate cause explains why a person died, whilst the secondary cause 
explains how the person died. As I have noted elsewhere (2014:99-101), Bebelibe burial 
ceremonies include interrogating the corpse and consulting diviners to establish the ultimate 
cause of death. 
3 The West African or Desert crocodile. 
4 Emile’s wife is from the Bɛkɔpɛ community, which has an alliance with the Bɛbidibɛ 
community (see below). Out of respect for the alliance, crocodiles are one of the Bɛkɔpɛ’s tikete 
(totems or, more precisely, “interdicts”). They also have their own tikedimɔmɔnte (true totems, 
literally “interdicts-true”), see below, Chapter Seven and Bebelibe Communities in the 
Appendices. 
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We learnt more details about what happened a couple of days later from 
Robert, an NGO worker in his late-thirties, who explained that it had been a 
huge scandal at the time. The Bɛbidibɛ community wanted Emile to provide 
them with a dog for sacrifice, so that the crocodile would not take revenge. 
Emile refused saying that he could not do such a thing as a Christian. Robert 
explained that the crocodile had probably decided to go and visit his family (the 
Bɛbidibɛ) and, as far as Robert was aware, did not threaten Emile in any way. 
We also learnt that the rifleman’s son had died shortly afterwards and that his 
death too is thought to be a direct consequence of his father shooting the 
crocodile. 
Fortes, speaking about the Tallensi of northern Ghana, explained that 
[w]e have seen that killing certain game animals is construed as 
murder. It is more heinously so if the victim is a totem animal; for the 
totem animals are assimilated to a quasi-human status. In Voltaic 
culture, this is equivalent to a quasi-kinship relationship – a sort of 
kinship symbiosis – with the lineages to which they appertain (1966:15). 
Fortes’ observations about the Tallensi resonate strongly with what I have 
observed in the Commune of Cobly, where the predominant language is 
Mbelime. Mbelime speakers are collectively known as the Bebelibe (sg. Ubielo), 
and are related linguistically to the Tallensi.5 
In this thesis I explore human-animal relations amongst the Bebelibe with a 
focus on how they relate to their tikedimɔmɔnte (true totem(s), literally 
“interdict(s)-true”). I start with an historical review of totemism, the debates it 
generated and how these contributed to the recent ontological turn. I then 
explore the theoretical ideas I use for my analysis, which include “presencing” 
and the “ontological penumbra” (see also J. Merz 2017b; J. Merz and S. Merz 
2017). Presencing builds on Peircean semiotics and explains how people make 
meaning present through their engagement in and with the world around them. 
                                             
5 The Tallensi speak Farefare, which is also a Gur or Voltaic language (Simons and Fennig 
2017, see linguistic note above). 
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Ontological penumbras, meanwhile, are the shadowy spaces where people find 
themselves in limbo, which they need to negotiate as part of making sense of 
their engagement with the world. I also examine the “onton”, as introduced by J. 
Merz (2017b), which is core to these theoretical frameworks. Ontons are 
experiential, agentive and relational entities that are the result of presencing 
processes. Ontons, however, cannot be divided into representations (signifiers) 
and represented (signified) as signs can. An engagement in the world between 
different entities in an ontonic and thus nonrepresentational sense necessitates 
my introducing further notions including shared “ontonity” (instead of shared 
humanity) and “ontonhood” (rather than personhood). I demonstrate how these 
theoretical ideas work with reference to human-animal relations primarily 
amongst the Bebelibe, and more broadly by drawing on examples from the 
wider region and beyond. 
Emile’s story, together with several other incidents involving Christians and 
their tikedimɔmɔnte, illustrates how violating a society’s moral norms can reveal 
the moral character of its institutions (C. Smith 2003:25). Thus, with this in mind, 
I also examine Christianity’s impact on human-animal and totemic relations in 
Bebelibe society. 
Background 
There are 24 Mbelime-speaking communities (abuotɛ, sg. dibotide) in the 
Communes of Cobly and Boukombé, Atacora Department, in the northwest of 
the Republic of Benin (see Maps 1-3). Locally, people often refer to these 
communities as les ethnies (ethnic groups) in French. Some of my French-
speaking interviewees explained that this is because many of the Bebelibe 
communities have their origins elsewhere. This means that the Bebelibe do not 
share a common ancestor and each community has its own set of origin stories, 
totems and founding ancestors. Neither do I consider communities to be clans, 
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as several unrelated families or lineages can comprise one community. 
Consequently, a community can also have more than one origin story, totem 
entity and founding ancestor. This community assimilation is a result of 
historical movements, as different groups and families either sought refuge in 
the mountainous area of today’s Atacora region as they fled oppressors or 
slave traders, for example, or because they were the protagonists of family 
disputes. Those who left their original communities and integrated into Bebelibe 
ones then took on the totem entities of their adoptive community, whilst also 
maintaining their own totem entities.6 
Many Bebelibe live in loose-knit villages mostly in the Commune of Cobly, 
with additional villages in the neighbouring Commune of Boukombé and across 
the border in Togo. Their neighbouring groups (see Map 3) are the 
Gourmantché (northwest), Berba (northeast), Natemba and Kuntemba (east), 
Betammaribe (southeast), Lamba (southwest) and the Gangam (west). There is 
a complex relational network between these neighbouring groups and the 
different Bebelibe communities and families, as several have their ancestral 
roots with the groups concerned and there are numerous alliances – such as 
marriage, land and defence – between the different groups (see Carte 3, J. 
Merz 2017a:14).  
Before colonisation, the Bebelibe had a non-centralised social structure, 
which some early colonial observers characterized as “anarchic” (Cornevin 
1981:36; Grätz 2000:682; Koussey 1977:10; N’Tia 1993:107, 113 & 116). N’Tia, 
however, considered them to be “eminently democratic” (1993:117, translation 
mine) as the social structure was founded on respect towards community elders 
and priests. These men discuss and decide how best to resolve community 
                                             
6 For more details see Huber (1969:260), J. Merz (2017a:10-15), S. Merz (2014:3-6), 
E.N.K. Sambiéni (1999:44-45), and N.B. Sambiéni and R. Sambiéni (2016). See also Mercier’s 
(1968) and Sewane’s (2002:211-213) observations for the Betammaribe and their kubwoti, the 
Betammaribe equivalent of dibotide, and Evans-Pritchard (1961), who reported a similar 
situation for the Zande of Sudan, who describe their clans as conglomerates. 
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issues. Before reaching a decision, they seek advice as needed from diviners 
and the different parties involved, including those of the less-visible parts of the 
world such as the bɛhidibɛ (ancestors, literally “the dead”, sg. uhiidɔ)7 and 
certain stones and rocks (ataadɛ, sg. ditade) who are shrine entities8.  
In the 1910s the French seized the Atacora region and started to integrate it 
into the colony of Dahomey. In 1913, for example, French administrators 
decreed that each village should have a chief (Mercier 1968:434). Dahomey 
gained independence in 1960 and was subsequently renamed as the 
République du Dahomey, then the République Populaire du Bénin during the 
Marxist-Leninist regime of president Mathieu Kérékou. Today, each village 
elects its own chief as a representative of the democratic nation state and 
liaison between the village community and local authorities. Despite changes in 
the political structure, the underlying non-centralised social structure still 
prevails. An egalitarian ethos is an important social principle, though there is 
some hierarchy resulting from respect for elders (see also Morris 1998:26-27). 
Accordingly, community elders and priests are still responsible for ritual matters 
and minor questions of jurisdiction and more general decision-making continues 
to be discussion-based. Women have their say, and are listened to, even if the 
society is patriarchal. 
All of the Bebelibe I know testify that Uwienu (God) is the Supreme Being 
and creator of all, regardless of their religious orientation. Those who speak 
French employ the word Dieu (God) when referring to Uwienu, whom they 
consider male. The majority of the population continue to follow the path of their 
ancestors, and paying homage to Uwienu via his intermediaries is an integral 
part of life for many people. Despite this, there is a significant Christian minority, 
even though Christianity only became established in the area in recent 
                                             
7 Bɛhidibɛ is also the term for corpses. People normally refer to the shrine in the plural and 
the corpse in the singular in order to distinguish the two. 
8 The general term for shrines and shrine entities is atenwiɛnɛ (sg. ditenwɛnde). 
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decades. The first Catholic missionaries arrived in the Commune in the late 
1940s, whereas the first Assemblies of God missionaries arrived in the early 
1950s (Akibo 1998; Cornevin 1981:436, 440-441, 453–454), whilst other 
evangelical and Pentecostal missionaries started to establish their respective 
denominations from the 1990s onwards. Although Ogouby (2008:54-55) claims 
that Christianity has increased from 10.6% in 1992 to 24% in 2002 in the 
Atacora and Donga regions, my observations suggest that regular church 
attendance in the Commune of Cobly is lower. Although there are signs that 
Islam is gaining ground in the Commune, and new mosques are being built, it 
remains marginal. 
People distinguish two eras: ubaayɔ (pre-colonial times, literally “ancestor-
past”) and upaanu (colonial and post-colonial times to the present day). Upaanu 
(literally “newness”) is translated as la modernité (modernity) in French and is 
also used when referring to all things new. Accordingly, new institutions – such 
as churches, Western-style healthcare and education system – are strongly 
associated with becoming modern. Since my arrival in 2002, I have witnessed 
the introduction of a number of new things including motorbikes, mobile phones, 
electricity and tractors, all of which have impacted husbandry practices (see 
Ploughing-Cattle, Chapter Four and Commodification, Chapter Five). 
With a local population of around 72,0009, the Bebelibe are largely rural and 
many rely on subsistence farming and cotton growing for their livelihood. The 
staple foods are white yams (Dioscorea rotundata), rice (Oryza spp.10), maize 
(Zea mays spp.), pearl millet (Pennisetum glaucum) and sorghum (Sorghum 
bicolor). Maize, millet and sorghum flour is used to prepare stiff cornmeal 
porridge, called pâte in French. People break off pieces of the porridge, which 
                                             
9 Estimated figure for 2017, assuming an average annual growth rate of 3.42% based on 
the census data between 2002 and 2013 and other data (Tchegnon and Guidibi 2006a:15; 
2006b:15, 17; Gblem-Poidi and Kantchoa 2012:259; INSAE 2015:13). Figure does not include 
diaspora. 
10 Exact species not known. 
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they manipulate into balls and dip into an accompanying sauce. The most 
important beverage is sorghum beer, which women brew for family and 
community celebrations, ceremonies and work parties11, and to sell at the local 
markets, in taverns and during special events. 
Other crops include black-eyed beans (Vigna unguiculata unguiculata), 
soya beans (Glycine max), bambara groundnuts (Vigna subterranea) and 
cotton (Gossypium spp.), which people grow as a cash crop. Besides cotton, 
people also sell their surplus crops at the local markets. More recently, soya 
beans have become especially important because health centres, development 
agencies and schools have been promoting their health benefits and teaching 
different ways of using them, including soya milk and cheese production. 
Women started to produce and market soya cheese in Cobly in 2004. Called 
soya naabesikanka̰nde12 or fromage de soja in French, soya cheese is made 
from curdled soya milk and is proving extremely popular, especially as it is 
cheap at only 200-250 CFA francs (approximately 30p)13 a cheese. The 
equivalent amount of meat would cost around 2,000-2,500 CFA francs. People 
now readily eat it as a meat substitute (see Commodification, Chapter Five). 
People also have diseede wante (family animals). Diseede (pl. asie) has the 
double meaning of “family” and “homestead”14, as the buildings constitute the 
material presence of the family unit, which includes the bɛhidibɛ (the dead). The 
Bebelibe are patrilineal and largely patrilocal. Normally, when the elder sons 
marry, they construct their diseede in the vicinity of their parents, whilst the 
youngest son inherits his father’s diseede (see S. Merz 2014:6-7, 17-18, for 
                                             
11 Called invitations in French, this is when someone invites others to form a work party to 
accomplish labour-intensive activities such as ploughing by hand, hoeing, harvesting and 
threshing. 
12 Cheese, literally “cow-milk-curdle”. 
13 All pound sterling amounts here and below based on exchange rate at the time of 
writing. 
14 In Africa a homestead is the group of buildings occupied by a single family. In West 
Africa, this is often called a compound in English (in Ghana, for example) or a concession in 
French. 
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more details). These homesteads are collectively called the diseduɔde (literally 
“family-big”). Most homesteads have a round vestibule hut next to the entrance 
in the west-facing wall that encloses the courtyard (see Homestead Sketches in 
the Appendices). The father’s diseede vestibule is called ukoohṵ 15 (literally 
“lineage”) and houses the bɛhidibɛ (the dead). Other entities – such as the 
siyawesi bush beings (see S. Merz 2017a) – reside in this room as well. This is 
also where people keep their ritual items and hunters put the horns and skulls 
of the animals they have killed (see Hunting, Chapter Four). Finally, this is 
where women keep their beer-brewing equipment. They also mash their 
sorghum beer here during the rainy season, otherwise they do this outside in 
other seasons. They then ferment and store it in the vestibule.  
People also call the vestibule dinaacuude (cow room). As the vestibule is 
too small for cows, this is probably a euphemistic term. Nevertheless, the 
vestibule does serve as a shelter for other diseede wante (family animals). 
Diseede wante typically include shorthorn cattle (Bos brachyceros), sheep (Ovis 
spp.), West African dwarf or pygmy goats (Capra aegagrus hircus), dogs (Canis 
spp.), chickens (Gallus gallus domesticus) and helmeted guineafowl (Numida 
meleagris), all of which can be sacrificed. People also have cats (Felis spp.), 
pigs (Scrufus spp.) and domestic Muscovy ducks (Cairina moschata 
domestica). Pigs and ducks have been introduced more recently (in people’s 
living memory). Some people have started to keep donkeys (Equus africanus 
asinus) since 2010. 
People used to keep horses (Equus ferus caballus spp.) in pre-colonial 
times. As raiders also had horses it was not always evident if approaching 
horsemen were friends or foes. People then decided to stop keeping and using 
them. That way, if someone came on horseback they knew he was a stranger 
and to be on the alert in case he had bad intentions. They also solicited the help 
                                             
15 Also called ukoyaahṵ (lineage-male), especially by the younger generation. 
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of the ataadɛ shrine entities by asking them to make sure that horses no longer 
bred successfully. This request has never been reversed, which is why horses 
are rarely seen today in the Commune of Cobly (see J. Merz 2017a:17). 
A few people have ventured into commercial farming by intentionally 
breeding poultry, goats and pigs for marketing as meat (see Commodification, 
Chapter Five). As yet there is no mechanised or industrialised farming as found 
in more industrialised nations. 
Totem animals are also considered family members. Those whose totem 
animal is the African rock python (Python sebae), for example, distinguish 
diseede sɛfɛ16 (family python) or diseede wɛfɛ (family python-that’s-mine)17 from 
fɛsɛfɛ (pl. isiɛ, snake/python), their wild counterpart. Those whose totem animal 
is the crocodile, meanwhile, distinguish between imuɔhḭ (sg. fɛmuɔfɛ, wild 
crocodiles) and ibodimuɔhḭ (sg. fɛbodimuɔfɛ,18 animating force-crocodiles). 
“Crocodiles,” Benjamin, a churchgoing university graduate in his late-twenties, 
told me, “are the souls19 of the community” (see Chapters Six and Seven). 
Each community has its myths about how the relationship between their 
founding ancestor(s) and totem animals was established (see Chapter Seven). 
Although I was aware of these myths and totems, it was only after Emile died 
that I realised how seriously people take their relationships with their totems. 
Emile’s story is not an isolated incident. Other events, which I explore further 
below, include an ongoing dispute between two allied communities and how 
they view and exploit their relationship with crocodiles, and a scandal from the 
1960s when newly-converted Christians started killing their community’s 
crocodiles. Such events further demonstrate how important totemic 
relationships are and the resulting consequences when they are challenged.  
                                             
16 Fɛsɛfɛ is also the general term for “snake”, but refers to pythons in this context. 
17 Literally “family mine-snake”. Compound noun of wɛ̰nnɛ (mine) and fɛsɛfɛ (snake). 
18 Compound noun of fɛmuɔfɛ (crocodile) and kɛbodikɛ (pl. sibosi, animating force). 
19 Interview in French. Benjamin regularly translates kɛbodikɛ as soul(s). 
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Totemism 
Despite Lévi-Strauss’s (1964 [1962]) attempt to deconstruct and invalidate 
totemism – or maybe because of it – scholars continue to examine, debate and 
employ totemism in their writing and analysis, whether this is on an ontological, 
cosmological, philosophical or more general level (for example, Borneman 
1988; Fortes 1966; Forth 2009; Hiatt 1969; Jones 2005; Morphy 1990; Morton 
1987; Pedersen 2001; Rosa 2003; Sapir 1977; T. Turner 1985; von 
Brandenstein 1972; Willerslev and Ulturgasheva 2012; Willis 1990). Thus, 
totemism lives on in both academic thought and popular thought in Benin and 
the wider region. Lévi-Strauss’s maxim – that natural species are not only good 
to eat but also “good to think” with (1964 [1962]:89) – was further added to by 
Fortes who stated that animals are also “good to forbid” (or, according to 
Tambiah (1969:423), “good to prohibit”) as “they lend themselves to moral 
constraint” given that they are “good to eat” and are therefore also “good to kill” 
(Fortes 1966:18). According to Kirksey and Helmreich animals are “entities, and 
agents, ‘to live with’” (2010:552). If these maxims are taken to their limit, it could 
be said that totemism itself continues to be good to think with. Alluding to 
relationships between totem entities, living kin, ancestors and the death cycle, 
which are needed to ensure social continuity, Morton, for example, suggests 
that “[t]otemism represents nature as an externalisation, even unto death, of 
man’s20 inner being” (1987:467). Borneman (1988), meanwhile, analyses 
ethnicity, race and identity by applying what he calls “reverse totemism”. He 
starts with the premise that totemic groups draw on their understanding and 
imagery of the totem entities they engage with in order to represent, classify 
and explicate their identity and social structure. Borneman then reverses this by 
                                             
20 As language use and attitudes often reflect scholars’ thinking and background at the time 
of writing, I do not add [sic] after vocabulary that would now be considered inappropriate and 
even offensive (see Chapter One). 
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demonstrating that people of the horseracing world use human imagery in order 
to represent, explain and classify horse breeds and how people relate to them. 
Dupire (1991) and Forth (2009) then illustrate the dynamic nature of totemism 
by demonstrating how history, politics and social change can impact how a 
given group defines and engages with totemic beings. As Forth states, “there 
are still new things to be learned about totemistic symbolism” (2009:263). 
The development of sub-disciplines, such as anthrozoology and 
multispecies ethnography, have their roots in classic anthropological studies in 
totemism, taboo and classification (Kirksey and Helmreich 2010:550; Hurn 
2017:2-4). Many anthropologists (both past and present) base their analysis of 
totemism, and other related -isms such as animism and perspectivism, on 
semiotics and thus interpret the resulting human-animal relationships in terms of 
what they represent for those concerned. Mullin, for example, notes that recent 
studies assert “the importance of exploring the linkages between semiotic and 
economic aspects of human-animal relationships” (2002:390; see also 
Hornborg 2006; Kohn 2007; 2013). Hurn points out, however, that if academic 
engagements with totemism are limited to a symbolic interpretation, they fail to 
“take into account the complexity of human interactions with, and perceptions 
of, nonhuman ‘persons’, and, more importantly, undermine[s] the views of the 
people themselves” (2012:76). She continues by suggesting that such an 
approach is “a form of anthropomorphic ethnocentrism” (2012:76). I thereby 
question whether semiotics adequately addresses totemism amongst the 
Bebelibe and human-animal relations more generally, or explain, as Kohn 
suggests, “transspecies intersubjectivity” (2007). 
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Overview 
Tapper points out that anthropologists should seek to understand “where 
different societies locate their humanity” (1988:49). Along the same line, Vilaça 
states that “humanity is not restricted to what we conceive as human beings: 
animals and spirits may also be human, which means that humanity is above all 
a position to be continually defined ” (2005:448, emphasis mine; see also Morris 
2000:6-8). Kirksey and Helmreich (2010:565) point out that humans have never 
been only human. Humanity is embedded in multispecies relationships (Morris 
2000:8). Morris adds that “both humanity and personhood can only be 
understood in terms of a dialectical relationship with animals” (2000:42). By re-
examining totemism in light of the ontological turn, I explore and question the 
notions of personhood and humanity and propose that multispecies 
relationships can be better understood in terms of what I call “ontonhood” and 
“ontonity” (see Chapters Two, Three and Eight). I do this by taking two 
examples from Bebelibe totemism – the West African or Desert crocodile 
(fɛmuɔfɛ, pl. imuɔhḭ ) and the African rock python (usɔkpɛnhṵ, pl. tisɔkpɛnte 21) – 
and investigating how people relate to these animals. I also present and draw 
on four case studies (see Chapters Seven and Eight). The first concerns how 
two allied Bebelibe communities, the Bɛbidibɛ and the Bɛkɔpɛ, view and exploit 
their relationships with crocodiles. These two communities are currently 
engaged in a dispute over which of them are the original inhabitants of Cobly 
and therefore have more authority in the Commune. The crocodile – which is 
the totem for the Bɛbidibɛ – forms part of the dispute (see Chapter Seven). The 
second case study presents in detail what happened with Emile the baker. The 
third case is about Arthur who killed and ate several of his community’s totem 
                                             
21 Also called fɛsɔkpɛnfɛ (pl. isɔkpiɛni ), fɛtɛnponfɛ, (pl. itɛnpuoni ) and more generally fɛsɛfɛ 
(pl. isiɛ, snake). 
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crocodiles when he became a Christian. Finally, in the fourth case study, I 
examine how Robert relates to his totem python and how this has changed 
since he became a Christian. I thereby examine how Christianity in particular 
influences individuals’ subjectivity and their interactions with animals and the 
world around them more generally. 
Apart from their totemic relations, crocodiles and pythons illustrate how 
multispecies relationships are important more generally. The crocodile and the 
python are the commonest totemic animals in the area and are consequently 
highly regarded by virtually all Bebelibe, even by those who do not have either 
one as their totem. Some of the Bebelibe shrine entities, such as the community 
guardian shrines (ataadɛ, sg. ditade) and fertility shrines (anitokitaadɛ, sg. 
dinitokitade), manifest themselves as pythons, for example, when they want to 
engage with someone. They may do this following the death of the community 
shrine priest (uyuɔsɔ kpiɛmɔ 22), in order to alert the person whom they have 
chosen as the new priest. Meanwhile, crocodiles like to attend parties, go to 
market and pose as ferrymen, for example, and will shapeshift23 to humans so 
that they can pursue these activities. Shapeshifting is not limited to crocodiles 
though. Several Mbelime-speaking communities are renowned for their ability to 
shapeshift between their human and totem animal form. 
Finally, interest in totemism, and human-animal relations in general, 
diminished for several decades in anthropology as “many cultural 
anthropologists worked to denaturalize intrahuman differences” (Kirksey and 
Helmreich 2010:550). Morris too critiqued postmodern anthropologists’ 
“mistaken impression” that “animals are just not worth bothering about as they 
                                             
22 Literally “person-who-fixes big”. Other names for the community shrine priests are 
usɔbaanɔ (python guard), usɔcudɔ (person who throws sorghum paste at the python) and 
usɔha̰dɔ (person who sits on the python). See Glossary. 
23 My findings indicate that “body-shifting” better describes what actually happens. For the 
time being I have maintained the word “shapeshifting” (and derivatives). I examine this 
phenomenon in Chapter Six. 
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are a ‘topic of marginal interest’ (as one scholar put it) to anthropologists” 
(2000:1). Viveiros de Castro’s seminal work on perspectivism (1998), coupled 
with his ontological stance, which culminated in the ontological turn (Holbraad 
and Pedersen 2017), has been crucial to reviving the study of human-animal 
relationships, as various scholars such as Candea (2013), Hornborg (2006), 
Hurn (2012), Kohn (2007; 2013), Russell (2010), Viveiros de Castro (2004) and 
Vilaça (2005), seek to understand how different people perceive their existence 
and relationships with the world around them.  
In order to understand these complex issues, I apply the idea of 
“presencing” initially developed by my husband, Johannes Merz (2014; 2017b). 
Presencing, in a nutshell, goes beyond the semiotic process of meaning making 
by accounting for how individuals “make present” and engage in and with the 
world around them (see Chapter Three). Presencing necessitates the 
introduction of the “onton”. Ontons are experiential, agentive and relational 
entities that cannot be divided into representations (signifiers) and represented 
(signified) as signs can (J. Merz 2017b). My aim is to apply and test the notions 
of presencing and the onton to human-animal relations and therefore verify their 
validity and applicability more generally, whilst further refining their theoretical 
implications (see Chapters Two, Three and Eight). In order to do this, I also 
provide an in-depth, “thick description” (Geertz 1973) ethnography that explores 
human-animal relations in the Commune of Cobly. I present my insights into 
how people perceive and relate to animals through hunting, domestication, 
attitudes to eating meat, animal commodification, reincarnation, shapeshifting 
and totemism (Chapters Four to Seven). As far as I know, no other work of this 
kind currently exists for the region. The closest works of a similar nature are 
Brian Morris’ books The Power of Animals (1998) and Animals and Ancestors 
(2000), which explore human-animal relations in Malawi, and Schott’s 
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(1973/1974) comprehensive article on wild and domestic animals for the Bulsa 
of northern Ghana. 
As an anthropologist working amongst the Bebelibe, my engagement with 
the community sometimes involves negotiating spaces of cultural limbo that 
affect my whole being, which J. Merz and I (2017) call ontological penumbras. I 
apply and further refine our theoretical concept of ontological penumbras in 
Chapter Two, where I also present my research from a reflexive stance. Before 
doing so, I start by giving an historical review of totemism, the debates it 
generated and how these contributed to the ontological turn. 
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Chapter One 
An Historical Review of Totemism 
The word ‘totem’ comes from the word ‘ototeman’, meaning ‘he is of my 
family’, in Ojibwa […], and it was first used by J. Lang [sic] in 1791 to 
describe the relationship existing in a society between a set of animals 
(or plants) and a human group (Gaillard 2004:17, emphasis mine; see 
also Frazer 1887:1-2; Hodge 1910:787-788). 
According to Frazer (1887:1), John Long was the first to write about totems 
(spelt “totam”).24 In Voyages and Travels of an Indian Interpreter and Trader, 
Long noted: 
One part of the religious superstition of the Savages, consists in each of 
them having his totam, or favourite spirit, which he believes watches 
over him. This totam they conceive assumes the shape of some beast 
or other, and therefore they never kill, hunt, or eat the animal whose 
form they think this totam bears (1791:86). 
Long (1791:86-87) then recounted how a Chippeway (Ojibwa) dreamt about 
where to go hunting. He set off for the place and found the large herd of 
animals, as seen in the dream. The Chippeway – whose totem was a bear – 
fired into the herd and killed a bear by accident. Another bear then attacked him 
as he returned to Long’s house. He had to seek the bear’s pardon, who 
instructed him what to do to gain forgiveness. The Chippeway then lamented to 
Long that he would never hunt again. Long then referred to the Chippeway’s 
lament about his destiny never to hunt again as “totamism” (1791:87). 
In this chapter I summarise the rise, fall and re-emergence of totemism – at 
least as far as anthropology is concerned – given that totemic relationships, as 
defined by Gaillard (2004:17) have never actually disappeared. I review some 
of the key literature about totemism, starting with totemism’s anthropological 
origins and working through to contemporary ideas, the theoretical frameworks 
                                             
24 See Bleakley (2000:130), who affirms that it was Long who introduced the word into the 
English language. Lescarbot, however, introduced it into the French language already in 1609. 
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involved, questions arising from this diverse scholarship and how these 
contributed to the recent ontological turn in anthropology. 
Herbert Spencer, a philosopher, is generally recognised as the founder of 
social evolution or “Social Darwinism” (Eriksen 2001:84), which, simply put, 
posited that societies evolved along a continuum from primitive to modern via 
animism, polytheism, monotheism, atheism and secularism (see, for example, 
Ellis 1965 [1890]:13-30). Spencer’s ideas about evolution were adopted by 
many academic disciplines including anthropology. Accordingly, many of the 
early anthropologists and scholars who engaged in the totemism debate, 
analysed their data and hypothesised in evolutionary terms. In his introduction 
to L’âge d’or du totémisme, Frederico Rosa points out that it is inevitable that 
society and ideology influence scholarly discourse. He adds that 
the fact that Edwardians were Edwardians is not sufficient reason to 
minimise the internal coherence of their anthropological theory and 
system due to their external influences. To not take [these scholars] 
seriously because their ideas were the fruit of a revolutionary age is 
probably the most pernicious power game between presentism and 
historicism (2003:5, translation mine; see also Jones 2005:1-7; Stringer 
1999). 
Not surprisingly, these scholars’ language and attitudes also reflected their 
evolutionary thinking and the historical context of their time. Consequently, in 
today’s climate, they come over as racist, sexist and offensive, and their 
vocabulary derogatory. With hindsight, it is easy to critique their ideas and 
vocabulary, and I acknowledge – together with other scholars – that the 
theories stemming from social evolution are problematic. This does not mean 
that these early scholars’ rationales should be totally dismissed, however. 
Referring to Victorian anthropology and its postcolonial critique, Robert Alun 
Jones notes: 
But if I am thus abundantly aware that there are many things that are 
‘problematic’ in the works of these writers, I have been less concerned 
to point out why they were wrong than to describe why they thought 
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they were right. […] as a historian, I’ve tried to see these writers as 
answering their own questions rather than ours and to see their beliefs 
as reasonable in a way that we might now consider irrational (2005:6-
7). 
In a similar vein to Jones, and like Rosa (2003:5), I intend to present a general 
outline of the debate. I do so by focusing on the aspects that are relevant for the 
totemic situation in the Commune of Cobly. 
Evolutionism and Early Views: From Lubbock to Durkheim 
In 1867 John Lubbock, a banker and scholar, proposed an evolutionary 
trajectory of religion that started with belief in mysterious beings, then passed 
through various stages to culminate in higher forms of religion (Jones 2005:42-
43). In 1870 Lubbock further defended his position and further refined and 
defined these stages by suggesting that the first stage is atheism, which he 
understood as an “absence of any definite ideas” about a “Deity” (1870:119). 
This was followed by fetishism where “man supposes he can force the Deity to 
comply with his desires” (1870:119); totemism, the worship of natural objects; 
shamanism, where deities are distant, different from and more powerful than 
humans, so only shamans can access them; idolatry and anthropomorphism, 
where deities become more human-like, as they retain their power, but are open 
to persuasion. With idolatry, the deities are “part of nature, and not creators. 
They are represented by images or idols” (1870:119). In the final stages of 
religious evolution, which Lubbock does not name, “the Deity is regarded as the 
author, not merely a part of nature. He becomes for the first time a really 
supernatural being [and] morality is associated with religion” (1870:119). 
It is generally acknowledged, however, that it was John Ferguson 
McLennan (see 1869a; b; 1870), a Scottish solicitor who was keenly interested 
in anthropology, who first wrote about totemism as an early form of religion 
(Durkheim 1915:88; van Gennep 1917a:295; Rosa 2003:11). According to 
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Jones, McLennan “provided the first genuinely evolutionary theory of social 
organization and laid the foundation for the first evolutionary theory of totemism 
[…]” (2005:7). 
Although McLennan did not posit totemism as such in his book, Primitive 
Marriage (1865), totemic relationships helped to inform his analysis and 
resulting hypothesis about endogamy and exogamy (Rivière 1970:37-38; Jones 
2005). McLennan’s one-time use of the word “totem” in this work came from a 
letter he received from Lewis Henry Morgan (1865:22, see also footnote, 22-
24). According to Rivière, “McLennan first saw the potential importance of 
totemism as a stage through which all societies have passed in their evolution” 
(1970:xvii; see also Jones 2005:45) in his article Kinship in Ancient Greece, 
originally published in 1866. Here, McLennan asked: 
Is it at all possible that, most anciently, there were among the Greeks 
tribes with totems, – Bull, Boar, and Lion tribes; Snake, Ant, and Dragon 
tribes? […] It might be worth the while of some one with leisure to see 
how the facts bearing on this question would look when collected and 
marshalled. There are dozens of existing races, some of them 
comparatively advanced, whose tribes are thus named. Why may it not 
have been so among the ancient Greeks? (1886:227-228, fn 1). 
McLennan then wrote about totems for the first edition of Chamber's 
Encyclopaedia in 1868 (Rivière 1970:xvii), before developing his ideas in more 
detail in a series of three articles on The Worship of Animals and Plants in the 
Fortnightly review (1869a; b; 1870). McLennan proposed that 
[f]etichism thus resembles Totemism; which, indeed, is Fetichism plus 
certain peculiarities. These peculiarities are, (1) the appropriation of a 
special Fetich to the tribe, (2) its hereditary transmission through 
mothers, and (3) its connection with the jus connubii [in this case, 
exogamy]. Our own belief is that the accompaniments of Fetichism 
have not been well observed, and that it will yet be found that in many 
cases the Fetich is the Totem (1869a:422-423, emphasis in original). 
McLennan concluded: 
We have found in numerous cases what seems good evidence that 
from the earliest times animals were worshipped by tribes of men who 
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were named after them, and believed to be of their breed. We have 
seen in several cases the oldest anthropomorphic gods having titles 
derived from the animals, or believed to be of their breed, or to have 
been fostered by them; and the conclusion seems to be forced upon us 
that these gods were preceded by the animals as Totems […] 
(1870:214). 
[And that] since the whole of the facts we have been surveying 
demonstrate a progress in religious speculation from savage fetichism; 
and since among the lowest races of men we find no such gods figuring 
as Zeus and his companions, we seem already, at this stage of the 
argument, to be justified in arriving at the conclusion that the ancient 
nations came through the Totem stage, and that Totemism was the 
foundation of their mythologies (1870:216). 
Thus, the anthropological notion of totemism as an early form of religion was 
born. Others then applied and developed further McLennan’s ideas. 
In his 1880 essay Animal Worship and Animal Tribes among the Arabs and 
in the Old Testament, followed by Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia, 
originally published in 1885, William Robertson Smith, a Scottish theologian and 
good friend and disciple of McLennan (Rivière 1970:xlii; Jones 2005:67), was 
one of the first to take up the theme of totemism (W.R. Smith 1912 [1880]:455-
483; 1907 [1885]:215-281; Jones 2005:73). He affirmed that McLennan was the 
creator of totemism (1907 [1885]:217) and that 
[t]he advantage of J. F. McLennan’s totem hypothesis over all previous 
theories of primitive heathenism is that it does justice to the intimate 
relation between religion and the fundamental structure of society which 
is so characteristic of the ancient world, and that the truth of the 
hypothesis can be tested by observation of the social organisation as 
well as the religious beliefs and practices of early races (1907 
[1885]:258-259). 
Smith (1912 [1880]:455-483; 1907 [1885]:217-251) rearticulated, applied and 
developed McLennan’s ideas, before presenting his analysis, which he believed 
demonstrated the historical existence of totemism in early Arabia and amongst 
the ancient Israelites. Smith’s treatment of totemism was such that Rivière 
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proposed that he “served to make many of McLennan’s ideas respectable” 
(1970:xlii; see also Rosa 2003:68-73; Jones 2005:73-81). 
According to Rosa (2003:323), it was because Smith raised totemism’s 
profile that James George Frazer decided to investigate the phenomenon. 
Jones (2005:82-83) adds that it was Smith who commissioned Frazer in 1887 to 
write about totemism for the next volume of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. His 
contribution, however, grew to such proportions that it was published instead as 
the book Totemism, where Frazer further promoted totemism’s place in a socio-
religious evolutionary trajectory. He also noted: 
Since the late J. F. McLennan first pointed out the importance of 
Totemism for the early history of society, various writers have treated of 
the subject and added to his materials, but no one, I believe, has tried 
to collect and classify all the main facts, so far as they are at present 
known (1887:vi). 
Frazer then endeavoured to do this by presenting an extremely detailed treatise 
of totems and totemism by making a statement, then providing a catalogue of 
examples, as he documented information he had gathered from various people 
all around the world. 
Unlike McLennan, Frazer distinguished totems from fetishes, given that “a 
totem is never an isolated individual, but always a class of objects, generally a 
species of animals or of plants” (1887:2). Rosa (2003:11-36), however, 
suggests that Frazer, amongst others, misunderstood McLennan’s notion of 
fetishism and Tylor’s theory of animism (see below) more generally. Rosa 
postulates that McLennan employed the term “fetishism” to “describe the 
animation of natural objects, representing a tradition that dates back to the 18th 
century” (2003:29, translation mine). He (2003:29-30) adds that this use of 
fetishism was then superseded by animism following Tylor. For McLennan, 
therefore, “totemism constituted a stage of animism, a type of cult of animals 
and plants based on matrilineal and exogamic clan organisation” (2003:30, 
36 
 
 
translation mine). Rosa (2003:33-35) then proposes that it was the separation 
of totemism from animism, which culminated in Frazer’s book Totemism, which 
really initiated the totemism debate. 
Wondering about how totemism originated, Frazer speculated that the 
religious and social aspects 
were originally inseparable […] the farther we go back, the more we 
should find that the clansman regards himself and his totem as beings 
of the same species, and the less he distinguishes between conduct 
towards his totem and towards his fellow-clansmen. For the sake of 
exposition, however, it is convenient to separate the two (1887:3). 
Even “for the sake of exposition”, it is not evident why Frazer thought it 
“convenient” or even necessary to separate totemism into these two aspects. 
By doing so, he reduces totemic relationships to a form of proto-religious 
worship, rather than recognising the respect and behaviour that results from the 
social norms of relating to fellow kin. Grounded in the Spencerian thinking of his 
time, Frazer (1887:2-49, 57-81) then differentiated how people related to their 
totem entities versus how they related to each other by claiming that the former 
was religious in nature, whereas the latter was social. Frazer then analysed how 
totemic relationships changed as descent groups divided (1887:87-90), before 
proposing that when 
one individual of the totem species is, as elder brother, guardian spirit, 
or what not, raised to a position of superiority over all the rest, totemism 
is practically given up, and religion, like society, is advancing to the 
monarchical stage (1887:90). 
He added that as a society’s social structure changed “totemism as a religion 
tends to pass into the worship first of animal gods and next of anthropomorphic 
gods with animal attributes” (1887:90). 
Others too tried to account for both the social and religious aspects of 
totemism. This is not to deny that some groups considered the ceremonial 
features of their totemic practices extremely important, as Walter Baldwin 
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Spencer and Francis James Gillen (2003 [1899]) demonstrated with the 
Intichiuma ceremony of the Arunta of Central Australia, for example. To what 
extent, however, should such ceremonies be separated from the social life of 
the people concerned, and are they evidence of religious evolution? Spencer 
and Gillen postulated for the Arunta that it is “quite possible that the original 
aspect of the totem is simply a religious or magical one, and that the social 
aspect has been, as it were, tacked on at a later period” (1899:276). 
Strongly influenced by Spencer and Gillen’s findings (Rosa 2003:134-142; 
Jones 2005:150-157), Frazer decided that “magical” would, in fact, better define 
what he previously referred to as the religious aspects of totemism (Frazer 1910 
[1899]; 1910 [1905]; Spencer and Gillen 1899:275; see also Marett 1900). 
Magic, he submitted, preceded religion in the evolutionary trajectory, as 
“propitiation or conciliation of the higher powers seems to be nearly unknown 
[amongst the ‘aborigines’]. Roughly speaking, all men in Australia are 
magicians, but not one is a priest […]” (1910 [1905]:141). Frazer then 
suggested that some of the aboriginal beliefs and practices with time “might 
have grown into a regular religion, if their development had not been cut short 
by European intervention” (1910 [1905]:142). 
Five years on, and with more data at hand, Frazer (1910d:3-6) modified his 
thinking once again. Having produced an even more detailed, four-volume 
exposition of the subject (Frazer 1910a; b; c; d), Frazer proposed a new 
definition of totemism, the essence of which he summed up as “an identification 
of a man with his totem, whether his totem be an animal, a plant or what not” 
(1910d:5), and decided that totemism in its purest form was entirely social in 
nature as totem entities were neither considered gods nor worshipped. “The 
system is thoroughly democratic”, he explained, “it is simply an imaginary 
brotherhood established on a footing of perfect equality between a group of 
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people on the one side and a group of things (generally a species of animals 
and plants) on the other side” (1910d:5). 
Alexander Goldenweiser (1910:274-276) independently arrived at a similar 
conclusion. He proposed that totemism should not be considered a condition or 
something static, but rather a “dynamic phenomenon” (1910:275, emphasis in 
original), which resulted in totemic complexes and accounted for both the 
similarities – the association of a social unit with specific objects, which have 
emotional value, and in turn become socialised – and variation found in 
totemism. 
Arnold van Gennep (1911) found the results of Frazer’s 1910 four-volume 
treatise a paradox, especially as it culminated in such a vague definition of 
totemism and divorced it from religion, and was a complete turnaround from 
Frazer’s first writings about totemism. Goldenweiser’s definition of totemism, as 
“a specific socialization of emotional values” was also critiqued as too vague 
(Goldenweiser 1918:280; Washburn Hopkins 1918:146). 
Frazer then apologised for misleading people with his earlier ideas about 
the religious aspects of totemism (1910d:6). Despite this, he maintained his 
overall evolutionary religious trajectory and rearticulated that totemism could 
develop into a worship of animals or plants, of the sun or the moon, of 
the sea or the rivers, or whatever the particular totem may have been; 
but such worship is never found amongst the lowest savages, who have 
totemism in its purest form; it occurs only among peoples who have 
made a considerable advance in culture, and accordingly we are 
justified in considering it as a later phase of religious evolution, as a 
product of the disruption and decay of totemism proper (1910d:5-6). 
Frazer then clarified that such a trajectory was probably not universal, given that 
he felt there was no clear evidence of totemism amongst the Aryans, Semites 
and Turanians (1910d:12-14). Thus, “totemism is an institution peculiar to the 
dark-complexioned and least civilised races” (1910d:14) and “[p]rimitive society 
advances simultaneously from democracy and magic towards despotism and 
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religion” (1910d:28). Finally, its democratic and social nature meant that 
totemism probably “serve[d] the cause of civilisation” (1910d:38) as it promoted 
values such as cooperation, trust and subordination, and unity. 
In An Introduction to the History of Religion, Frank Byron Jevons (1896), 
who was a scholar with many interests, discussed an evolutionary religious 
trajectory that also took the biblical account of Genesis into consideration. As 
he endeavoured to balance Christian beliefs with a scientific approach, he 
suggested that humanity might have started out as monotheistic, then some 
societies degenerated – which he notes is also an evolutionary process – 
before starting on a new religious trajectory (1896:1-10)25. His proposed 
trajectory can be summed up as follows: All things are animate; people seek 
relationships with supernatural beings and create taboos; people ascribe 
personality to natural objects, especially animals, as people recognise kinship 
parallels with them. This leads to blood covenants and alliances between 
humans and animals (totemism); people start worshipping animals; with time 
animal-like gods appear. Thus, a given society becomes a religious community 
(Jevons 1896:108-109; see also Jones 2005:132-135). Jevons (1896:11-14) 
posited that people initially seek help from supernatural powers, which includes 
those not recognised by the wider community, with the risk of punishment 
(fetishism) and family gods and guardian spirits that are publicly worshiped by 
the community at large. Ancestor worship then develops as a form of private 
worship within the more immediate family, whilst public worship starts with 
plants and animals, and some are adopted as totems. Animal and plant worship 
results in their domestication, a more sedentary lifestyle and alliances with 
neighbouring groups. This leads to the fusion of ideas, resulting in syncretism 
and polytheism, which in turn generates myths and the need for priests to 
govern beliefs and practices. People also need to account for what happens 
                                             
25 See also Rosa (2003:144-146), writing about Lang who proposed a similar idea in 1898. 
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with death. Initially people thought that either life would continue as was, but in 
less favourable conditions, or that their souls transmigrated26, often to their 
totem animals. Dissatisfied with both of these, with time people realise that their 
future wellbeing depends on a sacramental communion with a god. Jevons 
(1896) then examined the different aspects of this trajectory in the rest of his 
book. 
Edward Burnett Tylor considered totemism as one of several forms of 
animal cults, where the animal is venerated as a family member and ancestor 
(Rosa 2003:17). Rosa (2003:30) suggests that for Tylor totemism was one of 
many potential manifestations of animism; a concept he introduced to 
anthropology in Primitive Culture, originally published in 1871.27 Tylor admitted 
that he was hesitant to enter the totemism debate due to its “bewildering 
complexity” (1899:138), and did so initially in his article Remarks on Totemism, 
with Especial Reference to Some Modern Theories Respecting It. Although 
Tylor was a proponent of social and religious evolution, he was not convinced 
that totemism was a necessary evolutionary stage. Neither was he persuaded 
by either McLennan’s hypothesis or Frazer’s ideas about totem animals 
becoming deities. Tylor (1899:142-143) acknowledged that there were societies 
with special relationships with totem animals, and other societies with animal 
deities, but it did not follow that there was a direct correlation between the two. 
Tylor then protested against 
the manner in which totems have been placed almost at the foundation 
of religion. Totemism […] has been exaggerated out of proportion to its 
real theological magnitude. The importance belonging to totem-animals 
as friends or enemies of man is insignificant in comparison with that of 
ghosts or demons, to so say nothing of higher deities. The rise and 
growth of ideas of deity, a branch of knowledge requiring the largest 
range of information and the greatest care in inference, cannot, I hold, 
                                             
26 Other scholars (see below) also wrote in terms of soul transmigration rather than 
reincarnation, so I have maintained their terminology. As I have argued elsewhere (2013:9-10), I 
consider the two to be synonymous. 
27 Tylor added a brief description of totemism in the fourth edition (1903:234-237). 
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be judged on the basis of a section of theology of secondary 
importance, namely, animal-worship, much less of a special section of 
that, namely, the association of a species of animals with a clan of men 
which results in totemism. A theoretical structure has been raised quite 
too wide and high for such a foundation (1899:144). 
Tylor continued by critiquing Smith and Jevons, amongst others, for being 
unduly influenced by McLennan’s tentative hypothesis, together with Frazer’s 
initial ideas, of totemism as an early stage of religious evolution. He inferred that 
Frazer, at least, manipulated his analysis to fit with McLennan’s notion of 
totemism (1899:142; see also Washburn Hopkins 1918). Neither, Tylor pointed 
out, should exogamy be equated with totemism, as it “can and does exist 
without totemism” (1899:148). 
In his article The Place of Totemism in the Evolution of Religion, Jevons 
(1899), responded to those who claimed that he asserted that all deities started 
out as totems: 
It is one thing to say, as I have said, that the first plants and animals to 
be worshipped were totems; it is a different thing to say that all the 
plants and animals which came to be worshipped subsequently in post-
totem times were totems, and I have not said it. And so long as the 
Australian blackman, with his totem-clans, is regarded by 
anthropologists as occupying the lowest place in the evolution of 
society, so long will it be a plausible theory that his totem-plants and 
animals occupy the lowest place in the evolution of religion (1899:370). 
Jevons then called upon social and economic evolution more generally in his 
defence. He suggested that those fortunate enough to have had totem animals 
that could be domesticated would, with time, evolve beyond those whose totem 
animals could not be tamed: “In a word, the economic revolution produced by 
domestication would entail a social revolution also, and lead to the destruction 
of the totemistic form of social organisation” (1899:375; see also Frazer 
1910d:19-25). He went on to point out that as there were no domesticable 
animals in North America and Australia, “totemism prevailed until the coming of 
European man” (1899:376), and it is also there, Jevons suggested, that one 
42 
 
 
must look in order to “understand the condition of man in the pre-pastoral 
period” (1899:376). After some further discussion, he concluded that “[i]t is no 
longer necessary to argue that totemism must have been a stage in the 
evolution of religion, it is an established fact that it was” (1899:380, emphasis in 
original). In his earlier publication (1896:120-121), Jevons posited that as 
people abandoned their nomadic lifestyle, totemism would perish as people 
“advance from savagery to civilisation” (1896:121). 
Another aspect of the totemism and religious evolution debate concerned 
the possible role of soul transmigration between people and their totem animals 
and whether this could explain totemism’s origin (Tylor 1899; Frazer 1910d:45-
47; Durkheim 1915:168-171; van Gennep 1917b:293-295). Tylor (1899:147) 
also noted that George Alexander Wilken saw transmigration as evidence of a 
link between totemism and ancestor worship. Then, during his 1901 presidential 
address to the Folklore Society, Edwin Sidney Hartland (1901a:35-37) 
postulated that, based on data from South Africa, the transformation of chiefs 
into powerful animals when they die clearly demonstrated this evolutionary 
transition: “I venture to suggest that this was the link, now snapped asunder, 
between totemism and ancestor-worship in South Africa” (1901a:36). Northcote 
Whitridge Thomas agreed that “totemism in South Africa, as we know it at 
present, is, I submit, a form of ancestor-worship” (1901:342), but queried 
whether this is the case elsewhere. Hartland (1901b) briefly defended his 
position by responding that he never intended his example to be applied more 
broadly. Tylor (1899:147) too expressed caution about generalising findings 
about totemism and transmigration, given the variety of ideas and practices 
between different groups (see also Spencer and Gillen 2003 [1899]:94, 235; 
1899:279-280; Hartland 1911:363-364). 
Part of the challenge of the totemism debate was the lack of clear 
parameters about what exactly people were investigating, and their background 
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and approach to the subject were sometimes questionable (van Gennep 1908; 
1911; 1917a; b; 1919a; b; c; Washburn Hopkins 1918; Linton 1924; Firth 
1930:291-292; Majumdar 1930:221-223; Lévi-Strauss 1964 [1962]; 1966 
[1962]; Rosa 2003). There were varied opinions about what exactly could count 
as a totem; whether totems were always clan or kin-based or whether people 
could have individual totems or gender-specific totems; how it related to 
marriage practices; what the “religious” parameters were and whether totems 
were worshipped and/or implicated in other ceremonies such as rites during 
times of transition; and how totems were transmitted: via matrilineal or 
patrilineal descent, or if people received them when initiated into secret 
societies, for example. 
Several of those at the forefront of the debate – such as McLennan, Smith, 
Frazer and Jevons – worked exclusively with information they received from 
others. Nicknamed “armchair” anthropologists, they employed a comparative 
method, which assumed that similarities in beliefs and practices between so-
called primitive societies – both past and present, despite other sociocultural 
and geographical differences – could be directly compared (Boas 1896; 
Radcliffe-Brown 1951; Jones 2005:18-19, 295). Emile Durkheim commented: 
Everything we know about totemism amounts to information that is 
fragmentary, scattered and borrowed from very different societies, that 
one can hardly link together except by construction. One has never 
directly observed a whole totemic system. This serious omission has 
been filled by Messrs Spencer and Gillen in their book about the central 
tribes of Australia (1900-1901:81, translation mine). 
In their comprehensive ethnography Native Tribes of Central Australia, Spencer 
and Gillen (2003 [1899]) presented their own observations from time spent with 
aboriginal Australians. Their findings, especially amongst the Arunta – whose 
totemic practices did not fit the generally assumed parameters of totemism – 
significantly impacted the anthropological community, and further fuelled the 
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totemism debate. Different individuals drew on Spencer and Gillen’s findings to 
defend their position in the debate (Hartland 1900:57-58; see also Durkheim 
1900-1901; Frazer 1910a; Lang 1910; Rosa 2003:119-174; Jones 2005:205-
212), despite Spencer and Gillen’s warning that the variations between the 
different aboriginal totemic systems are such that it is not possible to describe 
their findings and consider them “typical of Australian natives generally” (2003 
[1899]:85). They did, however, identify “one essential feature common to all 
totemic systems, and that is the intimate association between the individual and 
the material object, the name of which he bears” (2003 [1899]:94). 
Many others collated data in their endeavour to establish the general 
parameters of totemism (see, for example, Marillier 1897a; Anon 1901; 
Willoughby 1905; Harper et al. 1906; Brun 1910; Frazer 1910a; b; c; d; 1937; 
Goldenweiser 1910; Hodge 1910; Durkheim 1915; Radcliffe-Brown 1952 
[1929]). Whilst some of the resulting publications are largely ethnographic, 
others are more analytical and question the veracity of some of the earlier 
hypotheses, such as the assumed relationship between totemism and exogamy 
(Spencer and Gillen 2003 [1899]; 1899; Brun 1910:850-851, 864; Frazer 1910d; 
Goldenweiser 1910; Hodge 1910:788; Hartland 1911; Washburn Hopkins 1918; 
Lévi-Strauss 1966 [1962]), the matrilineal transmission of totems (Spencer and 
Gillen 2003 [1899]:27, 53, 86-87; Brun 1910:864; Durkheim 1915:106-107; 
Washburn Hopkins 1918), and where – if at all – totemism fitted into a given 
society’s evolutionary trajectory (Hose and McDougall 1901; Frazer 1910d; 
Washburn Hopkins 1918). Léon Marillier (1897a; see also 1897b; 1898a; b), a 
philosopher and historian, critically analysed the evolutionary trajectories put 
forward by his contemporaries, including Smith (1912 [1880]; 1907 [1885]), 
Frazer (1887; 1910 [1899]; 1910 [1905]) and Jevons (1896). He concluded that 
the idea that totemism was a stage that all religions passed through during their 
evolution was difficult to sustain (1897a:246) and that, in fact, for those groups 
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who were totemic, totemism was not their religious starting point, but rather the 
finishing point of a perfected religious form (1897b:369; see also Marillier 
1898a:211). With reference to totemism amongst several ethnic groups in 
Francophone West African, Joseph Brun, a Catholic missionary, stated: 
Nowhere have we encountered totemism as a stage of religious 
phenomenon, nor even as the prevailing form of the Blacks’ religion. As 
it is, it appears to be a set of beliefs, mixed with other beliefs of differing 
importance. This is evident for the Islamised ethnic groups, and is the 
same for the pagans (1910:846, translation mine). 
Brun went on to present a body of data before concluding that “[t]otemism does 
not appear as a precise stage of religious evolution exclusive of all other belief. 
It is simply an element of beliefs” (1910:863, translation mine). Likewise, 
Goldenweiser boldly stated, “totemism as a necessary stage in the development 
of religion becomes an absurdity, and the concept itself, of totemism as a 
specific form of religion, ought to be abandoned” (1910:264) and that 
“[e]xogamy, taboo, religious regard, totemic names, descent from the totem, – 
all fail as invariable characteristics of totemism” (1910:266). 
Durkheim (1915), however, upheld an evolutionary approach and 
maintained that totemism was not only a religion, but its most primitive form, 
whilst at the same time emphasising its social nature (Rosa 2003:91-103, 159-
174; Jones 2005:220-224). On occasions, his argument seems somewhat 
circular and contradictory. For example, for people who have animals as 
totems, he stressed that totemism is not animal worship, nor should it be 
considered a cult; the animal is rather a friend or a member of the family 
(1915:139-140). He then stated: “If totemism is to be considered as a religion 
comparable to the others, it too should offer us a conception of the universe. As 
a matter of fact, it does satisfy this condition” (1915:141) and then justified this, 
given that 
[f]or the Australian, things themselves, everything which is in the 
universe, are a part of the tribe; they are constituent elements of it and, 
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so to speak, regular members of it; just like men, they have a 
determined place in the general scheme of organization of the society 
(1915:141). 
Durkheim then explained that all beings were sacred, and where such beings 
relate to each other, their relationship was therefore religious: “[Humans], too, 
are sacred, and the classifications which locate them in relation to the other 
things of the universe, by that very act give them a place in the religious world” 
(1915:150). Consequently, totem entities “fulfil exactly the same functions that 
will later fall upon the divine personalities” (1915:154). He then concluded that 
the “totemic religion is a complex system” resulting from the union of totemic 
clan cults (1915:156, 167-168). Durkheim (1915:168-239) then moved on to 
discuss the origin of such beliefs. 
Commenting on Durkheim’s analysis of the religious versus social nature of 
totemism, Alan Bleakley notes that it “reverses the early views of totemism as 
describing solidarity with nature, for now the solidarity is with the reified social, 
and has a completely anthropocentric and secular focus” (2000:133; see also 
Jones 2005:232; Willerslev 2013:46). Rosa, meanwhile, likens Durkheim’s 
analysis to a game of mirrors: “the clan’s sacred character was the reflection of 
the totem species sacred character, which in turn was the unconscious 
reflection of the religious force emanating from the first” (2003:171, translation 
mine). 
Like Durkheim, those engaged in the totemism debate were also 
preoccupied with how totemism originated (see, for example, Marillier 1897a; 
van Gennep 1908:64-67; Frazer 1910d:40-71; Goldenweiser 1910:276-288; 
1912; Boas 1916; Rosa 2003:6). Already in 1870, McLennan (1870:213) 
pointed out that his hypothesis was not intended to explicate the origin of 
totemism, for which he did not account. Frazer initially favoured Wilken’s idea 
that soul transmigration between people and their totem animals could explain 
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how totemism originated (Tylor 1899:146). Frazer later refuted this idea given 
that there was no evidence of a link between totemism and transmigration 
amongst the North American First Nations Indians and aboriginal Australians 
(1910d:45-47). 
Spencer and Gillen (1899:278) and Frazer then proposed similar theories 
about totemism’s origin (see also Jones 2005:155-157), which Frazer summed 
up as 
an organised and co-operative system of magic devised to secure for 
the members of the community on the one hand a plentiful supply of all 
the natural commodities of which they stood in need, and, on the other 
hand, immunity from all the perils and dangers to which man is exposed 
in his struggle with nature (1899:282; see also Malinowski 1948:44-47). 
Frazer (1910d:55-57) later rejected this theory, believing that it simply was not 
practical, overly rational and the social organisation required too complex for 
people he perceived as “primitives”. 
In 1905 Frazer had also suggested an alternative idea: “If we may 
hypothetically assume, as the first stage in the evolution of totemism, a system 
[…] based on a primitive theory of conception the whole history of totemism 
becomes intelligible” (1910 [1905]:161)28, given that aboriginal Australians 
believed that children were conceived by the entities that later became their 
totems. This hypothesis, he admitted, did not account for the rules of exogamy 
many associated with totemism. For Frazer, however, this was not an issue, as 
exogamy forms no part of true totemism. It is a great social reform of a 
much later date, which, in many communities, has accidentally modified 
the totemic system, while in others it has left that system entirely 
unaffected (1910 [1905]:162). 
Frazer (1910d:60-71) later reaffirmed his “conceptional theory” (1910d:60), 
especially in light of further data from the Banks’ Island, where people also 
                                             
28 For an in-depth treatment of Frazer’s conceptional theory, see Rosa (2003:242-251) and 
Jones (2005:168-171). 
48 
 
 
believed that women were impregnated by their totem entities. He concluded 
that “the ultimate source of totemism is a savage ignorance of the physical 
process by which men and animals reproduce their kinds” (1910d:61) and that 
“totemism may be described as a creation of feminine rather than of masculine 
mind. It is well known that the minds of women are in an abnormal state during 
pregnancy […]” (1910d:64; see also Durkheim 1915:180-183). Andrew Lang 
referred to Frazer’s conceptional theory as an “ingenious but erroneous psycho-
physiological hypothesis” (1910:1100). For Lang totemism and exogamy could 
not be separated, and that the case of the Arunta clearly demonstrated that 
“conceptional totemism is not primary but very late; totemic exogamy is not late 
but early” (1910:1103). For Lang (1913)29, exogamy clearly preceded totemism 
(see also Rosa 2003:105-115). For exogamic groups “[t]here must have been 
dim beginnings of the belief (so surprising to us) that each human group had 
some intimate connection with this, that, or the other natural species, plants, or 
animals” (1913:160), he explained. Local groups then distinguished themselves 
by adopting the name of the natural species in question and totemism slowly 
grew out of this given that “animals and sets of men having the same name are, 
in savage opinion, mystically connected with each other. That is now the 
universal totemic belief […]” (1913:161; see also Durkheim 1915:134) and that 
“the mere idea of a mystic connection between themselves and their name-
giving animals set the groups upon certain superstitious acts and abstentions in 
regard to these animals” (1913:164). Durkheim (1915:184-186), however, saw 
little difference between Frazer’s conceptional theory and Lang’s hypothesis 
about name giving. With regard to the place of exogamy, Franz Boas shared 
Lang’s opinion, given that exogamy 
is a universal phenomenon. Totemism is not. It is admissible to judge 
the antiquity of an ethnic phenomenon by its universality. […] On this 
basis it is justifiable to assume that exogamy also is very old. […] We 
                                             
29 Published posthumously; Lang died in 1912. 
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may, therefore, consider exogamy as the condition on which totemism 
arose (1916:323-324). 
Goldenweiser (1912) expressed concern about the many different theories that 
people proposed, and the resulting fight this generated. “Many of the theories 
advanced were good, in the sense that they indicated a plausible starting point 
for the totemic process; all the theories were bad in so far as they pretended to 
have revealed the one and only starting-point [sic] of totemism” (1912:600), he 
commented. The only positive Goldenweiser saw from such a preoccupation 
was that it stimulated further research into totemism, otherwise he felt that 
ongoing hypothesising about totemism’s origins was “foolhardy” (1912:602; see 
also Radcliffe-Brown 1952 [1929]:122). Moving away from the idea of one 
common starting point, Goldenweiser then proposed his own “pattern theory” 
(1912:606) based on the idea of totemic complexes that developed slowly over 
time as clans adopted different totemic features that diffused from one clan to 
another. Although van Gennep (1919a:14-17, 26-27) agreed with 
Goldenweiser’s basic theoretical principles, he added that the same could be 
said about Christianity and that the theory did not help resolve the question of 
how totemism actually arose in the first place. 
Drawing on data from Robert Henry Codrington about the Melanesians and 
mana, together with ideas put forward by Smith (Jones 2005:95-99, 131-132, 
214-215), Durkheim (1915), meanwhile, hypothesised that totemism – and the 
religious dimension of social life in general – was due to an underlying force 
that permeated and connected everything. People drew on this force, initially 
subconsciously, and with time consciously. Social occasions, which resulted in 
exultation, served to bring this force to the fore, and thus 
it is in the midst of these effervescent social environments and out of 
this effervescence itself that the religious idea seems to be born […] but 
we must still demand how it happens that these forces are thought of 
under the form of totems, that is to say, in the shape of an animal or 
plant. 
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It is because this animal or plant has given its name to the clan and 
serves it as emblem. In fact, it is a well-known law that the sentiments 
aroused in us by something spontaneously attach themselves to the 
symbol which represents them. […] This transference of sentiments 
comes simply from the fact that the idea of a thing and the idea of its 
symbol are closely united in our minds; the result is that the emotions 
provoked by the one extend contagiously to the other (1915:218-219). 
Durkheim (1915:222) added that people’s emotional response and perception 
of force attached to the emblem intensified when extended to the actual totem 
entity. Although van Gennep (1917a:327) found Durkheim’s social approach 
interesting, he concluded that Durkheim’s analysis did not really answer issues 
concerning totemism’s origin, evolution, content and function. The problem, 
according to van Gennep (1917a:335), stemmed from Durkheim’s working with 
other people’s data and analysis, which even they were reluctant to admit were 
accurate. Van Gennep (1911:101-102) originally suggested that there was no 
such thing as totemism, but rather totemisms30 and that each form of totemism 
or pseudo-totemism should be assigned a specific name. Van Gennep (1917a) 
did not advance an alternative theory to Durkheim’s, but reiterated that – for him 
– the belief in kinship relations was a fundamental psychological element of 
totemism, but not necessarily the defining character as Durkheim would have it. 
For van Gennep, totemism was composed of a number of distinctive characters, 
which he called principles (1917a:335). By 1919 van Gennep (263-264) had 
refined his ideas about kinship by stating that totemism was characterised by a 
combination of physiological, social and classificatory kinship together with a 
well-defined territory for the group in question; a factor that others had 
overlooked (Peterson 1972; Morton 1987; Rosa 2003:239-242). 
Edward Washburn Hopkins (1918:151-159), a Sanskrit scholar, also took 
the different theories on totemism’s origins to task. He concluded: 
If then we have regard to the fact that, with all its divergencies in detail, 
totemism in its original habitat (i.e. where the name arose) is in the main 
                                             
30 Lévi-Strauss (1964 [1962]:45), attributed this to A. P. Elkin. 
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a recognition of a peculiar bond subsisting between a group of human 
and a group of animal or vegetable beings, that this bond is not an 
individual or sex matter, but that in the great majority of cases it is 
connected with dietary restrictions, we have the basis of what may 
reasonably be called totemism (1918:158). 
Washburn Hopkins added that “the word totemism is American, and in America, 
until the sociologists began to play with it, it had a pretty definite meaning” 
(1918:159). Others too started to scrutinise the terminology itself. Some 
questioned whether totemism should be considered a genuine, independent 
phenomenon (Goldenweiser 1918). Van Gennep (1908:57) cautioned against 
using the words “totem” and “totemism” except where one could be certain that 
they corresponded exactly with totemic phenomena. Goldenweiser, who had 
conducted some research amongst the Iroquois, suggested that “if we continue 
to use the term ‘totemism,’ we may no longer apply it to any concrete ethnic 
content; for, while almost anything may be included, no feature is necessary or 
characteristic” (1910:267). Frederick Webb Hodge, meanwhile, made the 
pertinent observation that “‘[t]otemism’ is a purely philosophical term which 
modern anthropologic literature has burdened with a great mass of needless 
controversial speculation and opinion” (1910:789), whilst Alfred Radcliffe-Brown 
questioned whether the term had “outlived its usefulness” (Radcliffe-Brown 
1952 [1929]:117). Goldenweiser, however, felt that totemism “while not 
presenting in its make-up any new principle not found in other cultural 
phenomena, is nevertheless a specific institution, deserving as such a separate 
concept and term” (1918:284). Accordingly, he thought that totemism should be 
maintained as a unique phenomenon. Goldenweiser justified this by proposing 
that there was something distinctive about “the association of the totemic 
content with a clan system” (1918:284) and that it was the psycho-sociological 
interaction and emotional engagement between the members of a given social 
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unit and their totem that created totemic complexes (1918:290-295). Washburn 
Hopkins shared a similar opinion: 
Thus totemism is not a homogeneous institution. Under the appearance 
of uniformity it conceals a heterogeneous collection of social and 
religious conditions as vague and unsystematic as are those of taboo 
and fetishism. It consists, if it means anything specific, in clan-respect 
for a class of plants or animals and usually in a regard for ancestors […] 
(1918:151). 
Goldenweiser31 (1918) maintained his position that totemism should not be 
considered an evolutionary stage of religion, and as he justified his analysis, he 
repeatedly used the word “function”, indicating a move towards a functionalist 
analysis of totemism. 
As indicated above, others too questioned totemism’s evolutionary position. 
“Twenty years ago”, Hartland stated, “anthropologists were inclined to presume 
totemism as a necessary stage in the evolution of human culture. Today the 
pendulum has swung in an opposite direction. Perhaps it has swung too far” 
(1911:374). 
Boas (1896; 1916) and Radcliffe-Brown (1951) also questioned the 
comparative method that armchair anthropologists used to demonstrate their 
evolutionary theories. With changes in methodology, and more people engaging 
in ethnographic research and gathering additional data (Jones 2005:295), it was 
inevitable that the idea of totemism as the preliminary stage of religious 
evolution had to fall. Like Goldenweiser, others increasingly turned towards 
trying to understand how totemism shaped society in terms of function. They 
also challenged the notion that “uncivilized” people were inferior: 
Many modern anthropologists discount the supposed differences in the 
mental processes of civilized and uncivilized peoples and hold that the 
psychological factors which have controlled the growth of the so-called 
primitive cultures are still at work in modern society (Linton 1924:296; 
see also Hambly 1931:31; Lévi-Strauss 1964 [1962]:1-3; 1966 [1962]). 
                                             
31 For an in-depth treatment of Goldenweiser’s contribution to the totemism debate, see 
Shapiro (1991), Rosa (2003:207-227) and Jones (2005:290-295). 
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Ralph Linton, who served with the US 42nd Rainbow Division during World War 
I, wrote about the Division’s relationship with the rainbow. He explained that, 
with time, most of the division members would say “I’m a rainbow” (1924:297). 
Linton then demonstrated that the members’ behaviour and ready identification 
with the rainbow as their emblem, to the point of reverence, promoted social 
cohesion and unity in the Division (1924:298-300). He noted that “[a]lmost any 
investigator who found such a condition existing among an uncivilized people 
would class these associated beliefs and practices as a totemic complex” 
(1924:299). For Linton, this was no longer a question of evolution, as both the 
army’s and “primitive” totemic complexes resulted from the “same social and 
supernaturalistic tendencies” (1924:299). 
Functionalism and Structuralism: Radcliffe-Brown, Lévi-Strauss 
and Others 
Radcliffe-Brown first suggested studying totemism in terms of function in 1929, 
in order to discover “why in certain societies a ritual attitude towards a certain 
species of natural object is imposed upon the members of a particular social 
group” (1952 [1929]:124; see also Lévi-Strauss 1964 [1962]:11-13, 60-61). He 
too saw parallels between the emblematic role of totems and other objects, 
such as flags, that promote and maintain patriotism, and concluded that “the 
function of the ritual attitude towards the totem is to express and so to maintain 
in existence the solidarity of the social group” (1952 [1929]:125). Radcliffe-
Brown (1952 [1929]:126-129) then suggested that the majority of societies – 
whether totemic or non-totemic – from around the world initially favoured 
animals and plants as “sacra” over other objects due to hunting and gathering. 
When some of these larger societies divided into smaller clan units, each unit 
needed to maintain its solidarity and individuality. Thus, “[t]otemism does more 
than express the unity of the clan; it also expresses the unity of totemic society 
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as a whole in the relations of the clans to one another within that wider unity” 
(1952 [1929]:129). He then admitted that this still did not explain why “primitive 
peoples adopt in their custom and myth a ritual attitude towards animals and 
other natural species” (1952 [1929]:129). Radcliffe-Brown then suggested that 
“[f]or primitive man the universe as a whole is a moral or social order governed 
not by what we call natural law but rather by what we must call moral or ritual 
law” (1952 [1929]:130). Another outcome of this was that totemism also 
promoted social solidarity between people and nature (1952 [1929]:131). 
The change in theoretical focus from evolution to functionalism, however, 
did not resolve how to define totemism. On the contrary, as demonstrated by 
Linton above, discussions about what could count as totemism broadened (see, 
for example, Hiatt 1969). Accordingly, Ralph Piddington (1950:203-206) 
critiqued Goldenweiser’s vague definition (see above), as it could be applied to 
any emblem – such as badges, flags and national symbols – to which a 
community, society in its broadest sense or nation could develop an emotional 
attachment (see also Bleakley 2000:134). Along similar lines to Radcliffe-
Brown, Piddington proposed that totemism should be limited to social groupings 
that had a special relationship with their natural environment, which created a 
“single system, where human groups are classified in terms of natural species, 
and where the significance of natural species is to a large extent interpreted in 
terms of their relationship to human groups” (1950:204). 
Writing about the Azande, Edward Evans-Pritchard (1961) provided a 
counter example. Historical movements due to “war, migration, domination and 
the displacement and fractionization of clans” (1961:116) had resulted in 
“conglomerate clans” (1961:117), which were extremely complex with members 
from diverse origins. The resulting totemic system was equally complex and 
consequently of little worth, as “it is difficult to see how clan totemism can have 
55 
 
 
much meaning where there is so much mobility” (1961:119). Evans-Pritchard 
concluded that the 
[a]bsence of cult, absence of marks of respect, etc., may, however, be 
regarded as signs, rather than as causes, of the lack of significance 
which totems have for Azande. The cause is undoubtedly that clans are 
not in any degree localized and have no corporate functions […] clans 
as such are so amorphous that they mean little to Azande (1961:119). 
Radcliffe-Brown (1951), meanwhile, refined his thinking by proposing that, 
especially for Australia, marriage between two social units was often a “union of 
opposites” (1951:20). He arrived at this conclusion by analysing the totemic 
tales of intermarrying social units, which were about two animal opponents. 
Thus, the animals were chosen as they represented relationships of opposition 
and the stories “interpret the resemblances and differences of animal species in 
terms of social relationships of friendship and antagonism as they are known in 
the social life of human beings” (1951:18). Radcliffe-Brown (1951:22) pointed 
out, however, that his analysis still did not resolve the problem of how such 
structures and choices originated. As a proponent of structuralism who stressed 
the need to discover minimal structural units based on opposing or contrasting 
dyads, Claude Lévi-Strauss approved of Radcliffe-Brown’s approach:  
It brings about a reintegration of content with form, and thus opens the 
way to a genuine structural analysis. […] For it is indeed a structural 
analysis which Radcliffe-Brown undertakes, consolidating institutions 
with representations on the one hand, and interpreting in conjunction all 
the variants of the same myth on the other (1964 [1962]:86). 
He continued by adding that Radcliffe-Brown’s analysis demonstrated that 
animals in totemism cease to be solely or principally creatures which 
are feared, admired, or envied: their perceptible reality permits the 
embodiment of ideas and relations conceived by speculative thought on 
the basis of empirical observations. We can understand, too, that 
natural species are chosen not because they are ‘good to eat’ but 
because they are ‘good to think’ (1964 [1962]:89). 
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As scholars realised that totemism could not be explained in evolutionary terms, 
their enthusiasm – or “hysteria” (Lévi-Strauss 1964 [1962]:1) – for the subject 
also diminished (Jones 2005:9). In Totemism, Lévi-Strauss (1964 [1962]:3-4) 
started by presenting totemism’s downfall. He pointed out that “[t]he supposed 
totemism eludes all effort at absolute definition” (1964 [1962]:5) and that 
totemism was an illusion. Consequently, he suggested, when he employed the 
word totemism, the reader should imagine it in quotation marks (1964 
[1962]:15). Lévi-Strauss then reviewed the different theories put forward on the 
subject. 
Seemingly inspired by Radcliffe-Brown’s analysis (Shapiro 1991:599, 605-
606), together with the works of Bergson (1958) and Rousseau (1776; see Lévi-
Strauss 1964 [1962]:92-105, 108; Bleakley 2000:136-138), Lévi-Strauss (1966 
[1962]) wrote The Savage Mind as a counterpoint to Totemism, in order to 
“explore totemism’s positive side” (1966 [1962]:xi). Despite this, Lévi-Strauss’s 
overall aim was to demonstrate that totemism, as such, did not exist. He then 
provided a detailed, highly structuralist and semiotic analysis of myths, the 
different ways that people classify the natural world, marriage, naming 
conventions, sacrifice and philosophical outlook. He regularly identified and 
diagrammed underlying dyads, then illustrated how these interacted at different 
levels – or planes – and along various axes to produce a variety of classificatory 
systems. The resulting combinations thus accounted for divergent social 
structures. Ultimately, Lévi-Strauss claimed, “the universe is represented as a 
continuum made up of successive oppositions” (1966 [1962]:139). Lévi-Strauss 
(1966 [1962]) concluded that so-called totemism was just one of several 
classificatory systems and should not be considered an “autonomous 
institution”, but rather a “modus operandi ” (1966 [1962]:129). For Lévi-Strauss, 
the “upholders of totemism” made the mistake of arbitrarily isolating “one level 
of classification, namely that constituted by reference to natural species” (1966 
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[1962]:135). He later added that totemism was the “most famous example” of “a 
total system, which ethnologists in vain tried to pull to pieces in order to fashion 
them into distinct institutions […] (1966 [1962]:218). He did recognise, however, 
that as a classificatory system, totemism was unique: 
Unlike other systems of classification, which are primarily conceived 
(like myths) or acted (like rites), totemism is always lived, that is to say, 
it attaches to concrete groups and concrete individuals because it is an 
hereditary system of classification. […] In totemism, therefore, function 
inevitably triumphs over structure (1966 [1962]:232, emphasis in 
original). 
Ironically, having praised Radcliffe-Brown for coming around to a structuralist 
analysis of totemism, Lévi-Strauss ended on a functionalist note. Rather than 
putting the subject to rest, however, it seems that his books initiated a renewed 
interest in totemism. Lévi-Strauss recognised this potential eventuality but was 
prepared to take the risk: 
Perhaps it would be wiser to let obsolete theories fall into oblivion, and 
not to awake the dead. But, […] history does not produce useless 
events. If great minds were fascinated for years by a problem which 
today seems unreal, it is because they vaguely perceived that certain 
phenomena, arbitrarily grouped and ill analyzed though they may have 
been, were nevertheless worthy of interest (1964 [1962]:15). 
One direct outcome of Lévi-Strauss’s work was that members of the Association 
of Social Anthropologists organised a symposium, which was held in 1964 to 
discuss Lévi-Strauss’s works. This resulted in the publication of The Structural 
Study of Myth and Totemism edited by Edmund Leach, who convened the 
seminar (E. Leach 1967:vii-viii). 
Meyer Fortes (1966) also responded to Lévi-Strauss with reference to the 
Tallensi of northern Ghana, for whom it was not possible to identify an 
underlying totemic structure based on classificatory dyads – either mythically or 
between Tallensi kinship groups – as postulated by Lévi-Strauss: 
If there is any principle of classification or selection here at work it 
defies ascertainment; for […] these species do not constitute a single 
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type or class either to the Tallensi or objectively. The Tallensi 
themselves (like other Voltaic peoples and the Dinka) are not interested 
in the question. The association of a clan or lineage with a species is for 
them the result of a unique, accidental even quasi-miraculous, historical 
event. […] 
The emphasis is primarily on the internal meaning of the observance for 
the actor, not its external reference. The covenant that is its basis binds 
the descendants of the lineage founder by virtue of the internal unity 
and corporate continuity of the lineage that perpetuates him, not by 
reason of their differentiation from other lineages (1966:14). 
Fortes went on to explain that the Tallensi’s ontological understanding 
“presupposes a notion of continuity between man and animal species, and this 
fits in with the assumption that animal species have a potentiality for quasi-
human personality” (1966:15). He later added that “totem animals are 
assimilated to a quasi-human status […] equivalent to a quasi-kinship 
relationship – a sort of kinship symbiosis – with the lineages to which they 
appertain” (1966:15). In sum, Fortes (1966) demonstrated that the relationships 
and taboo observances between individuals and their totem animals were such 
that they constituted a moral code, which was core to both the individual’s and 
the society’s identity. The quasi-kinship symbiotic relationship was such that the 
so-called opposition between nature and culture – another one of Lévi-Strauss’s 
classificatory dyads – and totemism’s symbolic role in mediating this opposition 
was also brought into question. Robin Fox, for example, stated that “for Lévi-
Strauss [totemism] sets man over against Nature because it involves the use of 
Nature for social classification” (1967:161, emphasis in original; see also 
Tambiah 1969:453-457; Morton 1987:465; Bird-David 1999:S70). According to 
Fox, Lévi-Strauss was a “psychological reductionist” for whom nature provides 
“a source of metaphors for social thinking” and totemism “involves a relation 
between human thought-processes and the natural world” (1967:162; see also 
Bleakley 2000:139-141). Fox did conclude, however, that “‘totemism’ has 
withered away” (1967:176). 
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Lester Richard Hiatt (1969) too expressed concern about Lévi-Strauss’s 
reductionist approach and his attempt to dismiss totemism. Hiatt found Lévi-
Strauss’s dismissal oxymoronic, especially as Lévi-Strauss then explored the 
“fundamental features” of what he claimed to be a “null category” (1969:84). For 
Hiatt totemism lived on and he set out to reaffirm the reality of this phenomenon 
and seek its reprieve (1969:93). Like others before him, Hiatt defined totemism 
in broad terms as “a type of classification in which social groups are signified by 
natural species” (1969:86). He added that “[a]ll instances legitimately denoted 
by the term […] are united by virtue of possessing a special type of relationship 
that distinguishes them from other classifications” (1969:86-87). 
Carl Georg von Brandenstein, a linguist, then likened totemism to a phoenix 
back from the ashes “with a new life essence” (1972:586). Von Brandenstein 
conducted linguistic research in Australia and discovered additional 
classificatory dyads about hot- versus cold-bloodedness, which included the 
temperament of the social group concerned and whether their engagement with 
different entities and groups that they, in turn, perceived as hot or cold-blooded 
was active or passive. Like Lévi-Strauss, von Brandenstein applied a linguistic, 
structuralist framework based on axes and dyads, and thus affirmed Lévi-
Strauss’s theoretical approach (1972:586-587). Von Brandenstein then 
proposed that “[t]otemism, in the new concept, embraces theory and social 
practice. Theory here is early man’s device, and practice is the application of 
the device to the social life of the group […]” (1972:587). For von Brandenstein: 
The practical manipulation of totemism in the different regions where it 
occurs, must have resulted in a great variation of forms. […] The purity 
of the original idea could be expected to suffer when its rules were 
transacted in the social sphere of community life (1972:588). 
Despite his findings, von Brandenstein recognised the challenge of 
understanding the “original concept” (1972:593) of totemism before it was 
transformed by actual practice, and its resulting historical development. 
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Von Brandenstein was not alone in applying Lévi-Strauss’s structural 
approach to their data, which resulted in further ethnographic studies on 
totemism. David Sapir (1977), for example, applied a Lévi-Straussian analysis 
to his data for the Kujamaat Diola of Senegal, some of whom have faecal 
animal totems, as “it may happen that sometime in his life an Ajamaat Diola will 
defecate a live animal” (1977:1). Sapir referred to these animals as “totemic 
doubles”: 
A double because, as we shall see, it is a discontinuous objectification 
of some essential part of the self. A totem also, because, following Lévi-
Strauss (1962), it is a natural object (an animal) associated with a social 
category (an individual) that is subject to analogic extension where 
animal, is to animal, as individual, is to individual. Although here the 
extension takes on a complicating twist in that it is based on 
complementarity rather than homology, the more common form of 
totemism (1977:1). 
Finally, Marguerite Dupire (1991) initially thought that totemism did not exist 
amongst the Sereer Ndut of Senegal, until she attended a funeral and saw 
some beef hanging in a tree. Querying this, she was informed that it was for the 
vultures, “who are the parents of the Lebtaan matriclan” (1991:37, translation 
mine). She then conducted further research, applied a Lévi-Straussian analysis, 
and wrote Totems sereer et contrôle rituel de l’environnement. 
Totemism, it seems, cannot be quashed and – as Dupire discovered – may 
have a presence and an importance not yet discovered or properly recognised 
for other societies in West Africa and beyond; as I found out for the Bebelibe. 
Whether people like it or not, totemism is now an established part of 
anthropology that cannot be dismissed or ignored. As will become even more 
apparent in the following chapters, how societies and individuals relate to 
totemic entities is integral to their identity. This means that – like the early 
anthropologists I have presented above – current anthropologists also need to 
take totemism seriously. 
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The totemism debate so far has been convoluted, sometimes turning full 
circle. It has also contributed to the ontological turn, which I need to unpack in 
order to understand the implications for totemism more generally, for my 
findings and analysis, and how these – in turn – further contribute to the debate. 
Prevailing Semiotics and the Ontological Turn 
Moving away from a structuralist approach, whilst continuing to work within a 
semiotic framework, Victor Turner noted: 
One of the principal effects of the structuralist conception of totemism in 
particular, and the relation of nature to culture in general, as one of 
direct metaphorical correspondence at a purely formal level has been to 
define the fetishistic aspect of such phenomena out of existence. My 
argument, on the contrary, is that animals are so heavily used as 
symbols, not merely because of their formal appropriateness as 
metaphors for aspects of social structure which they accurately 
represent, but because, as natural beings with humanlike properties, 
they are the most suitable symbolic vehicles for the alienation of human 
(social) consciousness of the social nature of social phenomena 
through the misrepresentation of those phenomena as ‘natural’ 
(1985:51, emphasis in original; see also Kuper 1973). 
Although he did not write about totemism per se, his approach signalled a shift 
in anthropological theory and practice. Scholars increasingly interpreted and 
used totemism analogously to understand social structures and human-animal 
relations more generally. Roy Willis too noted that a direct consequence of Lévi-
Strauss’s contributions was that “the whole ‘totemic debate’ was raised to a new 
level of generality, from the level of ‘primitive’ society and culture to that of 
universal human thought processes” (1990:4). 
Rather than limiting themselves to one school of thinking, anthropologists 
started to broaden their theoretical approach by increasingly demonstrating 
eclectic pragmatism and profiting from cross-disciplinary ideas. They also 
acknowledged the relative and subjective nature of anthropology (Willis 1990). 
Despite this, semiotics continues to undergird their overall analysis. Willis again 
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attributes this to Lévi-Strauss, and that “even those hostile to [his] philosophical 
position” treated social phenomena semantically “as elements in total systems 
of signs” (1990:4-5). 
John Comaroff (1987), for example, examines ethnicity in Africa by utilising 
five propositions whose “theoretical significance lies more in the systematic 
relations among them than in the substance of each in its own right” (1987:302). 
Totemism provides the common thread through the five themes, and he draws 
on this to illustrate more generally how ethnicity could be understood given that: 
[e]thnic consciousness also entails the formulation of collective 
identities and their symbolic embodiment in markers of contrast 
between social groupings. For ethnicity, like totemism, exists above all 
else as a set of relations. In this respect, they are formally similar 
(1987:304). 
John Borneman (1988) too uses totemism analogously to examine how people 
classify light-horse breeds in America according to “‘stock’ (consanguinity), […] 
use (function), [… and] morphological characteristics (conformation)” (1988:26). 
He proposes that this is a “striking instance in which the animal world is 
classified according to the categories used for persons, a case of ‘reverse 
totemism’ (1988:25-26). In fact, he later adds, 
all totemism is initially a kind of reverse totemism. The animal and plant 
world does not order itself in a way that is immediately recognizable 
from a pan-cultural or universal-human perspective. The ordering that 
humans perceive to exist in the animal world is not initially an inference, 
it is a projection (1988:28). 
Borneman (1988) also demonstrates how America’s history has been 
instrumental in shaping people’s treatment of light-horse breeds. Borneman’s 
study – like Comaroff’s – resulted in an analysis of American ethnicity as 
people’s attitudes toward light-horse breeds reflect their views about race and 
national identity more generally. 
Willis, meanwhile, wryly notes: 
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Lévi-Strauss’s intention was not to understand totemism, but to abolish 
it as a possible topic of anthropological discourse […]. However, this 
effect, which should have been a logical consequence of the argument 
of Le totémisme aujourd’hui and La pensée sauvage, has patently not 
come about. Though officially pronounced dead nearly 30 years ago, 
totemism obstinately refuses to ‘lie down’. Indeed, it presently exhibits a 
vitality recalling the great days of Frazer and Durkheim (1990:5, 
emphasis in original; see also Shapiro 1991:599; Adler 1998). 
Willis (1990:5-6) provides two reasons for totemism’s comeback. The first could 
be traced back to Tambiah’s (1969) article, Animals Are Good to Think and 
Good to Prohibit, where Tambiah illustrated how complex human-animal 
relations could be, and the tensions this created. Secondly, “the academic 
debate about humanity’s relation with the natural world has, in a sense, been 
overtaken by a remarkable upsurge in social concern with what is generally 
called ecology” (Willis 1990:6). Consequently, scholars started to question 
Western assumptions about human superiority – which, in turn, was shaped by 
Judaeo-Christian teaching – by looking at how “small-scale, ‘tribal’ societies” 
engage with the natural world (Willis 1990:6). 
Philippe Descola’s Societies of Nature and the Nature of Society (1992), 
where he contrasts totemism with animism, or – as he prefers – totemic and 
animic systems, proved to be a seminal work. In a similar vein to Lévi-Strauss, 
Descola regards totemism as a classificatory system, whereas animism seems 
to be the experiential outcome of such a system, and can thus be considered 
totemism’s “symmetrical inversion”: 
Plants and animals offer natural stimuli to the taxonomic imagination. 
Their ethological and morphological discontinuities manifest contrasting 
qualities. Accordingly, they become signs which are particularly apt for 
expressing, in metaphoric terms, the internal differences which inform 
the social order. This interpretation contradicts psychological, 
evolutionist, and utilitarian explanations of totemism, but it nevertheless 
leaves us with a considerable analytical residue, which might be 
termed, for the time being, ‘animism’. [… which can] be considered as a 
kind of social objectification of nature. […] In that sense, what I shall 
now term animic systems are a symmetrical inversion of totemic 
classifications […]. Animic systems do not treat plants and animals as 
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mere signs or as privileged operators of taxonomic thought; they treat 
them as proper persons, as irreducible categories. The relation of plants 
and animals to humans is not metaphorical, as in totemism, but at the 
most, and then only in certain cases, metonymic (1992:114-115, 
emphasis in original). 
He adds that the two systems are not mutually exclusive, however, but could be 
combined and result in “complex configuration[s]” (1992:115). Descola 
(1996:87-89) briefly reiterates these ideas in Constructing Natures: Symbolic 
Ecology and Social Practice, and adds naturalism as a third system, prevalent 
in Western societies. He also seems to change his position about the 
metaphorical nature of totemism, stating that “symbolic or totemic classifications 
are based on a metonymic scheme” (1996:92). 
Not only did Descola’s observations help stimulate the totemism debate, 
they also broadened the discussions to consider ontology more generally, 
which ultimately culminated in the ontological turn (Kohn 2015). It was Eduardo 
Viveiros de Castro, however, who explicitly brought ontological issues to the 
fore (Holbraad and Pedersen 2017), and according to Holbraad and Pedersen, 
is the “father of anthropology’s ontological turn” (2017:157). In a review article 
about Amazonian anthropology, Viveiros de Castro initially seemed positive 
towards Descola’s 
model of “symbolic ecology,” which attempts to de-reify the 
nature/culture opposition by differentiating it into distinct practical-
cognitive modes [namely naturalistic, totemic and animic…]. The notion 
of an animic mode might illuminate some traditional ethnologic 
problems […] though it remains to be more thoroughly tested in certain 
contexts where the totemic rendering of the nature/culture opposition 
seems to be quite powerful (1996:190-191). 
Two years later, Viveiros de Castro (1998) examines a number of -isms, 
including Amerindian perspectivism, which should help Westerners to “gain a 
perspective on our own contrasts, contrasting them with the distinctions actually 
operating in Amerindian perspectivist cosmologies” (1998:470), where animals 
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“see themselves as persons” and their “manifest form […] is a mere envelope (a 
‘clothing’) which conceals an internal human form [… especially] those species 
which perform a key symbolic and practical role” (1998:470-471). He adds that 
for Amerindians 
[t]he differentiation between ‘culture’ and ‘nature’, which Lévi-Strauss 
showed to be the central theme of Amerindian mythology, is not a 
process of differentiating the human from the animal, as in our own 
evolutionist mythology. The original common condition of both humans 
and animals is not animality but rather humanity (1998:471-472). 
Viveiros de Castro expresses reservations about Descola’s idea that totemism 
and animism can co-exist and combine, especially as Descola’s definition of 
totemism is “primarily classificatory rather than cosmological: it is not a system 
of relations between nature and culture as is the case [with animistic and 
naturalistic] modes, but rather of purely logical and differential correlations” 
(1998:473, emphasis in original). He then voices his doubts about animism and 
finishes by asking: “Are we dealing with just another ‘totemic illusion’, if not with 
an ingenuous projection of our Western dualism?” (1998:474). 
Viveiros de Castro (1998:475) then briefly examines an essay by Lévi-
Strauss where he purportedly demonstrated that Amerindians also 
dichotomised nature and culture, considered themselves true humans and were 
therefore ethnocentric. If this is the case, however, it puts them on an equal 
footing with the rest of humanity; they too have souls and can no longer be 
considered savages. “Now everything has changed”, Viveiros de Castro 
continues: 
The savages are no longer ethnocentric but rather cosmocentric; 
instead of having to prove that they are humans because they 
distinguish themselves from animals, we now have to recognize how 
inhuman we are for opposing humans to animals in a way they never 
did: for them nature and culture are part of the same sociocosmic field 
(1998:475, emphasis in original). 
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For Viveiros de Castro, these different characterisations of Amerindian thought 
create 
[t]wo antinomies […]: either Amerindians are ethnocentrically ‘stingy’ in 
the extension of their concept of humanity and they ‘totemically’ oppose 
nature and culture; or they are cosmocentric and ‘animic’ and do not 
profess to such a distinction, being models of relativist tolerance, 
postulating a multiplicity of points of view on the world (1998:475). 
He then details how Amerindians perceive and understand bodies, and 
surmises: “As bundles of affects and sites of perspective, rather than material 
organisms, bodies ‘are’ souls, just, incidentally, as souls and spirits ‘are’ bodies” 
(1998:481). For Viveiros de Castro, then, perspectivism helps resolve these 
antimonies (1998:469). 
Unlike Descola (1992; 1996), for whom totemism is a classificatory system, 
Tim Ingold (2000:111-131, originally published 1998) understands totemism in 
terms of relationships. He draws on ethnographic data from aboriginal 
Australian societies for whom totemism is “a corollary of a more fundamental 
set of linkages between people, land and ancestral beings” (2000:112). His 
ethnographic data for animism comes from the circumpolar North. Ingold points 
out that he uses the nouns “totemism” and “animism” as “labels of convenience” 
and that neither should be understood as “doctrinal systems” but “rather 
orientations that are deeply embedded in everyday practice” (2000:112). Like 
Descola (1992; 1996), Ingold then switches from -isms to the adjectives totemic 
and animic to provide an ontological analysis of the data. For Ingold, it is the 
source and flow of “vital force” that differentiates the two ontologies: 
With a totemic ontology, the forms life takes are already given, 
congealed in perpetuity in the features, textures and contours of the 
land. And it is the land that harbours the vital forces which animate the 
plants, animals and people it engenders. With an animic ontology, to 
the contrary, life is itself generative of form. Vital force, far from being 
petrified in a solid medium, is free-flowing like the wind, and it is on its 
uninterrupted circulation that the continuity of the living world depends 
(2000:112). 
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Ingold then elaborates the two ontologies in more detail (2000:112-115), before 
going on to demonstrate how they determine how the societies concerned 
depict animals. 
Morten Pedersen (2001) applies Descola’s and Viveiros de Castro’s “new 
theories of animism” (2001:411) to analyse the ontological situation in North 
Asia. He identifies two broad societal groups: those of Northern North Asia 
(NNA) and those of Southern North Asia (SNA). In line with Descola (1992), 
Pedersen also thinks that a society can have both animistic and totemistic traits, 
although either animism or totemism will inevitably dominate. He proposes that 
NNA societies tend to be animistic, whilst SNA ones are totemistic. He explains 
that such tendencies are determined by the societies’ structure. Thus, animism 
is associated with those that have a horizontal egalitarian structure, whereas 
totemism is associated with those that have a vertical hierarchical structure. 
Commenting on Viveiros de Castro’s Amerindian perspectivism, Pedersen 
claims that it 
is a stronger version of animism. It seems to me that the 
conceptualization of nonhumans as persons (animism) must be a 
prerequisite for the notion that nonhumans may see themselves as 
human subjects as well as see humans as nonhuman objects 
(perspectivism) (2001:421). 
Consequently, perspectivism as described by Viveiros de Castro, is only evident 
for NNA societies where the animist principle predominates. He proposes, 
however, that 
a transformed version of perspectivism seems to thrive in SNA namely 
inter-human perspectivism (humans becoming other humans) as 
opposed to extra-human perspectivism (humans becoming nonhumans 
and vice versa) found in both NNA and the Amazon […], as the totemist 
principle takes over from the animist principle (2001:421). 
Pedersen’s analysis is based on shamanistic metamorphosis, and whether the 
spirits involved are primarily nonhuman or human (2001:423). 
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Descola (2013a) further modifies his ideas about totemism in Beyond 
Nature and Culture, originally published in French in 2005, by advancing an 
ontological approach that rectifies his earlier proposition that animism is 
totemism’s classificatory symmetrical inversion. He also admits that his initial 
analysis was flawed: 
I had fallen into the pitfall of a dichotomy through sticking too closely to 
Lévi-Strauss’s theory of totemism. That is why my first definition of 
animism and Lévi-Strauss’s definition of totemic classifications could 
not serve as a starting point from which to characterize modes of 
identification […] (2013a:124). 
Descola now proposes four ontological schemas, namely animism, totemism, 
naturalism and analogism. He explains that one ontological universal trait of 
humankind is to acknowledge that all humans have two attributes: interiority, 
which roughly corresponds with the Western notion of mind, soul and 
consciousness and can include other “immaterial principles” and other abstract 
notions; and physicality, a human being’s external, visible and tangible form 
(2013a:115-117). He then explicates: 
Faced with some other entity, human or nonhuman, I can assume either 
that it possesses elements of physicality and interiority identical to my 
own [totemism], that both its interiority and physicality are distinct from 
mine [analogism], that we have similar interiorities and different 
physicalities [animism], or, finally, that our interiorities are different and 
our physicalities are analogous [naturalism] (2013a:121). 
Having established the parameters of the four ontologies, and wanting to dispel 
his initial definition of symmetrical inversion, Descola clarifies that “animism and 
totemism, along with naturalism and analogism, become elementary 
components of a kind of syntax for the composition of the world, from which the 
various institutional regimes of human existence all stem” (2013a:125). He later 
adds that the four schema – or “modes of identification” – are not exclusive and 
can “coexist potentially in all human beings”, though one mode will dominate 
(2013a:233). 
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Descola has not abandoned the idea of metaphor and metonym, however. 
He suggests that totemism, which is typified in Australia, is perfectly 
symmetrical, and is both metaphoric and metonymic, which is why 
anthropologists have struggled to define it, whereas animism is metonymic, 
naturalism is metaphoric and analogism looks for analogies and differences 
between the two (2013a:237-239). 
Finally, although he does not acknowledge this, I find that Descola’s 
definition of totemism now parallels Ingold’s totemic ontology, as it is the 
dreamtime beings who are the source of both Descola’s interiority and Ingold’s 
vital force and who are responsible for the existence of all the different entities 
(Descola 2013a:147-148, 294-295; Ingold 2000:112-113). 
Although Descola, Ingold and Pedersen acknowledge that it is possible for 
a society to have a mix of totemic and animic typologies, Rane Willerslev and 
Olga Ulturgasheva (2012:50) critique these three authors for not providing 
examples and for their oversimplified ontological models that are 
constructed around a number of inter-related dichotomies. Thus, the 
dichotomy between animism and totemism has […] been arranged next 
to those between relations versus sign, extra-human versus inter-
human perspectivism, egalitarianism versus hierarchy, homologous 
relations versus analogous relations, and, above all, horizontal versus 
vertical social relationships (2012:50). 
Willerslev and Ulturgasheva then take the ontological debate one step further 
by proposing that “the combination of animistic and totemic features appears to 
be the rule rather than the exception” for the Eveny and Chukchi of Siberia, who 
“are marked by an essentially crossbred or composed ontology that takes on 
features of both animism and totemism” (2012:50). They then suggest that 
totemism and animism are interdependent before going on to illustrate this for 
the Eveny and Chukchi. Totemism and animism’s “respective presence 
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depends on who is looking and from where” (2012:65), they conclude, before 
suggesting that 
the terms totemism and animisms rather than being seen as to two [sic] 
opposed, coherent and explicitly articulated doctrinal ontologies, as 
implied by their ‘-isms’, are rather to be understood as orientations 
towards the spirit world, which are so deeply co-implicated that one 
cannot really exist without the other (2012:66). 
Their conclusion brings the debate full circle back to Tylor, for whom totemism 
was one of many potential manifestations of animism (Rosa 2003:30). 
Gregory Forth (2009) does not comment on the ontological debate. His 
interest is in ongoing ethnographic research and what can be learnt about 
“totemistic symbolism” (2009:263) and its implications, rather than treating 
totemism “as a general or definitive category of cross-cultural analysis” 
(2009:264). Forth (2009) then presents a case study of the Nage (Tamarind) 
people of the central region of the Indonesian island of Flores. Nage (Tamarind) 
is both the collective name for the people and their totem. What makes this 
case interesting is that Forth describes the tamarind is a “modern totem” 
(2009:273). Forth then explicates that the name 
‘Nage’ does not refer to a clan, nor is there any evidence that it ever 
did. More importantly, the use of ‘Nage’ for a political or territorial entity 
larger than a single village is relatively recent, being a creation of the 
colonial period effectively beginning around 1910 (2009:274). 
Forth (2009) provides a lot of ethnographic detail about the different clans that 
comprise the Nage people. Many clans are named after their totem, some of 
which are plants, usually trees. Common to all these clans is the taboo to burn 
the plant in question. Although there is no original Nage – or tamarind – clan, 
members of the Deu clan who were former rulers of the Nage colonial district, 
“assert that all Nage people should refrain from burning Nage (Tamarind) wood” 
(2009:267). Others contest this, however, especially those who come from other 
parts of the region (2009:267). Forth concludes: 
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The evidence thus points toward the Tamarind taboo as a recent 
political invention modelled on existing clan tree totems […]. Contrary to 
outmoded notions of totemism as a survival of an especially primitive or 
ancient form of social and conceptual order, the example of the 
Tamarind shows how a totem can emerge in a colonial context or in 
similar conditions of radical social change. […] the taboo itself can be 
understood as part of a larger appropriation of symbols by the Deu 
leadership and their efforts, during most of the twentieth century, to 
consolidate their authority within the Nage region and to justify the 
position bestowed upon them by the Dutch (2009:276). 
Forth’s example, together with Linton’s (1924) case study of the 42nd Rainbow 
Division, demonstrate how people employ totemistic coping strategies in 
different social contexts when their lifestyle is disrupted. It is also possible that 
“totemism”, however one chooses to define it, has been overlooked by many 
anthropologists, as they were not expecting to find it, as was the case with 
Dupire (1991). 
Tylor (1899:139-141; see also van Gennep 1908:56-57; Hodge 1910:789; 
Rosa 2003:13) thought that Long’s use of the word totam – which he apparently 
took from the Ojibwa term ototeman32 – confused several ideas: that Ojibwa 
clan names were often derived from animals, that the Ojibwa had rules about 
killing and eating these animals, and that the Ojibwa had individual guardian 
spirits, which could take animal form, and watched over them. McLennan then 
further developed the idea of totemism as a religion, after which there was no 
return (van Gennep 1908:57). 
Despite Long’s apparent misinterpretation – and McLennan’s further 
elaboration of totemism – the original sense of ototeman, “he is of my family” or 
“kinship” more generally, seems not to be totally incorrect. Frazer (1887:1), for 
example, noted several variant spellings and that otem could be interpreted as 
“family” or “tribe”. Descola (2013a:168-169) adds that the word’s verbal root in 
North Algonquian languages always demonstrates “a social link” semantically, 
                                             
32 In fact, Long (1791) does not mention ototeman (or variants), nor does he specify if his 
use of “totam” is derived from another Ojibwa term. 
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which can include kinship, totemic and individual animal spirit connections. He 
also notes that, despite Long’s decontextualising “the term totam by turning it 
into a noun, he is nevertheless not mistaken when he reports the use of this 
polysemic term in an apparently unusual context” (2013a:169). 
One common theme, therefore, that runs through the whole totemism 
debate is the idea of social identity and belonging, which is defined in some 
manner by a relationship with a non-human entity. Thus, Gaillard’s definition of 
“totem” as describing the “relationship existing in a society between a set of 
animals (or plants) and a human group” (2004:17, emphasis mine), seems to be 
valid. 
For me, it is not a question of whether totem entities exist or not. Neither is 
totemism a question of semiotic abstraction (should totems be understood 
metaphorically or metonymically?) or ontological typology, but rather one of how 
the members of the given society concerned make their totem entities present 
at any given moment of time. This, in turn, makes a relationship between them 
possible and determines how people experience and understand the 
relationship they have with their totem entities. Before examining the nature of 
this relationship as understood by my Bebelibe interviewees (Chapters Six and 
Seven) and their relationship with animals more generally (Chapters Four and 
Five), I give an overview of my research by exploring some of the research 
challenges I have had to deal with, which I refer to as ontological penumbras 
(Negotiating the Ontological Penumbra, Chapter Two). I then outline and 
discuss the fieldwork I undertook (Research Conducted, Chapter Two). This is 
followed by a detailed exposé of “presencing” (Chapter Three). 
73 
 
 
Chapter Two 
Research-Shadows and Rocks 
Negotiating the Ontological Penumbra 
One cannot really become a Zande or a Nuer or a Bedouin Arab, and 
the best compliment one can pay them is to remain apart from them in 
essentials. In any case one always remains oneself, inwardly a member 
of one’s own society and a sojourner in a strange land. Perhaps it would 
be better to say that one lives in two different worlds of thought at the 
same time, in categories and concepts and values which often cannot 
easily be reconciled. One becomes, at least temporarily, a sort of 
double marginal man, alienated from both worlds (Evans-Pritchard 
1976:243). 
Referring to this quote, Hutchinson states that Evans-Pritchard “capture[s] 
beautifully the sense of cultural limbo that anthropologists so often have” 
(1996:45) when conducting fieldwork. Other anthropologists have referred to 
this place of cultural limbo – or the space where they encounter “the other” (J. 
Merz and S. Merz 2017:8) – as “being in between” (Bielo 2013:5), the “space of 
ethnography” (Harding 2000:58), even an “epistemological abyss” (Ewing 
1994:571). As it is a space that affects our whole being, I propose with J. Merz 
that it should be called the “ontological penumbra” (J. Merz and S. Merz 
2017)33. We explain: 
Anthropologists occupy the penumbra by the means of a common 
humanity in order to expose themselves both ethnographically and 
experientially to difference and change. The penumbra is first of all an 
area where the self and the other, belief and disbelief, ignorance and 
certainty, possibility and impossibility, as well as the secular and the 
religious, meet, overlap and intertwine, sometimes to the extent of 
conflation […]. As a space of encounter and dialogue, as well as 
reflexivity and creativity, the penumbra has a strong epistemological 
component, since it is where ethnographic knowledge takes shape as a 
basis for anthropology as an academic discipline (2017:9). 
                                             
33 We first presented this idea during the ASA 2015 conference, University of Exeter. See 
J. Merz and S. Merz (2015). 
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We further elaborate: 
The ontological penumbra is a challenging position to occupy since it is 
in constant flux and subject to plurality and ambiguity. It is also 
potentially productive, as it provides the opportunity to engage fully with 
our counterparts. In order to occupy the ontological penumbra, we 
reflexively need to put our views, backgrounds and whole beings into 
question, at least to the same extent as we question our counterparts. 
We may feel that we lose parts of ourselves as the ethnographic 
encounter affects and changes us, but we should equally deepen our 
ontological knowledge and expertise, which provides the basis for our 
anthropological productivity in return. This process of ontological 
engagement is riddled with mystery, uncertainty, skepticism, doubt, 
incredulity, contradiction, paradoxes, tension, and constant negotiation, 
occasionally presenting itself even as threatening, sometimes leading to 
acute anxiety. At the same time, the ontological penumbra is full of 
wonder, excitement, joy, hilarity, fulfillment, and revelation, as we 
experience and explore with our very being what it is to be human in its 
full diversity, experience and expression, not only epistemologically, but 
also ontologically and thus existentially. This is why anthropologists 
should claim the ontological penumbra as the prime locus of their 
discipline and seek to occupy it consciously and reflexively. 
In occupying the ontological penumbra, anthropologists need to open 
themselves to their various counterparts’ epistemological and 
ontological ideas, including their secular and religious perspectives. 
While this necessitates relinquishing the former privileged position of 
secular and Western epistemology, it opens up the discipline to a 
potentially unprecedented ethnographic productivity that is 
epistemologically and ontologically innovative […] (2017:11). 
Vigh and Sausdal (2014; see also Bessire and Bond 2014; Harris and Robb 
2012; Kohn 2015) express concern that one outcome of Viveiros de Castro’s 
perspectivism and the subsequent ontological turn is a return to radical alterity. 
Furthermore, following Viveiros de Castro’s statement “One culture, multiple 
natures – one epistemology, multiple ontologies” (2004:474), some proponents 
of the ontological turn propose moving away from a humanist perspective that 
assumes a shared humanity with multiple cultures to a post-humanist position 
that recognises multiple natures and realities. For Vigh and Sausdal (2014:52) 
this results in many worlds with ontologies that have no common ground. If 
others occupy another ontological realm, then multispecies relationships – or 
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rather what I refer to as “inter-ontonic” engagement and understanding (see 
Chapter Three) – is rendered almost impossible (Vigh and Sausdal 2014:57). 
This being the case, Vigh and Sausdal ask, “with what register can we 
anthropologically perceive and describe such difference when we have rejected 
any notions of commonality?” (2014:57). “Fieldwork,” they point out 
builds precisely upon the idea that we can approach each other, 
communicate our differences and understand them (more or less 
successfully) in a way that enable [sic] us to meaningfully comprehend 
Otherness – thus, that we at the end of the road do share a 
communicative register or empathic nexus of some kind by which we 
are able to connect (2014:58, emphasis in original). 
This concurs with our observation that it is via our common humanity that we 
enter and negotiate the ontological penumbra (J. Merz and S. Merz 2017:9). 
Vigh and Sausdal (2014:58) add that for Viveiros de Castro these difficulties 
can be surmounted with the anthropologist taking on a shamanic role by moving 
between, mediating and translating the different ontologies and perspectives 
they encounter. Vigh and Sausdal find this proposition both flattering and 
preposterous, as there needs to be “an underlying idea of similitude rather than 
incommensurability” (2014:58) in order for this to work. 
Vigh and Sausdal (2014:63-64; see also Bessire and Bond 2014:444-445; 
Hurn 2012:25-26) then point out the potential political ramifications of the 
ontological turn and its radicalisation of alterity, as this continues to provide 
grounds for people to justify colonialism and racism, for example, or according 
to Bessire and Bond, could result in “new regimes of inequality or create the 
conditions for hypermarginality” (2014:445).  
I too share Vigh and Sausdal’s and Bessire and Bond’s concerns. Despite 
this, I think that the ontological turn was an inevitable and necessary outcome 
of various developments. Anthropologists became increasingly reflexive as they 
dealt with the postmodern crisis of representation (Salzman 2002). They also 
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started questioning various dichotomies and how best to do justice to other 
people’s ontological experiences, which culminated in the ontological turn (see, 
for example, Henare et al. 2007; Holbraad and Pedersen 2017). Scholars also 
began to question certain concepts such as what it is to be human. This 
resulted in a further sequence of turns (such as the animal, material, species 
and posthuman turns) and -ism derivatives (see, for example, Snowdon 1991; 
Coole and Frost 2010; Ryder 2010; Wolfe 2010). 
Vigh and Sausdal (2014:67) call for a return to an epistemological focus that 
builds on our shared heterogeneity. Despite the differences in our “ways of 
being,” they continue, “[w]e are basically all creators of culture, all thoughtful 
human beings” and our “shared being [is] central to lived life” (2014:67, 
emphasis in original). 
If anthropologists rely on a shared humanity to negotiate successfully the 
ontological penumbra, however, how do we deal with encounters with 
nonhuman entities? As noted in Chapter One, Viveiros de Castro (1998; 2004) 
explains that, following Amerindian thought, animals started as humans, and 
thus we do share a common humanity and culture. He (1998:476) further 
justifies this argument linguistically by explaining that the Amerindian terms for 
“human being” refer to “personhood”, whilst “people” refers to “person”, but in 
the sense of the pronouns “us” and “we”. Therefore, when other nonhuman 
entities think collectively as “us” and “we”, they too are persons. The difference 
between different entities is rather physical, given that “animals have a human, 
sociocultural inner aspect that is ‘disguised’ by an ostensibly bestial bodily form” 
(2004:465), hence Viveiros de Castro’s multinaturalism that results in different 
perspectives and – for some – entirely different ontologies.34 This, in turn, 
results in the oxymoron that Vigh and Sausdal (2014) have issue with. Several 
                                             
34 According to Holbraad and Pedersen (2017:175-177), despite Viveiros de Castro’s 
statement about multiple ontologies (2004:474, see above), he never intended his ideas about 
perspectivism and multiculturalism to be interpreted this way. 
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other authors, however, also emphasise our shared humanity and that how we 
define ourselves results from intersubjectivity as we engage in multispecies 
relationships (Abram 2004:154; Hurn 2012:125-138; Kohn 2013; 2015:313; 
Milton 2005; Morris 2000:6-8, 42; Vilaça 2005, for example). Nevertheless, I 
struggle to overcome the semantic restrictions of the word “humanity”, which 
inevitably maintains a humanist perspective (see also Tuckett 2015). 
Guthrie (1993:89-90, 197-199) suggests that our capacity for language and 
symbolism, combined with our predisposition to anthropomorphise, means that 
human engagement with the world is semiotic. Accordingly, we subconsciously 
and constantly search for symbols, metaphors and messages in our endeavour 
to make our encounters with other entities meaningful. Guthrie concludes that 
“[o]ur search for signs and symbols is so characteristic, so central to our being, 
that Homo sapiens would be better called Homo semioticus” (1993:198). This 
means that anthropologists too analyse their findings semiotically (see, for 
example, Descola 2013a; b; Galaty 2014; Hornborg 2006; Keane 2003; 
Kockelman 2011; Kohn 2007; 2013; 2015; Orr 2016; Willerslev 2007:17-19). 
“Others” – whether human or nonhuman – together with their ontological 
experiences, are thus interpreted in terms of what they signify for the “self” as 
symbols, icons or indexes (see also Henare et al. 2007; Scott 2013). 
Bekoff, an ethologist, also recognises that “anthropomorphism is inevitable” 
(2001:641) and not necessarily a bad thing: 
We are humans, and we have by necessity a human view of the world. 
By engaging in anthropomorphism […] we are making other animals’ 
worlds accessible to ourselves. […] Using anthropomorphic language 
does not have to discount the animals’ point of view. Anthropomorphism 
allows other animals’ behavior and emotions to be accessible to us. 
Thus, I maintain that we can be biocentrically anthropomorphic and do 
rigorous science (2001:641, emphasis in the original). 
Milton endeavours to move beyond anthropomorphism by proposing that  
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personal experience, rather than human-ness, is the basis for 
understanding others, and that understanding is achieved by perceiving 
characteristics in things rather than, as anthropomorphism implies, 
attributing characteristics to things (2005:260, emphasis in original). 
She suggests that “egomorphism” could be the way forward as this “implies that 
I understand my cat, or a humpback whale, or my human friends, on the basis 
of my perception that they are ‘like me’ rather than ‘human-like’ (2005:261; see 
also Tuckett 2015:24). Milton’s intersubjective approach opens up the possibility 
of a “communicative register or empathic nexus” (Vigh and Sausdal 2014:58; 
see also Bekoff 2007:122-131; Hurn 2012:129) not only with other humans but 
with nonhuman entities as well. 
In their chapter Thinking Through Things, Henare et al. note: 
Rather than accepting that meanings are fundamentally separate from 
their material manifestations (signifier v. signified, word v. referent, etc.), 
the aim is to explore the consequences of an apparently counter-
intuitive possibility: that things might be treated as sui generis 
meanings. […] meanings are not ‘carried’ by things but just are identical 
to them (2007:3-4, emphasis in original).  
Having identified the same issue in Cobly with regard to how people relate to 
stones, J. Merz (2017b) suggests that the limitations resulting from a Peircean 
semiotic framework can be overcome by introducing a new entity called the 
“onton”. He explains that it 
extends and complements existing signs. The onton is not a sign as 
such, but an indivisible and non-representational entity that cannot be 
broken down into different components as signs typically can. Such 
ontonic entities are more than meaningful; they are made present in the 
world when other entities relate to them through the process of 
presencing that shifts the focus from meaning to action (2017b:146). 
J. Merz (2017b; see also 2014; J. Leach 2015; Staples 2008) argues that our 
understanding of life should not be limited by current semiotic thinking that 
continues to determine anthropological analysis, but needs to be extended to 
include ontonicity. Our experiences and relationships with other entities are thus 
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not only semiotic but also ontonic. This being the case, ontonicity is a feature of 
life for both human and nonhuman entities. Therefore, rather than sharing a 
common humanity, I suggest that we share a common ontonity. I thereby 
reaffirm that all entities – whether human or nonhuman – exist within the same 
ontological world, which is nevertheless made up of multiple perspectives. 
These perspectives overlap and intermingle and our shared ontonity allows us 
to move between them, admittedly with varying degrees of success depending 
on how we presence other entities (see Chapters Three and Eight). Thus, when 
the encounter between two entities is more ontonic than semiotic, they meet 
each other as ontons. This allows us to move beyond the impasse resulting 
from a combination of current semiotic analysis, together with the challenges 
that a multiple ontological stance creates (see also Pickering 2017). 
By accessing the ontological penumbra through our shared ontonity, it is 
possible to negotiate it productively and creatively to the benefit of both myself 
– the human anthropologist – and hopefully the human and nonhuman entities I 
engage with. Not only does the notion of ontons and a common ontonity 
embrace ideas about intersubjectivity and Milton’s (2005) egomorphism, but 
they also allow for empathetic relationships, a subject I return to in Chapters 
Four and Eight. 
Some level of alterity between “self” and “other”, however, is inevitable and 
even necessary epistemologically (Tsuda 2015; see also Willerslev 2007:22-
26). After all, part of the anthropological endeavour is to seek out differences in 
order to understand others: “Taking alterity seriously is at the heart of what 
anthropologists do” Harris and Robb point out, yet “understanding, not alterity” 
should be our central aim (2012:676). Tsuda (2015:16; see also Marchesini 
2010) adds that difference is not only productive for the anthropologist, but also 
for interviewees, as it allows both parties to reflect about what makes them 
different. I too encountered this during my research. Several of my interviewees 
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thanked me at the end of an interview, as my questions stimulated them to think 
about their sociocultural background in ways they had not considered before 
(see also Miller 2013:145). At this juncture, I need to add that negotiating the 
ontological penumbra entails dealing with two areas of alterity: firstly that which 
exists between me, the anthropologist and the other entities I encounter; and 
secondly how I deal with my research data, which challenge what I consider to 
be true (Holbraad 2009, see below). Remaining with the former for the moment, 
one further way to diminish radical alterity is to think of the “other” as one’s 
“counterpart” instead (Marcus 2008:7). 
In his essay Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture 
(1973:3-30), Geertz notes: 
Although one starts any effort at thick description, beyond the obvious 
and superficial, from a state of general bewilderment as to what the 
devil is going on – trying to find one’s feet – one does not start (or ought 
not to) intellectually empty-handed. Theoretical ideas are not created 
wholly anew in each study (1973:27). 
Geertz recognises that one’s engagement in the field is never empty or neutral. 
We always engage in ethnographic encounters with some pre-conceived ideas. 
Although Geertz is referring here to theoretical ideas that anthropologists may 
benefit from and build upon from other studies, their exposure to ideas and 
resulting inspiration are not limited to these. Anthropologists’ counterparts 
should include not only their subjects with whom they engage whilst conducting 
research, but also others who are implicated in the act of generating 
anthropological theory and ethnographies35. According to Salzman, this is a 
necessary part of the ethnographic endeavour so that “the perspectives and 
insights of each researcher can be challenged and tested by the others” 
(2002:812; see also Lichterman 2017) in order to offset over-introspection by 
                                             
35 See, for example, Weiner (1988), who uses excerpts from her daughter’s diary. Weiner 
acknowledges that her daughter’s “presence and the diary she kept provided me with 
stimulation and insights” (1988:xi). See also Tsing (2015:viii-x). 
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individual anthropologists and validate their findings. In sum, the debate about 
the ontological turn is a good example of scholars engaging with their 
counterparts and negotiating the ontological penumbra (see, for example, Scott 
2013; Eduardo Viveiros de Castro 2014). For me, one such counterpart is my 
Swiss husband, Johannes Merz. 
Johannes, my Counterpart 
Johannes and I both work as sociocultural anthropologists for a faith-based 
non-governmental organisation called SIL International36, which specialises in 
language development. Johannes first developed the idea of presencing during 
his doctoral studies, and – quite correctly – the limelight is his. I cannot help 
feeling that I am in his umbra, as I helped him refine his ideas and came up with 
some of the vocabulary he introduces and uses (“transvisuality”, “onton” and 
“presencing practices”, for example). In other instances, ideas, such as the 
“ontological penumbra” and the example of how presencing accounts for 
different interpretations of Holy Communion (see Chapter Three) developed in 
dialogue for which neither of us can take individual credit. Conversely, when I 
expressed my concern about the limitations of “humanity” and my desire to 
come up with an alternative, all-embracing term, we discussed a number of 
possibilities. Working with the idea of “ontons”, I then suggested ontontity. 
Johannes advised that it should rather be ontonity. 
We thus work as a team, despite having different fields of specialisation and 
separate research projects. Our different interests, together with our ideas and 
findings often complement each other as we seek to understand the local 
sociocultural milieu, the ontological and epistemological ramifications of our 
research and if and how our findings can be applied more broadly. Sometimes 
one of us struggles with a notion and – as we discuss it together – inspiration 
                                             
36 Today the acronym is the organisation’s name. SIL was formerly known as the Summer 
Institute of Linguistics. 
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comes and together we work at refining our ideas and analysis. We are like two 
stones that rub together and hone each other, but sometimes one stone 
eclipses the other. Our collaborative relationship means that we draw on each 
other’s work in writing too. This also forms part of the ontological penumbra as 
we negotiate the fine line between giving credit where credit is due, whilst not 
appearing to promote one another’s work unduly. 
When we first arrived in Cobly in 2002 we did not have a specific research 
agenda. This meant we could spend time just being, as Henare et al. (2007) 
suggest, which allowed our encounters with people and other entities to be 
heuristic. Ironically, it helped that the Togo-Benin branch of SIL International did 
not know what to do with us. The branch’s administration was delighted to have 
two anthropologists assigned to it, but largely left us to our own devices as we 
found our feet and slowly established our roles, initially as anthropology 
researchers and advisors, and later as recognised consultants for SIL 
International. Our autonomy in SIL Togo-Benin gave us the freedom to openly 
engage with the community around us, which helped us increasingly to question 
modernistic and Western ways of analysing our encounters. Of course 
questions arose as our notion of what people, animals and things are was 
challenged. As Henare et al. propose, “anthropological analysis has little to do 
with trying to determine how other people think about the world. It has to do with 
how we must think in order to conceive a world the way they do” (2007:15, 
emphasis in original). It was only several years later, once we started our 
respective study programmes and embarked on specific research projects, that 
we realised that our way of thinking had changed and that we had begun to 
perceive the world more as the Bebelibe do. For example, Huber (1973:387) 
wrote about diviners being “possessed” by siyawesi bush-beings. With time, 
rather than accepting his analysis, I came to disagree with it. Cohen’s (2008) 
article on spirit possession further helped refine my unease with Huber’s 
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analysis. Cohen proposes that there are two forms of possession: pathogenic 
and executive, with the latter corresponding to a spiritual being taking over and 
controlling the host, which is what Huber’s analysis suggests. My experience 
and research indicated that diviners did not experience executive possession, 
although it could appear this way to those not familiar with the underlying 
ontological notions common to many Bebelibe. If the encounter is to be 
analysed in terms of possession, it is rather pathogenic given that the 
individuals concerned appear to be crazy, but their identities are not displaced 
by a spiritual being (Cohen 2008:109; see also S. Merz 2017a). As my 
knowledge of local ontological understanding further deepened, I realised that 
the idea of possession (whether executive or pathogenic) is – in fact – 
misleading, as the siyawesi are not spiritual beings, but bush-beings who 
primarily exist in the less-visible parts of the world. Those the siyawesi then 
choose to reveal themselves to thereby have an encounter with a physical 
being. The siyawesi remain invisible, however, to the majority of people 
witnessing such encounters. Consequently, the person appears to be behaving 
irrationally (see also Ontological Overview, Chapter Three). 
My reaction to Huber’s work was a natural outcome of my immersion in 
Ubielo society and heuristic encounters over a number of years. This 
exemplifies the other issue of alterity arising from the ontological penumbra: 
namely how I deal with my data and my need to address and deconstruct some 
dichotomous ideas I initially arrived with. Holbraad suggests that 
the most interesting anthropological data are those that cannot be 
captured by the analyst’s default concepts. Alterity, in this sense, 
implies that we must always begin analysis in the dark, mired in 
misunderstanding […] we have here the makings of a method that may 
allow us to approximate an understanding of native concepts and the 
strange statements that define them – a method I call ‘ontography’ 
(2009:90). 
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For Holbraad (2009) alterity is an ontological rather than epistemological issue 
that arises exactly because – in the endeavour to understand their counterparts 
– anthropologists are dealing with data that “resist collection” given that the 
underlying concepts they draw on may not allow them to adequately describe 
their findings, at least initially. He shares that something can appear to be 
“‘alter’ just because it negates what I assume to be true when writing 
anthropologically” (2009:84). He goes on to explain that 
the fact that ‘alter’ ethnographic data present themselves initially as 
negations of what we commonsensically take to be true is a result of the 
fact that our commonsense assumptions are conceptually inadequate to 
describe this data. We are getting the ‘wrong’ answers because we 
have been asking the wrong questions (2009:85; see also H. Hill 
1996:334). 
Although Holbraad emphasises the ontological nature of alterity, this should not 
result in epistemology being abandoned or negated in favour of ontology. On 
the contrary: 
As a space of encounter and dialogue, as well as reflexivity and 
creativity, the penumbra has a strong epistemological component, since 
it is where ethnographic knowledge takes shape as a basis for 
anthropology as an academic discipline (J. Merz and S. Merz 2017:9; 
see also Kenyon 2013). 
Holbraad, together with Pedersen, later acknowledges that ontology and 
epistemology need to go hand-in-hand, and that this is a “central concern of the 
ontological turn” which is “about creating the conditions under which one can 
‘see’ things in one’s ethnographic material that one would not otherwise have 
been able to see” (2017:4). For Holbraad and Pedersen, the ontological turn is 
thereby 
a methodological project that poses ontological questions to solve 
epistemological problems. […] The epistemological problem of how one 
sees things is turned into the ontological question of what there is to be 
seen in the first place (2017:5, emphasis in original. See also pp. 173-
174). 
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It was only as my understanding of Bebelibe ontology and epistemology 
developed that I started to question my own, and consequently Huber’s 
underlying and often dichotomous assumptions. Two such dichotomies that I 
needed to deconstruct and reappraise were spirit versus matter and what 
constitutes truth versus fiction. I examine these in detail in Chapters Three and 
Eight, and The Role of Myths, Chapter Seven, as they are pivotal for 
understanding human-animal relationships amongst the Bebelibe.  
Insider or Outsider? 
My reaction to Huber also illustrates another conundrum that I needed to 
negotiate in the ontological penumbra: am I an insider or outsider? This is not 
only an issue when I am in Cobly, but also when I am back in Europe. As I 
move between the different ontological and epistemological perspectives that I 
experience and encounter in Benin, the UK and Switzerland, I experience a 
sense of limbo, as I neither feel fully insider nor fully outsider in any of these 
countries. “Indeed, some argue that there is no such thing as a true ‘insider,’ 
either cultural or gendered, because multiple and overlapping traits both draw 
people together and push them apart”, Falen (2008:166) points out as he 
reflects on his research amongst women in Benin, whilst Narayan proposes to 
more profitably view each anthropologist in terms of shifting 
identifications amid a field of interpenetrating communities and power 
relations. The loci along which we are aligned with or set apart from 
those whom we study are multiple and in flux (1993:671). 
She later suggests that non-native anthropologists who have a long-term 
engagement with the communities they work with should be considered 
bicultural and that we should rather focus on how well we, as anthropologists, 
are “situated in relation to the people we study” (1993:671; see also Aston et al. 
2015; Bryant 2015; Tsuda 2015) rather than whether we are native (insiders) or 
non-native (outsiders). My bicultural status was brought home to me during a 
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community event in December 2016 that Johannes and I attended. The 
purpose of the event was to launch some new materials that had been 
produced in Mbelime and generally to promote the language. Invitees included 
the local authorities and other stakeholders from elsewhere in Benin and Togo. 
We were somewhat bemused by the speeches given by those representing the 
local community. They all lauded our contribution to developing the language 
and stressed that we were Beninese, Bebelibe or their children. We realised the 
speech givers were informing people coming from elsewhere that they were the 
outsiders, not us. Despite this, Tsuda correctly points out that “regardless of 
what type of anthropologist we are (native, non-native, semi-native), the 
distance and differences between researcher and researched always persist 
and can never be completely eliminated” (2015:15). Hammersley and Atkinson 
(2007:88-91) also discuss the insider-outsider tensions that the ethnographer 
faces. In discussing both the challenges and advantages of these tensions, they 
allude to the ontological penumbra: 
[T]he researcher can also generate creative insight out of this marginal 
position of being simultaneous insider-outsider. The ethnographer 
needs to be intellectually poised between familiarity and strangeness; 
and, in overt participant observation, socially he or she will usually be 
poised between stranger and friend […] (2007:89). 
There is a sense of split personality that the disengaged/engaged 
ethnographer may suffer. But this feeling, and equivalent feelings, 
should be managed for what they are. Such feelings are not necessarily 
something to be avoided, or to be replaced by more congenial 
sensations of comfort. The comfortable sense of being ‘at home’ is a 
danger signal. […] There must always remain some part held back, 
some social and intellectual ‘distance’. For it is in the space created by 
this distance that the analytic work of the ethnographer gets done 
(2007:90). 
The fuzzy insider-outsider boundaries become especially apparent when I need 
to communicate my findings to others. I find it a lot easier to write when I am in 
Cobly. Does this mean that I have become too much at home here? I recognise 
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that my immersion in local understandings means I have taken on some of 
these for myself, especially those that better explain my experiences than 
Western alternatives I am exposed to. Local explanations about how beings are 
composed (see Ontological Overview, Chapter Three), for example, make more 
sense to me now than ideas about the body, and the vague – sometimes 
confusing – notions about mind, soul and spirit that I grew up with. Despite the 
fact that Cobly has become home for me, however, I will never be truly Ubielo. 
This becomes especially apparent when certain principles I have been brought 
up with – such as those related to managing time and money – assert 
themselves. I also visit Europe regularly and these times of distance and 
detachment further help me to analyse my findings. 
When I relate my findings and experiences to people in Europe, however, 
they often sound nonsensical and many people’s reactions affirm this. In 
response, I tailor what I say depending on the situation and people I engage 
with. According to Bowie, this is inevitable, given that anthropologists are 
“translator[s] of culture” (2006:10) who address multiple audiences 
simultaneously (2006:12). Despite this, my efforts to explain the sociocultural 
situation in northwestern Benin as sensitively as possible in order to diminish 
alterity and heighten understanding can at times have the opposite effect. 
Consequently, I sometimes decide that it is better to say nothing and side-step 
questions about what it is I do. West identifies similar tensions when writing 
about Muedan sorcery in Mozambique, and likens the act of ethnographic 
writing as a form of sorcery: 
I have made of Mueda and Muedans something that they themselves 
have not; I have remade them in accordance with my own vision. If so 
doing constitutes a form of sorcery, I am left to wonder […] what kind of 
sorcerer I am. To what ends have I engaged with the Muedan life-
world? What have I made of it […]? Have I harmed or have I healed? If, 
as Andras Sandor has told us, the power of metaphor depends upon 
reflection, have I fortified Muedans by facilitating reflection upon how 
they have made their world through imaginative flights of reference to 
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the invisible realm of sorcery? Or have I – like Evans-Pritchard plucking 
charcoal from the witch doctor Bögwözu’s poultice to expose him as a 
‘fraud’ ([1937] 1976: 103) – disempowered Muedans by calling attention 
to the made-ness of the world and/or exposing how it has been made?” 
(2007:83, emphasis in original; see also Hastrup 1992). 
On other occasions I find myself questioning something from what could be 
considered an Ubielo perspective. I then reflect about how I used to react to the 
same thing previous to living in Cobly. For example, biblical passages that refer 
to God as a rock, or more generally rocks as altars,37 never held much 
significance for me in the past. When I read such passages now, I wonder how 
they are understood locally given that certain stones and rocks (ataadɛ, sg. 
ditade) are shrine entities and act as intermediaries between Uwienu (God) and 
people (see Ontological Overview, Chapter Three). This ongoing reflexive 
process highlights the different ways people experience and continually 
(re)construct reality, together with its plasticity and how different understandings 
of the world affect and infect one another (See also Bernard 2017; Bowie 
2006:9; Hastrup 1987; Hurn 2012:12, 78).  
Being an Anthropologist and a Christian 
This brings me to another issue: the challenge of being an anthropologist and a 
Christian. As we have explained elsewhere: 
As secularly trained professional anthropologists working for an 
international faith-based Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) we 
often find ourselves caught between the proverbial rock of religious 
theology and the hard place of secular anthropology. Together with 
other anthropologists who have spiritual interests, we sometimes face 
skepticism and animosity from various colleagues of both secular and 
religious perspectives and disciplines, including anthropology and 
theology.  
Some anthropologists have questioned our suitability and ability to 
engage in anthropology. Coming from British Baptist and Swiss 
Reformed backgrounds our ‘Christian’ bias is sometimes seen by 
                                             
37 Judges 6:17-24, 2 Samuel 22, Psalm 28:1-2, for example. 
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default as imposing, prescriptive and intolerant, especially due to its 
perceived genealogical links with the modern project of Western 
Christendom and its colonial past. Several of our colleagues who are 
anthropologists with religious or spiritual interests, most notably 
American Christians, have either had to keep quiet about their religious 
life, certainly in writing, or face opposition to the extent that some feel 
part of ‘a persecuted minority within the discipline’ ([Arnold 2006], p. 
268; see also [Fountain 2013], pp. 12–13; [Taylor 2007], p. 262). We 
have been involved in debates where some colleagues have argued 
that it is not possible to be a Christian and an anthropologist. Such a 
position inevitably leads to secular anthropologists doubting our ability 
to conduct research, engage in appropriate analysis and come to valid 
conclusions.  
On the other hand, anthropologists with spiritual interests have also 
been accused from within the religious camp as being either heretics or 
having succumbed to secularism ([Evans-Pritchard 1962], pp. 37–38). 
Christian friends, including theologians and missionaries, sometimes 
struggle with our findings and writings as being too secular and critical 
to the extent that we feel they question our spiritual identity and 
sincerity. On one occasion a missionary friend shared his concern with 
us that we had been seen by other Christians attending sacrifices. He 
was worried about our exposure to demonic activities and our personal 
integrity as Christians, how our actions would appear to the Christian 
community in general, and how this would reflect on the NGO we work 
with.  
Such confrontations may not always be pleasant, but they have pushed 
us to reflect on our backgrounds and secular and religious identities as 
we attempt to explain and justify our perspective to both camps. 
Consequently, we have gained first-hand experience of the inherently 
problematic nature of anthropology – and of theology to a lesser degree 
– as academic disciplines and of their practitioners’ different 
perspectives in terms of both the secular and the religious. While we 
find ourselves in a challenging and sometimes uncomfortable position, it 
is also exciting and enriching. Drawing on this experience and various 
aspects of current anthropology, we seek to overcome the 
religious/secular dichotomy that has plagued anthropology as a 
discipline and has significantly contributed towards its ‘awkward 
relationship’ [Robbins 2006] with theology. In order to achieve this, we 
propose that as anthropologists we consciously occupy what we call the 
ontological penumbra where we engage with various counterparts, both 
human and nonhuman, as part of the ethnographic encounter (J. Merz 
and S. Merz 2017:1-2).38  
                                             
38 See also Bekoff (2001) who makes some similar observations from an ethologist’s 
perspective. 
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We then go on to examine and deconstruct the religious versus secular 
dichotomy and propose the need for a postsecular stance within the discipline. 
We conclude by suggesting that 
a possible solution lies in the postsecular turn, to which anthropologists 
have not yet given much attention. Postsecularism rejects 
secularization theories as invalid and recognizes that the religious and 
the spiritual are still very much with us and continue to exist alongside 
the secular. The religious and the secular, then, need to be recognized 
as interdependent and coexisting to varying degrees. This means that 
anthropology can no longer escape or ignore the religious, even in its 
midst, but should rather seek to bring it back actively as part of the 
secular and religious dynamics of postsecularism (J. Merz and S. Merz 
2017:14; see also Ingold 2013a). 
Being an anthropologist with spiritual interests further blurs insider-outsider 
boundaries and can help reduce the distance between my counterparts and 
myself. As we have noted elsewhere (J. Merz and S. Merz 2015:10-11), the 
people we work with in northwestern Benin often assume that we are 
Christians, and would be sceptical if we were to claim an agnostic, atheistic or 
anti-religious position (see also Bryant 2015:39-40; Hutchinson 1996:326-327). 
Generally, we have found that our faith commitment has proved to be a 
methodological advantage. It facilitates relationships not only with the local 
population, but also with officials and religious leaders more generally, as they 
too often have a faith commitment and believe in God. 
Bowie notes: 
Sundkler goes on to reflect on the inevitable bias in all anthropological 
investigations, whether the fieldworker is a Christian believer or an 
atheist, noting that: ‘Obviously the writer’s valuations and ideals enter 
into the investigation – from the collecting of the material itself, which is 
the fundamental stage, to the final presentation with its balancing of one 
viewpoint against another’ (Sundkler, 1961, p. 16). The notion of 
disinterested social science is a myth (2006:7). 
Not surprisingly then, as an anthropologist who is also a Christian, I am 
particularly interested in the local forms of Christianity that I encounter in Cobly, 
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which aspects of church teaching people readily appropriate or not and the 
impact of Christianity more generally. At times I struggle with what people are 
being taught in church, the resulting corporate actions and the expectations 
placed upon them. Some of the churches, for example, promote a prosperity 
gospel and people are expected to regularly demonstrate their material 
success. Many individuals I know have got into debt as a consequence, by 
regularly spending their money on new outfits for church, and other material 
goods and services that demonstrate success, rather than on those I would 
consider essential (see the example of Victor in Relational Complexities and 
Becoming, Chapter Eight). What I perceive as an overemphasis on material 
wealth and individual success clashes with the values promoted by the 
churches I attend in the UK and Switzerland, which challenge materialistic and 
individualistic “it’s all about me” lifestyles (see, for example, Lindstrom 2011) 
and promote engagement with the wider society. 
Meanwhile, the relatively recent arrival of Christianity presents me with an 
ideal opportunity to explore the impact of church teaching on human-animal 
relationships. Accordingly, many of my interviewees were churchgoers (see 
Research Conducted below). Besides interviews, participating in the life of the 
community has been an important part of my research. 
Participating in the Community 
Henare et al.’s (2007:4-7) recommendations about the importance of 
experiencing things heuristically does not seem to be that much different from 
participant observation, especially when the anthropologist has no specific 
research agenda and thus has the liberty to simply participate, observe and 
develop relationships. The difference lies in anthropologists’ attitudes to the 
activities they participate in. By collapsing the “experience/analysis divide,” 
Henare et al. suggest that “the experience of things in the field is already an 
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encounter, simpliciter, with meanings” (2007:4, emphasis in original). Since 
2002, I have had many opportunities for such encounters as I participate in the 
life of the communities I engage with in the Commune of Cobly. During the past 
fifteen years, I have regularly attended various community and family events. 
These have included celebrations and ceremonies linked to birth, initiation, 
marriage, agriculture, installation of key community figures and death. I also 
generally take part in the day-to-day life of the neighbourhood where we live. 
We live in a simple house that is not too ostentatious, but affords us a level 
of privacy, whilst not isolating us completely from our neighbours. Times of 
general socialising have been especially important for deepening friendships 
and engaging in informal, yet in-depth discussions and conversations. Like 
Hutchinson, I have found these occasions and friendships allow me to “express 
my uncertainties, curiosities, and experiences of ‘culture shock’ openly with 
others and to take the conversation from there […]. Fieldwork”, she goes on to 
say, is “‘perfecting the art of conversation.’ And for a rewarding conversation, 
one needs thoughts and opinions for other people to engage with” (1996:45; 
see also Gibbal 1988:216). 
It is not unusual for people to express curiosity about my curiosity and ask 
me questions in return. Again, like Hutchinson (1996:45), I think it is important 
to give open and honest answers. As mentioned above, this is part of the 
ongoing process that allows anthropologists and their counterparts to deal with 
alterity and come to a better understanding of each other. 
These times of informal discussion with friends have often provided me with 
important lines of enquiry to follow up that I might not have thought of 
otherwise. It was when I was green-lighting ideas about what I could research 
for my PhD with Roland, a trained pastor in his mid-forties, that he told me 
about Emile the baker who had ordered the crocodile killed. This story then 
provided the foundation on which to build my research project.  
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I grew up surrounded by animals and have always been interested in how 
others interact with animals and their attitudes about meat. Two experiences in 
particular heightened my interest: dealing with the shock of being fed horse 
burgers by my host family during a French exchange when I was twelve, and 
my mixed reactions of appal, yet fascinating appeal, when offered whole-mouse 
kebabs by roadside sellers in Malawi during an undergraduate fieldtrip. Since 
coming to Benin, I have observed how people interact with different entities, 
including things and animals, and have, in turn been observed. Our diseede 
wante (family animals) include Fuggles the dog, Galaxy the cat, chickens and 
ducks. We have had other dogs, cats and a sheep in the past. Our diseede 
wante have acted as “social catalysts” (Hurn 2012:102) and gatekeepers (Acton 
2014), which has been beneficial for my integration into the community, 
understanding the local environment and my research. Several interviewees, for 
example, referred to our animals during their interview, commenting – with 
approval – about our keeping poultry or referring to one of our dogs to exemplify 
a point they wanted to make. More generally, people with whom I may not 
otherwise socialise, regularly engage Fuggles and me in conversation when I 
take him for a walk (see also Lane 2015; K. Swanson 2008). They ask after him 
when he is not with me, and tell me to greet him for them once I am home. 
People also express consternation that I take him out on a lead, as they see 
this as a violation of his autonomy (see What is an Animal? and Property or 
Sentient Beings?, Chapter Four). 
Such occurrences have allowed me to experience first-hand the joys and 
challenges of being responsible for animals in a situation very different from the 
UK. Not only are veterinary services in the Commune of Cobly minimal39, but I 
                                             
39 Locally there are no veterinary surgeons, but rather techniciens des services vétérinaires 
(TSVs) who have some basic veterinary knowledge, offer important vaccines (such as rabies) 
and can perform simple procedures. The regional capital, Natitingou (50 miles from Cobly, see 
Map 1), now has a private veterinary practice since 2014. 
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have also been confronted with local knowledge and ideas very different from 
those I grew up with, such as people’s reactions to my using a lead with 
Fuggles, and ideas about animal autonomy and husbandry more generally. 
Another early example of note took place in February 2004. Johannes and I 
had gone to a neighbouring town with a group of Bebelibe musicians for an 
ethnomusicology workshop. When we arrived a young American woman sought 
my advice. A horse had kicked a young mule (Equus mulus) and shattered its 
off hind leg, could anything be done to save it? The leg was a mess; the bone 
had broken through the skin and the rest of the leg was dangling by some 
muscle and sinews. There was no way it could be saved, but neither was there 
a vet40 who could come and put it down. Finding someone who would be willing 
to kill it proved to be almost impossible, although I knew that most of the men 
present would have an idea how to kill it. Yet, when I asked if someone could 
put the mule out of its misery, everybody refused. Yes, they agreed that the 
mule was suffering, but they evidently were uncomfortable with the suggestion 
that it should be killed. I realised that they were afraid. I later learnt that 
members of the Equidae family are considered extremely powerful and are 
accorded quasi-human status. Consequently, to kill an Equidae family member 
without just cause41 is tantamount to murder and there is the danger that the 
animal concerned will avenge its death (see Chapter Six). Those present 
thought it better to let the mule die naturally than to be implicated in its death. 
Eventually a Fulani42 agreed to do the deed. 
                                             
40 TSVs do not have the means – and are often unwilling – to put animals down. When an 
animal needs to be destroyed (locally, people employ the French verb achever) one needs to 
find a local person who knows how to kill the animal in question. 
41 This includes killing animals that are very sick or severely injured (see Sickness, Danger 
and Animals Behaving Badly, Chapter Five). 
42 The Fulani (or Peuhl in French) are cattle herders present throughout West Africa. They 
are largely nomadic, though there are some who have settled in the area. 
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Research Conducted 
Negotiating my own and other people’s views about and interactions with 
animals has been an enriching experience and one of the main motivating 
factors behind my choosing to conduct this research. My experiences have 
provided me with important insights about people’s relationships with animals 
and the issues arising from these. This, in turn, has been invaluable in thinking 
through what questions to ask during interviews. These insights also allowed 
me to understand better what people told me and to interpret and analyse the 
resulting data. Conducting formal interviews has been important for affirming – 
or otherwise – my observations and informal conversations to date. Such 
research provides me with points of orientation when negotiating the ontological 
penumbras I encounter. It also provides me with further data that will hopefully 
allow me to make a valid epistemological contribution to the field of 
anthropology. I now detail the actual research I conducted. 
Phase One 
During the first phase of my research, which I conducted in 2015, as part of my 
general participant observation, I spent a day with a dog butcher, an afternoon 
with a group of young men as they butchered a pig and goat for a celebration, 
and visited two commercial animal farms. I also interviewed 50 people (see 
details below) from 12 of the 24 Mbelime-speaking communities (see Map 3 
and Bebelibe Communities in the Appendices). Most interviews took place 
during the months of February to May, which is the hot season. People usually 
finish harvesting their crops by February and agricultural activities are minimal 
as people wait for the rains to start. I also interviewed a retired pastor whose 
first appointment was to a village in the Commune of Cobly where he had to 
deal with a scandal about Christians killing crocodiles in the 1960s (see 
Vignette Two, Chapter Seven), and asked the gendarmerie commander if he 
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would be willing to provide information about official complaints and crimes 
involving animals. In this instance, we established that it would be better for me 
to provide a simple questionnaire, for which he solicited the help of the other 
gendarmes, then provided me with written answers. 
Bienvenue Sambiéni conducted two butcher surveys in June 2015 and 
December 2017 for the town of Cobly to establish how many butchers and meat 
sellers there are and if they are increasing. The surveys include information 
about where in town they are located, when they started, what animals they 
butcher and what problems they encounter. Bienvenue has assisted me with 
research since 2004. Johannes and I initially employed him as a night guard in 
2002. Some months after taking him on, he asked if he could borrow our French 
dictionary. Curiosity finally got the better of us and we asked him what he was 
using it for. We learnt that he was spending his nights translating the dictionary 
into Mbelime. Bienvenue is passionate about his language and culture. 
Although he never finished his secondary school education, he has a good level 
of French and an excellent command of the Mbelime orthography. He is a 
natural networker and is well liked and respected. Having observed these 
qualities, we took him on as a fulltime research assistant and general helper. He 
has since become the driving force behind the Mbelime-French dictionary (N.B. 
Sambiéni et al. 2016). 
Claire N’Tadé, my second research assistant and general helper since 
2006, also started working for us in 2002 as a part-time cleaner. She too loves 
her language and culture and is in good standing with the community. She has 
been trained as a literacy teacher and also has a good level of French, despite 
not finishing her secondary school education. 
In order to understand the more complex nature of totemic relationships and 
other phenomena such as shapeshifting and reincarnation, I needed to 
establish how people relate to animals more generally. I also wanted to 
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ascertain if, how and why people’s attitudes toward animals might be changing, 
so I asked the 50 interviewees questions about: 
• Human-animal relations (human-animal ontology; communicating with 
animals; shapeshifting and reincarnation); 
• Killing animals (when; why; the dangers involved) and meat eating (likes and 
dislikes; interdictions; frequency and trends); 
• Animal husbandry (tethering and confinement; breeding and castration 
practices); 
• Using draught animals (perceptions and dangers involved). 
As this part of my research focused on people’s ideas about and attitudes 
towards animals, I conducted semi-structured – also known as guided (J. Bell 
2002:138) or reflexive (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007:117) – interviews. I 
started each interview with the same two questions: “Do animals have kɛbodikɛ 
(animating force)?” and “Do they also have mtakimɛ (identity)?” I then asked 
further questions pertaining to the subjects under discussion, but did not strictly 
follow my questionnaire, as I preferred to allow the conversation to develop and 
flow as naturally as possible. If the interview had been overly structured, it could 
come over as an oral questionnaire with the risk of being too limiting and 
impersonal. Conversely, having no structure at all could result in the 
conversation going in unexpected directions. Although the information might 
prove to be interesting, it might not necessarily be relevant (J. Bell 2002:138; 
Hammersley and Atkinson 2007:118). This scenario is not necessarily 
disadvantageous, however, and can arise with semi-structured interviewing too. 
Early on in my interviews, questions about shapeshifting quickly revealed 
information about an animal that interviewees referred to as kɛmunnaakɛ43 (pl. 
simunnaasi ) in Mbelime or l’âne sauvage in French. The French is ambiguous 
                                             
43 Literally “donkey-who-flattens” as they like to roll in the dirt, therefore flattening the 
ground. 
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as it could refer to the wild ass (Equus africanus) or feral donkeys (Equus 
africanus asinus). This opened up an avenue to explore further, as wild asses 
do not occur in the region and evidence suggests that they have never existed 
in Sub-Saharan Africa (Blench 2004:22). 
Working in a milieu where relationships and reciprocity are central features 
of the society means that good relationships are crucial, especially given that 
social research necessitates actively engaging with people and should never be 
treated simply as a means of collecting data (Banks 2001:179; see also 
Narayan 1993:677); “Ethnography, whatever else it might be, is a relational 
endeavour” (Bielo 2013:5; see also Hammersley and Atkinson 2007:70, 109; J. 
Merz and S. Merz 2017:10). Thus, it is important that there is already an 
established relationship with interviewees, so that they feel at ease enough to 
share deeply and honestly about their knowledge and experiences. Establishing 
new relationships in the Commune of Cobly, especially with the older 
generation, can involve several visits and exchanging gifts. Accordingly, I 
mainly chose people I already knew and had worked with before, several of 
whom I consider friends (see also Tillmann-Healy 2003). The nature of my 
research meant that I needed to choose some new people too (two butchers, a 
meat-seller and two community shrine priests) to ensure that I represented all 
the different roles people have that involve animals in the Commune of Cobly. 
As there are a number of butchers and meat-sellers present in the town of 
Cobly, I sought advice from Bienvenue and Claire about potential interviewees. 
Their good standing in the Commune of Cobly, extensive relational networks 
and knowledge of the wider community meant that they could advise me about 
those who would be genuinely interested in helping. Bienvenue or Claire 
already had a good relationship with the new people I subsequently 
interviewed. Thus, they mediated on my behalf to arrange an initial meeting. 
This, in turn, ensured a level of mutual trust and understanding that might have 
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been lacking had I tried to initiate direct contact with the people concerned. 
Interviewees readily told me when they did not know something or when I had 
misunderstood them. This reassured me that they were not concocting 
information to please me. 
Interviewees included people living in the town of Cobly and the villages of 
Namountchaga, Oukodoo, Oroukparé and Sinni, all within the Commune of 
Cobly (see Map 2). They had an age range of 21 to 70 amongst the women and 
22 to 90 for the men. Local social structures mean that nearly everyone is 
related one way or another through sanguine or affinal relations. This meant 
that interviewees were often from the same immediate or extended family, and I 
had several instances where I interviewed fathers and sons, aunts and 
nephews, husbands and wives, or siblings, for example. All the interviews 
during Phase One, however, were between the individual and me, together with 
either Bienvenue or Claire when I needed an interpreter (see below). 
Interviewees had varying degrees of formal education from none at all to 
university graduates and those who have completed apprenticeships. Of the 50 
interviewees, all except six (one of whom is Muslim) had attended church 
(protestant and catholic) at some time or other and 26 were regular churchgoers 
when interviewed. Although this high ratio of churchgoers – both past and 
ongoing – is partly due to my interest in researching the impact of church 
teaching on human-animal relationships, it is also indicative of the more general 
situation. Church attendance in the town of Cobly is relatively high and people’s 
general curiosity and Christianity’s association with modernity means that many 
people try church and thus have a basic knowledge of Christianity (Erny 
2001:19; Horton 1971:86; J. Merz 2008:209; 2014:255-256; Meyer 1998; 1999). 
Accordingly, there are not many people who have never attended church at 
some point in their lives. Local forms of Christianity are not without their 
problems. Consequently, many become disillusioned and leave again. As I 
100 
 
 
have noted elsewhere (S. Merz 2017b:123), their disillusionment is often with 
the institutional nature of the church rather than with Christianity as a faith. 
Many ex-churchgoers still consider themselves Christian and appropriate ideas 
from the teaching they received or from reading the Bible in French if literate, 
especially when these ideas help them to understand better the world around 
them. 
Key community figures whom I interviewed included: the king, a village chief 
and two village deputy chiefs, two community shrine priests, a diviner, a retired 
pastor, a church leader, three butchers, a businessman and commercial 
farmer44, a pig farmer45, a meat seller, an animal trader and a soya cheese 
maker. 
Of the 50 interviewees, only 11 were women, five of whom were widows. 
This imbalance is partly due to education, as those who have successfully 
completed their baccalauréat or received a higher education were all male. This 
is representative of the schooling situation in general, as – until recently – boys 
were prioritised over girls. Writing about the Commune of Cobly in 1988, 
Heywood (1991:11) estimated that 95% of women were illiterate, whilst only 
10% of secondary school students were girls. More girls started going to school 
following a local campaign by Aide et Action in 2001 and 2002. Aide et Action 
put up large posters in town with a picture of cheerful girls in school uniforms 
and the slogan “Toutes les filles à l’école” [All girls to school]. Today, most 
people accept that all children should go to school. 
Men also represent the public face of the family. This, together with the 
positions they may hold and the schooling opportunities they have had, means 
that men are generally more open to participating in research. This discrepancy 
                                             
44 Over the years Isaac has raised poultry, rabbits, pigs and goats explicitly for commercial 
purposes, as opposed to the majority of the population who have diseede wante (family 
animals). See Introduction, Chapters Four and Five. 
45 Like Isaac, Bernadette raises pigs commercially. 
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is not unique to the Commune of Cobly. When conducting research in Internet 
cafés in urban settings in southern Benin, Moratti (2009:82) noted that the girls 
she approached were reluctant to participate in her research. The high ratio of 
widows amongst my female interviewees also typifies the sociocultural situation. 
Despite ongoing levirate practices (S. Merz 2014:15-17), widows often have to 
take on duties usually executed by men and subsequently become more 
forthright and generally more willing to participate in research. 
Finally, 15 of the male interviewees have roles that are considered male-
only roles (the king, village chiefs and deputies, pastors and church leaders, for 
example) or that only men can fulfil (community shrine priests and butchers), as 
women should not kill animals. The Mbelime term for woman is unitipuohɔ̰ (pl. 
bɛnitipuobɛ), literally “person-who-kills”. Women have the power to either create 
or destroy (see also Sewane 2002:11; Falen 2008:170; Vialles 1994:106-108) 
and are called “persons-who-kill” out of respect. Women should not abuse this 
power, however. If they kill animals, the animals could seek revenge by 
reincarnating their next child, for example. On occasion, however, a diviner will 
indicate that someone’s paternal aunt should perform a sacrifice (S. Merz 
2014:38, 52, 61). In this instance, there is no danger of revenge. Women are 
therefore less ceremonially involved with animals than men. In terms of general 
knowledge, attitudes towards and opinions expressed about animals, I found 
that gender did not seem to make a difference. 
17 of the interviews were in French only, whilst two were predominantly in 
French with some Mbelime, and the rest were in French and Mbelime. 
Bienvenue and Claire were my interpreters given that my spoken Mbelime is not 
adequate for in-depth interviewing. When choosing whether Bienvenue or 
Claire should be my interpreter, the relational aspect rather than their gender 
was the deciding factor, given that I found relationships are often more 
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important than gender amongst the Bebelibe due to their egalitarian ethos (see 
Introduction). 
Neither did my being a woman seem to limit my access to men or their 
willingness to share. Although this may be partly due to the fact that 
relationships rather than gender seem to be more important, Falen, writing 
about his research amongst women in southern Benin, encountered a number 
of problems and notes that 
similar obstacles are generally not recorded for women doing research 
among men (cf Marshall 1970, 181). Scholars have commented on this 
widely-held assumption that female researchers are more flexible, or 
possibly more androgynous, than men, making women ethnographers 
more likely to accomplish cross-gender research […] (2008:166, 
emphasis in original). 
Before starting formal research, I visited key community figures and 
gatekeepers (the king, village chiefs and local authorities such as the 
gendarmerie commander, for example) in the locations where I intended to 
conduct research. I explained what I would like to do and asked for their 
permission to conduct interviews with people who fall under their jurisdiction. I 
then approached people on an individual basis, explained the nature of my 
research and asked if they would be willing to be interviewed. We then 
arranged a place and time to meet again. 
Many of my interviewees were illiterate or semi-literate. Besides issues of 
literacy, many of the participants would not have viewed the use of a consent 
form positively. People associate paperwork that requires personal details and 
their signature (or thumb print) with politics and the government. Consequently, 
using a signed a consent form would be ethically questionable (ASA 2011:2; K. 
Bell 2014:512; Miller 2013:143-146). I therefore relied on verbal consent, which 
I recorded at the start of the actual interview. I asked if interviewees: 
• Were happy for me to record the interview; 
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• Were willing to participate in my research; 
• Would allow me to quote or refer to what they shared with me in my thesis 
write-up and other resulting publications. For those with whom I had worked 
with in the past, I also asked if I could use information from our previous 
interviews; 
• Wanted to be named in the acknowledgements (having explained that I 
would use pseudonyms in the main text of the thesis). 
Having asked the questions above, Antoine, a farmer in his mid-fifties, asked 
rhetorically, “Would I be here if I didn’t want to be?” He then laughed. Despite 
this, there was a slight edge of frustration, as Antoine has participated in 
several of my research projects and thought these questions unnecessary. Most 
interviewees simply replied, “yes” to all the questions. Like Antoine, however, 
several others with whom I have worked over the years, also gave speeches, 
seemingly for the benefit of the University: 
I am completely at your disposal and I think I’ll accompany you right to 
the very end. When you have a need, let me know. I am available at 
any moment. […] If I didn’t want [to help you] I wouldn’t have come. I 
accepted, I agreed, there’s no problem (Adrien, a churchgoing NGO 
worker in his late-twenties). 
Most of the interviewees wanted their name to be acknowledged, whilst some 
others said I could decide. Several were not keen on my using pseudonyms as 
having their name appear in print is important to them: “Yes!” Henri, a carpenter 
in his late-thirties, categorically stated, “no problem, yes, me, I will be proud 
[laughs]. One is born to do something. Yes, when God puts you in the world it’s 
to help, to do something for him.” Van der Geest notes a similar situation in 
Ghana: 
[Research participants] said they did not like my ‘confidentiality’. They 
wanted to see their names on paper. Their main worry was that after 
death they would sink into oblivion. My writing about them would help 
them to be remembered (2011:148; see also 2003; Tillmann-Healy 
2003:742). 
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Despite this I want to diminish potential repercussions for my interviewees 
resulting from what I write. I therefore decided to maintain pseudonyms, 
especially as several interviewees did disclose sensitive information at times, 
such as illegal hunting expeditions to the local national parks. Their stories also 
made me rethink my understanding of poaching, which – in principle – I am 
against. Discovering that some of my friends, however, were technically 
poachers, whilst learning that hunting is integral to their way of life has clouded 
the issue. I realised that I needed to review my ideals about poaching. Morris 
notes a similar situation:  
What is of interest about [Adams and McShane’s] account – quite 
unique among conservationists and wildlife officers – is that they 
sympathise with the hunters’ predicament and acknowledge the crucial 
importance of subsistence hunting in the local economy, and to the very 
livelihood of men like Nyirenda. The ‘poacher’ is no longer depicted as 
the ‘villain’ […] (2009:243; see also Milner-Gulland 2002). 
Interviewees also explained that bushmeat used to be the family’s main source 
of meat and bemoaned the decrease in bush animals today in the Commune of 
Cobly. This, in turn, impacts their relationship with their diseede wante (family 
animals), which they increasingly eat instead (see Chapters Four and Five). 
What is not clear is to what extent their subsistence hunting contributes to the 
decline of bushmeat, and how much is due to general pressure on the land 
through population growth and increasing agricultural activities.  
Despite my using pseudonyms, anyone familiar with the dispute between 
the Bɛbidibɛ and Bɛkɔpɛ, the 1960s crocodile killings and Emile the baker’s 
death would be able to identify some of the interviewees that I give voice to. I 
have taken care not to share anything that is not already public knowledge, 
however, that could potentially compromise the people concerned. 
When quoting interviewees, I have endeavoured to express what they 
shared in clear, natural English, whilst maintaining as far as possible the original 
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meaning. Linguistically, I have had to negotiate three languages: Mbelime (the 
main language of the Commune of Cobly), French (the language of wider 
communication) and English. Thinking through my interview questions 
necessitated that I tried to think with Mbelime logic before translating them into 
French so that the interviewees would correctly understand them. Bienvenue 
and Claire were my first interviewees. Following their interviews, I reviewed my 
questions with them to ensure that they understood my research objectives. 
After the first few interviews we conducted together, we re-evaluated the 
questions and refined them as needed. For example, one of the more 
challenging questions concerned shapeshifting. When talking about 
shapeshifting in Mbelime, people use the verb kɔnta (to become). This verb, 
however, is not limited to shapeshifting and is employed to describe other 
situations where a being’s identity changes either temporarily or permanently. 
This can include becoming rich, becoming a doctor, or reincarnating, for 
example. This meant that when we tried to elicit information about 
shapeshifting, some interviewees initially talked about reincarnation until we 
clarified the question by asking about a human who could temporarily become 
an animal, and then change back again (and vice versa). Similarly, when 
interviews were in French, people employed the verb transformer (to transform) 
when discussing shapeshifting and reincarnation. 
Having first gained permission from interviewees, I digitally recorded our 
conversation. This enabled me to concentrate on the discussion, whilst allowing 
it to develop and proceed as naturally as possible. Having a recording also 
facilitated further analysis of the interview afterwards, especially as the meaning 
of words can change when they cross linguistic or sociocultural boundaries 
(Meyer 1999:55, 80-82) and the vocabulary people employ can help to 
understand how they perceive and engage with the world around them 
(Hammersley and Atkinson 2007:145). For example, I was perplexed why those 
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I interviewed in French regularly stated that people hunt in the forest. For me, 
this conjured up images of extensive woodlands. Yet, I knew that most of the 
animals that people hunt live in the savannah. Bienvenue and Claire also 
interpreted the Mbelime term dikpaade as “forêt ”. After an in-depth discussion, 
we established that, although dikpaade can be a forest and wooded areas, it 
refers to any uninhabited wilderness, which includes savannah bush and 
grasslands. I later learnt that there is a specific Mbelime term (dibuode) for 
forest. 
Having the interviews recorded also meant that I could clarify potential 
ambiguities between Bienvenue and Claire’s French interpretations with what 
interviewees actually said in Mbelime. For example, Bienvenue regularly 
interpreted interviewees’ descriptions of shapeshifting as changing shirts. When 
I read the interview transcripts, however, there was no mention of shirts in 
Mbelime. The interviewees concerned talked about putting on or taking off 
different bodies. When I queried this, Bienvenue explained that people only use 
these verbs when talking about changing clothes (see Ontological Overview, 
Chapter Three and Socialising Crocodiles and Mischievous Monkeys, Chapter 
Six). This assured me that Bienvenue and Claire were doing a good job, as they 
explicated information that would otherwise be implicit. 
Besides formal times of participant observation and semi-structured 
interviews, since arriving in Cobly in 2002 I have kept a field journal, which 
includes observations and anecdotes that conceptualise Bebelibe 
understandings of human-animal interactions. Bienvenue and I have also been 
collecting myths. One immediate outcome is a vernacular booklet on the 
Bebelibe communities and their totems (N.B. Sambiéni and R. Sambiéni 2016). 
Although I have not authored the book, people acknowledge that it is directly 
linked to my research. The book is extremely popular, especially as it helps 
preserve the communities’ cultural heritage. 
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Phase Two 
During phase two of my research in 2016, I conducted in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews with people whose totem animal is the crocodile or python. Most of 
the interviews took place during the months of February, May and June. I 
asked: 
• If they knew the reason why the crocodile/python was their totem; 
• What could happen if they harm, kill and/or eat their totem animals; what 
they would do if they came across someone else mistreating their totem 
animals; the scandal of Christians killing crocodiles in the 1960s and of 
Emile the baker having a crocodile killed in 2013; 
• What it meant if they encountered their totem animals (alive, dead and in 
dreams); 
• Totem animals’ kinship status, reincarnation and shapeshifting; 
• Some more general questions to further clarify what differentiates humans 
from animals. 
Interviewees included people living in the town of Cobly and the villages of 
Namountchaga, Nanakadé, Okommo, Oukodoo and Oroukparé, all within the 
Commune of Cobly (see Map 2). In all, I interviewed 39 people, 11 of whom 
were women. In order to try and address the imbalance of men and women, I 
sought out seven more women with the help of Bienvenue and Claire. In two 
instances, other male members of the women’s families joined in the 
conversation – resulting in three more men – so that they became group 
interviews, sometimes with lively discussions. The men tended to dominate, 
which somewhat defied my objective of offsetting the male-female imbalance. 
Nevertheless, one of the discussions elicited important information about the 
scandal with Emile the baker that I may not have gained otherwise. In another 
instance, however, Louis’ wife was present during the first half of the interview. 
At times she dominated the discussion, especially when talking about Emile. 
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Despite being from the south, her discontent about what happened was evident 
(see Vignette One, Chapter Seven). 
I also interviewed a third community shrine priest whose totem is the 
crocodile. As four of the men and seven of the women had not participated in 
the first research phase, I also asked them some foundational ontological 
questions about human and animal composition before discussing totem 
animals more specifically. This brought the total number of interviewees for both 
phases to 63 (44 men, 19 women). 
During 2017 I conducted some further follow-up research. This included a 
group discussion about shapeshifting in the village of Kèyamboussikè (see Map 
2), documenting how soya cheese is made and further interviews with Robert, 
the NGO worker in his late-thirties, about his relationship with his python. 
Finally, I made a trip to the Pendjari National Park to get animal video footage. 
So far I have shown the video to five people who have seen a kɛmunnaakɛ (pl. 
simunnaasi, l’âne sauvage) in order to establish if this is actually an antelope 
rather than a wild ass or feral donkey. Results to date are ambiguous and will 
necessitate further research. Two people indicated that it is the female 
waterbuck (Kobus ellipsiprymnus defassa). The other three did not see any 
simunnaasi in the video (which does not include donkeys). Thus, the exact 
status of kɛmunnaakɛ remains in the shadowy realms of the ontological 
penumbra. 
Whilst navigating the ontological penumbra and thinking through its 
methodological and analytical ramifications, I also realised that negotiating 
penumbral issues has broader implications that go beyond methodology. In the 
coming chapters, I further explore these implications, together with the notion of 
presencing, in order to understand better human-animal relationships amongst 
the Bebelibe more generally before explicating the more complex nature of 
shapeshifting and totemic relationships. 
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Chapter Three 
Presencing and the Onton 
It was six men of Indostan 
To learning much inclined, 
Who went to see the Elephant 
(Though all of them were blind), 
That each by observation 
Might satisfy his mind (Saxe 1873:259) 
Saxe (1873:259-260) goes on in verse and depicts how each man drew a 
different conclusion depending on which part of the elephant he felt. The 
elephant was respectively a: wall (side), spear (tusk), snake (trunk), tree (knee), 
fan (ear) and rope (tail). He concludes: 
And so these men of Indostan 
Disputed loud and long, 
Each in his own opinion 
Exceeding stiff and strong, 
Though each was partly in the right, 
And all were in the wrong! 
So, oft in theologic wars 
The disputants, I ween, 
Rail on in utter ignorance 
Of what each other mean, 
And prate about an Elephant 
Not one of them has seen! (1873:260-261, emphasis in original) 
“Each was partly in the right, And all were in the wrong!” (Saxe 1873:260) Or 
were they? Each blind man engaged with the elephant and found meaning in 
what he discerned. Or – to put it another way – each blind man presenced the 
elephant differently so that what he perceived made sense to him. Now 
someone who sees the elephant has a different perception of it and may 
presence it in an entirely different way. Different people using different senses; 
different perceptions resulting in different conclusions, but everyone engaged 
with the same matter. Presencing – as explained by J. Merz (2017b) and as I 
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stated in the Introduction – accounts for how individuals “make present” and 
engage in and with the world around them. 
In Chapter Two, I introduced the onton following J. Merz (2017b), who 
explains that ontons are any living, relational entities that cannot be divided into 
representations (signifier) and represented (signified) as signs can. J. Merz 
(2017b) further elaborates that an onton is neither a structured nor an abstract 
sign, a material thing nor any other manifestation that signifies something else. 
The onton is rather an experiential, agentive and relational entity, which 
“interacts with other entities that populate and constitute the world” (2017b:149). 
This does not mean that ontons do not – or cannot – have multiple parts; they 
may have several. These parts, however, operate together as a single, 
inseparable and indistinguishable, non-representational entity, which is identical 
with its meaning (J. Merz 2017b). I then reaffirmed that all entities exist within 
the same ontological world and I proposed that when the encounter between 
two entities is more ontonic than semiotic, they meet each other as ontons. This 
means that multispecies – or to be more precise inter-ontonic relationships – 
are possible because of our shared ontonity. Ontonity results from our 
underlying ontonic nature, which includes the ability to engage ontonically in the 
world and with other entities. Ontonity not only enables us to encounter other 
entities as fellow beings, but also means that these encounters can be 
intersubjective and empathetic.  
How different individuals or groups manifest – or “presence” – ontonity at 
different times results in multiple ontological explanations and understandings 
of the world. People then move between or entertain different ontological 
explanations and understandings depending on the situation at the time. 
Presencing, then, could provide the means to move away from reductionist 
tendencies to classify societies as totemistic, animistic, naturalist, et cetera. 
Rather than starting out by seeing how a society best fits a given classification, 
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presencing starts with the premise that there are no classifications as such. 
Presencing thus shifts the focus to the process that people employ in order to 
make sense of the world as they engage in and with it. In order to demonstrate 
this and how ontonity can be understood in Bebelibe terms, I first need to 
explicate the underlying ontological notions common to many Bebelibe, as 
explained by the majority of my interviewees. This, in turn, forms the basis for 
appreciating how people relate to the other beings who populate their world, 
including animals, and how these different relationships are experienced 
through hunting, animal husbandry, ritual, shapeshifting and totemic 
engagement. These experiences and relationships then inform attitudes 
towards hunting, domestication, killing animals and consuming meat, and the 
commodification animals, which I explore in Chapters Four and Five, and how 
people perceive and relate to their totem animals, which I explore in Chapters 
Six and Seven. 
Ontological Overview 
As noted in the Introduction, people generally acknowledge Uwienu as the 
Supreme Being and creator of all. For those who follow the path of their 
ancestors and would not call themselves Christian, Uwienu usually remains 
distant46 and can only be approached via intermediaries. These include the 
ataadɛ (stones and rocks, which are shrine entities, sg. ditade) and atenwiɛnɛ 
(shrine entities more generally, sg. ditenwɛnde), bɛhidibɛ (the dead, sg. uhiidɔ) 
and siyawesi (bush-beings, sg. kɛyawedikɛ) (see also Huber 1973; S. Merz 
2017a). 
                                             
46 Sometimes Uwienu takes on human form to visit people (see below). See also Huber 
(1979:78), who recounts some myths that tell why Uwienu distanced himself from humans.  
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All beings have kɛbodikɛ (animating force, pl. sibosi ), mtakimɛ (identity) and 
either ukuɔnu (body-skin, pl. tikɔnte 47) or uhedihṵ (pelt and plumage, pl. 
tihedite 48), which accounts for their material presence in the more-visible parts 
of the world. What really constitutes an individual being is its kɛbodikɛ and 
mtakimɛ as its ukuɔnu is transient, and some beings – such as the siyawesi 
bush-beings and ataadɛ stone shrine entities – can have several tikɔnte 
simultaneously in the more- and less-visible parts of the world (see below). 
Using the analogy of a clothed body Joël, a thirty-year-old farmer, summarised 
how he understood the relationship between peoples’ tikɔnte, kɛbodikɛ and 
mtakimɛ. He explained that when you see people walking, you see them 
dressed in shirts and trousers. Their bodies are hidden under these clothes. 
The clothes that you see are the people’s tikɔnte, which they can change, 
whereas the body underneath the clothes are kɛbodikɛ and mtakimɛ, which 
cannot be separated. People – and other beings – can “change bodies” 
temporarily when they shapeshift and permanently following death, when they 
reincarnate (see below). Kɛbodikɛ and mtakimɛ, however, do not occupy the 
body as such but infuse it. Thus, beings are simultaneously and inseparably 
material and immaterial; they are “transmaterial” (J. Merz 2014:79-135).49  
Kɛbodikɛ (animating force) animates a being’s ukuɔnu by providing it with 
the force needed to live. Some people associate it with the movements of the 
circulatory system and breathing, whilst others say that it is located in the 
                                             
47 Often, when interpreting into French, people say that ukuɔnu is the body, and tikɔnte is 
the skin. Tikɔnte, however, is the plural form of ukuɔnu (skin). 
48 When talking about animals that have fur or feathers, people rather say uhedihṵ instead 
of ukuɔnu. Several interviewees explained that this distinguishes birds and furry animals from 
humans. They also recognise, however, that when the feathers or fur are removed, these 
animals also have ukuɔnu. 
49 See also Willerslev (2011:515-516), who notes the same idea for the Chukchi (Siberia). 
He also observes that “when taking a hasty glance through the enormous ethnographic literature 
on soul conceptions, it is hard to find any examples whatsoever of an altogether immaterial soul” 
(2011:514-515). Also Howell, writing about the Chewong of Malaysia, notes that “the ingredients 
of their embodied knowledge” include the body, ruwai (“soul”), eyes, odour and liver (seat of 
emotions), which cannot be separated “into unconnected parts or qualities” even though they 
are “differentiated and named” (1996:132-133). They also refer to the body as a “cloak”. 
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being’s torso together with mtakimɛ (identity). Mtakimɛ comprises several other 
parts including upinsihṵ (pl. tipinsite, destiny), diyammaade 50 (pl. ayammaadɛ, 
the ability to think, reason and make decisions) and tipaninpaate (behaviour). In 
short, it is mtakimɛ that defines a given being’s character, makes individuals 
unique and enables them to relate to others, and thus provides them with their 
identity. Mtakimɛ also protects and strengthens kɛbodikɛ, and provides 
guidance and orientation through a sense of right and wrong, discernment and 
seeing. Kɛbodikɛ and mtakimɛ are interdependent51 and when the two work 
together in harmony, the being concerned is well balanced emotionally, 
mentally and physically. When this balance is lacking, the being’s behaviour, 
character, mental and physical wellbeing are affected. When this occurs, people 
say that the being has bad mtakimɛ (mtakitiɛmɛ). If the being concerned is 
human, for example, ceremonies may be needed to restore order (S. Merz 
2013:20-21; J. Merz 2014:91), whilst animals may need to be killed (see 
Sickness, Danger and Animals Behaving Badly, Chapter Five).  
The ukuɔnu (body-skin) dies when its kɛbodikɛ (animating force) and 
mtakimɛ (identity) leave it definitively, though it is only once the ukuɔnu has 
decomposed, disappeared or been consumed that their bond with it is 
completely severed. Kɛbodikɛ and mtakimɛ return to Uwienu (God) and 
negotiate a new upinsihṵ (destiny) with him. This includes their material form, 
which family they will return to, their ability to have healthy offspring, when they 
expect to return to Uwienu and their vocation in life (see also Fortes 1987:149; 
R.A. Swanson 1980; 1985:178). Thus, someone may be said to have hunter, 
cultivator or animal upinsihṵ or mtakimɛ (see Chapter Four), or shapeshifting 
upinsihṵ or mtakimɛ (see Chapter Six), for example. Once their new upinsihṵ 
                                             
50 Besides different tikɔnte (body-skins) or tihedite (pelts and plumage), for several 
interviewees it is the diyammaade that distinguishes humans from other animals (see What is 
an Animal?, Chapter Four).  
51 Consequently, interviewees often used one term or the other – usually kɛbodikɛ – when 
talking about both. 
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has been negotiated, and with Uwienu’s authorisation, kɛbodikɛ and mtakimɛ 
then take on their new ukuɔnu (pl. tikɔnte) by reincarnating (siihḭ 52) one, or 
several, new being(s) who will normally comprise the same material presence in 
the more-visible parts of the world, that is to say human to human, bush-being 
to bush-being, shrine entity to shrine entity, dog to dog, and so on. 
Those who have died a good death53 also continue to exist as bɛhidibɛ (the 
dead). As previously noted, the bɛhidibɛ act as intermediaries between the 
living and Uwienu (God). They too occupy a new ukuɔnu – also called bɛhidibɛ 
– that allows them to have a material presence in the more-visible parts of the 
world. These are mud mounds in the ukoohṵ (vestibule, literally “lineage”) that 
provide a point of contact between them and the living (S. Merz 2014:7; see 
also 2013:37-38 and Figure 1). 
In the case of multiple reincarnations, kɛbodikɛ and mtakimɛ divide and 
each kɛbodikɛ-mtakimɛ pair chooses its own distinct destiny. This means that 
individuality is maintained and each individual is considered unique. Despite 
this, the respective kɛbodikɛ-mtakimɛ pairs remain linked as they share the 
same reincarnating ancestor’s kɛbodikɛ and mtakimɛ. This has some 
ramifications as humans who share the same reincarnating ancestor risk dying 
together. To avoid this danger, when one dies, the others are forbidden from 
attending the person’s burial and subsequent death celebrations (see S. Merz 
2013:24-25, 36, for more details). 
Kɛbodikɛ and mtakimɛ may sometimes reincarnate a new being who has a 
different material presence. Such a change results when the beings concerned 
suffered during their previous life, as they hope for a better life the next time 
round. When this occurs, rather than talking about siihḭ (to reincarnate), people 
                                             
52 As noted in Chapter Two, people also employ the Mbelime verb kɔnta (to become) and 
transformer (to transform) in French, when talking about reincarnation. 
53 Those who die a bad death do not have this privilege, though they do reincarnate. Bad 
deaths include accidents, suicide and murder, which result in people returning to Uwienu before 
their designated time (S. Merz 2013:23). 
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employ the verb dedi (to come out), which accounts for humans who 
reincarnate animals, trees or termite mounds; or animals, bush-beings or shrine 
entities who reincarnate humans, for example. There is no sense of hierarchical 
progression or karma, however, where certain material forms are considered 
better or superior to others; nor is such a change related to how the being died. 
Finally, two beings with a different material presence may also share the 
same kɛbodikɛ and mtakimɛ. This happens with totemic reincarnation, where 
the community’s founding ancestor and founding totem entity (or another 
human-animal pair previously reincarnated by them) simultaneously reincarnate 
a human and a totem animal. The two beings are thus intimately paired, will die 
together and go on to reincarnate together (see Chapters Six and Seven). 
During pregnancy, fathers-to-be normally consult diviners to find out who 
the reincarnating ancestors are. Diviners may also learn that the unborn 
children’s mtakimɛ and tipinsite (destinies) need to be strengthened. This is 
more likely to be the case when they have been reincarnated by an animal or 
share their mtakimɛ with a totem entity, as their mtakimɛ are part animal. 
Diviners thus instruct the fathers-to-be to construct akṵnpe (mtakimɛ shrines, 
sg. dikṵnpuode) for the children once they are born, though sometimes they 
need to be constructed immediately. In the case of totemic reincarnation, the 
dikṵnpuode also strengthens the mtakimɛ of the animal with whom the child is 
paired.54 
Hence there is a continual flow of life through the death and decomposition, 
disappearance55 or consumption of a being’s ukuɔnu (body-skin) and rebirth of 
kɛbodikɛ and mtakimɛ, which is governed by Uwienu (God). The relational and 
transmaterial nature of mtakimɛ, which stretches both backwards and forwards 
                                             
54 Conical in shape, the akṵnpe are located just outside the homestead, next to the 
vestibule (see Homestead Sketches and Figure 2). See also Huber (1973:384-386), J. Merz 
(2014:102-104) and S. Merz (2014:52). 
55 When the stone, tree or earth mound of a given ditenwɛnde disappears, for example.  
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to encompass past, present and future generations, and different entities, 
means that not only is there a continual flow of life, but also of relationships, 
intersubjectivity and agency. Yet, each being is also an individual in its own 
right (see also Erny 2007:115; Howell 1996:140; Morris 2000:36, 45-49).56 
When a being dreams, its kɛbodikɛ (animating force, pl. sibosi ) leaves its 
ukuɔnu (body-skin) in order to circulate in the less-visible parts of the world 
where it can encounter and communicate with other beings. Mtakimɛ (identity), 
meanwhile, enables individuals to make sense of the inter-ontonic encounters 
their sibosi have whilst dreaming once they wake up. When dreaming, the 
mtakimɛ stays with the ukuɔnu, whilst also maintaining a link with kɛbodikɛ and 
thus keeps the ukuɔnu alive. Ingold describes a similar situation for the Ojibwa:  
[I]n dreams, the vital essence of the person – the self – is afforded a 
degree of mobility, not only in space but also in time, normally denied in 
waking life. While the body of the sleeper is readily visible at some fixed 
location, the self may be roaming far afield (2000:100; see also 
Hallowell 1960:40-43). 
Both Western and Ojibwa people might agree that in a certain sense, 
dreaming liberates the mind from its bodily housing. But whereas in the 
Western conception, this amounts to taking leave of reality, for the 
Ojibwa it allows complete freedom of movement within the earthly and 
cosmic space of ordinary life (2000:101, emphasis in original). 
For virtually all Bebelibe, should something happen in the less-visible parts of 
the world that prevents kɛbodikɛ from returning – if caught by a witch, for 
example – the being’s ukuɔnu will eventually die (J. Merz 2014:216-229). 
As mentioned above, some beings – such as the siyawesi bush-beings and 
ataadɛ (stones, sg. ditade) – can have more than one ukuɔnu that share the 
same kɛbodikɛ and mtakimɛ. Some of these tikɔnte exist primarily in the less-
visible parts of the world and are only apparent to those who can see in these 
                                             
56 See S. Merz (2013; 2017b), where I treat human death and reincarnation in more detail. 
One of my findings was that, despite exposure to church teaching, most of the people I 
conducted research with did not reject reincarnation but rather redefined their understanding of 
how and why it happens. 
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parts of the world whilst being awake, such as diviners (bɛpasibɛ, sg. upaasɔ) 
or seers (bɛhonhuonbɛ, sg. uhonhuɔnɔ). J. Merz describes this ability to see 
“beyond the strictly material” as “transvisuality” (2014:289). The siyawesi bush-
beings, for example, resemble humans, though they are a lot shorter and have 
long, thick hair. They primarily exist in the less-visible parts of the world and act 
as intermediaries between Uwienu (God) and diviners. Diviners have clay 
statues57 of their siyawesi. These statues, however, do not represent the 
siyawesi ; they are their material presence or ukuɔnu in the more-visible parts of 
the world. They provide the diviner with a point of contact and help orientate the 
relationship, thus allowing for better communication. This means that the 
siyawesi can be simultaneously present in both the more- and less-visible parts 
of the world. Diviners activate their transvisual powers when they pick up their 
divining staff and summon the siyawesi. This then allows them to see the 
siyawesi in the less-visible parts of the world and speak directly with them. The 
statues are also important for those who are not diviners (and therefore do not 
have transvisual powers), as the statues allow them to acknowledge the 
siyawesi ’s presence, whilst also revealing the existence of a relationship. 
As with the siyawesi statues, ataadɛ (stones, sg. ditade) do not represent 
shrine entities; they too are their material presence or ukuɔnu (body-skin) in the 
more-visible parts of the world.58 This does not mean that every stone is a 
shrine/shrine entity, though, but each stone has the potential of becoming 
one,59 as J. Merz explains:  
People’s understanding of materiality already implies that stones are 
alive in a general sense and have the potential to become beings in 
their own right. Through contagion with an existing shrine entity a stone 
realises its potential for life and becomes a specific being with a name 
                                             
57 See Figure 3. 
58 See Figure 4. See also Ishii (2012), writing about shrines in Ghana. 
59 See also Howell (1996:135-136) and Hallowell’s discussion about when the Ojibwa 
consider stones to be animate (1960:24-26). He notes that “the Ojibwa do not perceive stones, 
in general, as animate, any more than we do. The crucial test is experience” (1960:25). 
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that can now fulfil its purpose as a link between people and Uwienu 
(God) (2014:83). 
Ataadɛ shrine entities can also manifest themselves as humans and pythons. 
Each community also has a ditade for its totem animal, in which case the ditade 
manifests itself as that animal. It is exactly because of the fuzzy boundaries 
surrounding a being’s material presence (or transmateriality) in more- or less-
visible forms that I prefer to talk in terms of the more- and less-visible parts of 
the world. Morris makes a similar observation for rural Malawians who 
like Aristotle – do not make a radical distinction between the spiritual 
(unseen) and the material aspects of life, and that the natural world, 
specifically plants and animals, are seen as real entities, not simply 
pegs for symbolic forms or hierophanies of the spirit, and that they are 
thus believed to have inherent powers and causal agency (2009:253; 
see also McLennan 1869a:414). 
As those Bebelibe who have transvisual powers can see in the less-visible parts 
of the world (what Morris refers to as the “spiritual […] aspects of life”) and 
given that other beings also circulate in this dimension when dreaming, I – 
together with J. Merz – prefer not to talk in terms of the “seen” and “unseen”. J. 
Merz adds that the more- and less-visible parts of the world are “interdependent 
and overlap, thereby affecting and infecting each other” (2014:192). West, 
writing about the Muedans of Mozambique, explains that – although they do talk 
in terms of visible and invisible realms as separate domains – the two domains 
substantiate each other “through the visible effects of invisible forces” 
(2007:48). Amongst the Bebelibe, for instance, events experienced during a 
dream, followed by events in the more-visible parts of the world, regularly 
substantiate each other (see the example of Luc’s dream and the events that 
followed in Tiyɔsite, Chapter Five). 
Another phenomenon involving multiple tikɔnte (body-skins, sg. ukuɔnu) is 
shapeshifting, which takes place in the more-visible parts of the world. This 
differs from the siyawesi and ataadɛ shrine entities, however, as kɛbodikɛ and 
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mtakimɛ leave their primary ukuɔnu and shift to another ukuɔnu. From the way 
people describe shapeshifting, the primary ukuɔnu ’s life is suspended 
temporarily as its kɛbodikɛ and mtakimɛ are elsewhere. Several interviewees 
describe shapeshifting as people or animals changing their tops (tisusukite, 
shirts and other clothes worn on the torso). Given that the person or animal’s 
kɛbodikɛ and mtakimɛ move between different tikɔnte and that their material 
presence – their primary ukuɔnu – does not change shape, I propose that they 
are actually “body-shifting” rather than shapeshifting. Reincarnation too can be 
considered a form of body-shifting, given that a being’s kɛbodikɛ and mtakimɛ 
move to one or several new tikɔnte. In this instance, though, the shift results 
from the loss of the being’s primary ukuɔnu, and is consequently unidirectional 
and longer term. As mentioned in Chapter Two, the verb used to describe 
shapeshifting – or rather body-shifting – in Mbelime is kɔnta (to become). I 
examine this phenomenon in more detail in Chapter Six. 
Thus – in the Bebelibe setting – the conditions that allow for shared 
ontonity, and therefore inter-ontonic engagement, are three-fold: all beings have 
a material presence – ukuɔnu – that allows for physical encounters and 
movement within the more-visible parts of the world; kɛbodikɛ which not only 
animates each entity, but allows for encounters and movement within the less-
visible parts of the world; and mtakimɛ, which is unique to each individual entity 
(thus providing it with its identity), but also relational and therefore enables 
agentive and intersubjective encounters that are meaningful. 
For others, the shared condition of ontonity may diminish depending on 
their underlying ontological ideas of how beings are composed and operate in 
the world. Thus, how individuals determine ontonity is also dependant on their 
presencing practices. 
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Presencing Practices 
The capacity to find orientation by understanding signs remains an 
achievement of empathy and intellect. Interpretation is called for, an 
adaptive attempt at integration with experience past and present to 
foresee eventual consequences. The human psyche excels in this 
ability to create sense. This is not merely self-reflective nor arbitrary 
bricolage; the process requires keeping in contact with external reality 
and being conscious of this connection (Burkert 1996:157, emphasis 
mine). 
Burkert’s analysis hints at the idea of shared ontonity, but still puts the 
emphasis on the human intellect and the interpretation of signs. As suggested 
in Chapter Two, ontonity – together with presencing – provides the means to go 
beyond the impasse that often results from a semiotic analysis of other people’s 
ontological engagements with the world around them, given that the onton is 
more than a sign. Whether signs take a dualistic structure of signifier and 
signified following the semiology of de Saussure (1974 [1916]), or a triadic one 
of sign, object and interpretant, as in Peirce’s semiotics (1940), they all have 
representations. Even when an onton comprises several material and/or 
immaterial parts, its transmaterial nature means that these are inseparable. 
Thus, ontons cannot be analysed semiotically as they have no – and are not – 
representations. 
Peirce (1940) proposed three primary signs types, namely symbols, icons 
and indexes. J. Merz (2017b) is not suggesting that semiotics be abandoned in 
favour of presencing, but that presencing builds on semiotics, with icons, 
symbols, indexes and ontons forming its basis. By icon, I understand this to be 
a sign that resembles the entity it signifies (a photograph being an icon of the 
person it shows, for instance), whereas a symbol is an arbitrary sign that does 
not resemble the entity it signifies (words, for example). Finally, an index is a 
trace left by the entity that signifies the entity’s existence by its absence (such 
as a footprint). The interplay between symbols, icons, indexes and ontons as 
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people draw on them in various ways results in diverse presencing practices, 
which could be primarily ontonic, symbolic or scientific, for example. People 
then employ different presencing practices depending on given situations and 
circumstances at a given time. This, in turn, produces multiple ontological 
understandings and ways of engaging in and with the world around them. This 
diversity of presencing practices not only accounts for ontological differences 
between people, but helps explain why an individual can maintain or entertain 
apparently contradictory ideas by moving between different ontological 
understandings depending on the way they make present and engage with 
other entities at a given moment (see also Harris and Robb 2012). Candea, for 
example, observes that not only do 
people have different kinds of beliefs but also that they actively reflect 
on this and seek to cultivate certain attitudes toward their own beliefs, 
and by those means to cultivate some beliefs – and ways of believing – 
rather than others […]. Similarly, the image of a passive, situational 
‘ontological flip-flop’ that emerges, for instance, from Descola’s 
characterization, fails to attend to people’s agentive attempts to keep in 
view multiple ontological possibilities at once, without committing to any 
(2013:432). 
Candea (2013; see also 2010) questions Descola’s and Viveiros de Castro’s 
“Euroamericans’ putative ‘naturalist ontology’” (2013:424), and effectively 
demonstrates how scientists working with animals can move between different 
ontological perspectives. Candea concludes:  
If these scientists were not quite settled ‘naturalists,’ neither did they 
inhabit the opposite certainties of ‘animism.’ […] The point that people 
may entertain two mutually incompatible ontological perspectives in 
quick succession is certainly an important caveat to overly schematic 
accounts of naturalist ontology (2013:431). 
The scientists’ ability to entertain two differing ontological perspectives was 
possible as they were able to engage with their animal subjects both as 
“objective units” – thus drawing primarily on semiotic presencing practices – and 
as “intentional, minded, known individuals” or ontons, at which point an ontonic 
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presencing practice prevails (Candea 2013:428; see also Bekoff 2007:114-116; 
Phillips 1994). 
Law and Lien (2012) provide another example in their exploration of 
encounters between humans and salmon on a fish farm in West Norway. They 
suggest that the salmons’ ontology changes depending on the nature of the 
encounter. They conclude that 
Human–salmon practices generate an unknowable and elusive 
penumbra of slippery salmon-possibilities (2012:372). 
Our argument is thus that it is time to attend not just to ontologies 
enacted, but also to their shadowland of alterities; it is time to attend to 
the textures on the margins (2012:373). 
In their article there are examples of salmon as icons depending on how they 
conform to salmon norms or not for the people concerned (2012:369); indexical 
encounters when the fish remain at the margins of visibility in the murky water 
(2012:371) and the juxtaposition of salmon as relational beings – or ontons – 
versus symbolic knowledge provided by textbooks (2012:366). Thus, those 
working on the salmon farm presenced the salmon differently according to the 
situation and resulting encounter. This being the case, I suggest that it is not the 
salmons’ ontology that changes, but rather the way people presenced them at 
any given moment.  
Like Candea, Morris too points out the danger of trying to categorise people 
ontologically, given that people can derive a diversity of meanings depending 
on their encounters with animals: 
Although there is a tendency these days, especially among writers on 
ecological issues, and even some anthropologists, to identify whole 
cultures or historical periods by a single ontological motif 
(anthropocentric, biocentric, mechanistic, holistic), the relationship of 
Malawians to the animal world (like that of all cultures) is diverse and 
complex and embodies several contrasting attitudes towards animals – 
pragmatic, intellectual, aesthetic, symbolic, sacramental – that cannot 
be captured by monolithic labels (1998:151-152). 
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This should not come as a surprise. Just thinking through the complex and 
diverse nature of my relationship with Johannes, already results in a multiplicity 
of attitudes and meaning, depending on how I presence him at a given moment. 
The circumstances of that moment determine which presencing practice(s) I 
draw on. For example, if Johannes has travelled, his presence around me is still 
evident: the emails he sends me (symbols); the dent in his pillow or his shirt that 
smells of him (indexes); his picture on Skype (icon). In these instances I 
presence him by drawing on Peircean semiotic representations, thereby 
employing primarily symbolic, iconic or indexical presencing practices. But when 
Johannes is materially present, I engage with him holistically as a living entity, 
as an onton. The being I see in front of me and interact with is Johannes, I 
thereby presence him by drawing on a primarily ontonic practice. Should 
Johannes be sick and visit the doctor, however, the doctor may presence him 
differently again. If the doctor engages with Johannes principally in Cartesian 
terms as a physical being, thereby analysing what is wrong with him in largely 
mechanical and physiological terms, then Johannes is no longer an onton; his 
body is a material object that needs to be fixed. In this instance, the doctor 
draws on a primarily scientific practice.60 
One final example can be drawn from church practices and understandings 
of Holy Communion. In Catholicism, the bread and wine become the flesh and 
blood of Jesus, therefore the two elements are presenced as ontons. 
Protestantism, however, teaches that the bread and wine symbolise Jesus’ 
flesh and blood (see, for example, Yates-Doerr 2015:317-318). In this instance, 
a Catholic primarily draws on an ontonic presencing practice, whilst a Protestant 
primarily draws on a symbolic one. 
                                             
60 See also Harris and Robb (2012) and Mol (2002), who examine the different ontological 
understandings people can have of the body. 
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Thus, the interplay between ontons, symbols, icons and indexes and how 
individuals prioritise them results in the different presencing practices they 
employ and move between depending on the situation at the time. The 
presencing practice that predominates in a given instance comes to the fore 
and determines how something becomes present and meaningful for the 
individual. Certain presencing practices may also predominate at a given time 
within a society. When this differs significantly from another society – one that is 
predominantly ontonic versus one that is predominantly scientific for example – 
it can appear as if they occupy different ontological worlds, rather than the 
same one but with differing ontological perspectives of that world. Drawing on 
different presencing practices also means that people construct and experience 
life in different ways, which further adds to the potential illusion of multiple 
ontological worlds (see also Lloyd 2011). Furthermore, a presencing practice 
that may predominate in a given society can also change over time, which 
results in further diversity. Harris and Robb observe that 
the distinction between the multiple ontologies versus multiple modes of 
ontologies (one-of-many vs. one-in-many) is a product of Western 
intellectual histories, and in particular the demand for emergent 
unimodality and logical consistency that began in the medieval period 
with Christian theology and was transformed into scientific hegemony in 
the 19th and 20th centuries (2012:671). 
Referring to various examples over the course of time, Harris and Rob 
(2012:671-676) illustrate the interplay between different “modes”, such as 
religious, scientific, social and magical, and that “one can see all these 
modalities of belief interchanging with each other” (2012:671). They then point 
out that people’s ability to entertain and move between different ontological 
modes means that there are grounds for mutual understanding. Despite, this 
Harris and Rob (2012:671-676) also demonstrate how one notion of the body 
may predominate then change over the course of history. When interpreted in 
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terms of presencing, a transition from predominantly ontonic practices to more 
scientific ones is evident, as people increasingly perceived the body in 
mechanical terms. Even if one presencing practice predominates at a given 
time in history, this does not mean that people are not simultaneously drawing 
on other presencing practices. Harris and Rob point out: 
As science has developed over the last several centuries, we have not 
become less multimodal; multimodality is an ongoing condition of 
embodiment. 
We continue to live, today, in a multimodal body world – in other words, 
there is more than one ontology of the body in our society (2012:674). 
They conclude: 
The manner in which specific and multiple modes of the body can be so 
clearly identified from the medieval period onward, therefore, does not 
relate to a dramatic transformation in the nature of human bodies 
themselves but, rather, to the way in which an emergent and dominant 
modality comes to define the boundaries between different concepts 
(2012:675; see also Coole and Frost 2010). 
Harris and Rob (2012:672-676) also note that the interplay between different 
ontological modes can result in tensions, for example between religious and 
scientific modes of thinking. They suggest that this was not an issue for 
“ordinary people” but rather “long-standing specialists advocating particular 
views, such as clergy” (2012:675) as they struggled to process new scientific 
information, for example. Such tensions further demonstrate that negotiating 
ontological penumbras is not limited to the research endeavours of 
anthropologists or to other epistemologically inclined specialists. As Chua points 
out, “anthropologists are not the only ones to think with and through heuristic 
devices: so too do the people with whom we work” (2015:356). As my 
interviewees – many of whom could be considered “ordinary people” – talked 
about eating meat, domestication and the commodification of animals, for 
example, it became evident that they too struggled with tensions and resulting 
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penumbras generated by the interplay of different presencing principles and 
practices, as I illustrate in the coming chapters. 
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Chapter Four 
Hunting and Domestication 
In the next two chapters, I present and discuss the general nature of human-
animal relationships in the Commune of Cobly and how these shape 
understandings of hunting, domestication and eating meat. I also examine if, 
how and why these relationships and understandings may be changing. I start 
by briefly describing how people classify humans (bɛnitibɛ, sg. uniitɔ) and 
animals (tiwante, sg. kɛwankɛ). 
What Is an Animal? 
There is no Mbelime term for “creature” that encompasses all the beings that 
Uwienu (God) created. Kɛwankɛ (animal, pl. tiwante) is the broadest term and 
can be used in a general sense to refer to all of Uwienu ’s created beings – 
except humans – that have blood and that exist primarily in the more-visible 
parts of the world. More specifically, tiwante also refers to animals (mammals, 
reptiles, amphibians and snails) that have four feet or no feet and can live or 
move on land. Tinɔɔte (sg. unɔdihṵ), meanwhile, only have two feet and fly 
(birds and bats), sipaasi (sg. kɛpaakɛ) only live in water (fish, whales and 
manatees) and tibɛbite (sg. ubɛbihṵ) are the creepy-crawlies (insects, 
arachnids, crustacea and worms). 
One thing that became apparent during the course of my interviews is that 
animals and humans are beings of equal worth, especially in the eyes of 
Uwienu. All beings have a certain level of autonomy, whilst also being part of a 
relational web. Takida, a septuagenarian farmer, summed it up as follows: 
Animals have blood and so do we. Where’s the difference? If there is 
one it’s what we eat: we eat cornmeal porridge and they graze the 
grass; that’s where there’s a difference. 
128 
 
 
Joël, the thirty-year-old farmer, and Louis, an octogenarian with an important 
position in the Commune, gave similar explanations: 
People and animals have the same kɛbodikɛ (animating force), but our 
way of life means that we are different. Here I am sitting and thinking 
about how to maintain my home, whilst an animal is thinking about how 
to live in the bush. Don’t you see that this is where the difference is? 
Everything must have kɛbodikɛ, animals must have kɛbodikɛ like 
humans. Kɛbodikɛ does many things for us. If you don’t have it you 
can’t have fear. If you don’t have kɛbodikɛ you can’t reflect. If you don’t 
have kɛbodikɛ you can’t think about things and animals possess this the 
same as us. We’re almost the same except that we can’t understand 
each other. God divided us giving us each our way to live on this earth 
and each our own language so that we could dialogue with our own 
kind. 
These explanations, together with what other interviewees shared, demonstrate 
that animals and people are not very different. Even though definitions of 
personhood vary, there is consensus that: “a ‘person’ is an individual, animate, 
self-conscious being who becomes a person in a social context in which their 
individuality and intentionality is recognized and acknowledged by another” 
(Hurn 2012:30; see also 51; Henare et al. 2007:19-20; Hurn 2016a:4). Hurn 
later adds that “all persons have a shared essence which unites them, […] but it 
is their external, physical form which differs and effects their being in (and 
therefore perception of) the world” (2012:76), which is borne out by Joël’s and 
Louis’ observations. In light of these explanations, animals can be considered 
persons or – more precisely – ontons with whom people have an intersubjective 
engagement. 
“They are equal. One isn’t more capable than the other. One doesn’t 
surpass the other. Humans and animals are equal.” Basaadi, a nonagenarian 
diviner explained. If one creature excels in one area, this does not necessarily 
make it superior to another. Many interviewees pointed out that humans are 
physically weaker than their fellow animals. The success of a predator is not 
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necessarily due to its inherent superiority over another creature, but because 
Uwienu has allowed it to overpower its prey. Several interviewees explained 
that, in the case of humans, Uwienu has given us intelligence (mceyɔ̰mmɛ) and 
that our diyammaade (ability to think and reason) permits us to surmount our 
physical weakness and outsmart animals who are more powerful than us in 
other ways. Thus, besides physical differences in our tikɔnte (body-skins), for 
several interviewees it is our diyammaade that differentiates us. Four 
interviewees stated that animals do not have diyammaade, whilst five others 
qualified that most animals have diyammaade, but some do not, such as pigs 
(see Tiyɔsite, Chapter Five). For another five interviewees, we can all reason 
and think but our different diyammaade mean that we do not share a common 
language. Despite this, there is still a certain level of mutual comprehension. 
Finally, four interviewees explained that human diyammaade is stronger. 
 Interviewees also explained that animals accept their death when the 
reason for it is legitimate. Otherwise, they can seek vengeance when killed 
inappropriately, either by “overcoming” (die) the person concerned or by 
pleading their case before Uwienu, who then intervenes as he sees fit. 
Morris notes a similar situation amongst Malawians who do not make a 
“radical distinction between humans and animals, but rather conceive of 
humans and animals as sharing many attributes” (2000:37, emphasis in 
original). He continues by pointing out that this does not mean that people deny 
that there are distinctions, but they do not result in a “radical dualism” but rather 
a “socially engaged attitude [that] recognizes the fundamental affinities between 
humans and mammals as living beings who share a common world and are 
often in competition” (2000:37, emphasis mine). 
The interplay between affinity and competition was especially apparent 
when I asked what could be the consequences of killing an animal without just 
cause. Several interviewees where shocked by this question: “The animal 
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hasn’t done anything and you don’t need it for a ceremony? How can you kill an 
animal like that? You can’t kill an animal like that!” exclaimed Ntanki, an 
octogenarian community shrine priest. Other interviewees declared that to kill 
an animal without just cause was mtiɛmu (badness).61 Some interviewees 
initially struggled to answer the question, as the very idea seemed absurd – at 
least in abstract form – which meant I often had to provide a concrete 
scenario62. Our discussions revealed that there are many parallels between the 
Bebelibe and societies such as the Runa of Ecuador (Kohn 2007), the Nayaka 
of southern India (Bird-David 2006) and the Ojibwa of Canada (Ingold 2000:89-
110), who primarily subsist on hunting and gathering. Serpell observes that 
many hunter-gatherer societies across the world share analogous ideas about 
animals, which include 
the notion that animals are fully rational, sentient, and intelligent beings 
in no way inferior to humans, and the bodies of animals, like those of 
people, are animated by non-corporeal spirits or ‘souls’ that survive the 
body after death (1999:40). 
Hurn adds that “‘hunter-gatherer ontology’ is such that it promotes an equality of 
sorts between humans and other animals, recognizing ‘personhood’ beyond the 
human species” (2012:43). Based on these comparisons it would be easy to 
assume that the Bebelibe too subsist on hunting. Although this may have been 
the case in the past, the Bebelibe are now established agriculturalists. Their 
transition from hunting to husbandry is explained by a local myth that tells of a 
hunter’s (ucaatɔ, pl. bɛcatibɛ) encounter with the siyawesi bush-beings and how 
they instructed him in cultivation, sorghum beer brewing and animal husbandry. 
The siyawesi then gave him different gifts so that he could settle down and start 
farming (S. Merz 2017a; Huber 1979:40-48). Despite this, hunting continues to 
                                             
61 Writing about the Moba of northern Togo, Koabike (2003:84) also notes that it is 
forbidden to kill domestic animals without just cause. 
62 Someone sees an animal eating his maize, for example, and kills it out of frustration or 
anger. See Alma’s response below, page 156. 
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be important. Maurice (1986:101; see also Mercier 1968:224) briefly describes 
a similar situation for the Betammaribe, southeastern neighbours of the 
Bebelibe, who are also agriculturalists and whose customs demonstrate that, 
until recently, hunting was essential to their way of life. Morris, writing about 
agricultural societies in Malawi, also notes the continuing importance of hunting 
and 
that the advent of agriculture does not entail a fundamental break with 
regard to the close and intimate relationship that humans have with 
animals. For hunting still retains its sacramental dimension; indeed 
hunting in Malawi […] is in many ways more highly ritualized than 
among hunter-gathering societies, and has a social and cultural 
significance that goes well beyond its economic role in subsistence 
(2000:22-23). 
The same can be said for the Bebelibe, as I explore below, though hunting is 
becoming more difficult as many of the animals that people hunt are now largely 
confined to the national parks (see also Maurice 1986:101). Today, the national 
parks correspond with dikpaade (the wilderness). Dikpaade includes dense, 
impenetrable forests, woodland, savannah bush and grasslands. Timuɔte (the 
bush) includes essentially the same vegetation and landscapes as dikpaade, 
but is also the general term for all that is outside an inhabited area (ditendokide, 
pl. atendokɛ). Although timuɔte (the bush) is uninhabited, it includes farmland 
and where people go to search for firewood and collect water, for example, 
whereas there is minimal human presence in dikpaade (the wilderness), except 
for hunting (and now tourism). Thus, human activity and presence differentiates 
the two. As hunting continues to be important, I address this first before 
exploring Bebelibe understandings of domestication. 
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Hunting 
When asked if there was a time when humans and animals lived and conversed 
together, four interviewees recounted versions of the myth below, whilst another 
four referred to it. Not only does it explain why humans and animals no longer 
live and speak openly with one another, but also how hunting began and why: 
In the beginning, Uwienu (God) created animals and humans and they 
all lived together. One day an old man died – the first being to die – so 
they discussed what rites they would need and what each of them 
should contribute. Man was the weakest and poorest of all the beings, 
so the lion and leopard schemed to catch him and give him as their 
contribution. The man overheard their scheming and thought it better to 
run away and die under the sun than to be killed and given as meat. 
Whilst he was lying under the sun, an eagle soaring high saw him and 
thought he was dead. The eagle swooped down to take him and give 
him as his contribution for the burial rites. As the eagle put his talons 
out, the man grabbed him. The man then said that he would take the 
eagle as his contribution. The eagle proposed that if the man would let 
him go, he would go and fetch something to help the man. The eagle 
gave the man a cord and told him to tie his talons together so that he 
would be obliged to return. The eagle then went and got a quiver of 
arrows, a bow and a knife. He brought them back for the man and 
explained how to shoot and kill animals with the bow and arrows. The 
eagle would soar above and indicate to the man where the game fell 
after being shot. He then told the man he could use the knife to cut up 
the meat. 
The man followed the eagle's instructions and killed a duiker. He cut a 
portion of meat, hid his quiver, bow and knife in a hole of a baobab, and 
returned home with the meat, where he announced that this was his 
contribution for the old man’s burial. All the animals were surprised, how 
did this weak man succeed in catching and cutting up the duiker? He 
had nothing that would allow him to do this! The next day, the man went 
out again, caught another duiker and presented the meat to the other 
animals. 
The animals were getting worried, so the monkey announced that he 
would follow the man to see how he was getting the meat. When the 
man set off the next day, the monkey surreptitiously followed behind. 
He saw the man getting the quiver, bow and knife from the baobab. The 
monkey then climbed a tall tree to observe what happened next. He 
saw the man reach behind his back, then do something with his hands 
and bam the duiker fell dead. He ran back and explained to the other 
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animals how the man reached behind his back, made something fly and 
the duiker dropped dead. He warned them that they were all in danger! 
The man then came back with more meat. 
The fourth day, the same thing happened again. The monkey followed, 
then reported back. As the man approached home some flies started to 
buzz around his face and shoulders, so he tried to swat them away. The 
animals saw the man’s hand go over his shoulder as he swatted at the 
flies. They thought that he was reaching behind his back for the strange 
weapon the monkey had described so they all fled in terror. The dog 
fled too, but along the way he changed his mind and returned to the 
man. 
The dog then warned him that the leopard and lion were dangerous 
animals and may come back to kill him. The dog offered to stay with the 
man and at night, when the man slept, the dog would keep watch. If 
someone came, the dog would bark and the man should come with his 
bow and arrows and help the dog chase the intruder away. 
With time the lion came and the plan worked. The dog barked, the man 
came and shot the lion and the lion dropped dead. The other animals 
then realised how true the monkey’s words were. To this day, the dog 
stays with the man and warns him when strangers arrive.63 
In this version of the story, the eagle equipped the man with the weapons and 
knowledge needed to kill animals. In Kodaani’s version of the story, it was 
Uwienu who did this. Kodaani, who is in his sixties, finishes by explaining that 
the man was able to catch some of the animals before they all escaped. These 
animals became the diseede wante (family animals), whilst those that escaped 
became the timuɔte wante (bush animals). Writing about the Gourmantché 
(northeastern neighbours of the Bebelibe), Swanson (1985:12-13) shares a 
similar story. In this account, however, the first man and woman lived in the 
bush with other meat-eating animals that provided them with meat. Fed-up with 
this situation, the animals then asked the man to provide his share. The story 
then unfolds in a similar manner to Neeka’s account above, except that it is 
Tienu (God) who provides the man with the necessary weapons. Finally, whilst 
sheltering with the other meat-eating animals under a baobab during a storm, 
                                             
63 Recounted by Neeka, a septuagenarian village elder, June 2013. 
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the man swats at a mosquito causing all the animals to flee. The man and his 
wife then left the bush and the other meat-eaters and started to live in homes. 
Contrary to the Western construct, which is based on scientific and 
archaeological evidence, that all animals started out wild and then some were 
domesticated (Diamond 2005 [1997]; 2002; Gifford-Gonzalez and Hanotte 
2011, for example), local mythology teaches the opposite. A life of apparent 
harmony was disrupted by the first death of one of Uwienu ’s created beings 
and the ritual need for meat. This resulted in man learning to hunt, with the 
consequence that many animals then sought refuge in the wilderness. 
Responding to the same question (Was there a time when humans and 
animals lived and conversed together?), a significant number of interviewees 
referred to the Bible, several of whom talked explicitly about the Genesis 
accounts of creation and the fall. In the different versions of the local myth 
above and the biblical myth, the human ability to overpower and kill animals, 
and the authority to do so, were not innate but were accorded to humans by the 
eagle or by Uwienu (or Tienu for the Gourmantché). Thus, the myths are a 
reminder that humans and animals are beings of equal worth. This was further 
borne out during the interviews, as many interviewees stated “we are equal 
but…” and went on to explicate that it was Uwienu who: created humans this 
way; gave humans the authority to kill and eat animals; or appointed humans as 
his guardians over the animals. Several interviewees added that, despite our 
apparent superiority over animals, this does not make us more important. 
Gaston, a farmer in his early-forties, stated that:  
Humans and animals are equal. Uwienu created humans to look after 
everything, that’s where there’s a difference and why we are more 
capable than animals. But we are equal. Uwienu put us ahead of the 
animals so that we would know that it was Uwienu who created all 
beings to be like him. 
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Further discussions with the interviewees revealed that even though humans 
are in an apparent position of superiority over animals in the one sense, when 
we abuse this authority or lack respect towards an animal, the animal is in a 
position to overcome (die) us or plead its case before Uwienu, as mentioned 
above. For example, Yves, a farmer in his late-forties, explained that: 
You need to know that it’s the animals that support us. It’s thanks to 
them that I know that we all come from Uwienu and this is why we need 
to respect64 them and treat them well [or suffer the consequences]. 
Idaani, a church elder in his late-fifties, shared that: 
When you consider the animals and humans, there is no being alive 
who created itself; it’s Uwienu who created us all. It’s Uwienu who 
created everything and he loves us all. He commanded us all to 
reproduce. When you cause an animal to suffer, Uwienu who created 
the animals and who created you, won’t be happy with what you do. 
This need for respect becomes especially apparent in the rituals that surround 
hunting. Serpell briefly discusses the inherent dangers of hunting and that a 
successful hunt cannot be attributed solely to the hunter’s competence given 
that animals can seek “posthumous restitution” (1999:40) if not treated 
respectfully. He adds that this can lead to “considerable anxiety [which is] 
relieved through the performance of strict and elaborate hunting rules and 
rituals” (1999:41; see also Aftandilian 2011; Hurn 2012:47-48; Morris 1998:68). 
Amongst the Bebelibe, some of my interviewees explained, only men could 
be hunters and that “true” hunters are born this way, as they have hunter’s 
upinsihṵ (destiny; part of the mtakimɛ). Upinsihṵ guides them so that hunters 
know which animals they can legitimately kill. Michel, a farmer in his fifties, 
added that those with hunter destiny are drawn to the bush and do not need the 
same level of protection as other hunters. Before going on a hunt, most hunters 
ask the bɛhidibɛ (the dead) and atenwiɛnɛ (shrine entities) for their help and 
                                             
64 Yves employed the verb sɛdi (to respect). The notion of fear or awe is implicit as there 
will be consequences if your respect is lacking. 
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protection, prepare special medicines and further purify themselves by 
observing certain prohibitions such as refraining from sex (see also Maurice 
1986:107-108; Morris 1998:104). 
“Animals, as they too have mtakimɛ, know when hunters come and try to 
avoid them. So the hunters need to prepare and have medicines that draw the 
animals to them. They also have medicines that help them escape should wild 
animals or park rangers come after them,” Roland, the trained pastor in his mid-
forties, explained. In addition to his preparations and medicines, the hunter 
often takes special power objects with him such as a medicine-bracelet 
(kɛya̰kibeekɛ, pl. siya̰kibeesi ) or medicine-axe (kɛya̰kiyadikɛ, siya̰kiyasi ). The 
bracelet helps protect the hunter when he confronts a dangerous animal (lion65 
or leopard66, for example) or a park ranger. The hunter pronounces a short 
incantation to activate the medicine-bracelet and the animal or ranger falls 
immobile to the ground, thus allowing the hunter to escape. Hunters use the 
medicine-axes to traverse dangerous areas such as crocodile infested rivers or 
plains populated by lions. As with the bracelets, the axe renders the animals 
powerless so that hunters can safely cross the terrain concerned. 
Depending on the animal killed, further medicines and rites may be needed 
before the hunter can touch the animal or eat the meat; sometimes he is even 
prohibited from eating it. Didier, a village chief in his sixties who used to go 
hunting with his father, described the ceremony needed to separate the animal 
from the hunter (mɔnta)67 so that it cannot seek revenge (huoni ): 
[Once back] everyone else can eat the meat, but you [the hunter] need 
the head [of the animal] to perform the ceremony. You take the head to 
the bɛhidibɛ (the dead). My father would perform the ceremony, as he 
was the eldest male. He would take the head of each animal that I killed 
to the bɛhidibɛ. He would say, ‘n mɔnta [separate from the hunter]’. 
                                             
65 Panthera leo. 
66 Panthera pardus. 
67 Maurice (1986:117-118; see also Mercier 1968:226) briefly describes a similar ceremony 
for the Betammaribe. 
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When you say that, it means the animal is dangerous, but if you perform 
the ceremony, the animal can no longer act against the person who 
killed it. When you say ‘mɔnta’, you take the head and place it before 
the bɛhidibɛ and say: 
‘Hey you, beast, animal, if you want to seek vengeance, it’s Uwienu 
who made man and he made you too. But you are in the bush. Uwienu 
said that you should adapt and that man needs to eat meat. It’s Uwienu 
who made the rifle, who made the arrow, who made the club. It’s 
Uwienu who made all these things, not man, so that man could kill and 
eat. Rifle, it’s Uwienu who made the gunpowder and the cartridge. 
Uwienu made these things and man follows. Now if you want to seek 
vengeance, you should go and see with him who made the gunpowder, 
the rifle. Go and ask Uwienu. Uwienu will tell you that we have the right 
to kill and eat’ […] 
Then my father would pour water mixed with sorghum flour on the 
animals’ heads. He would make me get down on my knees and elbows 
and I would drink the flour-water mix like an animal [Didier gets down on 
his elbows and knees and pretends to lap from a bowl]. Then you say, ‘I 
have drunk you; you too have drunk [received the libation], now here’s 
the rest for you to finish’. And that’s it; the fight is over. 
Joël, the thirty-year-old farmer, also goes hunting regularly. He explained that 
he does not do anything special before going on a hunt. When he sees an 
animal, however, he prays to Uwienu for success and informs the animal why 
he is killing it. He does this internally rather than aloud. If successful, depending 
on the animal killed, mɔnta may be needed, during which he would say to the 
animal: 
Ah, I went looking for sauce and I’ve found my sauce. But I haven’t 
killed you because I hate you. I wanted to eat and I saw you, so I killed 
you. When I got up to go hunting, the hunter can take all that he finds. 
All things enter the hunter’s sack. What he finds, that’s what he takes. 
When I saw you lying there, should I leave you? Should I not take you? 
But by putting you in my sack, I’m not challenging you; I’m simply 
looking to eat. The hour has come; if you want to go and eat, go and eat 
[If you want to seek vengeance, go and see with Uwienu]. 
Bush animals that people consider especially powerful and dangerous include 
buffalo (fɛkpanaafɛ, sg. ikpanaahḭ [Syncerus caffer brachyceros]), bushbuck 
(fɛtɔɔdifɛ, pl. itɔɔdi [Tragelaphus scriptus scriptus]), red-flanked duiker 
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(kɛhodimɔnkɛ, pl. sihodimɔnsi [Cephalophus rufilatus]), leopards (ikpiihḭ, sg. 
fɛkpiifɛ) and l’âne sauvage (kɛmunnaakɛ, pl. simunnaasi, wild ass or feral 
donkey), which people fear the most. 
As described above, depending on the animal killed, hunters may be 
prohibited from eating the meat or the animal needs to be separated from the 
hunters before they can eat it safely. Other people, however, can eat the meat 
immediately. This suggests that it is acceptable if people hunt animals for the 
benefit of others but not if it is for personal gain; the killing has to be legitimate. 
Ingold makes a similar observation for the Cree, northern Canada: 
Above all, animals are offended by unnecessary killing: that is, by killing 
as an end in itself rather than to satisfy genuine consumption needs. 
They are offended, too, if the meat is not properly shared around all 
those in the community who need it (1994:9, emphasis in original; see 
also Aftandilian 2011:200; Morris 1998:67). 
The issue of unnecessary killing was further exemplified by a number of my 
interviewees, some of whom explained that each hunter may only legitimately 
hunt certain species, whilst others stated that there is a limit to how many 
animals a hunter can kill during his lifetime (see also Morris 1998:107). Should 
he kill an animal he is not authorised to kill or exceed his total of animals, then 
the animals will avenge their deaths. Revenge can take several forms including 
leprosy, other skin complaints such as eruptions of boils and abscesses, death 
or madness either of the hunter or someone in his family, the hunter’s wife 
could miscarry if pregnant at the time, give birth to an abnormal baby or the 
animal could reincarnate as the wife’s next baby. Luc, a church leader in his 
thirties, explained that it was because Esau exceeded the limit of animals he 
could legitimately kill that his father, Isaac, blessed Esau’s brother, Jacob, 
instead (Genesis 27)68. These forms of revenge are typical, not only amongst 
                                             
68 This is an interesting example of applying local understanding when interpreting stories 
and events from elsewhere. When I read the Genesis account, there is nothing to indicate that 
this was the reason Isaac blessed Jacob instead. 
139 
 
 
the Bebelibe, but also elsewhere in Africa and beyond. Serpell notes that in 
Siberia, Amazonia and the Kalahari: 
Types of spiritual retribution that may result from disrespectful behavior 
include infliction of illness, injury, madness, or death on the hunter or 
other members of his family or clan, or loss of success in future hunting 
(1999:40; see also Aftandilian 2011:198-199). 
Morris notes similar consequences and goes on to say that killing certain larger 
mammals, such as bushbucks and buffaloes, is “akin to homicide” (1998:73, 
105-107) in rural Malawi. Commenting on hunting in general, Morris (2009:281-
285) adds that it should not be considered as violent, aggressive or sadistic, 
and most certainly is not a sport, as may be the case in post-domestic 
societies.69 Finally, Maurice (1986:118), who was an ethnographically inclined 
colonial administrator in Benin, concludes that for the Betammaribe hunting is 
much more than a purely material activity needed for food given that animals 
have souls, supernatural powers and considerable influence over the lives of 
humans. Consequently, Maurice thinks that hunting also tests the hunter’s 
“strength, courage and audacity” (1986:119, translation mine; see also Nadasdy 
2007). 
Although none of my interviewees talked about homicide in relation to 
hunting, some of the interviewees commented that the ceremony needed to 
separate the animal from the hunter (mɔnta) is very similar to ya̰nta, which is 
performed for people who have killed another human either intentionally or by 
accident. As with mɔnta, the purpose of ya̰nta is to separate the perpetrator 
from the victim. Ya̰nta literally means “to make [the person] drink”. Similar to 
mɔnta, it is the act of drinking – in this case a special medicine – that separates 
                                             
69 See, however, Cahoone (2009) who effectively argues that hunting can be morally 
justified in post-domestic societies. He concludes that “Contemporary hunting is not a sport; it is 
a neo-traditional cultural practice in which contemporaries re-enter an archaic pursuit of meat” 
(2009:84). See also Marvin (2010) and Hurn (2016b). 
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the two.70 If not separated, human victims (like animal victims) seek 
posthumous revenge by inflicting sickness, which ultimately results in death. 
There is no notion, however, that victims pollute their killers by passing on some 
of their blood into the body of their slayers as they die, as Hutchinson 
(1996:106-107) notes for the Nuer of South Sudan. Thus, neither mɔnta nor 
ya̰nta involve bloodletting.  
Several interviewees compared killing certain animals such as donkeys 
(simunsi, sg. kɛmunkɛ), horses (sisa̰nsi, sg. kɛsa̰nkɛ), cattle (inaahḭ, sg. fɛnaafɛ) 
and cats (sinɔntisi, sg. kɛnɔntikɛ) to killing humans. Consequently similar 
ceremonies may be needed when diseede wante (family animals) are killed to 
“take care of” (sɔnni ) the relationship (see Tiyɔsite, Chapter Five). 
In order to keep track of the larger bush animals he has killed, a hunter 
either displays their skulls by hanging them on the outside wall of the 
homestead’s vestibule (ukoohṵ, literally “lineage”) or keeps them inside. Not 
only does this show his prowess as a hunter, but it is also a reminder to the 
whole family of what and how many animals he has killed. Should a hunter 
exceed his limit, the risk of revenge remains even after he has died, potentially 
affecting his descendants (see also Englebert 1973:116, writing about the 
Betammaribe). Animals may return as small game – a hare, wild duck or dove, 
for example – and tempt one of the deceased hunter’s family members to kill it. 
This, in turn, can result in the person’s death. 
Robert, the NGO worker in his late-thirties, shared about how his father 
succumbed to such a temptation by throwing his hoe at a pair of white-faced 
whistling ducks (Dendrocygna viduata) that landed close to him when he was 
working in his rice field. One of the ducks dropped dead, despite the hoe going 
wide. Delighted, his father took the duck home and put it to smoke. His father 
                                             
70 The ceremony is performed with powerful medicine horns. These are antelope horns 
stuffed with leaves and roots. The person officiating takes some of the leaves and roots from 
one of the horns and mixes them with water. 
141 
 
 
was puzzled, however, that no flies came to the meat. He went to see a diviner, 
who explained that it was not a real duck, but rather a hartebeest (fɛsefɛ, pl. isie 
[Alcelaphus busalaphus major]) that one of his ancestors had killed when he 
should not have; he had exceeded the limit of how many hartebeests he was 
allowed to kill. Even though Robert’s father did not hit the duck, the fact that he 
tried to kill the duck provoked its death. If his father had eaten the duck, he 
would have died. Since that day, Robert’s family never eat any bushmeat the 
same day that they kill it. They always examine the animal to check that it was 
genuinely killed, watch to see if flies come to the meat and then wait several 
days before eating it. 
Swanson, writing about the Gourmantché, also notes some of the inherent 
dangers of killing certain animals as they have 
bad cicilimu ‘guiding spirits’. A hunter must, if he is to be unharmed by 
these ‘spirits’, prepare special medicine over their bodies. Otherwise, 
the ‘guiding spirit’ of such an animal may follow the person home and 
bring death to him or a member of his household (1985:177). 
For almost all of my interviewees, the most notorious animal of all is the 
kɛmunnaakɛ (pl. simunnaasi ) or âne sauvage (wild ass or feral donkey) who 
can temporarily become (kɔnta) human posthumously. Rather than follow the 
hunter home, however, kɛmunnaakɛ goes ahead of him in order to visit and test 
the hunter’s wife. Should she fail the test, the hunter or someone in the family 
will die (see Chapter Six for more details). 
During the course of my interviews, I learnt that, until relatively recently, 
bushmeat was the main source of family meat, and quite a few interviewees 
lamented the lack of meat today as bush animals become scarcer. For 
example, Esther, a septuagenarian widow, explained that her father would go 
hunting during the dry season and her mother would conserve some of the 
meat by smoking it, so that the family would have meat for the rainy season. 
She remembers when smaller animals and game birds, such as wild helmeted 
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guineafowl (Numida meleagris) and double-spurred francolins (Francolinus 
bicalcaratus), were plentiful. 
Fish is also important and provides a further source of family meat. As with 
bushmeat, people smoke the surplus fish they either catch during rainy season 
or dig up71 during dry season. Fish too are getting scarcer. As bigger wild 
animals are now largely confined to the national parks and with fish, smaller 
game birds and animals becoming scarcer, people are more likely to eat meat 
from diseede wante (family animals) instead.  
People did not keep and intentionally breed diseede wante for meat; they 
did not practice animal husbandry as such until relatively recently. As noted in 
the Introduction, diseede means both family and homestead, with the buildings 
constituting the material presence or ukuɔnu (body-skin) of the family unit, 
which includes the bɛhidibɛ (the dead) and diseede wante. Thus, as with the 
atenwiɛnɛ (shrines and shrine entities), and the siyawesi bush-beings (both 
their humanoid presence in the less-visible parts of the world and their statued 
presence in the more-visible parts of the world), the homestead can also be 
considered a living being. The primary function of diseede wante is to help and 
support the human family members, as Yves, the farmer in his late-forties, 
mentioned above. People consider diseede wante essential for the wellbeing of 
the family and several interviewees explained that the diseede (family) is 
incomplete without them. Consequently, until recently people rarely sold their 
diseede wante and only killed them for special occasions (see Chapter Five). It 
is only more recently that some people have started to intentionally breed and 
raise animals for commercial reasons. This brings me to the subject of 
domestication. 
                                             
71 West African lungfish (kɛbakɔnkɛ, pl. sibakɔnsi [Protopterus annectens]). 
143 
 
 
Domestication 
That evening, as the man returned to the diseede, some small bees72 
started to bother him so he tried to swipe them away. When the other 
animals saw him reach behind his back, they fled and disappeared into 
the bush. The man was able to catch some of the animals before they 
all escaped. Today, these are the diseede wante (family animals), whilst 
those who escaped are the timuɔte wante (bush animals). This is why 
many diseede wante look like their counterparts who live in the bush 
such as fɛkpanaafɛ73 (buffalo) who resemble fɛnaafɛ (cattle), 
fɛtadiha̰nfɛ74 (wild helmeted guineafowl) who resemble fɛha̰nfɛ 
(domestic helmeted guineafowl) and kɛtadikodikɛ75 (stone partridge) 
who resemble sikosi (chickens, sg. kɛkodikɛ).76 
Besides reminding the listener that humans and animals are beings of equal 
worth, in this version of the myth from above, Kodaani elucidates where the 
diseede wante (family animals) came from. Given that it was Uwienu (or the 
eagle), who provided humans with the authority and ability to overpower 
animals in the first place, another possible outcome of such myths is that 
Uwienu also gave humans the responsibility of becoming good guardians of the 
animals that stayed behind. With the exception of helmeted guineafowl, 
however, all the other domesticated species now found in Cobly originated from 
outside the subcontinent (Gifford-Gonzalez and Hanotte 2011). Many of the 
domestic animals, such as different subspecies of sheep and cows, are so well 
established in the region that Blench refers to them as “indigenous” or 
“anciently established breeds” (1999:7). Other animals – notably Muscovy 
ducks, pigs and donkeys – have only arrived in Cobly more recently. Some of 
my older interviewees can recall when they first saw pigs in the Commune, 
whilst people only started to keep donkeys in Cobly since 2010. 
                                             
72 Mopane bee or fly (Plebeina hildebrandti), which is black, stingless and makes honey. 
73 Literally “wilderness-cattle”. 
74 Literally “mountain-guineafowl”. 
75 Literally “mountain-chicken”, Ptilopachus petrosus. 
76 Originally recounted in December 2010 by Kodaani, who is now in his sixties. He retold a 
shorter version of the story when I interviewed him in 2015. 
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Diamond asks, “is the abundance of large wild mammals the reason why no 
mammal species was ever domesticated in subequatorial Africa, making 
domestication superfluous for Africans?” (2002:702). He (2002:702; see also 
Clark 2007:55; Gifford-Gonzalez and Hanotte 2011:3-4) goes on to suggest that 
Africans’ ready acceptance of domestic animals, the majority of which 
originated in Eurasia, indicates that the main reason African wild animals were 
not domesticated was not for lack of trying; these animals could not be 
domesticated. Given that, until relatively recently, bushmeat continued to be the 
main source of meat for many Bebelibe, the introduction of domestic animals 
might not have resulted in a drastic change of day-to-day meat-eating habits as 
such. It might have had a significant impact on the family in other ways, 
however, such as ceremonially, as diseede wante (family animals) came to 
represent utedu (non-monetary abundance, see below). I realise that this is 
speculative, given that there is no written record of what happened locally, and 
given that the communities that form the Bebelibe today would not have existed 
as such when many of the domestic animals were first introduced. In 
considering what has happened in the wider region though, it is likely that the 
arrival of domestic animals led to rapid social change. In order to help deal with 
this, it is possible that people created and told variations of the above myth, 
together with other myths, to help maintain social cohesion, a subject I explore 
further in The Role of Myths, Chapter Seven. 
Morris asserts that “it has to be recognized that the advent of farming has 
had a profound effect on the way humans relate to the natural world, and 
specifically towards animal life” (2009:217). Despite this, Morris points out that it 
does not necessarily result in a radical break – as some authors claim – as 
people transition from hunter-gatherer to agriculturalist (2009:217). He then 
states: 
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What is of interest about the Malawian context is that these two 
attitudes towards the natural world and specifically towards mammals, 
one – the sacramental egalitarian – associated with hunter-gatherers, 
the other – implying an ethic of opposition and control – associated with 
agriculturalists, do in fact co-exist (2009:218-219). 
In order to explain better my findings for the Commune of Cobly, which are in 
line with Morris’ statement above, certain classic features that are associated 
with Western domestication practices need to be set aside. Clutton-Brock 
defined a domestic animal as “one that has been bred in captivity for purposes 
of economic profit to a human community that maintains complete mastery over 
its breeding, organization of territory, and food supply” (1989:7). Elsewhere, she 
added that “only humans benefit” from associating with domestic animals 
(1994:27) and that domestic animals are often “treated as property rather than 
as sentient beings with their own interests” (1994:31). Serpell and Paul add that 
domestic animals need to be “controlled and confined […] to prevent them from 
wandering or reverting to the wild” (1994:132). Serpell later states that “[m]ost 
domestic animals are utterly dependent for survival on their human owners and 
custodians. They have no free will as such” (2005:14). Few of these classic 
features, however, typify how the majority of Bebelibe I know relate to their  
diseede wante (family animals). Ideas about domestication continue to change, 
however, both amongst the Bebelibe and in post-domestic societies, which I 
discuss in Chapter Five (see Commodification). In this section I present the pre-
domestication position where trust and domination coexist, which is typical of 
the majority of Bebelibe households that have diseede wante, by exploring each 
of the classic features of domestication noted above. 
Property or Sentient Beings? 
In the ancient world, people lived very close to their livestock, often 
even sharing the same house with them, and however cruel they may 
have been at times, they treated their animals as individuals who could 
suffer like themselves (Clutton-Brock 1994:33). 
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Clutton-Brock’s statement seems to presume that such relationships no longer 
exist, though she does go on to clarify that animals only lose their individual 
identity when dealt with in large numbers, as is the case with industrial farming 
(1994:34; see also Vialles 1994). Ingold makes a similar observation about the 
changing nature of social relations between people and reindeer that results 
from transitioning from hunting to pastoralism: 
The reproductive increase of the nucleus of domestic stock to substitute 
for the wild herds as a subsistence resource simultaneously reproduces 
the property relations of pastoralism, but not the original bonds of 
taming that gave rise to them (1980:94). 
As previously mentioned, for many people in the Commune of Cobly, animals 
are their own agents and beings of equal worth. To claim that people own the 
diseede wante (family animals) that stay with them immediately creates a 
subject-object dichotomy. Writing generally about relationships between 
hunters, pastoralists and the animals they engage with, Ingold distinguishes 
domination as “a form of social control exercised over subject-persons” from 
domestication, which is “a form of mechanical control exercised over object-
things” (1994:17). Based on this distinction, the relationship between the 
Bebelibe and their diseede wante is largely one of domination rather than 
domestication. 
Ingold (1994:14-16) argues that hunters are in relationships of trust with the 
animals they hunt, whilst pastoralists dominate their animals. Armstrong Oma 
(2010:176-177; see also Brightman et al. 2012:18; Nadasdy 2007; Willerslev et 
al. 2015) challenges Ingold’s analysis of trust and domination and questions if 
relationships of trust can truly exist between hunters and individual animals, 
given that hunters kill their prey. Following Armstrong Oma this means that the 
hunter’s relationship with a particular animal is short-lived and does not allow for 
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reciprocity.77 Conversely, relationships between humans and domestic animals 
are reciprocal and rely on trust. Armstrong Oma’s observations resonate with 
my findings, which affirm the importance of trust between people and their 
diseede wante (family animals) in the Commune of Cobly. As beings whose 
autonomy is respected, diseede wante choose to stay with their human 
guardians and allow them to make decisions on their behalf. They entrust their 
human guardians with a level of authority that allows them to dominate when 
appropriate. Should people try to dominate their diseede wante in an 
inappropriate manner, however, by abusing the authority an animal has 
entrusted them with, the animal can seek revenge (see below). Thus, the 
interplay of trust and domination is multidirectional between humans and 
animals (see also Nadasdy 2007). 
Humans can’t live without animals and animals can’t live without 
humans. Thus, the two complement78 each other. That’s my personal 
conviction and I say this because, whether it concerns ceremonies, 
hunting or other things, people use animals and animals can’t live 
without people. That’s why I’ve found that the two are complementary. 
You can say that people are more powerful than animals because they 
raise animals and kill them when they want, but also people cannot live 
without animals. 
In his late-twenties and working for an NGO, Adrien’s view, whilst 
acknowledging human domination over animals, still recognises animals as 
“subject-persons”. His use of the verb se compléter (to complement) affirms the 
idea that humans and animals are in a reciprocal relationship. 
In her critique of Ingold’s analysis of trust and domination, Armstrong Oma 
(2010; see also Palmer 1997) suggests that relationships between humans and 
domestic animals should rather be understood as social contracts, which 
                                             
77 See, however, Nadasdy (2007), who effectively argues that the relationship between 
hunters and animals is also reciprocal. See also Hill (2013:125-127). 
78 Interview in French. Adrien stated that: “Ils se complètent”. 
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encompass trust and reciprocity. She acknowledges, however, that the 
relationship may be asymmetrical in nature (2010:179). She explicates: 
As participants in the social contract, animals are given multiple roles 
and can simultaneously participate in different arenas. As such, the 
social contract is a tool to examine the animals in a community where 
they have a variety of roles and obligations, rather than seeing them as 
segregated, for example, as either calorific value or cosmological 
vehicles. […] The idea of a social contract acknowledges that the 
relationship between living animals and humans is multi-layered and 
beyond a one-way communication. I hold that animals are agents by 
way of their ability to act upon the world as living, sentient beings 
(2010:179). 
Vialles (1994:118-124) also discusses different “traditional domestication” 
contracts and alludes to their asymmetrical nature: 
Take the individual contract first, the one between man and animal. 
Feeding and looking after an animal gives a man a right to its flesh. The 
eater thus legitimises his eating of meat by virtue of the care and 
attention he has bestowed on the animal, in slaughtering which he is, as 
it were, realising his investment (1994:118). 
Palmer (1997:419-421) questions the validity of such social contracts on the 
grounds that a social contract should be a win-win situation between equal 
partners. I too have my reservations about the term “contract” as this suggests 
a formalised, legal agreement made between two parties. It does recognise, 
however, that animals have a certain level of autonomy and are able to 
communicate, reciprocate and enter into relationships of trust (Larrère and 
Larrère 2000). Maybe the word “understanding” would be more appropriate as 
this can be tacit and not necessarily formalised. Palmer (1997:417-418) too 
expresses similar reservations and suggests that “tacit consent” could be a 
better alternative, although she goes on to question whether such consent is 
ongoing: 
Even if […] historically in some sense animals ‘chose’ or gave ‘tacit 
consent’ to domestication, this is no longer a possible ‘choice’ for 
current generations of animals. The nature of the ‘animal contract’ is 
such that once in, it is impossible to get out. This makes a mockery of 
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the idea of either tacit or hypothetical consent, since if there are no 
alternatives consent is meaningless (1997:421). 
Although Palmer’s objections seem justified for a post-domestic setting, the idea 
of a “social contract” based on tacit understanding does resonate with my 
findings in Cobly. Amongst the Bebelibe, such understandings are especially 
apparent between diseede wante (family animals) and individuals who have 
animal mtakimɛ (identity), which includes animal upinsihṵ (destiny). Several 
interviewees referred to these individuals as empathetic. The implicit trust and 
resulting empathy that exists between such individuals and their diseede wante 
is due to a level of communication and ontonic engagement that prevails 
between their mtakimɛ. “Understanding” therefore embraces not only the idea of 
an agreement between the parties concerned, but also sympathetic awareness, 
the combination of which results in empathy79. I explore this further in Chapters 
Seven (see The role of Myths) and Eight (see Relational Complexities and 
Becoming). Conversely, there are those who, despite all their efforts to keep 
diseede wante, never succeed. Benjamin, the churchgoing university graduate 
in his late-twenties, explained as follows:  
[For those who don’t succeed with their diseede wante] it’s because of 
their mtakimɛ, their spirits80, that’s why it doesn’t work, their spirits and 
the animals’ spirits don’t marry. They don’t have animal upinsihṵ, which 
is part of mtakimɛ. So, when talking about keeping animals, for those 
that don’t have animal destinies, they don’t glue together; their spirits 
can’t grab hold of the animals’ spirits and that’s why it doesn’t work for 
them. 
You’re born with this; it’s not something you can learn. You can have 
children and, even whilst they’re babies you don’t need to say, ‘These 
animals are for you,’ it just works and you say, ‘Ah, those children there, 
they have animal destiny.’ […] 
You can say that it’s God who gives this, but the person also negotiates 
this with God. So, in a way it’s not necessarily God who decides as the 
person has asked for it. What I mean is that, before I come into the 
                                             
79 See also Hurn (2016a), writing about the relationship between human and animal 
members of the Skanda Vale ashram community in West Wales. 
80 Interview in French. Benjamin regularly translates mtakimɛ as esprit(s). 
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world, I tell God, ‘I want to raise animals.’ And if I have asked for this, 
God will give me this destiny so that I will succeed. 
Grégoire, a teacher in his twenties, also identified the importance of inter-
mtakimɛ relations: 
I’ve already said that animals have spirits81 just like humans do. 
Sometimes the animal’s spirit doesn’t get along with a person’s spirit. 
This is the simple reason why some people succeed in keeping 
[animals], whilst others don’t, because their spirits talk to each other, 
they communicate, and when they don’t get along, it doesn’t work, it 
won’t succeed. 
“These animals are at the same time his children,” commented Joseph, who is 
in his twenties and studying for his baccalauréat, an idea affirmed by several 
other interviewees for those who have animal mtakimɛ. Robert, the NGO worker 
in his late-thirties, observed that they even sleep in the same room as their 
animals. The natural affinity that exists between such individuals and their 
diseede wante means that the animals never wander far, and return of their 
own volition at night.  
More generally, relationships of trust and inter-ontonic engagement 
between individuals and their diseede wante (family animals) have been 
challenged by upaanu (new times). Literally “newness”, people also employ the 
term upaanu when referring to anything that is new, and translate upaanu as la 
modernité (modernity) in French. One example of upaanu, which typifies the 
interplay of trust and domination, and the resulting ontological penumbras that 
people have had to deal with, is the introduction of cattle as draught animals. 
Ploughing-Cattle 
Many interviewees can remember when they saw ploughing-cattle (inaahaaki, 
literally “cattle-that-are-ploughing”82, sg. fɛnaahaakifɛ) used in their village for 
                                             
81 Interview in French. Grégoire too translates mtakimɛ as esprit(s). 
82 Compound noun of “cattle” (inaahḭ, sg. fɛnaafɛ) and “are ploughing” (haa). Both bulls and 
oxen are used for ploughing. 
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the first time. Based on their recollections, the first ploughing-cattle were used in 
the late 1960s, and slowly spread throughout the Commune of Cobly during the 
years that followed. It was obvious that seeing ploughing-cattle used in this way 
for the first time made a big impression on people. Many were captivated and 
amazed by the sight, “I saw how vast the field was and the oxen went back and 
forth and the field was finished! It was good and, at first, we were happy,” 
Antoine, the farmer in his mid-fifties, stated. Using cattle in this way, however, 
was also extremely controversial. Antoine continued: 
But then we started to have problems. Sickness came and people said, 
‘kɛnaatɔɔkɛ, kɛnaatɔɔkɛ [anthrax], it’s because our fathers [tɔɔ denbɛ ]83 
didn’t know better. Just like that, they started to trap and use cattle to 
plough.’ Do you understand? At that time, that’s how it happened. They 
had to ask the cattle to forgive [sɔnni ] them. It’s the truth. 
“My father refused to use cattle to plough until he died. He would say, ‘how can 
you take cattle and make them suffer, beat them so they plough a furrow, then 
you sow your cereals and eat afterwards?’” commented Alma who is in her 
sixties. Several other interviewees mentioned the same concern; that it was not 
right to exploit animals in this way so that you could eat. Takida, the 
septuagenarian farmer, went as far as saying that you make the animal a slave, 
whilst Yves, the farmer in his late-forties shared: 
[When I first saw cattle ploughing] I wasn’t happy and said to myself, 
‘How can we take the cattle we use for sacrifices, that give us life, and 
use them to plough?’ We suffered. One year there was no rain and 
people said, ‘It’s the cattle who are grumbling. They’re saying, “Ah, it’s 
not possible! You, who sacrifice us, now you want to make us plough?”’ 
Sinbonko, a community shrine priest in his sixties, explained that by making 
ploughing-cattle do the work of men, their status changes to that of a human. 
As humans are not sacrificed and eaten, ploughing-cattle should not be either. 
Sinbonko elaborated that by making cattle plough for humans, not only do they 
                                             
83 Includes fathers and forefathers. Denbɛ is a plural marker for words that do not have 
nominal class markers. 
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become human, they become their children. Marc, an ex-church farmer in his 
mid-forties also stated that by making cattle plough you accord them human 
status. He then explained that the atenwiɛnɛ (shrine entities) were also upset 
when people first used cattle in this way. He added that the atenwiɛnɛ want 
food and drink that people have produced by their own labour. The atenwiɛnɛ 
were so upset to be offered food that was produced by ploughing-cattle that 
they caused a drought. Marc concluded that the atenwiɛnɛ are now weak, as 
they have no choice but to accept produce that has not resulted from human 
effort. Timothée, a septuagenarian retired pastor, added that some people were 
so unhappy that they asked the atenwiɛnɛ to intervene by killing the ploughing-
cattle. After some time, however, the same people realised that ploughing-cattle 
were good, so they asked the atenwiɛnɛ for forgiveness. Now even the 
community shrine priests use ploughing-cattle. 
Some of my interviewees, however, were amongst the first who were willing 
to try ploughing with cattle. Yooka, a septuagenarian farmer, was one such 
person: “People said we were thieves and that we didn’t want to work; that’s 
why we said that cattle could plough to give us food. But now, they use 
[ploughing-cattle],” he shared. Many people still do not like the idea of using 
ploughing-cattle, especially when they see ploughing-cattle abused by 
ploughmen so that they plough faster or more than is reasonable in a given day. 
Most interviewees affirmed that if someone were responsible for the death of 
ploughing-cattle through abuse, the cattle would seek vengeance. Despite this, 
most people have accepted the necessity of using ploughing-cattle. With 
increasing population pressure, and more people growing cotton, ploughing by 
traction is necessary if enough land is to be cultivated during the relatively short 
rainy season. “It’s really difficult”, explicated Isabelle, who is in her late-thirties, 
“if it wasn’t because we need to plough our fields to have food, [I don’t like that] 
first of all you take the ploughing-cattle, you put wood on their necks, then the 
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plough behind, and when they refuse to walk, you hit them.” Basaadi, the 
nonagenarian diviner stated, “ploughing-cattle are now our sons, they are 
everything to us,” whilst Anne, a churchgoing widow in her late-forties, 
explained this relationship further by drawing a parallel between a father giving 
his son a daba 84 and giving an ox a plough: “Now he has made the ox his own 
son by giving him a daba to plough. He’s his son now. As your son holds the 
daba, so does the ox; would you kill your own child to eat? [If you do] he [the 
ox] will seek vengeance.” 
Blench, writing about sub-Saharan Africa, notes that “[t]he most notable 
example of an implement that failed to spread is the plough” (2015:5). He 
explains that ploughs where first introduced by missionaries and colonialists. 
People, however, were reluctant to adopt ploughs unless the right social, 
environmental and agricultural conditions were met, usually as a result of 
“human population pressures [which] necessitate short fallow periods” (2015:5). 
Blench (2015:9) refers to Togo (Benin’s western neighbour), where attempts by 
German colonialists in 1900 to introduce animal traction had little success. 
Despite further attempts to introduce ploughs in the 1950s, less than 1000 
ploughs were in use by 1960 when Togo became independent. Blench 
concludes that “In most villages in Africa, animal-drawn ploughs were 
introduced in living memory” (2015:15). The social conditions that Blench 
mentions do not include how people relate to the animals concerned. In addition 
to other factors that Blench does note, I suspect that one major reason behind 
people’s reluctance to adopt ploughs is because of their perceived abuse of the 
animals affected. Sewane (2002:40) substantiates this for the Betammaribe. 
With the desire to promote development, the American Peace Corp imported 
some cows who had been trained to the yoke. They hoped that the 
Betammaribe would abandon their hoes and use cattle to plough instead. Under 
                                             
84 A large-bladed hoe with a short handle used for ploughing by hand. 
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the heavy sun, young Americans demonstrated the cows’ ploughing abilities. 
Those who watched thought that the cows’ docility was abnormal. Nothing in 
the world would make them subject their own cows to such a traumatic 
experience. In the same way, the Betammaribe forbid sending their daughters 
away to work as domestics. 
Today, in the Commune of Cobly, most people now accept using ploughing-
cattle – or maybe it is the ploughing-cattle who have accepted their fate (or 
both) – as cattle are no longer held responsible for problems such as anthrax 
and drought. This mutual acceptance may be because people have found a 
way of maintaining a subject-person relationship with their cattle by according 
them human status as their children. Perceptions also change with time and 
circumstances. The younger generation, for example, has grown up with 
ploughing-cattle: 
It’s a good thing. If it weren’t good, if people abandoned them 
[ploughing-cattle], what would they do? Men yoked them so that we 
could use them. Uwienu thought about it and saw that people should 
profit from [ploughing-cattle] and that they should also profit from us 
(Juliette, who is in her early-twenties and recently married). 
Didier, the village chief in his sixties, explained: 
[Using ploughing-cattle] is good, yes, well each thing has its time. When 
cattle were first used people said it was because of the cattle; we were 
maltreating them in the fields and that’s why we had a big drought. Now 
that we’ve become accustomed to using cattle, we cannot [abandon 
them] today. 
Now people have brought us tractors; they’ve come from Ghana,85 and 
are used throughout the area for ploughing. So people are saying it’s 
because the tractors ploughed too close to the shrine entities that the 
rains were late. Do you see? Each thing has its consequence. It’s 
because of new things that these things happen, especially late rains. It 
was only the 16th August [2014] that the rains arrived and people 
exclaimed that it’s because of the tractors, which make too much noise 
                                             
85 Although some people in the Commune of Cobly now own tractors, the majority come 
from Ghana. With the start of each rainy season, Ghanaians drive over in their tractors and hire 
their services to the local population.  
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for the shrine entities, that’s why the rains were late. Well, what can you 
do? 
Grégoire, the teacher in his twenties, also shared about tractors and how they 
are implicated in the increase of beef: 
Today, ploughing-cattle are becoming less useful and are now destined 
for meat because of the arrival of tractors that can plough an extensive 
acreage. Cattle continue to increase, but machines now do the work 
that they were meant for. Therefore, the only thing to do is to kill them. 
That’s why there’s often beef available. 
These incidents typify how people deal with upaanu (new times) and the 
introduction of new things, which often results in friction between different 
entities (J. Merz 2014:29-77; see also Bernard 2003), at least initially. Despite 
this, tractors are catching on more readily than ploughing-cattle did. This is 
probably due to people having less ontonic engagement with tractors than 
ploughing-cattle, especially as the majority of those who own the tractors and 
actually plough the fields are Ghanaians; thus foreigners. With more land being 
cultivated, however, there are other consequences.  
Territorial Control and Breeding 
In the past there was plenty of land and our fields were far away. When 
we were children, the sheep and goats could wander freely. People 
didn’t prepare the land next to their houses, so they could wander 
freely. Now we are numerous and people plough next to [their 
homesteads]. What do you do? When you see the sorghum [growing], 
you need to tie them up. We didn’t used to tie them up (Duuté, an 
octogenarian farmer). 
There is little control of breeding, and the majority of people let their diseede 
wante (family animals) wander freely, mixing and mating with other animals as 
they desire. This is possible as there is only partial territorial control, which 
people undertake once the crops have started to grow (June/July) until they are 
ready for harvest (November). People attach pigs to trees and tether goats and 
sheep out in the open, or children shepherd them, together with cattle, during 
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the day. They then round the diseede wante up for the night. This is both for the 
animals’ and the crops’ protection and is paramount when crops are grown in 
the immediate vicinity of the homestead. The village chief has the right to take 
possession of any animals that are not tethered or shepherded and are causing 
damage. If nobody claims the animal in question after several weeks, the chief 
can eat or sell the animal. Otherwise, people need to pay a fine of 2,000 CFA 
francs (approximately £2.70) per day when they go to claim back the animal in 
question. They also have to pay compensation to those whose fields have been 
damaged. The other risk is that the animal will be stolen or even killed by those 
whose fields are being destroyed. Consequently, incentives are high to make 
sure that animals are tethered or shepherded. Those whose fields suffer 
damage from wandering animals are also careful not to act too quickly against 
the animals in question. They should first speak with the animal’s guardian and 
the village chief before taking action against the animal. Should they kill the 
animal out of frustration or anger not only will the animal’s guardian be upset, 
but the animal can avenge its death, as Alma, who is in her sixties, explained: 
Ah, that’s bad. Animals can’t sow, animals can’t plough, and then you 
kill the animal [out of anger]. Uwienu has authorised the animal to eat 
vegetation. The animal sees the cereals and thinks they’re vegetation. 
The animal doesn’t know that you sowed them and that you like them. 
By killing the animal, it’s you who have sinned. […] One day something 
bad will happen to you and you won’t [immediately] realise that it’s the 
animal’s revenge. 
If a wandering animal’s exact identity is in doubt, however, no one will intervene 
for fear that the animal in question is another entity who has body-shifted. In 
such instances, the animal may cause extensive damage. I examine such a 
scenario involving seven donkeys (simunsi, sg. kɛmunkɛ) in Chapter Six. As 
previously mentioned, people consider Equidae family members powerful 
animals and respect them accordingly. Normally the only person who has any 
authority over a donkey is its guardian; others who try to intervene in a donkey’s 
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life are intruding on the donkey’s rights. The donkey will then set about 
destroying such people and their families.  
People sow around their homestead first, sometimes using fast-growing 
varieties of millet and maize, before sowing slower-growing varieties in their 
fields away from home. This allows them to liberate their diseede wante (family 
animals) sooner rather than later. Interviewees generally acknowledged that it is 
only the fields that are in the immediate vicinity of a homestead that are at risk 
and that, in past times, when people did not farm close to home, they neither 
tethered nor shepherd their diseede wante. 
At the height of dry season, when most natural sources of water have dried 
up and vegetation is scarce, some Bebelibe provide their diseede wante with 
food and water. As previously mentioned, many people acknowledge that 
animals have a certain level of autonomy. Accordingly, they largely leave their 
diseede wante to fend for themselves, which can appear as indifference or 
neglect, especially to expatriates. As Serpell and Paul (1994:132) suppose, 
some animals do wander off, may revert to a semi-wild state, and are never 
seen again. A recent development is to entrust the care of some livestock, 
especially cows, to Fulani who have settled in the area. Several interviewees 
explained that another solution is to castrate86 the males so they do not wander 
far from home. A more recent development, and the other main reason 
interviewees gave for castrating animals, is to increase their meat-yield. People 
are well aware that a male can no longer reproduce once castrated, but they do 
not necessarily castrate their animals in order to control breeding. Two 
interviewees explained that too many males who compete to mate could be 
distressing for the females. In this instance, it is better to castrate most of the 
males in order to maximise reproduction. Several interviewees added that you 
                                             
86 People crush the testicles (wɛpu or wɛbita), of cattle, goats and sheep, for example, and 
properly castrate (dota) dogs and pigs by removing their testicles. 
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only castrate a male after it has had the chance to mate at least once. 
Otherwise, most interviewees thought the idea of limiting or controlling breeding 
absurd, “Oh! People would never accept doing that!” declared Idaani, the 
church elder in his late-fifties. “No, no, no, you can’t do that, you can’t do that. 
You leave them [to breed freely],” exclaimed Nicole, who is in her twenties and 
studying for her baccalauréat, whilst Charles, a farmer in his late-thirties stated 
that only modern people87 use birth control and went on to explain that for 
animals: 
There is no limit to their multiplication, unless they set their own limit. An 
animal, you know, when he goes wandering he eats what he wants. He 
chooses and eats what he likes. But when he’s tied up, what he has to 
eat isn’t the same. He doesn’t have the same choice and he’s obliged to 
eat what’s there. You can’t provide for him in the same way as when he 
wanders freely. Now it’s the same thing with reproduction [if you try to 
control it], the animal will produce but it won’t be the same as when he 
wanders freely [and can choose for himself]. 
Idaani, Nicole and Charles’ responses were typical and illustrate that many 
people do not accept the idea of “seriously curtail[ing] an animal’s ability to act 
as ‘it’ chooses” (Hurn 2012:58). The general sentiment was that it is good and 
important to let animals breed freely. Following Blench, such sentiments about 
reproduction and castration are typical for the region: 
Throughout most of sub-Saharan Africa, ruminant livestock are allowed 
to mate freely, and thus the only control exercised over the quality of 
sires is the fertility of individuals. Castration is practised in sub-Saharan 
Africa but it is neither common nor carried out with the primary goal of 
improving genetic quality (1999:47-48). 
Only two people affirmed that, yes, you should control breeding: Bernadette, a 
churchgoer who breeds pigs commercially, and Isaac, a churchgoing 
businessman and commercial farmer, as they seek to maximise production and 
meat-yield for tikpate (monetary wealth). Although keeping and breeding 
animals for economic gain is a more recent development, it is one that is 
                                             
87 Bɛpanbɛ (literally “people-new”, sg. upaanɔ). 
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beginning to gain in popularity (see Commodification, Chapter Five). Bernadette 
and Isaac are amongst a small handful of commercial animal farmers currently 
active in the Commune, and Thérèse, a churchgoing meat-seller in her fifties, 
will start breeding pigs commercially once her pigsties are built. Meanwhile, 
other interviewees continue to leave breeding in the “hands” of their diseede 
wante (family animals), not only out of respect for their autonomy, but to have 
as many animals as possible. They too talked about the wealth that their 
diseede wante represent, but this is of another kind: utedu (non-monetary 
abundance): 
Sharon: Do you think that humans have the right to control or limit the 
breeding of domestic animals? 
Roland (the trained pastor in his mid-forties): Humans have the right to? 
Sharon: To try and limit or control breeding… 
Roland: …of animals? 
Sharon: M hmm. 
Roland: That, that’s not at all normal! You should leave animals to 
reproduce because a man’s wealth88 [utedu] is measured by the 
amount of land and the number of wives, children and animals he has. 
These are the things that indicate wealth [utedu]. 
Animal utedu is important for sacrifices and for developing and maintaining 
relationships through reciprocal giving and eating together. In order for these 
things to happen, however, the animal concerned often needs to be killed and 
consumed. If people recognise that animals are beings of equal worth and 
therefore have a certain level of autonomy, how can they justify killing and 
eating them? I explore this issue in the next chapter. 
                                             
88 Interview in French. Roland used the word richesse. 
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Chapter Five 
Killing and Consumption 
Interviewees regularly expressed their high regard for animals. They also 
testified that they enjoy eating meat (tininte). This apparent paradox has been 
noted by others such as Ingold (1986:247), Lindquist (2000:178-179), Serpell 
(2005), Serpell and Paul (1994:131-132) and Willis (1990:7-8, 13). Morris 
dispels this paradox by explaining that 
in many clan-based societies [in Malawi], particularly hunter-gatherers, 
meat eating coexists with a close spiritual relationship between people 
and their natural environment […]. Meat eating may reflect, therefore, 
not power over animals but rather identification with them (2009:186). 
Morris further clarifies that eating meat should not be interpreted as an act that 
opposes or controls nature, but rather one of incorporating and “harnessing” 
natural powers that are crucial for individual and social wellbeing (1998:186-
187; 2009:187). He also notes that people enjoy and even crave meat 
(1998:191; 2009:190). 
When I asked Anne, the churchgoing widow in her late-forties, if she would 
eat meat every day if she could, she responded with a laugh, “I would love to, I 
truly would! Just show me where you keep your meat and watch me!” Takida, 
the septuagenarian farmer, and Idaani the church elder in his late-fifties both 
exclaimed that meat “takes the throat”; only meat can satisfy your craving. Many 
interviewees were down-to-earth in their views; for them – as for Malawians – 
there was no apparent paradox between their respect for animals as beings of 
equal worth and eating them. “Yes, we kill animals to eat, and they eat us,” 
Franck, a pork butcher in his mid-thirties, stated pragmatically. Paul, a village 
deputy chief in his late-forties, and Henri, the carpenter in his late-thirties, also 
mentioned that there are human-eating animals. “God created animals so that 
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we could have meat”, added Henri, “as humans don’t eat humans.” Other 
interviewees pointed out that some animals are carnivores. Writing generally 
about animals and moral behaviour, Bekoff notes that “[s]ocial morality does not 
mean other animals are behaving unfairly when they kill for food, for example, 
for they have evolved to do this” (2006:468). 
Not all Bebelibe, however, are happy about killing animals for meat. Many 
interviewees affirmed that those with animal mtakimɛ and who succeed best 
with their diseede wante (family animals) could not kill them. Roland, the trained 
pastor in his mid-forties, explained that it would be as if they are sacrificing a 
part of themselves. Such people are often more reticent about eating meat too. 
Esther, the septuagenarian widow, is widely recognised for her rapport and 
success with diseede wante. She told me that she did not like eating meat and 
that it made her feel sick. What she shared was later borne out by her actions. 
We both attended a party in July 2015. Everybody was served meat. Although 
Esther accepted the meat (to not do so would have been inappropriate), this did 
not mean she was obliged to eat it. Knowing that Esther did not actually eat 
meat, Sarah, a widow in her mid-forties, provided her with a container to take 
the meat home. Esther then gave it to her grandchildren. Others, especially 
those reincarnated by an animal, may need to observe special interdictions 
such as not eating four-footed animals. To do so could result in their death. 
More generally, most interviewees explained that they could not eat their totem 
animal, a subject I examine in Chapter Seven. If there is a paradox, then, it is 
that animals are simultaneously good to eat whilst providing moral constraints, 
as posited by Fortes (1966:18). Following Serpell, such constraints result from 
the human 
capacity to use introspection or ‘reflexive consciousness’ […]. But 
because we are animals and share many of our feelings, needs and 
motivations with other animals, it can also be applied to the task of 
penetrating and exploring the mental states of nonhumans […] 
(2005:10). 
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Serpell elucidates that one consequence of such thinking is that it results in 
“moral inhibitions about killing and eating [animals]” (2005:10) and “generates 
feelings of anxiety, guilt, and the fear of retribution when the [hunted] animal is 
eventually killed” (2005:13). He later adds that some pastoral societies fear 
retribution if livestock are killed “simply to satisfy the desire for meat” (2005:15-
16). Similarly, as with hunting and killing bush animals, there is a limit to how 
many diseede wante (family animals) an individual Ubielo should kill, and the 
diseede wante can seek revenge if the reason for their death cannot be 
justified. 
Anne, the churchgoing widow in her late-forties, explicated that all animals 
and humans are equal in the eyes of Uwienu (God), as he created us all. Thus, 
for Uwienu, to kill an animal without just cause is the same as killing a human. 
He does not accept this and he will see that the animal is avenged. Yaaté, a 
farmer in his early-fifties, lamented: 
Oh, suffering will come. You’ve despicably killed an animal who was 
with you. The animal will go to Uwienu, who created us all. Uwienu will 
judge by asking the animal, ‘what did you do?’ And he says, ‘I didn’t do 
anything.’ Uwienu then asks your mtakimɛ, ‘what did you do?’ And your 
mtakimɛ says, ‘I committed a despicable act.’ […] The animal then 
returns and will make you suffer. You committed a despicable act 
against the animal, so its mtakimɛ will do something despicable to you. 
Yaaté added that the animal could seek vengeance by seeing that you would 
no longer succeed with your diseede wante, or that your crops would fail. He 
surmised that animals are more powerful than humans, as a person’s utedu 
(non-monetary abundance) depends on animals. Many interviewees affirmed 
that failing with diseede wante was the most common form of reprisal, which 
Uwienu (God) either metes out directly or authorises the aggrieved animal to 
dispense. As diseede wante are integral members of the diseede (family) and 
essential for a family’s wellbeing, to deprive a family of animals is to deprive 
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them of utedu. As mentioned in Chapter Four, the diseede is incomplete without 
animals.  
Thus, killing an animal should be legitimised at the mundane as well as 
authorised at a sacred level. It is not so much a question of whether one should 
kill animals, but rather when and why. 
Morris notes: 
In rural areas, domestic animals and poultry are rarely killed for food, 
unless there is a good reason, such as a feast for a wedding or funeral 
or to honor an important visitor with good ndiwo [meat sauce]. The 
suggestion of many vegetarians that people would not eat animals if 
they had to kill them themselves gets no support at all from the 
Malawian context. People who kill animals invariably eat them 
(2009:192)89.  
I have observed the same situation in the Commune of Cobly. Butchering, and 
seeing animals being butchered, does not deter people from eating meat. I 
watched the butchering of a sow and a female goat90 in July 2015 ready for the 
party mentioned above. Victor, an animal trader in his early-forties, provided the 
animals. Three young men and Victor then butchered the animals in front of 
Sarah’s homestead. Bystanders included several other men, some children, 
Sarah who oversaw the butchering, and later the cooking, and the family dog. 
Sébastien (early-twenties) quickly and efficiently slaughtered the two 
animals, so their suffering was minimal. Edouard (late-teens) assisted him. 
Sébastien first killed the sow by delivering a quick, hard blow from behind to the 
top of her head with a large wooden pestle normally used for pounding yam. He 
then slit her throat with a machete and drained the blood. Sébastien and 
                                             
89 Writing about abattoirs in France, Vialles (1994:31-32, 118-119) intimates that 
squeamishness over bloodshed and slaughter increases with distance. She also observes that 
new, humane slaughter methods actually makes slaughtering worse for the abattoir workers: 
By treating animals ‘humanely’, man is in fact humanising them, and by the 
same token the feeling of unease increases in proportion to the taxonomical 
ambiguity created by dissolving the frontiers between humanity and animality 
(1994:123). 
90 Ideally, only male family animals should be killed for meat, though this is changing with 
the commercialisation of animals. 
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Edouard then burnt the hair off, scraped the skin clean of charred matter and 
washed the carcass. Edouard and Pascal (mid-twenties) butchered the carcass 
into manageable chunks ready to give to Sarah. Sébastien then trussed up the 
goat and – whilst Edouard held her – slit her throat with a sharp knife and 
drained the blood. Sébastien then used boiling water to scald the skin so that 
he could easily scrape the fur off. He also used fire to burn the fur off the 
extremities. As with the sow, the two then washed the carcass. Victor then 
arrived and helped Edouard complete the butchering. The whole process took a 
little over two hours. There was one distressing moment when Pascal opened 
up the sow and Sarah thought she was pregnant91. Sarah’s fears were quickly 
alleviated though; the sow had evidently had a hearty meal before being 
slaughtered so her intestines were distended. Otherwise, those present chatted 
and socialised in a relaxed manner, talked positively about the meat-yield and 
were obviously looking forward to the party meal. 
Despite their evident pleasure at the prospect of eating meat and although 
some interviewees – such as Anne, Takida and Idaani – openly expressed their 
desire for meat, most of the interviewees voiced concern (including Takida) 
about eating too much meat, which many considered unhealthy. 
There are several reasons for killing diseede wante (family animals). I 
will kill one for a stranger or if I need to perform a sacrifice. Otherwise, 
[if I want to eat meat] I’ll take my bow or my rifle one morning to go 
hunting and say, ‘today, as I’m looking for meat, I can kill’ (Michel, the 
farmer in his fifties). 
As mentioned in Chapter Four (see Hunting), until relatively recently, bushmeat 
was the main source of family meat and diseede wante were rarely killed just so 
that a family could eat meat. As bush animals become scarcer, however, people 
are increasingly eating diseede wante, especially in the town of Cobly (see 
                                             
91 Sarah was not too happy that female animals were slaughtered. The thought that the 
sow might be pregnant upset her further, as the piglets represented potential tikpate (monetary 
wealth) that was lost. 
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Commodification below). Otherwise – as Morris notes for Malawi – my 
interviewees were unanimous that diseede wante should only be killed for 
social consumption, or if they are antisocial or dangerous.  
Social Consumption 
‘Why is it so important to offer meat to strangers?’ I asked Robert. He 
explained that it’s out of respect and consideration. It’s important to 
offer something good, especially as you never know if the visitor is 
really who he or she appears to be! Sometimes the visitor is Uwienu 
[God] or a ditade [stone/shrine entity, pl. ataadɛ] who has taken on 
human form. Uwienu and ataadɛ can visit as a child or an old person of 
your acquaintance, or as a complete stranger. If you don’t welcome the 
person correctly, it could be you’re showing disrespect towards Uwienu 
himself or a ditade [… and] you could die. 
[Robert went on to explain that if] someone is stingy and lacks respect 
towards others, then Uwienu isn’t happy either. He can come in human 
form to see how you’ll behave towards him. If you don’t welcome him 
properly, he’ll take action against you (Journal entry, 6 February 2015). 
Duuté, the octogenarian farmer, explained that animals too sometimes become 
(kɔnta) humans in order to visit people: “The animal comes to visit you and 
says, ‘Give me this, give me that.’ If you don’t give to him, he will kill you.” 
Writing about the Tallensi of Ghana, Fortes also notes that “Beings of the Wild”, 
“evil trees” and “stones” can transform themselves “into human shape to test 
and tempt one. To refuse hospitality […] lays one open to the mystical attack 
that might result in madness” (1975:232; see also Candea and da Col 2012). 
When I asked interviewees when someone could kill an animal, the first 
reason given by nearly everyone was to welcome a stranger. The word for 
“stranger” in Mbelime is usaanɔ (pl. bɛsanbɛ) and includes not only unfamiliar 
visitors, but also newborn babies, new wives and returning family members or 
friends who have been absent for several months or more. In sum, strangers 
include visitors “whose immediate experiences and possible motives remain 
hazy or unknown” (J. Merz 2014:43; see also Piot 1999:77-78; Fortes 
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1975:230). Given that one cannot be entirely sure if a stranger is normally 
human, but could be another entity who might be testing you for some reason, 
welcoming strangers properly is crucial (see also S. Merz 2014:45-46). “It brings 
home the importance of hospitality and is a necessity,” Alexis, the churchgoing 
student in his late-twenties expounded, as he shared about the importance of 
welcoming ataadɛ shrine entities who may come and visit you in person: 
Therefore, as we don’t have the means to properly identify who is who, 
you need to have a spirit of hospitality, you need to be hospitable and 
see that everyone is welcomed – invited and strangers alike – you 
mustn’t discriminate and try to know who’s who before welcoming them. 
If circumstances mean that there is no time to prepare a meal, however, hosts 
should give their visitors a gift such as a chicken, guineafowl, some yams or 
maize to take away with them. In this instance, the stranger in question is not 
obliged to actually consume the gift and can choose to keep it or pass it on to 
someone else. It is necessary that the host has demonstrated hospitality, and 
that the visitor has accepted it. 
Other social occasions when people should offer meat include work parties 
and celebrations. Consuming meat socially is important for forming, maintaining 
and sometimes restoring relationships, as well as demonstrating respect 
towards and appreciation of others. Eating meat together symbolises union, 
trust and identity (see also Hurn 2013; Staples 2008:43; Vilaça 2005:454). 
Several times now, people have told Johannes and me, “we’re the same now, 
you’re truly Bebelibe,” after sharing a meal with them. Hutchinson (1992:494) 
suggests that sharing food together in such circumstances is the equivalent of 
establishing a blood bond between the people concerned, thus recognising 
them as kin (see also Candea and da Col 2012:S9-S10; Carsten 1995; Piot 
1991:413-414; Yates-Doerr 2015:313-316).  
Robert, the NGO worker in his late-thirties also explained that diseede 
wante (family animals) should normally be killed by the akṵnpe (individuals’ 
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mtakimɛ shrines)92 or in the vestibule (ukoohṵ) where the bɛhidibɛ (dead) 
reside. The person who kills the animal sprinkles some blood onto the shrines 
and tells the bɛhidibɛ why he has killed the animal. Robert explained that the 
bɛhidibɛ look after the diseede wante, therefore they expect to be informed 
when and why they are killed. If the host gives a fowl to the visitor to take away, 
he should first pluck some feathers and deposit them on the bɛhidibɛ or the 
place where the fowl slept. Robert then bemoaned the fact that many do not 
bother to keep the bɛhidibɛ informed anymore as they consider themselves 
modern and think that this is no longer necessary. Then they wonder why their 
chickens disappear or their animals get sick! He added that diseede wante who 
are not normally sacrificed (such as pigs), could simply be killed without 
informing the bɛhidibɛ. 
Although there is no formal ceremony as such, I propose that killing diseede 
wante for social consumption is a form of mundane sacrifice, especially as its 
primary purpose is to establish and maintain good relationships, not only 
between hosts and guests, but also with the bɛhidibɛ. Writing about sacrifice 
more generally, Evans-Pritchard (1954:31), Detienne (1979:9-11), Vernant 
(1979:43-45), Bloch (1992:36-43) and Burkert (1996:149-152), for example, all 
discuss the role of social consumption during formal sacrifices. Little has been 
written about the idea that social consumption in its own right could be analysed 
sacrificially, although Hurn’s (2013; see also 2016b) analysis of the commensal 
role of sharing a meal together could be a comparative example. Writing about 
a Welsh farming community and foxhunting, she notes that “[p]artaking in a 
communal meal at the end of a day’s hunting further served to reaffirm hunt 
followers’ shared values and interests” (2013:222). Hurn then demonstrates that 
                                             
92 Sprinkling blood and speaking over the akṵnpe is another way of informing the bɛhidibɛ 
of something, given that their shrines are only present in the vestibule of the most senior male 
of the family (see Introduction). If the akṵnpe and bɛhidibɛ shrines are present in a homestead, 
then blood can be sprinkled on all of them. 
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the hunt, followed by the meal, which always includes a bowl of lamb stew, can 
be analysed sacrificially. She points out that the farming community’s foxhunting 
“lack[s] much of the pomp and ceremony associated with mounted foxhunting in 
other parts of the United Kingdom” (2013:220), and that it “is an inherently 
secular sacrifice which lacks any of the reverence or ritual of the foxhunt 
[elsewhere]” (2013:224). What Hurn does not make explicit is whether those 
who partake in the hunt and subsequent meal are conscious of the sacrificial 
nature of their acts. 
Vernant recalls that 
for us sacrifice and butchering belong to two different semantic zones, 
[Casabona] noted that among the Greeks matters were completely 
different. The same vocabulary encompasses the two domains, from 
Homer to the end of the classical age. Ancient Greek has no other 
terms to convey the idea of slaughtering an animal to butcher it than 
those referring to sacrifice or killing for the gods (1989:25). 
Despite this, the sacrificial aspect of butchering seems to have predominated in 
ancient Greece as Vernant also states that “[n]ormally, meat cannot be eaten 
except on the occasion of a sacrifice and by following its rules” (1989:25). 
As with the other societies analysed by the authors above, Bebelibe 
sacrifices also serve as social occasions when meat is consumed, as their main 
purpose is to maintain and restore relationships, both intra-human and between 
humans and other entities, as well as to safeguard the different individuals’ 
wellbeing. In fact, there is no Mbelime word for “sacrifice”. People employ the 
verb yuɔsi (to fix, resolve, repair, restore order), which they also use for other 
activities such as tidying the house and repairing a bicycle. The person who 
performs the sacrifice is uyuɔsɔ (person-who-fixes), whilst tiyɔsite (restoration) 
refers to ceremonies, sacrifices and other occasions when uyuɔsɔ fixes or 
restores something. 
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Tiyɔsite (restoration) 
‘It’s the end of the world!’ lamented Sarah [the churchgoing widow, then 
in her late-thirties]. This morning we woke up to silence, as there was 
no crowing competition between the neighbourhood cockerels now that 
most of the poultry has been culled (Journal entry, 16 July 2007). 
In July 2007 there was a bird-flu scare. The government banned all trade and 
movement of poultry. The gendarmerie and government meat inspectors93 
established several control points where they confiscated, killed and burnt 
poultry and smashed eggs. Miscreants had to pay a fine and pay for the paraffin 
used to burn the poultry. Rumour had it that all poultry would need to be 
culled.94 Many decided to go ahead and kill their poultry and eat the meat. 
Sarah’s reaction might appear to be overdramatic, but given that chickens are 
part of a family’s utedu (non-monetary abundance) and that nearly all 
ceremonial events require a chicken95 – whether it is sacrificed or not96 – maybe 
her reaction was not so extraordinary after all. Huber (1973), for example, 
documented a number of ceremonies that he witnessed in the village of Sinni, 
all of which required chickens. 
The African domestic chicken is descended from the red junglefowl (Gallus 
gallus). Establishing when and how chickens first arrived in West Africa from 
Asia continues to be a challenge (Mwacharo et al. 2013), but evidence shows 
that they were definitely present from 850 AD onwards, probably as early as 
450 AD, if not earlier (MacDonald 1992). In terms of their current-day 
                                             
93 These are usually techniciens des services vétérinaires. See fn. 39, p. 93. 
94 See also Haraway’s (2007:270-271) comment about the 2006 bird-flu outbreak in 
northern Nigeria. 
95 Exceptions include dikṵntide (female initiation ceremony). An initiated woman should no 
longer eat chicken meat or eggs, as the dikṵntide shrine entity forbids them. Consequently, if a 
woman needs further ceremonies, guineafowls are used instead. Should an initiated woman eat 
chicken meat or eggs, she can no longer visit the dikṵntide shrine entity, otherwise she runs the 
risk of falling sick and dying. Sewane (2002:18, 21) notes the same situation for the 
Betammaribe. 
96 Often an initial offering only requires some blood, in which case the person performing 
the ceremony cuts off the last digit of a chicken’s toe and drips blood onto the shrine. 
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importance, however, a few hundred years makes little difference. They are so 
integral to many people’s lives, not just in the Commune of Cobly but also 
across the region, that they have become almost indispensable. In a small 
survey amongst the Mamprusi of northern Ghana, for example, van Veluw 
(1987:13) reported that 35% of chickens are used for sacrifices, 28% are sold 
for cash, 15% are consumed, 13% are given away and 10% of chickens are 
kept for breeding. Kondombo et al. (2003:566, 568; see also Guèye 1998:74-
75; Zoungrana and Slenders 1992), who conducted research amongst farmers 
in two villages in Burkina Faso, also noted that chickens are used for sacrifice, 
to honour guests, given as gifts, exchanged, essential for funeral ceremonies, 
sold to generate income and used to feed work parties. Consequently, chickens 
are present in every homestead. 
For the Luluwà, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), chickens are so 
important that they “arrange every problem in life” (Kantshama and Luboya 
1986:127, translation mine) through rituals that help resolve social issues and 
maintain relationships between the living and the dead. Meanwhile the “fowl 
figures so much in Ibo sacrifices that one would not be wrong to say that the 
majority of fowls in Iboland [Nigeria] in the past lost their precarious lives in 
honour of the higher powers” (Arinze, cited in V. Turner 1977:204), whilst 
Sewane (2002:37, fn. 1), notes that the Betammaribe (southeastern neighbours 
of the Bebelibe) think that the chicken is the oldest of all animals and that to 
sacrifice a chick, or better still an egg, replaces all other sacrifices. Thus, there 
are multiple reasons why people consider chickens important, but neither 
should the role of other diseede wante (family animals) be downplayed. 
Besides chickens (and guineafowls), many Bebelibe regularly sacrifice 
sheep, dogs, cows and goats (see also Sacrifice in the Appendices for a 
summary of what animals can be sacrificed when). People consult diviners to 
find out if and what other animal(s) are needed for the ceremony in question. As 
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mentioned above, sacrifices are important for maintaining relationships between 
different entities. By doing so, an individual’s wellbeing is also maintained. In his 
article The Meaning of Sacrifice among the Nuer, Evans-Pritchard distinguishes 
between two types of sacrifice “confirmatory” and “piacular” (1954:21). Whereas 
confirmatory sacrifices are more concerned with social relations, piacular 
sacrifices rather deal with individuals’ moral and physical wellbeing, though 
Evans-Pritchard does point out that the two overlap. Although it would be 
possible to class the different Bebelibe sacrifices according to these definitions, 
I am hesitant to do so as both aspects are apparent in all ceremonies, although 
one may be more predominant than another depending on the ceremony 
concerned. Evans-Pritchard also warns against analysing sacrifices in terms of 
“communion” or “gift” theory: 
As a sacrifice may be a gift or a communion or it may be both, and 
these meanings may be combined with yet others; and the emphasis 
varies from rite to rite and even in the same rite. We should rather be 
seeking for the core, the basic mechanism, of all sacrificial acts 
(1954:24; see also V. Turner 1977:189-190). 
Bloch too discusses the different theories that have been put forward about 
sacrifice and concludes that “sacrifice cannot be defined cross-culturally and 
that the word is nothing more than a pointer to a cluster of phenomena which 
are contained within a wider family of rituals” (1992:42). 
For Turner (1977), the principle aim of many rituals is communitas. He 
proposes, for example, that for the Ndembu of Zambia the Chihamba ceremony 
“is a matter of transforming the group as a whole, and its main individual 
members, from a social state of mutual antagonism to a social state of 
communitas” (1977:196) and that “sacrifices aimed at restoring true fellowship 
or communitas, human relationship without formal structure, the ideas of gift, 
expiation, and communion all find expression” (1977:197). Burkert favours 
commensality and suggests that in ancient Greece sacrifice was a celebration 
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of this “[i]n the presence of the sacred” (1996:150) and that the “integration of 
gods into the common meal serves the purpose of consolidating the group by 
establishing a superior authority, and ensuring continuity in the precarious 
transfer of life” (1996:151). 
In a similar vein, in his analysis of sacrifice amongst the Kuranko of Sierra 
Leone, Jackson proposes that “sacrifice demands a dialogue” and that 
[m]ost Kuranko sacrifices are made in order to establish a form of 
enduring reciprocity between man and spirit (sacralization) rather than 
to separate the two categories (desacralization). […] Sacrifice is thus an 
attempt to extend social communication across the boundaries of actual 
space and time (1977:125-126). 
Thus, restoring and maintaining communitas or good relationships between 
different entities – both human and nonhuman – necessitates good 
communication, which is optimised by some sort of sacrificial act. The Bebelibe 
have various rites of passage that accompany first pregnancy, birth, marriage, 
initiation and death, which ensure that all the parties concerned – including the 
extended family, the bɛhidibɛ (dead) and ataadɛ (community guardian shrine 
entities) – are officially informed about the occasion and those involved. Such 
rites also assure their participation and endorsement of the person’s transition 
from one stage of life to another (see also S. Merz 2014; Mendonsa 1976:55). 
Once the animal has been sacrificed, a meal is prepared with the meat, which is 
then shared by those participating in the ceremony. In terms of tiyɔsite 
(restoration), the ceremonies also ensure that people successfully transition 
from one stage of life to another, thus establishing them in their new position 
and restoring social order.  
These rites of passage include a purely festive aspect where, in addition to 
animals sacrificed, the hosts butcher other animals for celebratory meals. This 
allows those who have not been involved in the actual ceremonies to celebrate 
a person’s successful transition from one stage of life to another. The hosts also 
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send portions of meat to family members and friends who are unable to attend 
the celebrations (see also Jackson 1977:133). Today, the most popular meat 
for such occasions is pork. Basaadi, the nonagenarian diviner, recalls when he 
saw pigs for the first time: 
It was the year that people were re-housed [1960]97, that’s the year that 
pigs arrived here. I went into someone’s home and there was a pig 
standing there. I wondered what it was and they said it was a pig. ‘Ah, a 
pig?’ Then we saw them grow in popularity. 
Interviewees explained that pigs are popular because of their high meat yield 
compared with other animals, which means pork works out to be cheaper. 
People are also easily satisfied with a small portion, which usually contains a lot 
of pork fat and skin. Furthermore, pigs are easier and faster to breed, and are 
harder to steal than other animals because they squeal.98 Consequently, many 
people now keep pigs.  
Writing about pig-keeping in Africa, Blench notes that “the degree of ritual 
embedding in a culture can be taken as evidence of relative antiquity” 
(2000:356). The pigs’ lack of ritual embedding for the Bebelibe further affirms 
their recent arrival in the Commune of Cobly and explains their inferior status 
when compared with other diseede wante (family animals). This was borne out 
by several interviewees who added that anyone can eat pork99 and that pigs 
have no ceremonial significance, which also facilitates their commodification 
(see below): “It’s not an animal that we sacrifice, but it is there principally to 
allow us to have a good time. When there’s a working party or a celebration, 
anyone can take a pig and kill it as no sacrifices are needed before doing so,” 
Benjamin, the churchgoing university graduate in his late-twenties expounded. 
Meanwhile Timothée, the septuagenarian retired pastor, lamented that some 
                                             
97 See Hartveld et al. (1992:7) and Huber (1969:260; 1973:378). 
98 Though Alma explained that you can stop a pig squealing by putting soap in its mouth. 
99 The common warthog (kɛdodikɛ, pl. sidosi [Phacochoerus africanus]) is the totem animal 
for the Bɛcɛkɔnkibɛ community. As pigs are from the same family, members of this community 
should not eat pork. Some Bɛcɛkɔnkibɛ, however, have started eating pork and raising pigs. 
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people no longer perform funeral rites, and as pigs are not sacrificed, this is the 
meat that people now expect. He added that funerals (dihuude)100 have simply 
become celebrations and an occasion for families to impress their maternal 
uncles with lots of pork (see S. Merz 2017b:130). 
Furthermore, several interviewees explained that pigs are the least 
intelligent of the diseede wante, as – unlike other animals – they do not have 
diyammaade (ability to think, reason and make decisions). This, in turn, is due 
to their perceived lack of myammɛ (gallbladder), which is where one’s 
diyammaade and emotions are located. 
Finally, people simply like pork, and especially in the town of Cobly, many 
people now eat pork as part of their regular diet. Consequently, pork is now the 
most popular meat and pigs are the most commodified of all the diseede wante 
in the Commune. In sum, it is probable that the different factors affecting 
people’s perception of – and relationship with – pigs mean that people can 
satisfy their craving for meat with fewer qualms. Despite this, several 
interviewees explained that pigs too can seek revenge should an individual kill 
too many (see Commodification below).  
The Bebelibe’s relationship with pigs contrasts with that noted for other 
societies. The Tsembaga of Papua New Guinea, for example, sacrifice pigs in 
order to maintain relationships between both “the nonhuman components of 
their immediate environments and the human components of their less 
immediate environments” (Rappaport 1967:17). Rappaport then explained that 
they  
almost never kill domestic pigs outside of ritual contexts. In ordinary 
times, when there is no pig festival in progress, these rituals are almost 
always associated with misfortunes or emergencies, notably warfare, 
illness, injury, or death. Rules state not only the contexts in which pigs 
                                             
100 Today, people also use the word dihuude more generally when referring to any 
celebration. 
175 
 
 
are to be ritually slaughtered, but also who may partake of the flesh of 
the sacrificial animals (1967:22). 
Writing more generally about Melanesian societies, Dwyer and Minnegal note 
that 
pigs commonly play a crucial role in ceremonial and spiritual life: in 
bride wealth and affinal exchanges, initiation, curing and mortuary rites, 
in establishing prestige, and in major regional exchange networks […] 
of the New Guinea Highlands (2005:37-38; see also Josephides 1983). 
Pigs aside, amongst the Bebelibe, people also sacrifice diseede wante (family 
animals) to thank entities such as the bɛhidibɛ (dead) and ataadɛ (community 
guardian shrine entities) who have helped them in some way, following a 
successful hunt, for example (see Hunting, Chapter Four). Besides hunting, 
people may also solicit help from these or other entities to intercede on their 
behalf in times of trouble. As previously noted, for those who would not call 
themselves Christian, Uwienu is distant so they approach him via intermediaries 
such as the atenwiɛnɛ (shrine entities) and the bɛhidibɛ (dead). A woman who 
is having trouble getting pregnant, for example, may solicit the help of a 
dinitokitade (family fertility shrine). During the initial ceremony, the person 
responsible for the shrine cuts off the last digit of a chicken’s toe and drips 
blood onto the shrine. The woman then tells the entity what she will give in 
return should her request be fulfilled (see S. Merz 2014:91). 
Finally, diseede wante may need to die to reconcile relationships between 
two entities. As mentioned in Chapter Four, these ceremonies may serve to 
“separate” the entities concerned, such as mɔnta (to separate hunters from their 
prey) and ya̰nta (to separate human killers from their human victims). On other 
occasions, entities who feel they have been neglected may need to be 
appeased if, for example, the woman fails to thank the dinitokitade who has 
fulfilled her request for a child, or a hunter fails to thank the bɛhidibɛ (the dead) 
and atenwiɛnɛ (shrine entities) for their help and protection (see also Mendonsa 
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1976:56, 64-67; Jackson 1977:130, 132; V. Turner 1977:206-207; Burkert 
1996:152-153). Although these entities mediate between humans and Uwienu, 
and are not worshiped as such, they can still take offense when their 
intervention is not appreciated. Writing about the Sisala of northern Ghana, 
Mendonsa notes that “[a]ncestors are merely dematerialized human beings” 
(1976:58). Despite this 
[t]hey retain their protective responsibility toward the living and the duty 
to protect the moral order. […] Just as a father has the right to punish 
his child, the ancestors punish the living when the moral order is 
violated. […] The ancestors are also individuals. As jural abstractions 
they are the defenders of the moral order, but as individuals they are 
thought to be interested in their own fate (1976:64; see also Kröger 
2003:259-260). 
Failure to appease an offended party can have dire consequences, as the 
example of Emile in the Introduction illustrates. People speculate that Emile’s 
refusal to provide a dog to propitiate the crocodile he was responsible for killing 
resulted in his death (see also Vignette One, Chapter Seven). When the two 
entities concerned are both human, and a relationship breaks down to the 
extent that one curses the other, mya̰kitimɛ (ceremony to remove words spoken 
in anger) may need to be performed to lift the curse, during which a goat should 
be sacrificed (see S. Merz 2014:28-29). As with other ceremonies, mya̰kitimɛ 
ends with a meal that everybody shares. Food and drink items needed for the 
ceremony and the meal are set out before the bɛhidibɛ (the dead) in the 
vestibule (ukoohṵ). This includes fermented and non-fermented sorghum beer, 
condiments for the sauce, sorghum flour and water. 
Whoever is in charge of the ceremony can only sacrifice the goat, however, 
once it has indicated that it is satisfied that the two people concerned sincerely 
desire to be reconciled. The person who started the dispute brings the goat into 
the vestibule, who then indicates its acceptance to be sacrificed by sampling 
each of the items and jumping onto the bɛhidibɛ. Mya̰kitimɛ cannot take place 
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should the goat fail to do this. Allowing the goat to demonstrate its willingness to 
be sacrificed is the exception rather than the norm, however, as diseede wante 
usually have no say in their fate for the other sacrificial occasions. 
More generally, diseede wante (family animals) should not learn about their 
impending death, whether for sacrifice or other occasions of social 
consumption. Consequently, people should catch and tether the animals 
concerned well before the event, and should not discuss the animals’ fate in 
front of them, as the level of mutual comprehension means that they can 
understand some of the things people say. It is also important to water and feed 
the animals, as this demonstrates respect for them and helps ensure that they 
do not seek vengeance posthumously. 
Writing about sacrificial rituals amongst ancient civilisations, Serpell notes 
that 
some of [the] features of animal sacrifice were apparently designed to 
dilute individual responsibility for the animal’s death so that its meat 
could be eaten with a clear conscience. First, the animal bore some 
responsibility for appearing to give its assent, then the knife was blamed 
as the instrument of slaughter, the priests then acknowledged 
culpability as the actual agents of death, but ultimately the Gods were 
held responsible for ‘demanding’ the sacrifice in the first place (2005:17; 
see also Vialles 1994:45-46). 
As noted in Chapter Four, shifting the blame from the hunter to the instrument 
of death to Uwienu occurs during the mɔnta ceremony so that the hunter’s prey 
does not seek revenge. A similar practice of shifting the blame exists when 
killing cattle. As previously mentioned, killing certain diseede wante – such as 
cattle – can be compared to killing humans. Accordingly, ceremonies are 
needed to “take care of” (sɔnni ) the relationship so that they do not seek 
vengeance when killed. Each community has a designated person who can 
safely kill cattle. During a similar ceremony to mɔnta, the person shifts the 
blame to the knife, then to Uwienu : 
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He takes the head [of the cow] and the knife he used and deposits them 
next to the bɛhidibɛ. Then he takes a morsel of cornmeal porridge and 
he puts it on the knife and says, ‘If you want to overcome [avenge] 
someone, take your dispute to the person who made the knife and take 
it up with Uwienu. It’s Uwienu who said to kill you. And it’s the person 
who made the knife who said to kill you.’ That’s it. Then he takes and 
throws [the cornmeal porridge on the bɛhidibɛ] (Basaadi, the 
nonagenarian diviner).101 
Many of the interviewees indicated that sacrifice is one of the things that 
distinguish humans from animals, and that Uwienu authorised this. Some 
churchgoers went on to explain the origin of sacrifice, with obvious parallels with 
the biblical account of Abraham and Isaac: 
There was a man who had two wives, but one of them was barren. With 
time she had a child and she loved Uwienu and Uwienu loved her. 
Uwienu had told her, ‘You will have a child in your old age. If you have a 
child, you must give him to me; you must kill him for me.’ The woman 
truly accepted this. The husband accepted this too and said, ‘Ah, I truly 
accept. I will kill the child to give you.’ 
With time, the woman became pregnant and gave birth to a son. She 
said, ‘Ah, as I accepted Uwienu ’s word and he gave me [a child], I will 
follow and see Uwienu.’ So she took her son, she climbed the 
mountain, she took a knife and went to cut his throat to return [the child] 
to Uwienu. Uwienu said, ‘No!’ He came down to tell her not to do it. ‘I 
know now that you are a person of truth. Don’t slit the throat of your 
child! Look behind you.’ So she looked behind her and saw a ram tied 
up and Uwienu said, ‘Take that and use it instead for the sacrifice.’ 
This is why animals and humans are not the same. Uwienu doesn’t like 
it if someone kills a human. Uwienu created animals so that we could 
kill them and eat them (Anne, the widow in her late-forties). 
Anne later added that Uwienu created humans first, then the animals. Colette, a 
seamstress in her late-thirties, also explained that Uwienu first created man.102 
The man wanted to thank Uwienu and lamented that he had nothing to give. He 
then took one of his children to sacrifice, but Uwienu refused this. Therefore, 
                                             
101 See Figure 5. 
102 More generally, 12 interviewees said Uwienu created humans first; 11 that he created 
the animals first; two that he created all his creatures the same day. The rest did not specify 
who Uwienu created first.  
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Uwienu created animals, gave the man a sheep, and told him to go and offer it 
to ditade (stone/community guardian shrine). Both Anne and Colette affirmed 
that they had learnt about the origin of sacrifice at church, though Colette added 
that it is a story that non-churchgoers recount too.  
Even though Uwienu has authorised humans to sacrifice animals, this does 
not mean that Uwienu considers animals less important. Robert, the NGO 
worker in his late-thirties, explained that sometimes Uwienu judges it better for 
an animal to die rather than a person, as this will result in less suffering in the 
long run. Evans-Pritchard also notes the same notion for the Nuer for whom the 
“general idea underlying [piacular] sacrifices is that of substitution, the life of a 
beast being taken by God in the place of the life of a man, or the life of a beast 
being given in exchange for the life of a man” (1954:25). Amongst the Bebelibe, 
this idea is not limited to formal sacrifices, however, as diseede wante may die 
instead of a person without human intervention. 
In December 2007 our dog, Gaspode, who was in good health, stopped 
eating. He had no other symptoms and, despite all our efforts to encourage him 
to eat, he died several days later. In January 2008 Luc, the church leader in his 
thirties, came to visit us. Gaspode liked Luc and would try to climb into his lap 
when he came to visit. We had not seen Luc for a while and soon learnt why. 
Gaspode had died whilst Luc was in hospital fighting for his life. Luc then told us 
that several weeks earlier he had dreamt that he was on his way to visit us with 
his wife and children. As they approached our house, three huge dogs tried to 
attack his wife and children. “The dogs closed in on my wife and children and it 
was getting dangerous,” he explained. Luc decided that it would be better for 
him to die than his wife and children, so he placed himself in their way. He told 
himself, “If I have to die, then I will do everything to kill the dogs too.” By the 
time he had successfully fought off the dogs, his left arm was ripped and 
bloody, with the bones and sinews showing. In the morning, Luc told his wife 
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about his dream and that he was sure that he would either get sick, have an 
accident or be bitten by a snake. Shortly afterwards, Luc had a motorbike 
accident. He spent about a month in hospital and needed three operations. Luc 
explained that the dream had warned him that he was under spiritual attack and 
that his enemies were out to kill him. Evidently thankful that he was still alive, 
Luc was upset to learn that Gaspode had died. Luc concluded that God had 
spared him by allowing Gaspode to die in his place.  
Antoine, the farmer in his mid-fifties, reiterated how important it is to have 
animals: 
You should not say that you want to limit your diseede wante because 
[…] animals replace things [death] for us. It’s to do with mtakimɛ ; 
animals save us. I cannot emphasise this enough, if you have lots of 
animals and something out of the ordinary happens, for example 
someone decides to take [kill] a family member – maybe your child or 
your brother – but Uwienu or the bɛhidibɛ (dead) refuse and an 
exchange is made and one of your animals is taken instead. You go 
outside and see that your animal is dead. What if that animal didn’t 
exist? You found your animal dead [as] it replaced someone else’s 
death. If it didn’t exist, maybe you would be burying your child instead. 
“A true Ubielo cannot live in his house without an animal,” Roland, the trained 
pastor in his mid-forties, emphasised, “our mtakimɛ communicate with each 
other. If misfortune comes, our spirits [mtakimɛ] deviate the misfortune so that it 
falls on the animal instead. This is why an Ubielo should always have animals in 
the house.” Thus, when an animal that was healthy suddenly dies for no 
apparent reason, it may be that the mtakimɛ, Uwienu or the bɛhidibɛ have 
intervened directly to save someone who was in danger. It is only after such a 
sudden death that people may question why the animal died and who might 
have died otherwise or – in the case of Luc – have it confirmed that he was 
meant to die (see also Willerslev et al. 2015:17, who mention similar ideas 
amongst the Eveny of Siberia). 
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Sickness, Danger and Animals Behaving Badly 
Before we didn’t kill animals [that were sick]. It’s only now that all is 
commercialised that people kill [sick animals]. Before, when an animal 
was sick, you would try to take care of it, but if this didn’t work you’d let 
it die then get rid of the body. Sometimes the animal takes the place of 
a person. If the animal is suffering and should die in your place and you 
kill it, it means you don’t care about yourself. If you realise it won’t 
recover, you should rather let it die, then consult a diviner to find out 
why it needed to die (Grégoire, the teacher in his twenties). 
Diviners will also advise what follow-up ceremonies may be needed. If those 
concerned learn that the problem is resolved, they should express their 
gratitude to the entities who intervened on their behalf – Uwienu and the 
bɛhidibɛ, for example – through libation with sorghum beer. Depending on the 
nature of the problem, however, further sacrifices may be required. If, for 
instance, a witch was trying to attack the person, having failed the first time, the 
witch may try again. Churchgoers such as Luc, however, express their gratitude 
to Uwienu through prayers of thanksgiving – both private and corporate – and 
may ask their church congregation to intercede prayerfully for them if they 
suspect that the problem that provoked the animal’s death is not resolved.  
Grégoire went on to say that those who kill sick animals usually eat or sell 
the meat. It is only more recently that people have started to kill sick or severely 
injured animals, as they do not want to lose the meat or monetary benefit that 
the animals’ meat potential represents. Many of the interviewees affirmed that 
they would kill – or have killed – animals who are seriously sick or injured and 
would either eat the meat themselves or pass it on to someone else. Other 
interviewees, however, expressed caution about eating the meat of sick animals 
and concern that more and more people now try to sell their animals when they 
realise they are sick: 
People no longer know when meat is good. An animal can get sick in 
the village and the owner says, ‘Hello’ [calls a butcher] as he wants 
money. So the butcher goes [to the village]. When he arrives the animal 
is already dead, so the butcher takes a knife and slits its throat anyway, 
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then takes it to sell [in town]. And you don’t know how the animal died. 
[…] This is why there is so much sickness (Anne, the churchgoing 
widow in her late-forties). 
Like Anne, other interviewees lamented that butchers willingly sell meat from 
sick or already dead animals and that government meat inspectors are easily 
bribed. Cattle are especially problematic, since there is the possibility that they 
have anthrax103: 
Hmm, I love beef, but since my childhood, my papa said that we should 
not eat beef because of the vets, because cattle have anthrax. It dies 
and the butcher doesn’t want to throw [the meat] away. [When cattle are 
sick] you call the butcher, he comes and buys. The [vet] examines it 
and it has anthrax. You should destroy it, but [the butcher] doesn’t 
agree [and bribes the vet] as he must sell. So he sells infected meat, 
people eat it and they get anthrax. So my father said, ‘No more beef.’ 
(Roland, the trained pastor in his mid-forties). 
 Henri, the carpenter in his late-thirties, explained: 
There are those who kill [sick animals] and those who leave them to die 
and throw them away. For example, my older brother has many cows, 
too many to count! When one gets sick he’ll try and treat it. If he sees 
that it’s not working sometimes he’ll let it die, then throws it away. Or he 
offers it to someone and says, ‘If you want, take it, I’ll give it to you. If 
you want you can kill it.’ But [my brother] won’t kill it. 
Sharon: And if someone kills the animal, will he eat it? 
Henri: Oh! Here people eat, people eat and it’s not good because it was 
sick; you eat and you can also get sick. Those who know this won’t eat, 
but others will and say, ‘There’s no need to worry.’ They take [the meat] 
and eat, and that’s why there’s so much sickness. Even the butchers 
will kill [sick] cattle to sell the meat. Many people now refuse to buy beef 
because of this, because butchers buy sick cattle extremely cheaply, 
then kill and sell the meat. The butcher, he wants his money. […] If you 
want to live healthily, you need to avoid certain meats. 
Although people now cull sick animals when highly contagious illnesses such as 
Newcastle’s disease sweep through the region, they rarely take other measures 
to curb the spread of such diseases. Victor, the churchgoing animal trader in his 
                                             
103 In September 2016, I learnt that there was an anthrax outbreak in the neighbouring 
Commune. I asked the veterinary surgeon in Natitingou about this. He confirmed the outbreak 
and that you could not always trust the butchers. He advised me not to eat beef. 
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early-forties, lamented that many people take their poultry to market to sell, 
knowing that they are contaminated. 
Knowing whether an animal is sick or misbehaving, however, is not always 
evident: 
Just after our arrival in Oukodoo a dog was killed104 at Michel’s 
compound. It was suspected to have rabies. They then made a fire and 
burnt off the fur. The meat was then divided out to be shared and eaten 
later (Journal entry, 28 February 2003). 
People often suspect that dogs who behave abnormally or in a threatening way 
are rabid and will kill them. Some people eat the meat, though others are more 
circumspect, as they are not always sure if it actually had rabies. Sarah, the 
widow in her mid-forties, shared about an instance when people killed a dog 
that had bitten someone. The person later died of rabies. Meanwhile, those who 
ate the dog did not get sick. Thus, the other occasions when people justify the 
killing of diseede wante (family animals) are when they misbehave or are 
dangerous, as their comportment indicates that they have bad mtakimɛ 
(mtakitiɛmɛ, see also Koabike 2003:84). Interviewees shared several examples 
such as chickens that eat their eggs or pigs that eat young chicks. Michel, the 
farmer in his fifties, explained that those who kill misbehaving animals should 
not eat the meat, but rather give it to others, otherwise the animals could 
accuse them of being motivated by their desire for meat. Other interviewees 
expressed similar ideas. Timothée, the septuagenarian retired pastor, added 
that animals whose actions result in their defilement, such as dogs that dig up 
graves and eat the remains or who jump over ya̰nta medicine horns during a 
man’s burial and subsequent funeral,105 also need to be killed but must not be 
                                             
104 Normally, a dog is first tied up before it is killed. A man then clubs it on the head with a 
bludgeon. Rabid dogs are chased and cornered, then clubbed by a group of men.  
105 See fn. 70, p. 140. During the burial and subsequent funeral of a man who has died a 
good death, men who have undergone ya̰nta dance with and play the medicine horns by 
scraping along their length with a ron palm (Borassus aethiopum) nut shell. The men place the 
horns tip down in the ground when they are not playing them (see Figure 6). 
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eaten. Some interviewees stressed that it is important to explain to animals why 
they need to be killed, especially if they are sick or injured and have not done 
anything explicit to justify their death. This also demonstrates respect for the 
animal. Otherwise, the animal would be within its rights to complain to Uwienu. 
When Antoine, the farmer in his mid-fifties, had to kill a dog with a prolapsed 
uterus and no hope of recovery, he told her: 
We are together and you have worked well, 
It hurts me to see you like this, 
I don’t have a choice, though, and it’s difficult for me to kill you, 
Today, seeing you in such a state truly hurts me, 
But I’m obliged to do this, I don’t want to see you suffer, 
It’s an illness that others often have too, 
I’m not at ease with having to kill you, but what else can be done? 
You were at my side every day, it hurts me (Journal entry, 31 August 
2015).  
Antoine then killed and ate the dog, as he did not want to see the meat go to 
waste.  
In sum, most Bebelibe continue to raise diseede wante for utedu (non-
monetary abundance) whilst knowing that they also have worth as tikpate 
(monetary wealth)106. Pigs are the exception, with several commercial pig 
farmers and many families now raising pigs specifically for their worth as 
tikpate, although there are now some individuals who have started to rear 
poultry and goats commercially. Most of the interviewees – including those who 
are directly involved in commercial activities with animals – shared about the 
impact and consequences of the commercialisation of meat, and the resulting 
domestication and commodification of diseede wante. 
Commodification 
Sharon: Why do you think people are eating more meat today than 
before? 
                                             
106 When people sell diseede wante for money, their choice is primarily governed by the 
animals’ behaviour, followed by their form, as people more willingly sell animals with bad 
mtakimɛ. This is especially the case with dogs. 
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Roland (the trained pastor in his mid-forties): Well, what can I say? It’s 
modernisation. Before, in early Ubielo society, you killed [animals] for 
special occasions such as marriages, ceremonies, celebrations. When 
you kill [an animal], it’s divided up and you know how it should be 
shared between the families. But the town has grown, outsiders have 
come and they expect meat and that’s how the custom of killing animals 
every day also came. There are also Bebelibe who left and went 
elsewhere. They saw how others prepared meat to sell. So, they saw 
that meat is commercialised. Then they returned [to Cobly] and started 
to commercialise it, that’s how it is. 
“Now money is attractive to us in all domains,” Sinbonko, the community shrine 
priest in his sixties, remarked, whilst Yaaté, the farmer in his early fifties 
bemoaned that “money gathers us together and carries us along like water 
does with rubbish. It will be our end.” The Bebelibe live in an increasingly 
commodified world where more and more market forces come into play and 
people need to pay for most goods and services – including health care, 
education and mobile phones107 – with money. Consequently, as more people 
start to assess their diseede wante’s worth in terms of tikpate, the number of 
diseede wante being sold has also grown since I first came to Cobly. This trend 
has been facilitated not only by the growing demand for meat locally, but also in 
the wider region with animal traders coming from the south to find cheap pork, 
for example (see below). When I arrived in Cobly in 2002, meat was not readily 
available. Cobly town had one non-Ubielo Muslim butcher, who slaughtered a 
cow every Wednesday, which is market day, and sometimes on a Saturday. 
There was also an Ubielo pork butcher, who started to slaughter a pig a week 
for market day in 2001. 
In June 2015, Cobly town had twelve established butchers and meat sellers 
offering both raw and cooked meat, if not daily, then several times a week. This 
included the original Muslim beef butcher and Ubielo pork butcher, who also 
started to slaughter donkeys in 2015. One of the new butchers was a Muslim 
                                             
107 These have become an essential commodity, not only for communication, but for 
monetary services, such as money transfers and payments. 
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from Nigeria who sold goat and chicken kebabs. The other new butchers were 
all Bebelibe. One of them offered dog meat, another dog and pork, and the 
others pork only. In addition, there were several other non-Bebelibe Muslims in 
the Commune who regularly bought cattle to slaughter. There were no Bebelibe 
beef butchers.  
In December 2017, there were ten rather than twelve butchers and meat 
sellers, which indicates that the local demand for meat has stabilised and even 
diminished slightly. The Nigerian Muslim has left Cobly, the dog butcher and 
one of the pork butchers have since ceased their activities, and the original pork 
and donkey butcher died on the 28 December 2017. Some attribute his death to 
his becoming a donkey butcher. Meanwhile, Sébastien has become a dog 
butcher and there is a new pork butcher. Reasons for this stabilisation are 
threefold: the growth of the soya cheese market (see below); people can now 
buy frozen fish, which is readily available every day;108 and there are fewer 
diseede wante (family animals), as southerners come and buy them (see 
below). Thus, it is possible that with viable alternatives to eating diseede wante, 
people are less inclined to buy meat. Despite this, the market for meat 
continues to be steady. 
Ingold defined domestication as “a form of mechanical control exercised 
over object-things” (1994:17), whilst Clutton-Brock stated that domestic animals 
are often “treated as property rather than as sentient beings with their own 
interests” (1994:31). Following these older ideas about domestication, there 
seems to be a direct correlation between the classic features of domestication, 
as defined by Clutton-Brock (1989:7) and outlined in Chapter Four, and the 
commodification of animals. Once people start to think in terms of ownership 
                                             
108 People can also buy smoked fish on market days (Wednesday in Cobly). A kilo of 
frozen fish costs 1,400 CFA francs (approximately £2) versus 1,200 CFA francs (approximately 
£1.60) for a kilo of pork “meat”, which includes the fat and skin layers. Sarah explained that 
people are willing to pay more for fish, as they consider it healthier than pork. 
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(which changes the nature of the relationship from subject-subject to subject-
object), and when people take charge of animals’ territory, food and breeding 
primarily for economic gain, then animals become commodities. Thus, 
domestication could be defined as the commodification and exploitation of 
animals for commercial gain. Leach too observes that when domestication is 
defined as training or adapting animals or plants “to live in a human 
environment and be of use to humans [… they] become commodities and 
artifacts, to the extent that today their genes can be patented, the ultimate 
affirmation of property rights” (2007:72). 
“Our fathers [tɔɔ denbɛ ] didn’t castrate their animals […]. Now it’s all about 
money. We want the animals to gain weight so we castrate them,” elucidated 
Yooka, the septuagenarian farmer. Other signs that people in the Commune of 
Cobly increasingly perceive animals as commodities include ideas about 
economic profit and ownership (see below). Despite this, the interdependent 
nature of human-animal relationships helps to offset the commodifying process 
so that it is unlikely that it will be ever fully achieved. Even in post-domestic 
societies, such as Europe and North America – despite factory farming and “an 
imposition of ‘efficiency’ that seeks to exclude links in the food chain that come 
between human consumers and those living things they wish to consume” 
(Clark 2007:50) – domestication has not resulted in the full commodification of 
animals. Hurn (2012:63-64; see also Cassidy and Mullin 2007) points out that 
scholars now recognise that the “‘control’ model” (2012:63) of domestication 
advanced by Clutton-Brock and others, which dominated anthropological 
debates about domestication, has come under scrutiny (Simon 2015). Hurn 
asserts that domestication should rather be “viewed as the outcome of a series 
of complex relationships between humans and other animals in different places 
at different times,” thus debates about domestication might be “best thought of 
in terms of ‘symbiosis’” (2012:64; see also Hurn 2016a:10). Other scholars are 
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less comfortable with the idea of symbiosis. Armstrong Oma (2010:179), for 
example, prefers the idea of social contracts (see Chapter Four) as these go 
beyond symbiosis by catering for the complexity of different relationships that 
can exist between people and animals. Willerslev et al., (2015) writing about the 
Eveny of Siberia and their kujjai (consecrated reindeer), demonstrate that, 
sometimes, it is the animal that initiates such a contract: 
The kujjai is hyper-domesticated, to a point which makes it hard to call 
this a domination. The primal reindeer that sought domestication were 
offering humans a social contract, so that one could almost say it was 
the reindeer who domesticated us. The trust between a herder and his 
kujjai is more sure [sic] than that between a hunter and his prey. Rather 
than from trust to domination, the progression is from unpredictability to 
reliability, and from evasiveness to trust (2015:19). 
Thus, the need to go beyond symbiosis becomes especially apparent where the 
understanding between people and animals is such that their relationships are 
empathetic. This seems to be the case for the Eveny and their kujjai, as well as 
for Bebelibe individuals with animal mtakimɛ and their diseede wante (family 
animals) mentioned above. Although Bebelibe totem animals are usually bush 
animals (except for dogs), they too are an example of animals initiating and 
entering into a relationship with humans. The respective animal and 
community’s founding ancestor made a pact, which established their totemic 
relationship. These relationships encompass ideas of social contracts, 
understanding, empathy and kinship, thus taking human-animal relations to an 
even higher level of complexity, as I demonstrate in Chapters Seven and Eight. 
Exploring the concept of domestication more generally in anthropology and 
archaeology, Russell too questions whether it should be understood as a form 
of symbiosis or rather “a change in social relations” (2007:28). She goes on to 
suggest that animal domestication could be analysed “as a form of kinship” 
(2007:28). This idea is borne out by Sinbonko’s, Anne’s and Basaadi
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examples in Chapter Four of ploughing-cattle becoming sons. Timothée, the 
septuagenarian retired pastor, remarked: 
It’s man who changed the system, and we know why he changed this 
system, mmm? [For our gain.] God didn’t say that we should yoke 
animals to cultivate for us. So when you take and yoke [stutters…] it’s 
your son who ploughs for you, you take the ox and he becomes your 
son. You need to understand this and the things that animals do for 
you. 
There is some resonance here with ancient Greek thinking: 
[T]he ox slain and carved by Prometheus at the first sacrifice is the 
domestic animal closest to man, the animal best integrated into his 
sphere of existence, especially when it is harnessed to the plow to open 
the furrows of the earth (Vernant 1989:37). 
As demonstrated in Chapter Four, people already accorded cattle quasi-human 
status before they started ploughing, which was why harnessing them was so 
controversial. In order to come to terms with the controversy that ploughing 
created, many now justify using cattle in this way by recognising their human 
status in terms of kinship. Thus, even with changing ideas about animals in the 
Commune of Cobly, primarily resulting from their commodification, all my 
interviewees expressed notions that continue to demonstrate the 
interdependent nature of human-animal relationships and that diseede wante 
(family animals) have maintained their personhood, at least whilst they remain 
members of the diseede. It also became apparent during my interviews that the 
introduction of ploughing-cattle was the pivotal event, as Timothée’s comment 
above indicates, that led to the partial objectification of animals, and their 
subsequent commodification. 
Clutton-Brock drew a parallel “between the husbanding of livestock and the 
keeping of slaves” (1994:31; see also Ingold 1994:17). This resonates with 
Takida’s observation that ploughing-cattle are slaves, whilst Luc, the church 
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leader in his thirties, specifically pinpointed a change in attitudes towards 
animals to the introduction of ploughing-cattle: 
We thought it was good in the beginning, but with time we’ve noticed 
that life has completely changed. Regarding animals, life has 
completely changed. Animals started to die and theft started. There was 
never a problem with theft before. It was when they [cattle] started to 
plough that these two things started. 
He went on to explain that cattle did not want to plough so they were mistreated 
and even died, and that this has resulted in suffering all round. It has also led to 
family disputes and individualism. Whereas cattle used to belong to the family 
and resources were shared, today individuals claim ownership and keep the 
money they make from cattle for themselves (see also Hutchinson 1996:50-51). 
Paul, the village deputy chief in his late-forties, is of the same opinion: 
When people realised that animals should work, it was at that moment 
that people started to use animals and it was their end. Now there is 
sickness and thieves take the rest. It’s because of thieves that animals 
are becoming scarce. 
Having noted that domestication does not result in the full commodification of 
animals, it also becomes apparent that commodification is not a linear process. 
Appadurai (1986), Kopytoff (1986) and Gosden and Marshall (1999), for 
example, all demonstrate the complex nature of commodification and the 
importance of examining the social life or biography of things. Using the 
example of human slavery, for example, Kopytoff concludes that 
the slave was unambiguously a commodity only during the relatively 
short period between capture or first sale and the acquisition of the new 
social identity; and the slave becomes less of a commodity and more of 
a singular individual in the process of gradual incorporation into the host 
society. This biographical consideration of enslavement as a process 
suggests that the commoditization of other things may usefully be seen 
in a similar light, namely, as part of the cultural shaping of biographies 
(1986:65). 
Kopytoff later points out that controversies about commodification result from 
conflicts over the “precise location of the line that divides persons from things 
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and the point at which ‘personhood’ begins” (1986:84). Thus, it is not surprising 
that those in Cobly who acknowledge their diseede wante’s personhood, 
struggle with their commodification. In order to survive in an environment where 
essential goods and services now need to be paid for with money, however, 
people often have no choice but to sell their animals, thus converting them from 
utedu (non-monetary abundance) to tikpate (monetary wealth). When I first 
interviewed Juliette, she was still single and at school. She has since married 
and was around seven months’ pregnant with her first baby in August 2016. As 
Juliette was not sleeping well and had lower abdominal pains, she wanted to go 
to the maternity hospital for a check-up, but did not have the necessary 
finances. Her husband asked me if I would be interested in buying two of her 
hens. I agreed, and then sold them on to a friend. Juliette was able to have her 
check-up and treatment needed. Following Kopytoff (1986:69), Juliette’s hens 
were temporarily commoditised when I bought them for money, then 
decommoditised once integrated into my friend’s homestead or, as Appadurai 
explains it, “things can move in and out of the commodity state” (1986:13, 
emphasis in original. See also 16-18). In this instance, the hens’ worth went 
from utedu to tikpate back to utedu again (see also Cartry 1976:161-164; 
Hutchinson 1996:72-73, 98-99; and the example of Shambo the bull in Hurn 
2016a). Under other circumstances, Juliette’s husband might have visited a 
diviner instead, in which case the same chickens might have been used 
ceremonially. Although they would not have been commoditised, they might no 
longer be alive. Thus, in order to understand the complex dynamics of 
commodification, it is necessary to examine both the cultural biography of 
things, whilst seeking to understand the overall social and political trends and 
the history of the items or entities concerned (Appadurai 1986:34-36; Gosden 
and Marshall 1999:173-174; see also Comaroff and Comaroff 1990; Kantshama 
and Luboya 1986:128). Besides the introduction of and today’s general 
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acceptance of ploughing-cattle in Cobly, several interviewees pointed out the 
role that technological change has played in promoting commodification. When 
I asked Anne, the churchgoing widow in her late-forties, for example, why there 
are more butchers today compared to when I first arrived in Cobly in 2002, she 
explained: 
They’re looking for money. In the past our fathers [tɔɔ denbɛ ] didn’t 
know about what we now call udekitiwaabu109 (commerce). […] It’s 
money that drives all our activities […]. Maybe someone in Tokibi wants 
to sell a cow. He’ll call the butcher with his mobile. The butcher then 
comes on his motorbike to buy the cow, lashes it to the motorbike 
[rack], and then returns with it [to town]. 
The arrival of electricity has also been important. Isaac, the churchgoing 
businessman and commercial farmer, not only sells the animals he raises to 
traders, but has them butchered and sells frozen meat from his chest freezers. 
Besides butchers, Cobly now has several shops that sell imported frozen fish 
and chicken.  
Neither is the commodification process straightforward for the humans 
involved. Whilst discussing the cultural biography of objects, Gosden and 
Marshall point out that “[t]he central idea is that, as people and objects gather 
time, movement and change, they are constantly transformed, and these 
transformations of person and object are tied up with each other” (1999:169) 
thus “[t]here is a mutual process of value creation between people and things” 
(1999:170). This constant process of transformation of people, objects and 
values became especially apparent when I asked interviewees in 2015 about 
the increase in butchers and meat-sellers, especially in the town of Cobly. 
There are several [legitimate] reasons why you kill domestic animals. 
For work parties, for celebrations, for your in-laws and for ceremonies 
[…]. It’s always for meat, but I don’t include butchers who kill and sell 
meat. I don’t count them, I don’t count them (Louis, the octogenarian 
with an important position in the Commune). 
                                             
109 Literally “money-search”. 
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Louis, went on to elucidate that domestic animals are gentle and do not 
normally seek revenge when killed for legitimate reasons. Butchers, however, 
are at risk. Louis continued: 
Those who take animals for commercial reasons, those who kill for 
commercial reasons are at risk. The animals will rise against him 
because he kills them, they will rise against him. If I said that humans 
are superior to animals, this isn’t the case with their mtakimɛ and 
kɛbodikɛ. 
Basaadi, the nonagenarian diviner further explained: 
Butchers are often sickly and die quickly. It’s because the animals 
overcome [avenge] them. What has the cow that he slaughtered done? 
[…] Later, it will ask you [the butcher], ‘Why didn’t you sacrifice me? 
You didn’t have a work party and you didn’t have strangers [visiting], yet 
you killed me just like that, what did I do to you?’ 
As previously noted, there is a limit to how many animals a person should kill. 
Swanson notes the same for the Gourmantché who 
believe it is wrong to kill too many animals. They recount how this is 
true for those who slaughter animals for the market. When such a 
person is dying, he will be heard crying out in fear; it is the cicilimu 
‘guiding spirits’ of the animals he has butchered who are killing him 
(1985:177). 
Most of the interviewees, including the three butchers and meat-seller I 
questioned, shared about the potential consequences of being responsible for 
the death of so many animals.  
David, who is in his late-thirties, was the first dog butcher in Cobly. He 
would roast the meat to sell and explained why he chose dogs over other 
animals: 
When you want to start a business, it’s good to look around and ask, 
‘What business could I do that will work? What do people like? What do 
they like to eat? What do they like buying? What do people find 
pleasing? That’s what I should do.’ For example, here [in Cobly] people 
like dog meat. Men, all the men who eat dogs, when they see well 
prepared dog meat, they like to eat it, it attracts them, you know, it’s 
better than all the other meats, you know, such as pork, mutton, goat, 
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beef. It’s the best, it’s appetising, you know, that’s how it is. It’s because 
of this I said, ‘Well, let’s give it a go and corner the market.’ 
David has since stopped selling dog meat, as it did not generate enough 
income for him and his family to live on. He has moved out of town to be closer 
to his fields and concentrate on farming. Before he stopped, he would butcher 
about four dogs a week. People told him that if he continually killed dogs he 
would not succeed, as the dogs’ misfortune110 would be passed on to him. He 
chuckled at the idea that the dogs he killed might pursue him and explained that 
as he was not killing dogs daily and has now stopped, he has not suffered any 
consequences. Neither is he overly concerned should he start again: 
If you followed what people say, what would you eat? You wouldn’t eat! 
You need to do the work that your spirit tells you to do. […] God will 
also protect you, God said you need to make an effort to eat and not 
fold your arms and say, ‘God, give me.’ How can you expect God to 
give you food if you stay in your room with your arms crossed? No, you 
need to make an effort and God will give you, bless you too, that’s how 
it is. 
Despite this, David told me that he would pray before killing a dog, and explain 
to it that he needed to do this in order to eat; that he was not killing it out of 
malice (see also Hurn 2013:231). 
Georges is also a dog butcher in his late-thirties. He roasts the meat in a 
wood-fired oven made from a metal barrel.111 People can either eat the meat on 
the spot or take it away. He admitted that being a dog butcher was not 
something he would have chosen if he had other means to make money. He 
needed to escape being poor and he knew that people like dog meat and that 
there were not many dog butchers in town. 
Georges knows that people talk about him and ask what could have 
happened that he chose this job. He acknowledged that being a butcher has its 
                                             
110 People do not breed and market dogs commercially. The dogs people sell for meat are 
usually those who they think have bad mtakimɛ (see above). The dog’s mtakimɛ can then cause 
trouble for the butcher. 
111 See Figure 7. 
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dangers and that he would probably get sick and might die early, but it is better 
to work than to sit and do nothing, or to steal. “Those who sit around and do 
nothing, don’t they also get sick and don’t they also die?” He asked rhetorically. 
“There isn’t any job that one can do without suffering. Each job has its [share of] 
suffering.” 
Georges does not pray or do anything special before killing a dog; he simply 
kills it. Dog meat is popular and sells very quickly. He prepares several dogs a 
week and he could sell more, but dogs are not readily available. 
Franck, who is in his mid-thirties, was the second person in Cobly to 
become a pork butcher. He sells his meat raw and is renowned for good quality 
meat cuts, with buyers coming from all over the wider region. Franck initially 
trained as a builder, but poor health meant he had to give up his work. Rather 
than sit at home with his arms crossed, or become a thief, he weighed up the 
different options available to him. Franck concluded that he should try being a 
butcher, despite the fact that he does not like killing animals. He managed to 
save enough money to buy a pig, which he killed. He sold the meat and saw 
that it worked. 
Franck agrees that being a butcher is a dangerous job and that the animals 
will eventually seek revenge. He puts this danger to the back of his mind in 
order to survive. Before he kills a pig, he explains to it that it is not his fault, that 
he needs to eat, and that to kill an animal to meet one’s needs is authorised by 
Uwienu : 
We do this [kill animals] according to Uwienu. When we do this, we 
want the animal to know that you have killed it according to Uwienu ’s 
rules. If you think to yourself, ‘I’m killing them,’ they will kill me; you 
won’t survive two days. 
Thérèse, the churchgoer in her fifties, mainly sells pork that she roasts in a 
wood-burning brick oven and sells in her small restaurant, though people can 
also buy to take away. As she is a woman, she does not kill the pigs but has a 
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man do it for her (see Phase One, Chapter Two). She agreed that killing 
animals without just cause has its consequences, but for her killing to sell meat 
is justified. Despite this, Thérèse acknowledged that she is at risk given that she 
has so many animals killed, but she needs to live; she needs to make money 
somehow. She cannot just sit there and do nothing. She concluded, “Therefore, 
if something happens, it’s you who sought it as you want to eat. You haven’t 
killed the animal saying that you’re against it, you are not against it.” She also 
plans to breed pigs commercially once her pigsties are built. 
Hurn points out that “individuals involved in meat production are not 
immune to feelings of guilt, shame and crises of conscience when it comes to 
making a living from the deaths of other animals. Many find ways of asserting 
their moral agency” (2013:232). David, Georges, Franck and Thérèse all found 
ways of doing this by justifying the marketing of meat with their need to survive. 
For Geneviève, a soya cheese maker in her late-thirties, it was clear that 
butchers are troubled by guilt:  
Something will happen to them. They shouldn’t kill animals every day; 
to always have the knife on the animals’ backs like that. When he 
sleeps, when he goes to bed, his kɛbodikɛ doesn’t know where to go, 
as he constantly slaughters animals to sell. He’ll kill one animal too 
many and he’ll go mad. […] His mtakimɛ doesn’t know where to go and 
his diyammaade [thoughts] are focussed on killing animals. The way he 
kills, he’ll never be blessed. He won’t be blessed with utedu (non-
monetary abundance) by killing animals every day to sell. He won’t be 
blessed. When he starts [butchering], he thinks he’ll become rich, but 
later he’ll realise he has nothing. You won’t know utedu [despite the 
money you make]. 
Théophile, a farmer in his early-thirties, had a different perspective and 
explained that butchers choose this path before they are born; that they have 
tiwanpoote takimɛ (animal-killing identity/destiny), so there was no real danger 
for them. Nevertheless, he expressed concern about the general 
commodification of animals and that people are killing too many animals for 
their tikpate (monetary worth), including wild animals. The problem lies, 
197 
 
 
however, as much with those who sell animals for their tikpate, as with the 
butchers and meat sellers, not to mention their customers. Many interviewees 
initially blamed the commodification of animals on the butchers and meat 
sellers. I would then suggest that the successful marketing of meat relied on 
consumer demand and ask why more people were buying meat, especially in 
the town of Cobly. Interviewees gave a variety of reasons including: population 
growth; modernisation and external influences (see Roland above, for 
example); education and the need to include more protein in the diet; the 
cosmopolitan nature of urban life; eating meat is a sign of wealth and success; 
and that urban-dwellers do not always have space to keep their own animals, 
so they need to buy meat instead: 
In town, you don’t have chickens to slaughter, you don’t have any 
animal to slaughter. So you must go and buy meat to prepare and eat. 
That’s why, when you arrive in town, you see that meat sellers are 
numerous. [In the village] you kill [your own] animals to eat together 
with the family. Why would you need to look for meat [to buy]? 
They [town-dwellers] eat more. […] Why do I say this? They must have 
meat in the morning, they must have meat at midday, and meat in the 
evening. And we [villagers], if we find it, it’s in bigger quantities and we 
eat it all at once. Then we may go without meat for several weeks. But 
they don’t miss a day without eating meat (Gaston, the village farmer in 
his early-forties). 
Although Gaston may have an exaggerated view of town-dwellers’ meat-eating 
habits, his observations are somewhat justified, as those that can afford it do 
eat more meat. “There’s not a day that goes by that I don’t eat meat,” Roland, 
the trained pastor in his mid-forties, readily admitted. Other town-dwelling 
interviewees, such as Victor, the churchgoing animal trader in his early-forties, 
initially explained that he does not eat meat every day because he does not 
fancy it, but he later added that only the rich could eat meat daily: 
Now, if you have money in your hands, you’ve already got meat. You 
can be sitting in your house or somewhere and they will bring the meat 
to you. Some people want to show they have money so they must eat 
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meat. […] As you eat and you haven’t got money, you pretend that it 
[meat] is something that doesn’t interest you. Once you have money, 
that means you’ve already bought [meat] because you have money and 
you like it, so you buy it. 
Victor started trading animals several years ago to generate an income. He has 
a mix of local and regional customers, with some coming from the south to buy 
animals. Whilst there have always been outsiders who came to buy goats, trade 
in pigs is more recent. Now there are southerners who come and trade directly 
with the locals. They arrive with trucks and fill them with pigs to sell in Cotonou. 
This has forced the price up. Sometimes people refuse to sell their pigs to 
Victor, as they know they can get a better price when the southerners come. 
Victor went on to explain that the general demand for animals continues to 
grow, but that there is also a decline in the number of animals available. 
Consequently, some of his local colleagues have stopped trading. Although the 
decline in availability is largely due to southerners buying the animals, other 
reasons include an increase in sickness and theft. 
Isaac, the churchgoing businessman and commercial farmer, is not keen on 
meat and rarely eats it. He has always been interested in raising animals and 
often succeeds in his endeavours. This is partly due to his having animal 
mtakimɛ (identity/destiny suited to succeeding with animals), but he also 
researches how to care for each animal and invests the money needed to do 
so. He started with poultry, and then added beekeeping, raising rabbits and pigs 
in 2009. He first got the idea from watching programmes on TV5112, and then 
did some further research. He quickly stopped keeping rabbits as he found 
them too demanding. 
When I visited Isaac’s farm in 2015, he explained that he would also stop 
breeding pigs due to growing competition and lack of profit. His main customers 
were southerners, who would pay 75,000 CFA francs (approximately £98) for a 
                                             
112 An international francophone satellite channel. 
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large pig. They would then resell it in Cotonou for double the price. Local people 
do not want to buy his pigs claiming that they are too expensive, despite the 
lean and high meat-yield. They prefer to buy other locally raised pigs that are 
smaller and fattier, but cheaper. He thinks it is important to diversify, so he 
would rather focus on his bees, wonders about venturing into pisciculture, and 
wants to try cross-breeding pedigree113 and pygmy goats, which should be 
more resistant to disease and give a high meat-yield. 
Bernadette started breeding pigs commercially in 2013. She told me how 
she got going: 
I’m a development agent, working with the communities especially 
about nutrition for children. I realised that one day this work will come to 
an end and, rather than do nothing, hey, raising animals is a simple 
thing to do and as no-one else was doing it at that time, there must be a 
market. You can sell [pigs] at any moment to make money, whether 
small or big, you can always sell. So I said, ‘I’ll try it to see if I’ll 
succeed.’ So I went and had some training, I saved enough money to 
take out a small loan. With the loan, I built [a barn] and went to Parakou 
to buy three piglets, and so I started and I saw that it worked. Besides, I 
really like pigs, even if they’re dirty, well me, I go inside [the barn], I 
clean, I feed them, it doesn’t bother me. 
Her customers include southerners who come with their trucks, local butchers 
and individuals who want pork for special occasions such as weddings, funerals 
and baptisms. She recently sold a large pig for 80,000 CFA francs 
(approximately £105) locally for a celebration. People also buy her piglets so 
that they can raise them: 
There’s too much demand, too much demand. I can’t satisfy the orders I 
receive. I tell people they need to wait until it [the sow] gives birth. 
When it gives birth, I take and fulfil my list by order of who came first. 
She has a barn with six pens in the grounds of her town house. With time, she 
wants to expand and have a pig farm. One reason for Bernadette’s success, 
compared to Isaac, is that she does most of the work herself. As Isaac has a 
                                             
113 Actual breed not known. 
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number of enterprises, he needs to employ several people to look after the 
animals for him. 
Although Bernadette did not make an explicit link between her child nutrition 
work and breeding pigs, a number of interviewees mentioned that the personnel 
at the local health centre and Tanguiéta hospital, development agencies and 
schools all promote meat as part of a protein-rich diet, especially for children. 
They also promote other protein-rich sources of food, however, such as soya. 
This has resulted in another trend that may be helping to counter meat 
consumption, namely the production and marketing of soya cheese: 
I started making soya cheese114 because of poverty. There was nothing 
in the house and I haven’t learnt any profession to earn money for 
housekeeping. That’s how I got started. I had to take my son, Frédéric, 
to Tanguiéta [hospital] as he was anaemic. He was always anaemic. 
We went at least three times in the month. Money was a problem for the 
family. And [at hospital] they said, ‘Grind and roast some soya to feed 
him.’ […] You see, that’s when I started to grind [soya] and I went out 
[to buy soya] and people saw me and said I should buy soya cheese to 
give him to eat. So I went and bought to feed him. And a lady said to 
me, ‘If you can make it yourself, you can feed him regularly. You need 
to give it to him whilst it’s warm.’ Do you see how I got started? I started 
[to make cheese] and now I have money and things are better. I find my 
housekeeping money, and so I continue (Geneviève, the soya cheese 
maker in her late-thirties). 
Geneviève’s testimony is typical. As noted in the Introduction, soya cheese is 
proving extremely popular, especially as it is cheap. Many interviewees also 
equated it with meat: “They took it [soya] and it’s become (kɔnta) meat,” 
Charles, the farmer in his late-thirties explained, whilst Joël, also a thirty-year-
old farmer, went one step further and stated, “Now that we don’t have animals 
anymore, [soya cheese] has become (kɔnta) the animals.” Others referred to it 
as the poor man’s meat and explained that people can now offer soya cheese 
to visitors or during work parties (see also Yates-Doerr 2015:311-313, writing 
about soya as meat for the people of Xela, Guatamala). Other special 
                                             
114 See Figure 8. 
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occasions still necessitate meat, however, and the bɛhidibɛ (dead) and other 
shrine entities usually require meat, though they do sometimes ask for cow 
cheese. 
One final preoccupation is theft. Together with the testimonies above, many 
other interviewees expressed concern that this is contributing to a rapid decline 
in diseede wante (family animals). Appadurai notes that “[t]heft, condemned in 
most human societies, is the humblest form of diversion of commodities from 
preordained paths” (1986:26). Although I generally agree with this, I do not think 
it applies when animal theft is motivated by commodification, which seems to be 
the case in the Commune of Cobly. In September 2015, I asked the 
gendarmerie commander about complaints and crimes involving animals. He 
identified theft as the primary problem, which had been rising steadily during the 
past three years. He explained that the main causes of theft are poverty, 
demographic explosion and youth delinquency. Although thieves sometimes 
steal poultry to eat, they usually steal animals to sell to animal traders who 
come from the wider region and butchers, both locally and further afield. 
Kantshama and Luboya (1986:128) note that chickens have not yet lost 
their traditional role for Luluwà society (DRC), neither have they been reduced 
to “simple ‘sellable’ or edible animals” (1986:128, translation mine), despite 
social change resulting from globalisation and cultural adaptation. They warn, 
however, that it would be wrong to think that the role of chickens remains static. 
They suggest that, with time, some of their roles could disappear due to the 
influence of Christianity, economic pressure and as people’s way of thinking 
changes. 
Similarly, it is hard to judge to what degree diseede wante’s roles are 
changing – especially in terms of utedu (non-monetary abundance) – amongst 
the Bebelibe. As described above, both the animals and people concerned are 
undergoing a complex process of non-linear transformation, as they negotiate 
202 
 
 
trends and institutions resulting from upaanu (new times). Saunders concludes 
that “[a]ll cultures create and express a meaningful order but the status of 
meaning and the logic of connections are constantly open to change and 
elaboration as a result of human, nonhuman and environmental interaction” 
(1990:174), whilst Kopytoff suggests that “[c]ommoditization […] is best looked 
upon as a process of becoming rather than as an all-or-none state of being” 
(1986:73). Before I further examine such processes of transformation and 
becoming resulting from the need for meaning, I first look at body-shifting, which 
is also a phenomenon of transformation and becoming. 
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Chapter Six 
 Body-shifting 
In August 2015, there were seven donkeys wandering loose through our 
neighbourhood in Cobly, trampling through the fields between the houses and 
eating the crops. Jules, one of our neighbours dropped by to greet one evening, 
and during the course of our conversation, he complained about the donkeys as 
they were destroying his maize field. He went on to explain that nobody was 
willing to intervene for fear of retribution from the donkeys. As nobody knew 
where the donkeys came from, some questioned if they were ordinary donkeys 
or if they had been reincarnated by other animals in order to tempt people to 
catch them.115 In December we had another visit from Jules: 
Jules came by this morning to greet us and to give us some maize to 
thank us for helping his sick daughter. I asked how his harvest had 
been. ‘Okay’, he replied, ‘but those donkeys destroyed a lot.’ I asked 
him what happened to the donkeys. He explained that the village chief 
did eventually intervene and had them tied up in his yard for a while. As 
nobody knew who the donkeys’ guardian was, though, the chief 
eventually let them go again. ‘It would’ve been too dangerous for him to 
eat them’, Jules explained, ‘without the guardian’s permission he 
would’ve died.’ […] 
‘The donkey has a wild counterpart that lives in the bush, oh, how is it 
called?’ Jules wondered. 
‘Kɛmunnaakɛ?’ I queried. 
‘Yes, that’s it! Humph, kɛmunnaakɛ is also very dangerous. If someone 
kills one, it will visit the family and ask, “did you know that so-and-so 
killed a kɛmunnaakɛ?” The family has to answer, “Oh yes, that’s what 
we do,” and then they’ll be okay,’ Jules explained, before reiterating that 
it’s a very dangerous animal (Journal entry, 12 December 2015). 
As noted in Chapter Four (see Hunting), people consider kɛmunnaakɛ (pl. 
simunnaasi ) or l’âne sauvage (wild ass or feral donkey) as the most notorious 
                                             
115 See incident of the white-faced whistling ducks, in Hunting, Chapter Four. 
204 
 
 
animal of all. Many interviewees shared about the potential consequences of 
killing kɛmunnaakɛ, either when discussing hunting or body-shifting. Although 
Joël, the thirty-year-old farmer and hunter, has never killed kɛmunnaakɛ – he is 
too young to attempt such an act – he has seen them and his brother has killed 
one. Joël explained how to prepare for the eventuality of killing kɛmunnaakɛ : 
When you’re ready to leave, you take some [sorghum] flour and leave it 
with your wife, which she puts to one side. She mustn’t touch this, even 
if she needs more flour during your absence. Now, as we’re sitting here, 
maybe you [the hunter] will kill the animal [kɛmunnaakɛ] in the bush. 
Whilst in the bush, it becomes (kɔnta) a man and comes to your house. 
When he arrives, he greets and she [your wife] responds. He then asks, 
‘Where is your husband?’ She says, ‘My husband has gone hunting.’ 
He says, ‘Oh, he’s gone hunting?’ And she says, ‘Yes.’ He says, ‘I 
learnt that he killed an animal in the bush.’ When he says the husband 
killed an animal, your wife should say, ‘If he killed that animal, that’s 
what our family eats.’ She then goes into her room; she takes the flour, 
mixes it with water and gives it to him. Once the animal [kɛmunnaakɛ in 
human form] drinks it, that’s the end. He leaves and he can’t do 
anything. 
If, however, he says, ‘Oh, did you hear that your husband has killed an 
animal?’ And she says, ‘Ooh! Are we going to live?’ That’s the end. 
When you [the hunter] return, your children, your wife, your family will 
die and he [kɛmunnaakɛ] has left. 
Many interviewees gave similar accounts, though most said that it is the hunter 
who will die should the wife not give the correct response. Kɛmunnaakɛ, in 
human form, may visit either as a stranger or someone the family knows. The 
general consensus is that should the wife show pity or deny that her husband 
has done such a thing, then kɛmunnaakɛ is free to avenge itself. If the wife 
affirms that, yes, her husband is capable of such an act, the danger of revenge 
is averted. Once the visit is over, kɛmunnaakɛ returns to Uwienu (God) in order 
to reincarnate normally as another kɛmunnaakɛ. 
As previously noted, people employ the verb kɔnta (to become) to describe 
situations where a being’s identity changes either temporarily or permanently, 
such as changes in status as well as different forms of body-shifting. This 
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includes reincarnation, which I suggest is a more permanent or long-term form 
of body-shifting, versus more transient forms such as the example of 
kɛmunnaakɛ above. A being does not need to die, however, in order to body-
shift. Members of the Bɛwiɛnbɛ, Bɛyṵɔbɛ and Bɛkodibɛ communities, for 
example, and certain animals – such as crocodiles, buffaloes and pythons – 
and are renowned for their ability to body-shift. 
Socialising Crocodiles and Mischievous Monkeys 
Crocodiles become (kɔnta) [human] so that they can go to markets and 
funeral celebrations. Crocodiles become humans, they become and 
they even smoke cigarettes. You’re in the market together and you 
won’t know that the human is a transformed crocodile. They circulate in 
the market and buy things to eat, but they’re crocodiles. 
There are two bodies. When a crocodile wants to go [to market], he 
takes his [crocodile] body off (sukita 116) and buries it, then he puts his 
human body on (suki 117, Basaadi, the nonagenarian diviner). 
A crocodile becomes (kɔnta) human and he takes his [crocodile] body 
and puts it in his hole by the river. He puts his human body on (suki) 
and becomes so that he can go to market. As we’re sitting here, he 
could arrive and we could be talking and you’ll be wondering where he’s 
come from. You’ll see people you don’t know in the market. Some will 
say they’re from over there [indicates one direction], others will say from 
over there [indicates another direction], when they’ve actually come 
from the river that flows past your house. Buffaloes too become (kɔnta) 
[humans] and may pass in front of your house on the way to market and 
you go to the market together (Joël, the thirty-year-old farmer). 
Several others also stated that such animals become human so that they can 
go to market and funeral celebrations. They also become human in order to: 
visit people and ask for things; pose either as ferrymen or as passengers, then 
drown and eat you in the middle of the river; attend wrestling matches; go to 
town to seduce girls118; and seek vengeance (see Vignette One, Chapter 
Seven). 
                                             
116 Literally “to take your shirt off”. 
117 Literally “to put your shirt on”. 
118 See myth about the headstrong girl in Chapter Seven. 
206 
 
 
Duuté, the octogenarian farmer, for example, shared about a python who 
visited him: 
It was midnight and I was sleeping under the mango tree. I was still 
young and didn’t have any children. It was a time of hunger and he 
came and greeted and I wondered who comes to greet at this time of 
night? So I got up to greet him and asked, ‘What’s the matter?’ He told 
me he was hungry. So my wife got some food and wanted to put it in a 
calabash for him to eat when he said, ‘No, I have a bowl.’ She put it in 
his bowl and he left. He wouldn’t accept to stay here to eat; he took it 
and left. We watched him go and a few seconds later he disappeared. 
What could we do, could we follow him in the night? 
I thought he was one of my relations. Sometime later, when I saw him I 
asked, ‘Did you come to my house the other night?’ He said, ‘What 
day?’ I replied, ‘That day there.’ He responded, ‘No, I didn’t set foot in 
your home.’ 
The animals that people most commonly body-shift to are patas monkeys119, 
buffaloes, crocodiles, pythons and warthogs. Although many interviewees 
talked in general terms about what they had heard from others, several shared 
personal accounts about body-shifters. David, the dog butcher in his late-
thirties, for example, will ask his friend who can become a monkey to guard his 
fields. David then recompenses him for his help: 
You can give him – if it’s maize – a basin of maize or – if it’s cotton – 
some cotton money. You say, ‘Here’s something [for your help].’ When 
it’s like this, he enters your field and he signals. If monkeys come and 
see his signal, they know that, ‘Ah, that field there, it’s our brother’s 
field.’ 
Conversely, many interviewees – such as Louis and Juliette – shared that 
should you upset those who can body-shift to monkeys, they will come and 
destroy your crops: 
There are many who can transform into monkeys, hmmm? Here’s a 
personal example. One day, I had maize all around the house. I joked 
with someone who can transform into a monkey. I said, ‘Our maize is in 
the town, you eat maize that’s out of town so you can’t eat mine!’ I said 
it like this, to have fun you know. He didn’t respond. He kept quiet. That 
                                             
119 Diwanmɔnde (pl. awanmuɔnɛ), literally “monkey-red” (Cercopithecus [Erythrocebus] 
patas). 
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evening it was drizzling and there was nobody at the house. It was 
drizzling. I went to spend some time with a friend. When I came home, I 
found that monkeys had destroyed it all. There was not one cob they 
hadn’t broken, then thrown into the courtyard. That’s how it was, I was 
there, I know. It was the person whom I’d teased, he did it all. Well now, 
what can you do? (Louis, the octogenarian with an important position in 
the Commune). 
I had just started primary school. One day, as I was returning home 
from school, some people were following me, and to my great surprise, 
I looked behind and saw that they were monkeys. They [people-cum-
monkeys] insult you as you walk by, or they become (kɔnta) [monkeys] 
and enter your field to destroy your maize. You can plant sweet 
potatoes, and they’ll come and dig them all up (Juliette, who is in her 
early-twenties). 
Didier, the village chief in his sixties, meanwhile, shared about the time his 
father shot a buffalo: 
My father shot a buffalo with an arrow, when in fact it was a person he 
had shot. [The buffalo] transformed back into a person and returned 
home and said, ‘It was Nenboni who shot me.’ The next day he died. 
His friends armed themselves [and came]. I arrived home, my father 
had gone out; he wasn’t in his room. ‘We’ve learnt that Nenboni is here.’ 
Mum said, ‘He’s gone hunting.’ ‘Where?’ they asked. ‘He took his rifle 
and left, I don’t know where he’s gone.’ Fully armed, they left. 
After their departure, my father arrived and the lads said, ‘Hey, some 
people came here fully armed, you need to leave!’ So my father packed 
his bags and left around 4 pm. The [deceased man’s] friends returned. 
‘Why have you come looking for him?’ we asked, ‘He’s left.’ ‘He shot 
one of our men, our friend, saying he was a buffalo. [Our friend] 
returned and said that it was old man Nenboni who injured him and now 
he’s dead.’ 
Whilst Esther, the septuagenarian widow, described the antagonistic 
relationship her maternal uncles – who are Bɛcɛkɔnkibɛ – had with a Bɛyṵɔbɛ 
family when she was young: 
My maternal uncles don’t eat warthog and when they see [the Bɛyṵɔbɛ] 
who become (kɔnta) monkeys, they hunt them. And if the Bɛyṵɔbɛ see 
a warthog, they’ll hunt him, he’ll suffer and they hunt him to kill him. […] 
The two families would make each other suffer. The Bɛyṵɔbɛ would be 
outside drinking sorghum beer and would see a warthog running past. 
They would take their horses, chase after it, but they would never find 
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where he went, so they’d return home. The next day, the person would 
go to see them and say, ‘Yesterday, did you try and kill a warthog that 
you were chasing? You dogs, you meat eaters!’ 
The following day, my uncles would be sitting outside and a monkey 
would go by and they hunted it too. They thought it was a normal 
monkey. They hunted it until it disappeared. The next day, the person 
would go to see them and say, ‘Yesterday, did you kill a monkey and 
eat its meat? You dogs, it’s you who want monkey meat.’ 
In all the cases above, the animals – monkeys, buffaloes and warthogs – whom 
the individuals became were their totem entities. Interviewees generally 
affirmed that when people body-shift it is into their totem animal. Yanteka, an 
octogenarian farmer, for example, explained that individuals become (kɔnta) the 
animal that is their communities’ tikedimɔmɔnte (true totem). Not everyone can 
body-shift, however, only those who share their kɛbodikɛ (animating force) and 
mtakimɛ (identity) with their tikedimɔmɔnte. This happens when the 
community’s founding ancestor and the founding tikedimɔmɔnte reincarnate (or 
another human-animal pair previously reincarnated by them) both the person 
and the animal in question, thus their respective kɛbodikɛ and mtakimɛ come 
from both founders. Such individuals and their corresponding totem animals 
thereby form a pair. I explore this pairing further in Chapter Seven, where I 
propose that the person and animal are in an “ani-mate” relationship. Neither 
can all ani-mates body-shift. For this they need body-shifting upinsihṵ (destiny; 
part of the mtakimɛ).120 
Besides those who have ani-mate relationships and body-shifting upinsihṵ 
resulting from totemic reincarnation, there are some animals and humans who 
can also body-shift depending on who has reincarnated them. This can happen 
when kɛbodikɛ and mtakimɛ reincarnate new beings who have a different 
material presence – a person who reincarnates a crocodile, for example – as 
they were unhappy with their previous lot in life (see Ontological Overview, 
                                             
120 See also Frazer (1937:468, 473-474), who documented similar ideas for Northern and 
Central Nigeria. 
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Chapter Three). As with totemic reincarnation, people say that the animal has 
human mtakimɛ, and the human has animal mtakimɛ, which enables them to 
body-shift. 
Recognising reincarnation as an act of body-shifting also suggests that the 
notion of body-shifting is not in itself exceptional. On the contrary, it is 
necessary for life to continue. Morris too observes that 
[t]he key religious idea in Malawi is not that of ‘reincarnation’ or 
metempsychosis, which implies a dualistic metaphysic, a radical 
demarcation between the material and spiritual worlds, but that of 
‘transformation’, or metamorphosis. This implies a change of form 
expressed by the verb ku-sanduka – to change, or turn into something 
else […] (2000:221-222, emphasis in original). 
The way most of my Bebelibe interviewees talked about body-shifting more 
generally further demonstrated that they considered it quite normal, as those 
concerned have body-shifting upinsihṵ (destiny). Accordingly, people consider it 
an innate gifting with which certain animals and individuals are born. Several 
interviewees explicated that body-shifters often start becoming animals even 
before they are born. As mentioned in Chapter Three, diviners may instruct 
fathers-to-be to construct akṵnpe (mtakimɛ shrines, sg. dikṵnpuode) for their 
children once they are born. This happens when diviners learn that the 
children’s mtakimɛ and destinies need to be strengthened. This is often the 
case for those who have ani-mate relationships resulting from totemic 
reincarnation, whether they body-shift or not, and other children with destiny-
related gifts that may need reinforcing. The children also receive what I call an 
mtakimɛ-band, which is a bracelet121, armlet or necklace depending on which 
community they come from. The ceremonies surrounding the dikṵnpuode’s 
construction and the fabrication and presentation of the mtakimɛ-band mean 
that they are infused with – and therefore share – the child’s mtakimɛ, thus 
                                             
121 See also Huber (1973:385, 399, 435). 
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creating a network of mtakimɛ-bonded entities. In the case of those who are 
ani-mates, this network includes the child, the totem animal, the dikṵnpuode 
and the mtakimɛ-band. There is also an additional ceremony at the totem 
animal’s ditade for children who have an ani-mate relationship. 
As with other shrines – who are simultaneously the shrine and the shrine 
entity – the dikṵnpuode not only harbours and strengthens the child’s mtakimɛ, 
it is the child’s mtakimɛ. Likewise, the mtakimɛ-band harbours and strengthens 
the child’s mtakimɛ. It also maintains the bond between the child and the 
dikṵnpuode and symbolises this bond to others. With the exception of the 
diviner, father and some community elders, however, people do not know who 
the reincarnating ancestor is, the exact nature of the child’s mtakimɛ and 
destiny and why they needed strengthening (see also Chapter Seven and 
Robert’s Story, Chapter Eight). Children should wear or keep their mtakimɛ-
bands close at hand for the rest of their lives. Once old enough – usually when 
preparing to be initiated into adulthood – fathers inform their children why they 
wear the mtakimɛ-band. 
In the case of body-shifters, their strengthened mtakimɛ means they are 
more difficult to hunt, injure and kill when they become animals. Should the 
mtakimɛ-band break or be lost, the individual’s mtakimɛ’s vulnerability 
increases, and a replacement mtakimɛ-band and accompanying ceremonies 
are needed. Although the mtakimɛ-band protects and strengthens an 
individual’s mtakimɛ, it is not the power source that enables individuals to body-
shift; accordingly, it is not a power object. 
Neither did interviewees consider the ability to body-shift inherently good or 
bad; it is what the individuals decide to do with their ability to body-shift that 
determines its moral nature, as the examples above illustrate. There is some 
evidence, however, that some churchgoers start to demonise body-shifting. Six 
interviewees, for example, wondered if body-shifting might be something 
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diabolical. Three of them added that witches could body-shift or even shapeshift 
(where the body itself changes form) into animals in order to trap their victims. 
This is a more recent phenomenon and is probably linked to watching Nigerian 
and Beninese produced films. The Christian video-film Yatin, Lieu de 
Souffrance (Yatin: Place of Suffering, a 2002 Beninese production), for 
example, has had quite an influence on the Christian community of Cobly (see 
J. Merz 2014). During the video-film, the audience sees two different witches 
shapeshifting into a barn owl (Tyto alba) and a python respectively. Benoît, a 
churchgoer studying for his BEPC122, for example, shared that he had seen 
humans becoming pythons on television. Although he did not specify in which 
film(s) he had seen this, he has watched Yatin. 
From the way people describe body-shifting, the primary ukuɔnu (body-skin) 
is in a comatose state; it is still breathing and blood continues to circulate, but 
its life is suspended temporarily. Here’s how Idaani, the church elder in his late-
fifties, described it: 
His mtakimɛ and kɛbodikɛ are together [when he body-shifts]. If one 
was there, and the other wasn’t, how would it work? It’s like when we 
die; is kɛbodikɛ still there? If it were, we’d still be alive. [When someone 
body-shifts] kɛbodikɛ leaves the body lying dead. 
“The way the person sleeps [when body-shifting] is the same as when someone 
dies. […] Once the person sleeps, his body is like a corpse,” added Franck, the 
pork butcher in his mid-thirties, whilst Yanteka, the octogenarian farmer, 
explained that when people become (kɔnta) their totem animal, they “leave their 
bones [bodies] lying there and are breathing. Whilst they’re out and about you 
mustn’t touch them to wake them up.” Grégoire, the teacher in his twenties, 
shared about a boy he taught who was a body-shifter from the Bɛyṵɔbɛ 
community: 
                                             
122 The French equivalent of GCSEs. 
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When I noticed him sleeping in my class, I would try to wake him all the 
time. I told him to stand up, I would make him do sports to wake up. His 
father came to see me one day. He told me that when the child sleeps 
to not wake him up because his spirit [mtakimɛ]123 had transformed and 
left, he had transformed into a monkey and was out and about. ‘If you 
force him to wake up and open his eyes he will die.’ He explained 
everything to me, that the child was born this way and his spirit regularly 
becomes a monkey. […] When I tried to wake him up, he would always 
keep his eyes closed. He would stand with his eyes closed. He wouldn’t 
open them until his spirit returned. 
All those who described how body-shifting happens talked about the comatose 
state of body-shifters and the danger of trying to wake them up. The fact that 
the body is in a comatose state suggests that both kɛbodikɛ and mtakimɛ leave, 
as Idaani states above. To complicate matters further, people often talked about 
either kɛbodikɛ or mtakimɛ when they meant both, and several interviewees 
switched between the two as they described the process of body-shifting. Unlike 
dreaming – when an entity’s kɛbodikɛ leaves ukuɔnu (body-skin) in order to 
circulate in the less-visible parts of the world to encounter and communicate 
with other beings, whilst the mtakimɛ remains behind – many interviewees 
attributed the act of body-shifting to mtakimɛ. It also became apparent that 
kɛbodikɛ is implicated in the process of body-shifting, given that the alternative 
ukuɔnu that the body-shifter becomes is clearly animated and active in the 
more-visible parts of the world. Furthermore, the body-shifter’s alternative 
ukuɔnu can also be injured and even killed. When this happens, the body-
shifter’s primary ukuɔnu also sustains the same injury and can die as a result of 
it, as illustrated by the incident with Nenboni and the buffalo. Thérèse, the meat-
seller in her fifties, also shared about her grandmother who died from injuries to 
her side that she sustained whilst being a buffalo. 
Killing body-shifters’ alternative tikɔnte (body-skins) also kills their tikɔnte: 
Hunters put out traps. If those who become (kɔnta) animals have the 
misfortune [to be caught in one], the hunters club and kill them. If those 
                                             
123 Interview in French. Grégoire translates mtakimɛ as esprit(s). 
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who become animals die, as their sibosi (animating force, sg. kɛbodikɛ) 
are also with them, if they die, they also die at home. You see? In other 
words, it’s really a person out in the bush as an animal. Uwienu created 
them like this and they are animals. You need to understand that they 
are animals when it happens (Franck, the pork butcher in his mid-
thirties). 
For Yaaté, the farmer in his early-fifties, it is the body-shifter’s mtakimɛ that 
becomes the animal, whilst kɛbodikɛ stays behind with the primary ukuɔnu 
(body-skin). When I asked if he could explain how the injury appears on the 
body-shifter’s primary ukuɔnu, he likened it to electricity: if the mtakimɛ is 
injured whilst being an animal, the pain is transmitted to the kɛbodikɛ like 
current flowing along a cable. These examples further exemplify the 
transmaterial nature of the different components involved, as both the material 
and immaterial parts of the body-shifter’s alternative ukuɔnu are injured. The 
immaterial part(s) then transfers these injuries to the entity’s primary ukuɔnu. 
When I tried to clarify where the second ukuɔnu comes from that an entity 
body-shifts to, interviewees often referred to it as mnannammɛ (something 
extraordinary or miraculous). It was not that interviewees found the act of body-
shifting itself miraculous. Rather, they were unable to explain how the mtakimɛ 
materialises a second ukuɔnu that allows the human or animal who body-shifts 
to be present and act in the more-visible parts of the world. I suspect that it is 
something that many take for granted and had never thought about until I asked 
them. Several interviewees likened it to body-shifters having two sets of clothes, 
which they change between. When describing how crocodiles change their 
bodies, for example, Basaadi and Joël (see above) used the verb suki, which 
means “to put your shirt on”. Basaadi also used the verb sukita “to take your 
shirt off”. Others too used these two verbs when describing body-shifting. 
I never managed to interview a known body-shifter to clarify further where 
the second ukuɔnu comes from. I suspect, however, that some of my 
interviewees are body-shifters. Bienvenue and Claire – my research assistants 
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– affirmed my impressions and indicated several other neighbourhood 
acquaintances who they think are body-shifters.124 They also made some 
discreet enquiries on my behalf to see if someone would be willing to talk more 
openly with me, but to no avail. They then explained that most body-shifters are 
reluctant to talk openly about their gifting, as this could increase their 
vulnerability (someone with bad intentions could wake them up whilst body-
shifting, for example, and thus kill them). Neither should they reveal how it really 
happens for fear of forfeiting their ability to body-shift. Nevertheless, 
interviewees made it clear that body-shifting is not an act of possession where 
kɛbodikɛ and/or mtakimɛ enter the body of an existing entity, which is the case 
for Naga leopard and tiger-men of the Indo-Burmese borderlands (Heneise 
2017; see also Hutton 1920). Despite this, there are several similarities: tiger-
men share a “common kinship” (2017:94) with the animal and have an ani-mate 
relationship (2017:94-95); it is part of the tiger-men’s destiny; they inherit the 
ability to body-shift, or “soul-transfer” as Heneise describes it, as their souls 
leave their human bodies whilst in a “deep dream state” and enter the bodies of 
tigers or leopards (2017:95); finally, tiger-men suffer the same injuries as their 
tigers or leopards (2017:95). 
 Nor is it a case of alternating ani-mates for the Bebelibe, that is to say that 
whilst one ani-mate is awake and active, the other is dormant. On the contrary, 
Anne explained that body-shifting Bɛnammucaabɛ sometimes become 
crocodiles in order to go and visit their crocodile ani-mates, and vice versa. 
Thus, in this instance, there are three distinct material beings: the person, who 
is in a comatose state, the crocodile that the person has become and the 
crocodile who is the person’s ani-mate. 
                                             
124 See also West (2005:61-71), who describes a similar scenario when he was conducting 
research in Mozambique. 
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Neither do Bebelibe body-shifters use medicines, power objects, 
hallucinogens, or draw on power from other sources (such as innate witchcraft 
or acquired sorcery powers) in order to become (kɔnta), change form or identify 
with other entities125, which is often the case elsewhere. Morris, for example, 
notes that in Malawi humans only change into animals under “special 
circumstances, in rituals, and by the possession and knowledge of powerful 
medicines” (2000:222; see also Attala 2017; Hallowell 1960; Hurn 2012:77; 
West 2005; 2007). 
Finally, Bebelibe body-shifting is not a case of mimesis, as described by 
Willerslev (2004) for the Yukaghirs of northeastern Siberia. Their mimetic 
success allows the Yukaghirs to identify with the animals and “take on the 
bodies of animals when they go hunting” (2004:630), which increases the 
probability of a successful hunt. The mimetic process involves adopting the 
animals’ movements, smells and sounds, but they do not actually “become” 
(kɔnta) the animal in the question. On the contrary, the Yukaghirs take care that 
their imitation and identification does not go too far for fear of truly becoming the 
animal in question, as such a transformation could be permanent: 
Therefore, what Yukaghirs strive for when transforming their bodies into 
the image of prey is not to take on its perspective in any absolute 
sense, which would mean literally becoming the animal. Rather, they 
attempt to assume the point of view of the animal, while in some 
profound sense remaining the same. Mimetic practice, I argue, provides 
this ability to be like, yet also different from, the animal impersonated; it 
grants the hunter a ‘double perspective’ whereby he can assume the 
animal’s point of view but still remain a human hunter who chases and 
kills the prey (2004:630). 
Big Cats and Elephants 
The Wè panther-men of Côte d’Ivoire use a combination of mimesis and 
medicines. As with the Yukaghirs, there is no physical transformation. The 
                                             
125 See, for example, Kohn (2007), writing about the Runa of Amazonia and how they use 
hallucinogens to communicate with their dogs. 
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panther-men’s mimesis and medicines, however, result in the panther’s spirit 
possessing them (Guiblehon 2007). Although Pratten (2007) focuses on the 
Annang leopard-men of southern Nigeria, he documents further cases of 
leopard-men in West and Central Africa, whose shape-shifting abilities were 
due to mimesis and medicines, or – in the case of the lion-men of Tanganyika – 
witchcraft (2007:8-17). Both Guiblehon’s and Pratten’s accounts involve secret 
societies, initiation and violence. Pratten notes that all the different big cat men 
cases share the following common features: “ritual”, “resistance” and “social 
cleavages of gender and generation” (2007:19). He adds that “common to all 
the human leopard accounts are apparently indeterminate links between 
murders and historical moments of social tension” (2007:19-20), none of which 
apply for the Bebelibe. Writing about the Annang, Pratten (2007:41-42) then 
clarifies that each person has a “bodily soul” and a “bush soul” [ukpöñ ]. 
According to early mid-nineteenth century records, the latter is associated with 
[a]n animal, with the existence of which the life of the individual is bound 
up. It may be a leopard, a fish, a crocodile, any animal whatever… If the 
ukpöñ gets sick or dies, so does the individual whose ukpöñ it is, and 
the ukpöñ is correspondingly affected by the individual. Many 
individuals, it is believed, have the power of metamorphosing 
themselves into their ukpöñ (2007:42). 
Pratten adds that early twentieth century accounts described that some, more 
powerful individuals could “enter or project their bush soul[s]” (2007:43). In 
order to do this, however, they would take medicines, and their intent was 
usually assumed to be malevolent (2007:43). 
Jackson’s (1990) description of shapeshifting amongst the Kuranko of 
Sierra Leone more closely resembles my findings for Cobly. Jackson notes, for 
example, that shapeshifters: are not witches; can take on animal form and 
destroy the crops of those they resent (1990:59); are born this way and their 
ability to shapeshift is a “God-given endowment” (1990:60) or “inner faculty” 
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(1990:62); public knowledge further heightens the shapeshifter’s vulnerability; 
and the human body sustains the same injuries and death if the person is 
wounded or killed whilst in animal form (1990:60). Much of what Jackson initially 
learnt about shapeshifting was based on ancestral myths, more recent accounts 
that circulate in the community and other anecdotes that the Kuranko learnt 
about from Mohammed who could shapeshift into an elephant (1990:60-61). “[I]t 
was more a matter of luck than ethnographical diligence,” Jackson explains, 
that eventually brought him into contact with Mohammed (1990:61). Whilst such 
direct accounts serve to affirm the veracity of shapeshifting amongst the 
Kuranko, Jackson remained sceptical. He then outlines what Mohammed, the 
shapeshifter, shared with him, together with his reaction: 
I could not accept his ontologizing of the experience. Sincerity or depth 
of experience are not proofs that the phenomenon experienced actually 
exists. I argued with Mohammed that his experiences were open to 
other interpretations, by which – on reflection – I guess I meant that 
they could be interpreted my way (1990:63). 
Mohammed did not appreciate Jackson’s argument. With some distance, time 
and reading Foucault, Jackson modified his analysis: 
Rather than think about shape-shifing [sic] in terms of such antinomies 
as true/false, real/illusory, objective/subjective, rational/irrational, I 
began to explore the grounds for the possibility of the belief – the 
conditions under which the notion of shape-shifting could be entertained 
as reasonable and made intelligible, and, most important, realized, as in 
Mohammed's case, as a sensible truth (1990:63, emphasis in original). 
Jackson then proposes that Kuranko ontological understanding that underlies 
their ideas about shapeshifting are based on morgoye, which he interprets as 
“personhood”. Morgoye, in turn is “a quality of being realized in social praxis 
rather than in personal style or appearance” (1990:63-64). Furthermore, 
morgoye is not limited to human beings; all beings have it. Morgoye thus allows 
people to be in relation not only with each other but also other entities such as 
“ancestors, fetishes, bush spirits, a divine creator, and totemic animals” 
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(1990:64). He surmises that “in Kuranko clan myths it is the totemic animal’s 
relationship with the clan ancestor which expresses in exemplary form the moral 
ideal of personhood” (1990:64). The similarities between Kuranko and Bebelibe 
ontological understandings of shapeshifting and totemism are such that I quote 
some of Jackson’s observations at length: 
[T]he bond of kinship (nakelinyorgoye) said to exist between 
clansperson and clan totem becomes more than a metaphor, a 
rhetorical image; it implies a real moral and physical identification. If one 
eats the meat of one’s totemic animal one’s body takes on the 
superficial features of the animal. Eating one’s totem is tantamount ‘to 
eating oneself.’ And, in the view of some Kuranko, the prohibition 
against killing or eating one’s totem is prompted by the perennial 
possibility that the animal one eats may be an actual kinsman in animal 
form, i.e. a shape-shifter from one’s own clan. 
From an intellectualistic point of view we would say that the totem is a 
symbol of the clan, but if we are faithful to the more holistic reasoning of 
the Kuranko we would have to acknowledge that the totem is the clan. 
Mind and body are one. The moral bond between clansperson and clan 
totem is thus construed as an actual physical identification and may be 
experienced as such (1990:65, emphasis in original). 
Jackson then proposes the “need to elucidate the place of beliefs in the context 
of actual existence – how they are experienced and employed, not what they 
may be said to register or represent” (1990:69). Despite this, as far as he is 
concerned, shapeshifting as such does not really happen: 
Thus, while I was inclined to see Mohammed’s shape-shifting as an 
altered state of consciousness – an intrapsychic event – Kuranko tend 
to ontologize the experience and see it as a change in objective reality. 
[…] Perhaps the Kuranko are more pragmatic than most 
anthropologists: if illusions have real and useful consequences, then 
they are truths (1990:73). 
Jackson’s analysis and thoughts demonstrate the ontological penumbra that he 
endeavours to negotiate as he strives to understand Kuranko ontological ideas 
that differ from his own. In terms of presencing practices, Jackson’s account 
demonstrates that the Kuranko’s engagement with the entities around them is 
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ontonic, as their encounters are with real, transmaterial beings, rather than 
signs. Therefore, the Kuranko presence these entities as ontons. Despite 
Jackson acknowledging the reality of such experiences for the Kuranko, and 
how this then shapes their engagement with the world around them, he 
continues to draw on more modernistic and scientific presencing practices, 
which mean that – for him – shapeshifting together with totemic relations more 
generally exist primarily at a psychological and symbolic level. 
In a similar vein, West (2005; 2007) explores the ontological penumbra that 
he finds himself in as he thinks through what he learns about Muedan 
individuals in Mozambique who either transform themselves into lions or can 
bring lions into existence through material manipulation. West – locally known 
as Andiliki – suggests that these sorcery lions “not only symbolized both 
dangerous predator and regal protector but also symbolized a deep 
ambivalence about the workings of power in the social world” (2007:4). His 
ideas provoked the following response from Lazaro: 
‘Andiliki, I think you misunderstood.’ 
‘How so?’ I asked, trying to hide my anxiety. 
‘These lions that you talk about…’ He paused, looking at me with what 
seemed a mixture of embarrassment and amusement. He then 
proceeded once more, cautiously but confidently, ‘they aren’t symbols – 
they’re real’ (2007:5). 
In a parallel scenario, when West (2007:24-25) suggests that sorcery lions are 
metaphors, Lazaro responds, “Andiliki, metaphors don’t kill the neighbors, lion-
people do!” (2007:25).  
In Kupilikula, his 2005 publication, West relates other similar conversations 
with Muedan collaborators, as they thought through how they understood such 
lion encounters. In one location, for example, villagers had accused someone of 
making the lions who were visiting their village. Whilst talking about this with 
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Marcos (his research collaborator), West (2005:xii-xxviii) reasons that they must 
have been bush lions and that the locals “took advantage of the lions to get rid 
of this guy” (2005:xxviii, emphasis in original). Marcos seems to initially affirm 
West by agreeing that such events should be “studied scientifically” (2005:xxviii, 
emphasis in original; see also West 2007:12-18) before adding that sorcerers 
do take advantage of natural phenomena. After some silent contemplation, the 
conversation continued: 
I remembered that I did not really know what Marcos meant when he 
suggested – as he often did – the need to study sorcery ‘scientifically.’ 
‘Maybe they were just bush lions,’ I suggested, sensing my 
interpretative triumph slipping away. 
‘Mano [brother],’ Marcos said, with a hint of exasperation. ‘They took 
clothes off the clothesline. They left the pig’s feet. Someone made 
those lions!’ (2005:xxviii, emphasis in original). 
West (2007) further elaborates about an individual who regularly became a lion 
and threatened his neighbours: 
Imbwambwe – and, more importantly, the lion that he became – 
inhabited the same domain as Imbwambwe’s neighbors. As Lazaro 
Mmala reminded me, the lion, Imbwambwe, bared teeth and claws with 
which he drew blood and tore the flesh of his victims. His ‘reality’ to 
them – his copresence in their ontological domain – was a matter of life 
and death, for he left in his wake mauled bodies and terrorized 
witnesses. When neighbors saw Imbwambwe, the lion, in the village, 
they took refuge inside their homes (2007:36-37). 
West also asks, “So what does the anthropologist make of it when told that 
people make, or make themselves into, lions?” (2007:20, emphasis in original; 
see also Henare et al. 2007:1-3). Presencing, I propose provides us with the 
means to negotiate the ontological penumbras we encounter. Thus, like the 
Kuranko of Sierra Leone, the Muedan engage with sorcery lions as 
transmaterial beings or ontons, whilst West – like Jackson – analyses them in 
terms of symbols and metaphors, thus drawing on scientific presencing 
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practices that remain largely alien to those he seeks to understand. Marcos 
regularly reminded him about this and West readily acknowledges that, by 
suggesting that sorcery lions operate as metaphors, he has remade the 
Muedans according to his own vision (2007:83). 
My preoccupation with where a body-shifter’s second ukuɔnu comes from 
also illustrates that I too am negotiating an ontological penumbra as I strive to 
come to terms with body-shifting from a scientific perspective, whilst also 
recognising that this simply was not an issue for my Bebelibe interviewees. 
Body-shifting blurs boundaries and can be considered a transmaterial process, 
as kɛbodikɛ and mtakimɛ transition between two tikɔnte (body-skins). Leaving 
their primary ukuɔnu (body-skin) in a comatose state – shedding one shirt for 
another – the primary ukuɔnu can now be considered a material shell. It thus 
becomes an icon that represents the body-shifter, whilst the second ukuɔnu 
becomes the entity’s transmaterial presence in the more visible parts of the 
world, with which others engage ontonically. Trying to actively engage with a 
body-shifter’s primary ukuɔnu is even dangerous; people learn not to do so as 
they realise that the body-shifter is actually elsewhere. Ontonic engagement is 
further exemplified by people’s relationships with their totem entities, as I 
explore in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Seven 
Totem Crocodiles and Pythons 
Mbelime does not have a word as such for totem; people rather talk in terms of 
taboos or interdicts. The general term for interdict(s) is tikete, which people 
employ when talking about things – such as food, drinks, actions or 
relationships – that are forbidden for them. People also refer to totemic entities 
– both their own and those whom they respect due to alliances with other 
communities – as tikete. Each community also has its tikedimɔmɔnte (true 
totem(s), literally “interdict(s)-true”), which explicitly refer to the communities’ 
totemic entities and cannot be used in any other context. In this chapter I 
examine the relationships between four Bebelibe communities of the Commune 
of Cobly and their tikedimɔmɔnte : The Bɛbidibɛ (sg. Ubiidɔ) and 
Bɛnammucaabɛ (sg. Unammucaanɔ) communities whose tikedimɔmɔnte 
include the crocodile and the Bɛhotuubɛ (sg. Uhotuunɔ) and Bɛhodukpadibɛ 
(sg. Uhodukpaadɔ) whose tikedimɔmɔnte include the python.126 
Each community has its myths about how the relationship between their 
founding ancestor and each totem entity was established, and the ancestor’s 
decree that the entity concerned should never be eaten or harmed in any 
way.127 These myths recount one of the three following scenarios: 
• How the totem entity helped or saved the founding ancestor; 
• Why the totem animal was hunted and killed. Its meat was then shared out, 
and the ancestor discovered that his portion was actually human flesh; 
                                             
126 Each community has at least one animal tikedimɔmɔnte (see Bebelibe Communities in 
the Appendices). Some have multiple tikedimɔmɔnte, including plants and trees.  
127 See also: Frazer (1937:455-490) who documented similar myths from Nigeria and 
Ghana; Agalic (1978:272) for the Bulsa, Ghana; Jackson (1990:64) for the Kuranko, Sierra 
Leone; Koabike (2003:88-89) for the Moba, Togo; and Maurice (1986:194-215) for the 
Betammaribe, southeastern neighbours of the Bebelibe. 
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• That the ancestors were the totem animals and how they became fully 
human.  
How the Crocodile Saved an Unammucaanɔ 
It was a time of war and our ancestor fled. He came across a crocodile 
in its hole, so he entered the hole and the crocodile sealed him in. After 
the crocodile had sealed him [in the hole], his enemies arrived and 
searched and searched without finding him. Once the war was over, the 
crocodile opened the hole and our ancestor came out (Basaadi, the 
nonagenarian diviner). 
There are those who say that the crocodile helped an Unammucaanɔ 
warrior cross the river. It was a time of war and when he arrived at the 
river, he didn’t know how he would get across. He then climbed onto the 
back of the crocodile and got across. He then said, ‘As for me, I can no 
longer eat [crocodile].’ Others say that the crocodile saved a child by 
hiding him in a hole, and that’s why we don’t eat crocodile. Personally, 
I’m not sure which version is correct, but you could say that the origin is 
the same [the crocodile saved us] (Benjamin, the university graduate in 
his late-twenties). 
There was a man who fell into the water. Thinking he was dead, people 
set out to find his body only to see him sitting on the back of a crocodile. 
The man should’ve died, but the crocodile had taken him and placed 
him on its back. The crocodile opened its mouth, and those who knew 
how to swim entered [the water] and took the man. That’s why people 
say that the Bɛnammucaabɛ must not eat crocodile (Lucie, a 
churchgoing widow in her fifties). 
People were in their fields when there was a huge downpour that filled 
the stream. A lady and her child wanted to return home and didn’t know 
how to cross the stream, which was known to be dangerous. A 
crocodile emerged and told the lady to sit on its back. She sat on its 
back and it carried them across the stream. Since that day we have 
been united. The crocodile was a family sibling; it was a deceased 
[sibling] who became (kɔnta) a crocodile and helped the lady cross. 
Since that day we don’t eat crocodile (Colette, the churchgoing 
seamstress in her late-thirties). 
As the examples above illustrate, myths can vary significantly, neither are they 
universally known. With the exception of two female interviewees who shared 
that their fathers never told them, the other Bɛnammucaabɛ interviewees 
related variations of one of the above scenarios. The situation was similar 
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amongst Bɛhotuubɛ and Bɛhodukpadibɛ interviewees, with all but two – who 
simply said it was something ancestral – narrating or referring to differing 
versions of the following myth: 
The Headstrong Girl and the Python 
There was once a headstrong girl who refused all the men her parents 
found for her or who propositioned her. She would say that she hadn’t 
yet found the one she loved. One day a python became (kɔnta) a man 
and sought out the girl. When he arrived, the girl welcomed him. She 
was happy and said, ‘This is my man!’ She prepared a meal, which they 
ate. Once they had finished eating, she followed the python-cum-man. 
Whilst they were en route, she asked her man where his house was. He 
responded, ‘There where the cockerels crow and where the goats 
bleat.’ They continued walking into the bush and, eventually, the man 
showed her a termite mound and said, ‘This is my home,’ and they 
stayed there. 
After a while, the girl became pregnant and had a baby. She returned to 
her parents and fetched her young sister to help look after the baby. 
Each time the girl went to the stream to fetch water her husband would 
turn back to a python and play with her young sister by swallowing her 
and then regurgitating her. One day, the python was playing with the 
sister and swallowed her, but when he tried to regurgitate her, it didn’t 
work! When the girl returned from the stream she asked her husband 
where her sister was. He replied, ‘I was playing with her and I 
swallowed her.’ (Until now, the girl didn’t know that her husband was 
also a python.) The girl responded, ‘What am I going to tell my 
parents?’ The python reassured her, ‘I will send the ostrich with the 
body,’ and this is what he did. The ostrich took the young sister’s bones 
to the girl’s parents, singing as he went. When the ostrich was a few 
metres from the house, the parents heard his song. The ladies quickly 
cleaned the courtyard so that they could welcome the visitor. Once in 
the courtyard, the ostrich deposited the bones and explained what had 
happened to the parents: ‘Your son-in-law, the python, sent me with 
these bones. He liked to play with his sister-in-law by swallowing and 
regurgitating her. Then, the other day, whilst his wife was out, he was 
playing this game and when he wanted to regurgitate the sister it didn’t 
work.’ 
The girl’s parents then trapped the ostrich and shut him in the vestibule. 
The parents summoned and informed the whole population what had 
happened and said that they wanted to avenge the death of their 
younger daughter. Everyone took up arms and set off for the python’s 
house. A dove saw the people coming along the path and started to 
sing an alert to the python, but the python wouldn’t listen to her. 
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Suddenly the crowd was upon him, and to his surprise, surrounded him. 
He managed to escape to the stream and started to enter the water. 
The people caught up with him and cut off his body that wasn’t yet 
submerged. They then shared out his meat and returned home. 
Some people prepared and ate their portion of meat straight away, but 
others waited to eat it the next day. Those that waited then saw that it 
was human meat! This is why some people eat python, but others do 
not (Robert, the NGO worker in his late-thirties). 
Robert added that this myth not only accounts for why the Bɛhotuubɛ and 
Bɛhodukpadibɛ refuse to eat python, but also comes as a warning to girls to be 
careful! It is better to let the family choose a husband for her than to go after the 
man of her choice (see also Agalic 1978:263). He then explained more 
generally that animals became members of the communities’ founding 
ancestors’ families when the ancestors decreed never to eat or harm them 
again. Each ancestor and animal made a pact. The animal gave a chain to the 
founding ancestor, the links of which are bracelets of various forms and 
colours.128 These chains harbour the animals’ mtakimɛ and are the animals’ 
equivalent of people’s akṵnpe (mtakimɛ shrines, sg. dikṵnpuode, see Chapters 
Three and Six). The totem animals also instructed the ancestors to install 
specific ataadɛ (stones, sg. ditade) for them. By making this pact, the founding 
ancestor and animal became one. They then died together and went on to 
reincarnate together.129  
When I asked Bɛbidibɛ interviewees how the crocodile became their totem 
animal, all but Roland (see below) said they did not know. Some added that it 
was something ancestral, but their fathers never told them exactly what. 
Overall, I got the impression that they were evading the question (see Georges 
                                             
128 Bracelets given to children when their akṵnpe are constructed are modelled on one of 
the chain links (see Chapter Six). The diviner instructs the father which link should be copied. 
129 See also Fortes (1966:14-15), writing about the Tallensi (northern Ghana), and the 
covenants established between each lineage founder and an animal species. He then suggests 
that “[i]n Voltaic culture, this is equivalent to a quasi-kinship relationship – a sort of kinship 
symbiosis – with the lineages to which [the totem animals] appertain” (1966:15). 
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below). The following myth may account for the general reticence I encountered 
amongst my Bɛbidibɛ interviewees: 
How Our Ancestor Became Fully Human 
In the beginning our ancestor lived in a hole130 at Kèkoutchièke [in the 
plains near Cobly town]. He then left the hole and came to live in 
Birihoun [in Cobly]. He was a seer (uhonhuonɔ) and could become 
(kɔnta) a crocodile, which allowed him to live in harmony with nature. 
During the night, he would change back into a man, sneak into people’s 
homesteads and eat their leftovers. The local inhabitants didn’t know 
who was doing this. 
One day, an Uhotuunɔ [Bɛhotuubɛ community] went to visit his older 
brother who was Ukɔɔnɔ [Bɛkɔpɛ community]. The Uhotuunɔ was also 
a seer and he discovered that our ancestor could body-shift between a 
crocodile and a man [and that he was the one eating people’s leftovers]. 
He told his older [Ukɔɔnɔ] brother and they went to find our ancestor. 
Now, you need to know that, even when he was a man, he always had 
a crocodile tail. When the other two men found him, they cut off his tail, 
and consequently our ancestor became a normal human131. He then 
constructed a house on sand, hence our name Bɛbidibɛ [sand-
people]132. Since that time, he refused to eat crocodile meat, otherwise 
it would be as if he was eating his own flesh, and this is why we have 
the crocodile as our totem.133 
It seems that the idea that their ancestor may have been part crocodile, who 
then became fully human due to the radical intervention of another, is shameful 
for many Bɛbidibɛ. Georges, the butcher in his late-thirties, was one of the 
Ubiidɔ interviewees who initially responded that he did not know why the 
crocodile was his totem. When I asked him if he had heard this myth and what 
he thought about it, he responded as follows: 
It’s true, but the way people speak, it’s not true, they lie. The Bɛkɔpɛ are 
our slaves, it wasn’t an Ukɔɔnɔ [who cut off the tail]. It’s a story that 
dates back to olden days, before we were born, so we have only heard 
about it. It’s a story about men of old. If someone saw this with their 
                                             
130 When people state that their ancestor came out of a hole, this indicates that they 
consider themselves autochthonous, i.e. the original inhabitants. 
131 When his tail was cut off, he also lost his seeing powers and could no longer become 
(kɔnta) a crocodile. 
132 The word for sand is mbidimu. So Bɛbidibɛ literally means “sand-people”. 
133 Recounted by Nèntaakè, who is Ubiidɔ, June 2009. 
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own eyes, if it’s true or not, we don’t know. Our parents don’t say, we 
learnt about the story from other people. Our elders say that if you have 
a wound, you don’t walk around saying, ‘I have a wound.’ Only you 
know, so you hide it [as you are ashamed] but another person may see 
it [and spread rumours]. 
“Take the example of the Bɛbidibɛ and the Bɛkɔpɛ,” Grégoire, the teacher in his 
twenties who is Uhotuunɔ, shared, “It’s a well-known story […] the Bɛkɔpɛ 
befriended the Bɛdibibɛ, persuaded them to leave their cave, cut off their tails 
[…] and domesticated them.” 
Having come out of a hole, and as “sand-people”, the Bɛbidibɛ claim that 
they are the original inhabitants of Cobly. It is generally acknowledged both by 
those who are Bɛkɔpɛ and those of other communities, that the Bɛkɔpɛ134 
ancestor fled his Betammaribe homeland, as his brothers could no longer 
tolerate his violent nature and plotted to kill him. Duly saved by his dog135 – who 
became his totem – he eventually settled in the flood plains just east of the 
stream that borders the town of Cobly. As the original inhabitants of Cobly, the 
Bɛbidibɛ claim that they have jurisdiction over the area. The Bɛkɔpɛ refute this 
claim; if they had not cut off the Ubiidɔ’s crocodile tail, he never would have 
become fully human, thus – according to the Bɛkɔpɛ – they are the first real 
human inhabitants of Cobly and should therefore be accorded judicial authority 
in the Commune. 
Sometimes, when disputes arise, the Bɛkɔpɛ may remind the Bɛbidibɛ that 
they know where they buried the crocodile’s tail and threaten to go and tap it (a 
euphemism for cursing): 
Sarah shared the other day that there was a brawl in one of the 
[sorghum beer] taverns. A young man, who is Ubiidɔ, was drunk and 
insulted an old man who is Ukɔɔnɔ. The older man got upset and 
reminded the younger man that it is only because of the Bɛkɔpɛ cutting 
off their tails that the Bɛbidibɛ are humans today. He told the young 
                                             
134 From the Ditammari verb kɔ “to kill”, with the noun class markers that denote “people”, 
Bɛkɔpɛ literally means “killing-people”. Ditammari is spoken by the Betammaribe, southeastern 
neighbours of the Bebelibe. 
135 See How the Dog Saved Ukɔɔnɔ (Appendices) for the full story. 
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man that he knew where the tails had been buried and threatened to go 
and tap on the place so that all the Bɛbidibɛ would die. Infuriated, the 
younger man then went and got his older brother. The older brother told 
the old man off. Yes, he knew that his brother was a drunkard and 
difficult, but to threaten him in this way is not appropriate (Journal entry, 
18 June 2013). 
Roland, the trained pastor in his forties, was the only Ubiidɔ interviewee to 
narrate a myth, which was also about a crocodile that helped his ancestor 
escape his enemies. When I asked about the myth above and the incident in 
the tavern, he explained that: 
It’s a way to insult an Ubiidɔ, to say that without [the Bɛkɔpɛ], an Ubiidɔ 
wouldn’t be who he is [today]. Ubiidɔ occupies Cobly territory, it’s Ubiidɔ 
who is Cobly’s earth priest136. 
Ukɔɔnɔ had a problem with his brother [… and] was also a hunter […]. 
Ukɔɔnɔ and Ubiidɔ met several times, hunted together and shared the 
meat. When Ukɔɔnɔ would leave, Ubiidɔ would smoke his portion of 
meat to take back for his family. One day, the Ukɔɔnɔ told the Ubiidɔ 
that he was ready to go home. He left, then turned around and followed 
[Ubiidɔ]. He followed until he saw a huge homestead! It was almost a 
town. When Ubiidɔ arrived, women and children came running to 
welcome him and take the meat. Ukɔɔnɔ then arrived and said, ‘Oh my 
friend, is this how it is? You told me you didn’t have a home, so what’s 
this? What’s before my eyes, are these not people?’ Ubiidɔ said, ‘Yes, 
they’re people. I didn’t know who you were or where you came from. 
You always appeared from behind the mountain and I didn’t want to 
bring you [here].’ And Ukɔɔnɔ said, ‘The truth is, this is the problem that 
I have. I live in a cave in the mountains. I would like to settle.’ Ubiidɔ 
said, ‘If that’s the case, you can come and settle here, but on the other 
side of the stream. The stream will be the border between us.’ 
Now Ukɔɔnɔ had not told Ubiidɔ that he had brought his fetish137 with 
him. So he descended from the mountain, together with his fetish, 
which he deposited on the other side of the stream. As he hadn’t alerted 
Ubiidɔ, [Ubiidɔ’s] fetish138 made the night fall on the other side of the 
stream, to demonstrate its occult powers. It was night for three days; 
there wasn’t any light, there was no daytime over there. Even the fire 
went out. So Ukɔɔnɔ said, ‘Okay, I’ll go, I’ll cross the stream to see my 
friend and ask for fire.’ He crossed the stream and he saw that it was 
daytime on the other side. So he went to his friend and said, ‘For three 
                                             
136 The earth priest (utenyiɛnɔ) is ritually responsible for the land that his community 
occupies. 
137 Difɔnde initiation shrine entity. 
138 Ditade stone shrine entity. 
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days now, since I arrived and settled, it has been night.’ And the other 
said, ‘Ah, you’ve settled in, how have you settled in?’ Ukɔɔnɔ said, ‘Ah, I 
forgot to tell you that I have something. This thing, it’s my fetish, but it’s 
not a bad fetish, it’s a fetish that gives health and fertility to women and 
virility to adults, to juveniles. I would like to perform a ceremony for my 
fetish.’ Ubiidɔ said, ‘Now that you’ve told me, return and you’ll see that 
all is normal.’ So Ukɔɔnɔ took the fire, thanked him, took his leave and 
found that it was day. 
Now he needed to perform the fetish [initiation] ceremony, but he was 
worried that if Ubiidɔ wasn’t with him, something else could go wrong. 
So he went and insisted that one of Ubiidɔ’s children should be with him 
for the ceremony. And so they performed difɔnde [male initiation rites] 
and toured all the fetishes. [And still today,] an Ubiidɔ child initially leads 
the way […]. 
You may have noticed that the Bɛbidibɛ outnumber the Bɛkɔpɛ today, 
and there are more Bɛbidibɛ who have executive jobs. So now they say 
that we are who we are today because they introduced their fetish and 
had us do difɔnde. But instead of saying this outright, they say, ‘You 
were crocodiles and it’s thanks to us that you are men today. You were 
half crocodile, half man, and if the Bɛkɔpɛ hadn’t arrived and cut off 
your tails…’ It’s their way of alluding to what really happened [that it’s 
because of their initiation rites that we become adults]. It’s because they 
uphold the initiation ceremony, but they can’t do the initiation ceremony 
if we don’t authorise it. An Ubiidɔ who knows this history, can respond 
to Ukɔɔnɔ [should he threaten to tap the tails], ‘If the tails are buried on 
your territory, go ahead and tap them! If you know where they are 
buried, go and exhume them.’ That will make him [Ukɔɔnɔ] shut up. It’s 
his way of talking, to see if you know your origins. Normally, you would 
never threaten people with their totem. 
Until relatively recently, the Bɛbidibɛ and Bɛkɔpɛ had a good relationship based 
on several alliances founded on shared initiation practices and marriage. 
Today’s animosity over which community has official jurisdiction in Cobly seems 
to date back to 2002. In an attempt to officially recognise and re-establish the 
worth of customary roles such as kings and chiefs, the government contacted 
each commune to find out who was the officially recognised traditional 
leader139. As noted in the Introduction, the Bebelibe did not have chiefs before 
colonial times. The closest customary leadership role is the utenyiɛnɔ (earth 
                                             
139 See Tall (2016) who explains the historical and political circumstances behind the initial 
demise of such roles, and how they were re-instigated. 
230 
 
 
priest), who would normally be an Ubiidɔ for Cobly, as Roland points out. In 
2002, when the governmental request arrived, there was no utenyiɛnɔ (earth 
priest), as the Ubiidɔ community had let the role lapse when Mustafa, the last 
utenyiɛnɔ, died in 1992. So when the mayor (an Uhotuunɔ) was asked who 
Cobly’s traditional leader was, he informed the government that it was his 
father-in-law’s brother (an Ukɔɔnɔ) who was the uyuɔsɔ kpiɛmɔ (community 
shrine priest) for Cobly and responsible for the difɔndɛ initiation shrine at the 
time. When the Bɛbidibɛ community learnt of this, they promptly appointed a 
new Ubiidɔ utenyiɛnɔ and had two installation ceremonies in quick succession: 
the official earth priest installation, followed by a public “kingly” installation 
according to southern Beninese conventions, on the 9 November 2002, which I 
attended. People then started calling the newly installed utenyiɛnɔ the King of 
Cobly. 
To complicate matters further, Mustafa – the utenyiɛnɔ (earth priest) who 
died in 1992 – was not Ubiidɔ, as his genitor was Ukɔɔnɔ. Mustafa’s mother 
was pregnant with him when his father died. Following levirate customs, 
Isèdimè, who was Ubiidɔ and the utenyiɛnɔ at the time, inherited Mustafa’s 
mother. When Isèdimè died, his other sons declined the role of utenyiɛnɔ, so 
Mustafa – Isèdimè’s inherited son – was installed as the new utenyiɛnɔ. 
Although Mustafa grew up in an Ubiidɔ family, he remained Ukɔɔnɔ. This, 
together with the circumstances surrounding the appointment of the current 
utenyiɛnɔ, and his resulting title of King, has contributed to the judicial dispute, 
which has been further politicised by different family members from both 
communities. 
If anything, Nèntaakè recounted the myth about an Ubiidɔ crocodile 
ancestor who had his tail cut off with pride, yet its apparent manipulation by the 
Bɛkɔpɛ means that many Bɛbidibɛ now find it shameful. Despite the fact that 
this myth is now contested, the recent incident of the old Ukɔɔnɔ threatening the 
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young Ubiidɔ with his totem was not appreciated by my Bɛbidibɛ interviewees. 
All my interviewees from all four communities were vehement that one should 
never threaten individuals with their totem animals. Should someone do so, the 
animal concerned could intervene to protect the person under threat and may 
even attack the aggressor. Several interviewees added that such an act is so 
serious that they would have the right to defend themselves: “I would injure the 
person”, Thérèse, the meat seller in her fifties, shared, “or I would have them 
summoned [to the gendarmerie], since I don’t know why they should do such a 
thing. It could make my kɛbodikɛ (animating force) flee.” Georges, the butcher 
in his late-thirties, rhetorically asked, “If someone did that? What does the gun 
do? I would shoot the person,” whilst Yooka, the septuagenarian farmer 
categorically stated, “If someone provoked me with a python I would kill him. If 
he held it and provoked me, I would kill him.” 
Even joking around with someone’s totem animal can be dangerous: 
When my aunt was doing tikɔnte [initiation], one of her jokers140 killed a 
python and provoked her with it. A rash broke out all over her body and 
stayed with her just until she grew old and died (Idaani, the church elder 
in his late-fifties). 
Like Thérèse, several other interviewees mentioned that threatening or teasing 
people with their totem animals could result in their sibosi (sg. kɛbodikɛ, 
animating force) fleeing the body. The person would then fall sick and could die 
if the kɛbodikɛ does not return. Idibiènu, a widow in her fifties who is Uhotuunɔ, 
explained, “If someone knows that I don’t eat python, he shouldn’t use it to 
threaten me. The python is my kɛbodikɛ.” Interviewees who were Bɛhotuubɛ or 
Bɛhodukpadibɛ distinguished between a diseede sɛfɛ (family python) or diseede 
wɛfɛ (family python-that’s-mine) versus a wild fɛsɛfɛ (snake/python), whilst 
Bɛnammucaabɛ and Bɛbidibɛ interviewees contrasted fɛbodimuɔfɛ (animating 
                                             
140 An affine with whom an individual has a joking relationship. See S. Merz (2014:47-49) 
for more details. 
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force-crocodile) with a wild fɛmuɔfɛ (crocodile). Interviewees differentiated 
between community members who are direct descendants of their communities’ 
founding ancestors and those who are not. In this instance, direct descendants 
are those who have been reincarnated by the founding ancestor and the 
founding tikedimɔmɔnte (true totem) or another human-animal pair previously 
reincarnated by them. Such people and their totem animals thus share the 
same sibosi (sg. kɛbodikɛ, animating force): 
Sharon: I’ve heard that one can say fɛbodimuɔfɛ, which seems to be a 
compound noun of… 
Benjamin: …yes, soul141 and… 
Sharon: …soul and crocodile… 
Benjamin: …yes, that’s it, it’s the crocodile of the soul. These crocodiles 
are the souls of the community. They’re the souls of the community, 
which is why they are sacred. 
Sharon: Does that mean that there’s a link between these crocodiles 
and people’s sibosi ? 
Benjamin: Exactly, when one says fɛbodimuɔfɛ, this supposes that 
Bebelibe souls can reincarnate crocodiles. One can have reincarnation. 
Sharon: Of Bɛnammucaabɛ? 
Benjamin: Bɛnammucaabɛ and exactly that’s why there are certain 
[people], if their souls are incarnated by a crocodile, if they even see 
crocodile remains they’ll start to have sores all over. 
Sharon: Does that mean that you can have a person and a crocodile 
who share the… 
Benjamin: …soul… 
Sharon: …kɛbodikɛ... 
Benjamin: …same soul… 
Sharon: …same soul. Does that mean that with regard to reincarnation, 
the two are reincarnated… 
Benjamin: …incarnated by the same person. 
                                             
141 Interview in French. Benjamin regularly translates kɛbodikɛ as âme(s). 
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Sharon: Ah ha, I’ve also heard it said that when the person dies the 
crocodile will also die… 
Benjamin: …also dies. 
Sharon: And if a crocodile dies… 
Benjamin: …the person will also die. They have the same soul. But it’s 
not everyone, it’s only some individuals, those who are reincarnated. In 
the community you can have several people who are like that and if 
they should touch something that’s crocodile [remains] they can have 
problems. When a child is born, one performs sacrifices to find out what 
sort of reincarnation it has, so that one knows if it shares its soul with a 
crocodile and the precautions it should take. 
Given that others, like Benjamin (the churchgoing university graduate in his late-
twenties), interpret kɛbodikɛ as soul, it could be said that the totem animal is a 
person’s soul mate. I propose that the term “ani-mate” would be more 
appropriate, thereby expressing the idea that the two are simultaneously 
animated by the same force and could be considered mates as they are 
intimately bound together. Such individuals and their corresponding totem 
animals thus form a pair, though individuals do not necessarily know their 
corresponding crocodile or python. As noted in Chapters Three and Six, they 
also share their mtakimɛ, which enables some of them to body-shift.  
Ani-mates 
Early ethnographic data indicates that such relationships were not unique to the 
Bebelibe (see, for example, Marillier 1897a:227-229; Frazer 1910b:551-552, 
559-560; 1937:455-472; Hambly 1931). Tylor speculated that it was such 
notions of reincarnation that provided Frazer 
with a theory of the origin of totemism. He argues that the man’s 
relation to the totem is derived from his soul (or one of his souls) 
residing for security in one of the totem-creatures, whence his worship 
of them and his objection to killing and eating them, and their reciprocal 
kindness to and protection of him, and the general conception that the 
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man and his totem guardian are kinsfolk by descent (1899:146; see 
also Frazer 1887:3-49; Frazer 1910b:593-600).142 
Writing about northern Ghana, Cardinal noted: 
Everyone has some animal which is a species or alter ego – not to be 
slain or eaten, an animal which is recognised as one’s friend, one’s 
brother. Most noteworthy of these animals is the crocodile, which is 
called by the Paga [Kassena] people their soul. The life of a man or 
woman is identical with that of his crocodile, alter ego. When he is born, 
the crocodile is born; they are ill at the same time: they die at the same 
time ([1920]:39; see also Frazer 1937:457-458; Journet-Diallo 
1998:203-204). 
As I have explained elsewhere, individuals do not know who their reincarnating 
ancestors are, as this is considered dangerous: 
[A]nnouncing the names of reincarnating ancestors can kill the 
individuals concerned.143 It seems that the ancestor’s power is invested 
in his [or her] anonymity. If the reincarnating ancestor’s identity 
becomes public knowledge, the ancestor feels vulnerable and can no 
longer protect the person as his [or her] mtakimɛ [identity] is 
compromised and kɛbodikɛ [animating force] is left open to attack. 
Consequently, the ancestor leaves and the person dies (S. Merz 
2013:36, see also 22-23). 
Those who do know an individual’s reincarnating ancestor include the diviner, 
several community elders known for their discretion and the individual’s father. 
Fathers and community elders also make sure that people know the interdicts 
they should observe. Some of these might be specific to the individual, whilst 
the whole community respects others, such as interdicts about totem entities. 
As people do not know who their reincarnating ancestors are, and given that 
totem interdicts are observed by the whole community, individuals do not 
                                             
142 Frazer (1910d:45-47) later speculated that totemism in its purest form was not religious 
in nature (see Chapter One and below). He also surmised that reincarnation (or 
metempsychosis and transmigration of the soul) developed separately from totemism, and that 
the relationship between reincarnation and the worship of animals was a later religious 
development. Frazer (1910d:54-55) then concluded that reincarnation could not account for the 
origin of totemism. 
143 Robert mentioned that the same danger exists for those reincarnated by animals should 
someone call them by the animal’s name. 
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always know if they share their kɛbodikɛ (animating force) and mtakimɛ 
(identity) with their totem animal or not, unless something happens to verify this: 
In 1996, Robert would’ve been about twenty, a python started to visit 
him in his room every day. He would see it hanging from the beams of 
the thatched roof, or find it in his bag; everywhere he looked he would 
see it. Robert had noticed that each day he encountered the python it 
was bigger. The first day it was thin like a biro, then it got thicker, and 
thicker until it was as thick as his thigh. 
One evening, around 9 pm when he had finished eating, he decided to 
go to bed. He was relaxed and tired so he didn’t bother shining the 
torch around his room before lying down. That year he had a pullover 
that he used as a pillow and when he lay down, he thought he was 
placing his head on his pullover. He nestled his head in the pillow, then 
a little later, when he moved his head he realised something wasn’t 
right – it was cold! But that was okay… then, when he moved his head, 
the pullover started to move! Several times the same thing happened, 
so he felt it with his hands and realised it wasn’t his pullover! He jumped 
up and cried out! The family came running, ‘What is it?!’ He couldn’t 
speak. His father took a torch and entered the room, ‘Oh ho, it’s him.’ 
Robert’s father then took some sorghum flour, mixed it in water, and 
sprinkled it on the python and it disappeared. 
Robert refused to go back into the room and spent the rest of the night 
in his father’s room. The next day his father went to see the diviner. His 
father already knew the python, and knew that it came regularly to visit 
the family. His father tried to reassure him not to be scared, that it was 
the family python and that it had taken a shine to Robert, which is why it 
came to visit him. But should Robert ever eat snake he will die (Journal 
entry, 14 August 2015). 
Robert, who is Uhodupkaadɔ, later explained to me during one of our 
interviews: “According to our fathers some people can eat [python] but others 
must not. For example, those who are reincarnated by our ancestor, if they eat 
they’ll have problems… others will die and others will suffer.” 
Valentine and Juliette, who are Bɛnammucaabɛ and in their twenties shared 
what happened to them: 
I’ve never eaten crocodile; it’s forbidden. Have you seen my foot? Don’t 
you see? [She shows me some scars.] That’s it! I was drawing water 
one day from the stream to drink and I didn’t know. I don’t know if when 
I drew water if there were [crocodile] bodily secretions in it. I don’t know. 
I drew water, went home and drank some and my two feet swelled up 
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and liquid poured out. They went and got medicine to give me. [The 
crocodile] was in the hole where we drew [water]. I can’t even eat a 
little. If I eat I will die (Valentine). 
If I pass close to crocodile bones I get sick. You’ll see that my legs 
become swollen. One day, when I was still at school, we were having 
fun as we crossed the river. We didn’t know that someone had killed a 
crocodile and thrown the bones [in the river]. So we crossed the river 
and I didn’t know that there were crocodile bones. It was only 
afterwards that they said that a crocodile had been killed there. We 
went home and I fell sick. 
On another occasion [someone] prepared [crocodile meat] and threw 
out the bones. I arrived at her house. I saw the bones and stepped over 
them, but I didn’t know they were crocodile bones. By the time I got 
home my feet were swollen. My grandma told them to clear the bones 
away, so they took the bones and hid them. Grandma knew what to do. 
She prepared a lotion that I applied and it was over. My father also 
knew what to do and gave me medicine and it was over (Juliette). 
Other interviewees affirmed that those who share their kɛbodikɛ and mtakimɛ 
with their totem animal, and thus have an ani-mate relationship, are highly 
sensitive to any adverse contact with the animal in question. This includes 
stepping on shed snakeskin for those whose totem is the python, or even 
smelling or seeing the totem animal’s meat as it is prepared and cooked, or 
brushing up against someone who has just eaten the meat. Besides swelling 
feet, other effects include coughing, vomiting, rashes and open sores. Finally, 
for those who have an ani-mate relationship death is certain should they eat 
their totem animal’s meat, though interviewees also explained that it is almost 
impossible for such individuals to do so, even accidentally: 
If it’s your true totem you can’t eat it. Something will prevent you from 
eating. Or it alerts you not to eat or it tells you you’re not hungry. Or 
when you take a ball [of stiff cornmeal porridge to dip in the sauce] it 
falls, and when you take it again it falls and you leave [it] (Colette, the 
churchgoing seamstress in her late-thirties). 
Interviewees generally acknowledged that those who do not have an ani-mate 
relationship could eat the meat without dying, though they may still get sick. 
Several interviewees added that there is a medicine that can be administered to 
237 
 
 
help the person recover. Alexis, a churchgoer in his late-twenties studying for 
his maîtrise144, summed up as follows: 
Sharon: If someone who is [Uhodukpaadɔ] eats python, what could 
happen? 
Alexis: The thing is I don’t know anyone who has ever tried, I’ve never 
seen anyone try to infringe that law to see the consequence, but what I 
do know is that if one eats, something could happen. There could be 
consequences that follow afterwards such as malformations. You could 
give birth to a child that is malformed because it was affected whilst it 
was still a foetus. Or other intermediary consequences; the person who 
ate that meat might get sick. We’re even forbidden from stepping over 
snake meat or a snake’s skeleton. Even if you inadvertently step over it, 
after a few days you’ll notice sores and people will say, ‘Ah! They must 
have stepped over the skeleton or meat of a dead snake somewhere in 
the bush.’ So, if that can happen simply from stepping over the meat or 
skeleton, and now you eat? It has to be worse! Therefore, supposing 
that it’s really your true totem, it [death] comes. 
Sharon: The person could die? 
Alexis: Absolutely! Once the person falls sick [chuckles], it’s true, death 
could come, that’s absolutely how it is. The person could die… now if 
the person has eaten by accident, it’s similar to if you accidently step 
over a snake’s skeleton. Something could happen to them. One will try 
and find out what’s happening, what is the origin of that sickness… and 
there are symptoms that prove that they have eaten their totem… and 
when one concludes this, there is a remedy. There are some roots that 
one prepares for them and if they take [the medicine], if the sickness, if 
you catch it early enough, you might be able to save them. But if it’s too 
complicated or too advanced, then it’s impossible to cure. 
Sharon: M hmm, you mentioned symptoms? 
Alexis: Yes, concerning symptoms, what I know is that first of all the 
stomach bloats or the feet swell, they could also have sores that break 
out all over. Those are the symptoms that I know. Or you could see that 
their cheeks start to swell or there’s itching all over. 
As most individuals do not know the status of their relationship with their totem 
animal, they generally respect the interdict not to eat them; not only could their 
                                             
144 Post-graduate diploma, which follows the licence (French equivalent of a Bachelor’s 
degree). 
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lives be in danger, but it could be an act of cannibalism145, as Christophe (a 
village deputy chief in his forties) and Henri (the carpenter in his late-thirties) 
intimate: 
Sharon: Is the python a family member? 
Christophe: Our sibosi (animating force) become (kɔnta) pythons. 
That’s why I think it’s forbidden for us [to eat]. This means it’s one of our 
children; it’s one of our sisters. That’s why we forbid [eating it] because 
we could be eating someone one day. 
Sharon: Does the crocodile have the same status as a human? 
Henri: It’s the same status because it’s an animal who, who is like a 
human for you. Before saying you don’t eat something, it’s sure that 
there is a little something that links you, which forms a link between you 
and that animal. So when you eat it, it’s as if you’ve eaten a human. 
As Benjamin mentioned above, ani-mates also die together. Many interviewees 
shared about this, including Juliette: “If you’re out walking and you see a dead 
crocodile, that means that someone in the family has died. For example, my 
father’s older brother, when he was ready to die, the crocodile also died. They 
went and buried it before burying him.” Sophie, a mother in her early-thirties, 
elaborated that 
the kɛbodikɛ is a person’s soul146 that can also be a crocodile in our 
family. Now if you kill the crocodile that means you’ve killed the person 
without knowing. Or [for others], if it’s the python there that you’ve killed, 
you’ve killed the person without knowing. You could see a dead python. 
So you go home and often you go to consult [a diviner], and you learn 
that this or that could happen. Upon your return you’ll find a dead body 
at the house. 
Sophie went on to explain that in the past, when people died, the family would 
verify if they had an ani-mate by looking for a dead crocodile or python. If they 
found one, they would bury it before burying the person. Due to population 
                                             
145 Jackson notes that for the Kuranko of Sierra Leone, “Eating one’s totem is tantamount 
‘to eating oneself.’ […] the prohibition against killing or eating one’s totem is prompted by the 
perennial possibility that the animal one eats may be an actual kinsman in animal form […]” 
(1990:65). 
146 Interview in French. Sophie regularly translates kɛbodikɛ as âme(s). 
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growth, however, this is no longer practical. Like Sophie, many of my 
interviewees justified the strict interdicts not to kill their totem animals, as to do 
so is not only disrespectful but could result in the death of another, or even 
yourself should you kill your ani-mate. Paul, the village deputy chief in his late-
forties, shared about how his daughter, whose ani-mate was a python, died: 
I was in Nigeria and my eldest daughter died. I was hoeing and I saw a 
python. Others, who eat snakes, saw it and said they wanted to kill it. I 
told them not to. I went to the other side of the field and carried on 
hoeing; the others also continued to hoe and they said they wanted to 
kill it. I told them not to. I then returned [home] and they tracked it down 
to kill it. The child died. 
The interdict to not kill or eat applies to all crocodiles and pythons, as it is not 
always apparent if they are wild or not.147 Despite this, several interviewees 
explained that if a python or crocodile attacks you or your diseede wante (family 
animals), it is obviously wild. As its behaviour is not acceptable it can be killed, 
but never eaten (see discussion about misbehaving animals, Chapter Five).148 
Interviewees pointed out some other behavioural and physiological differences 
that can help distinguish diseede siɛ (family pythons) and ibodimuɔhḭ (animating 
force-crocodiles) from their wild counterparts: diseede siɛ and ibodimuɔhḭ are 
friendly, gentle, can be played with, stay within the general vicinity of the 
homestead and do not flee when people approach them; ibodimuɔhḭ have five 
rather than four digits per foot149, whilst diseede siɛ can make themselves 
invisible to those who are not Bɛhodukpadibɛ or Bɛhotuubɛ, are generally 
smaller, but and change size as needed if they feel threatened150: 
                                             
147 The Bɛhotuubɛ and Bɛhodukpadibɛ also refuse to eat other snake species out of 
general respect, but they kill dangerous snakes such as cobras and vipers. 
148 Fortes noted that the Tallensi would slay totem pythons and crocodiles that deliberately 
killed livestock, given that “they are capable of moral conduct” (1966:15) and should know 
better. 
149 Which raises the question whether it is possible to really distinguish them 
physiologically, given that Crocodilians’ front feet have five digits. Their back feet are webbed 
with four full digits and a fifth rudimentary one (Kelly 2007). Unless one gets really close, it often 
appears that they only have four digits per foot, as they tuck their thumbs in as they walk. 
150 One interviewee mentioned that ibodimuɔhḭ do this too. 
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Alexis (the churchgoer in his late-twenties studying for his maîtrise): 
Sometimes people try to kill [a python] and finally it gets big; they hit it, it 
grows, hit, it grows, hit it grows and finally they notice it growing and 
growing [so they stop]. But sometimes there are children at the house 
and they don’t know. When they see [a python] they throw themselves 
at it and start to hit it, and it grows, and then they learn, ‘Be careful, it’s 
a house python.’ [...] 
Sharon: Have you ever seen this, a python who… 
Alexis: …yes, I saw it once, it wasn’t in our house but another 
homestead and that’s why I talked about hitting it and it getting bigger. 
Yes, I arrived and the children were throwing themselves at it and 
hitting it, but they didn’t intend to kill it. It was when some adults 
intervened and said, ‘No, don’t hit it,’ a few minutes later it left, we 
couldn’t find it. It was just a few minutes and we realised it was no 
longer there [it disappeared]. 
Nearly all my Bɛhodukpadibɛ and Bɛhotuubɛ interviewees mentioned diseede 
siɛ ’s (family pythons) ability to defend themselves in this way. As with body-
shifting, the way interviewees talked about diseede siɛ ’s ability to change size 
at will or become invisible, indicated that they consider these normal 
phenomena. Those who have an ani-mate relationship with pythons often see 
them around the homestead, whilst they remain invisible to others. This further 
illustrates the transient nature of the material realm. 
Whether individuals have an ani-mate relationship with their totem animals 
or not, all but three of the interviewees attested that diseede siɛ and ibodimuɔhḭ 
are part of the family. 
Family Status 
The snake is a family member. Why do we say that it’s a family 
member? The snake is in ditade (stone, shrine entity), and ditade is with 
the family. Our whole life, all our sacrifices are there. That’s why I say 
that the snake is with us in the family […]. When you say ditade, you 
say at the same time Uwienu (God). You need to know that our snake 
and Uwienu are like this [together]. I know that Uwienu is the snake’s 
father. When you speak with the snake, he goes to his father and he will 
bring and give you [Uwienu ’s answer] (Gaston, the farmer in his early-
forties). 
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As previously mentioned, a ditade (pl. ataadɛ) is simultaneously the community 
guardian shrine and the shrine entity, whose material presence in the more-
visible parts of the world is a stone and also a python or the totem animal of a 
given community. Like Gaston, several other interviewees explained their totem 
animals’ family position in terms of their role as family guardians such as 
ataadɛ, elders, fathers, and most commonly, ancestors. Benjamin (see above) 
summed it up when he stated, “Crocodiles are the souls of the community… 
which is why they are sacred.” Although Benjamin and other interviewees (see 
Vignette One below) employed terms such as “sacred”, the general consensus 
amongst interviewees was that they do not venerate their totem animals. “It’s 
the python that asks Uwienu to give to us,” Sinbonko, the community shrine 
priest emphasised, “When we perform a sacrifice, [the snake] takes it and goes 
and gives it to Uwienu. What you do [during the ceremony], he then takes [to 
Uwienu].” Interviewees thus consider their totem animals primarily as guardians 
and intermediaries, who – in turn – perform protective and oracular roles. Henri, 
the churchgoing carpenter in his late-thirties, for example, shared:  
A crocodile came to my house the week before last. A young crocodile 
like this [shows length, about 50 cm]. My son went outside, shone the 
torch around and saw it. He came and cried, ‘Papa, it has come, I saw it 
lying down.’ I told him to leave it, and it would leave again… 
Fɛbodimuɔfɛ (animating force-crocodile) is the fetish [ditade] crocodile 
and it doesn’t kill. Fɛmuɔfɛ (wild crocodile) though is merciless. If it sees 
you in the stream, it will kill you. 
Sharon: Even if you’re Ubiidɔ? 
Henri: Ah ha, even if you’re Ubiidɔ, you should never mess with it in the 
water. But fɛbodimuɔfɛ, you can see it lying, as I said, it came to the 
house. It can walk and come to the house, lie down, then leave again… 
it’s not merciless, it won’t harm you… and should it encounter a vicious 
crocodile, when the stream is full, if they meet and you’re asleep in the 
night and you wake up, you’ll hear them fighting, oh how they fight! 
They don’t like meeting. 
Sharon: Does that mean that fɛbodimuɔfɛ tries to protect, it doesn’t 
want the wild crocodile to enter the town? 
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Henri: That’s it exactly. When a wild crocodile comes, [fɛbodimuɔfɛ] 
goes after it and they fight. 
Sophie, the mother in her early-thirties, recounted: 
One day my mum told me [about a wild] crocodile151 that came to Disadi 
and there were [animating force] crocodiles [in the stream]. And the 
[wild] crocodile came, there was lots of noise [in the night] and people 
heard, they heard, so the elders got up really early and before their 
arrival the [animating force] crocodiles had killed the wild crocodile 
because it wanted to harm, it wanted to kill children and others because 
it wanted to eat. There were no standpipes or water pumps at the time, 
so people got water from holes they dug next to the stream, which fill 
with clean water. If you’re not careful, it will take you… [animating force-
crocodiles] start to fight, to defend themselves, because they’re, they’re 
human so they fight so no harm comes to their territory… 
Sharon: And if you see a living fɛbodimuɔfɛ, if it arrives, for example, in 
your house or surroundings, does that mean something? 
Sophie: Yes, that means something; it could mean that someone 
important has died. Or something else is about to happen or something 
has happened elsewhere and its soul has come to the house to alert 
you that something has happened. 
“Sometimes, when a woman wants to get pregnant, you’ll see [a python]. When 
a woman wants to get pregnant, you’ll see it and you’ll know that a stranger 
[baby] will arrive in your family. It shows us,” Yammu, a farmer in his sixties, 
explained, “[And] when a child sleeps and the mother is absent, it comes and 
encircles the child to protect it. It leaves when the mother returns.” Several other 
interviewees also shared about how pythons protect babies and suckle them 
with their tongue or tails152: 
My dad was [working] in Tanguiéta, I think it was in 1966. A python 
came into the house… Mum had put [my baby sister] on a mat, covered 
her with a cloth as usual and then left to draw water… when she had 
drawn water, she returned and she found, there where she had left the 
child, a python was there and it had taken its tail and put it into the 
child’s mouth! And the child suckled! The child sucked the tail. She 
returned, when she saw, hey! She wanted to shout! She shouted, 
                                             
151 Interview in French. Sophie referred to wild crocodiles as crocodiles and animating 
force-crocodiles as caïmans. 
152 See also Malian myth recounted by Brun (1910:857-858). 
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‘Snake, snake, snake!’ Dad came, and he looked and said, ‘No, leave it, 
it’s a visitor who has left my family to come [here].’ So he called some 
people from the neighbourhood, some elders who were there and they 
came and put some flour on it and it left (Roland, the trained pastor in 
his mid-forties). 
For others, such as Anne, the churchgoing widow in her late-forties, seeing 
totem animals in dreams is also significant: 
If you dream and see a crocodile that means the crocodile is your baakɛ 
(tibaakite kin, see below) and has come to greet you. Also, if something 
is about to happen you may see [a crocodile]. If a person is about to get 
sick and die you may see it. 
Several interviewees (such as Christophe above) also explained that totem 
animals have more immediate kinship roles such as brothers, sisters or children 
if an individual’s brother, sister or child should have the animal in question as 
their ani-mate. Others – like Anne – stated that totem animals were their baakɛ 
(tibaakite kin). As I explain elsewhere (2014:51), reincarnation can occur 
matrilaterally when children are reincarnated by ancestors from their fathers’ or 
grandfathers’ maternal family. When this happens a ceremony called tibaakite 
needs to be performed to reintegrate the children concerned into their 
reincarnating ancestors’ original lineage. These children thus become fictive kin 
members of the maternal family. The maternal uncles who perform the tibaakite 
ceremony become second fathers to the children and are called baakɛ 
(tibaakite kin). The term baakɛ thereby exemplifies the kinship relationship 
resulting from reincarnation and the fatherly role that the totem animal has. 
Then and Now: Re-animating the Totemism Debate 
Believing himself to be descended from, and therefore akin to, his 
totem, the savage naturally treats it with respect. If it is an animal he will 
not, as a rule, kill nor eat it. In the Mount Gambier tribe (South 
Australia)… the identification of the man with his totem is carried very 
far; it is of the same flesh with him, and to injure any one of the species 
is physically to injure the man whose totem it is (Frazer 1887:7). 
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As I noted in Chapter One, Frazer emphasised that totemic societies consider 
their animals as kin and having human status. He summarised the “essence of 
totemism” as “an identification of a man with his totem, whether his totem be an 
animal, a plant, or what not” (1910d:5). “In pure totemism,” he continued, “the 
totem is never a god and is never worshipped” (1910d:5). “In short,” Frazer later 
added: 
pure totemism is essentially democratic; it is, so to say, a treaty of 
alliance and friendship concluded on equal terms between a clan and a 
species of animals or things; the allies respect but do not adore each 
other. Accordingly the institution flourishes best in democratic 
communities, where the attitude of men to their totems reflects that of 
men to their fellows (1910d:28; see also Goldenweiser 1910:261). 
Durkheim (1915:139-140) also emphasised the democratic and familial nature 
of the relationship between people and their totem animals, and that these 
animals are not worshiped. In some instances, Durkheim suggested, “the 
animal seems to occupy a slightly more elevated place in the hierarchy of 
sacred things [which is why] it is sometimes called the father or the grandfather 
[…]” (1915:139). Frazer’s and Durkheim’s observations resonate with my 
findings in northwestern Benin, as outlined above. They further fit with the 
democratic nature of Bebelibe social structure, which I outlined in the 
Introduction, and the autonomy and morality that people accord animals more 
generally, which I outlined in Chapters Four and Five. 
Besides ideas about familial and ani-mate relationships, there are other 
similarities between what interviewees shared with me and some of the early 
ethnographic data that sparked the totemism debate in the first place. Frazer 
(1887:16-19; 1910b:609-610), for example, listed the consequences of eating a 
totem animal, which included giving birth to the animal, various skin diseases 
and sickness resulting in death. Finally, he mentioned that “the totem gives his 
clansmen important information by means of omens” (1887:23). Frazer 
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(1910b:543-630; 1937:455-498) also documented examples of totemism for 
West Africa, including southern Benin (1910b:576-584). Totemic relationships in 
the south, however, differ significantly from northwestern Benin, as the animals 
have divine status there. Thus – according to Frazer – these relationships do 
not qualify as “pure totemism” (1910d:5). Despite this, the data Frazer presents 
demonstrates the importance and prevalence of such relations more generally 
both in Benin and the wider region (see also Adler 1998).  
Although many of the theoretical ideas that helped fuel the original debate 
were flawed (see Chapter One), this does not mean that the ethnographic 
observations and data from which they were extrapolated should be dismissed 
(see also Willerslev 2011:210). They still have validity as historical data, which 
demonstrate that – amongst the Bebelibe at least – totemic ideas and practices 
appear not to have changed much in the intervening years, nor has their 
significance diminished. As the totemism debate developed, scholars focussed 
on the theoretical issues, which has resulted in a paucity of ethnographic data. 
Nevertheless, there are some more recent accounts that include case studies 
and corroborate the ongoing importance of totemic entities for many societies, 
including some for West Africa. 
Sapir discussed what he called “complementary totemism” (1977) given that 
some Kujamaat Diola153 of Senegal may, at some point in their lives, defecate 
live animals, which Sapir called totemic doubles (see Functionalism and 
Structuralism, Chapter One). There are some clear differences between how 
totemism is understood amongst the Bebelibe and Sapir’s complementary 
totemism. For example, for the Kujamaat Diola the defecated animal is an 
individual totem rather than a community one, reincarnation is not involved, 
individuals and their doubles remain in constant communication, and when 
individuals die their animal doubles do not (1977:2). If, however, an animal 
                                             
153 Officially the Jola-Fonyi (Simons and Fennig 2017). 
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double is killed, the corresponding individual may also die (1977:2), unless the 
kajupen ritual is performed in time to transfer the animal double’s soul to the 
individual concerned (1977:3). Like Bebelibe totem animals, Kujamaat Diola 
and their animal doubles have an ani-mate relationship, the animals can be 
distinguished from their wild counterparts, as they too prefer to be within the 
vicinity of their people, do not flee when approached, and can be differentiated 
physiologically. Despite this, they are still considered natural animals (1977:2-
3). 
Journet-Diallo (1998) also writes about different Diola speakers, including 
the Felup154 of Guinea-Bissau, who can have multiple animal doubles. One of 
these can be a lineage totem (1998:216), where the bond between animal 
doubles and their individuals results from reincarnation (1998:224-226). Like the 
Bebelibe, individuals do not necessarily know their totem doubles and may only 
learn about them as a result of some disorder, injury or sickness (1998:217). 
Three examples from closer to home demonstrate further totemic 
similarities with the Bebelibe. Maurice (1986:194-215), writing about the 
Betammaribe – southeastern neighbours of the Bebelibe – catalogues the 
animals that the different Betammaribe clans should not eat, sometimes 
together with the myths behind the interdict. The myths either recount how the 
animal saved an ancestor or how the ancestor suffered as a consequence of 
eating the animal. The ancestor then decreed that his descendants should not 
eat the animal henceforth. Swanson (1985:175-176), writing about the 
Gourmantché – northeastern neighbours of the Bebelibe – also notes that many 
clans have animals that they are forbidden to eat. Killing and eating such 
animals is equated with killing a subclan member as it “is the spirit of a 
particular clan’s animal ‘ancestor’ (or totem) that is represented by the ciciliga 
‘guiding spirit’ in every person” (1985:175). Swanson continues: 
                                             
154 Officially the Jola-Felupe (Simons and Fennig 2017). 
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Today, various birds, snakes, fish and other creatures represent the 
specific taboo of certain clans. Such relationships can always be traced 
back to some vital role these animals’ ancestors played in preserving or 
maintaining the life of some human ancestor. Such help and guidance 
continues to the present day within every person in the form of the 
‘spirit’ being known as the ciciliga ‘guiding spirit’. 
We may, therefore, state that the ciciliga ‘guiding spirit’ is some koali 
‘taboo’ animal, recognized as a kinsman, which Tienu ‘God’ assigns to 
each person as a guide throughout his life. Seen as a kinsman, though 
not a human kinsman (which the ŋaali ‘ancestor form’ is), it is 
understandable that it could be offended at times, that, even like the 
‘ancestor form’, it has the right to make demands upon the individual. 
To kill and eat a koali ‘taboo’ animal is to ask for certain death within the 
family (1985:176).  
The Moba of northern Togo also have totem animals resulting from alliances 
between the animals concerned and the founding ancestors (Koabike 2003:87-
89). Koabike (2003:89) mentions that the ancestors punish those who eat their 
totem animals. The punishment is such that nobody dared to violate the 
interdict until more recently when some people read in the Bible (1 Timothy 4:3) 
that those who are faithful and know the truth could eat everything that God 
created as food. Likewise, some Bebelibe churchgoers have intentionally killed 
and eaten either their own or other people’s totem animals, sometimes with 
tragic consequences. Two incidents in particular came to light during my 
research that I present in the following vignettes, which are a compilation of 
what several interviewees told me. Although they read like group conversations, 
interviews were with individuals, except for Louis and Diane. 
Vignette One: Emile the Baker 
Even if you are not Ubiidɔ, “you shouldn’t kill crocodiles [in Cobly]. If someone 
sees you, it’s a problem,” explained Henri, who is Ubiidɔ and goes to the same 
church that Emile went to. Henri continued: 
I had a [Christian] brother who ran the café opposite the market. The 
crocodile came by. I’m sure you heard about the problem, when the 
crocodile came by in the drainage ditch next to Emile’s. I don’t know 
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exactly what they did – I think they shot it – but it created a big problem! 
So big that it went to the King. Oh, he was in serious trouble and 
afterwards the [rifleman’s] child, who was playing football for his team, 
died! Emile saw the crocodile first. 
They called Emile and told him to buy things for the ceremony, but as 
he prays he refused to give for the ceremony. People say this is why 
Emile died, but as we’re not God, we can’t really know. 
The King wasn’t happy, but I think [the rifleman] finally gave the things 
needed for the ceremony. 
Had I been there, I wouldn’t have let them kill it. It could’ve been me 
who saw it first. I’d gone to Emile’s and I’d drunk some tea. I was 
manoeuvring my motorbike so that I could return home and I heard a 
noise in the drainage ditch; something walking, ‘boi, boi, boi’, and I said, 
‘Hmm, whatever is walking there is a big animal, if it’s not a crocodile, 
it’s something else big.’ I didn’t have a torch to see what it was, so I 
said, ‘Okay, as I don’t have a torch, I’m not going to go looking for 
something that could be bad in the night without a torch.’ So I left on my 
motorbike. The next day I learnt that they’d spotted the crocodile and 
[the rifleman] came and killed it. I said, ‘Ah, that’s what I heard, the 
noise that I heard, it was him walking.’ He was in the drainage ditch. He 
had left the pond and followed the ditch. He was walking and I heard 
the noise, but I didn’t have my torch to check so I left, then they saw the 
crocodile. It was night already, maybe 8 or 9pm. 
“The crocodile was hot,” Diane, Louis’ wife, explained, “So he went out to get 
some air.” 
“It was the evening, in the night, about 8pm. It wasn’t daytime; crocodiles 
wouldn’t go walking around in the day. It was already dark,” Louis clarified. 
Diane continued: 
Emile called a security guard to come and kill the crocodile. They killed 
him and the King heard about it. The King said, ‘You are Ubielo, you 
know that it’s our totem, why did you kill it? You did it on purpose? You 
need to pay this and that so that we can arrange things.’ Emile said that 
he prays and is a believer so he wouldn’t pay anything. They were two, 
Emile and the one with the gun; his son was at military school and he 
died. He wasn’t even sick, he just died like that and was brought back 
here. Emile, who gave the order, said he was a believer and couldn’t 
pay for the ceremonies needed. 
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“The ceremonies on the shrines there,” Louis added, “And now he’s gone 
[dead]. Emile refused the ceremonies that were needed, though the other one 
accepted. If you accept, once you’ve accepted, you can be saved.” 
“Once you’ve accepted, you can be saved. You’re told what to provide,” 
Diane reiterated, before continuing: 
But Emile refused as he worked with the Bible, so he wouldn’t and you 
couldn’t force him. He’s gone, therefore err… these sorts of things; if 
you don’t respect their totems, they have their punishments that they 
give: ‘I protected you and now you, you no longer respect me. You 
wanted to eat me, can I leave you like that?’ 
“Was the crocodile Emile’s totem?” I asked. 
“No, it wasn’t his totem,” Diane explicated: 
But he knew that it was the crocodile who protects the town, because 
Cobly is Ubiidɔ, hey! Therefore, it’s their totem, and protects the whole 
town and he was in Cobly. Where you live, you should follow the place’s 
totem. You shouldn’t disrespect it just because it’s not your totem; it 
protects the town! That’s it, and now Emile’s gone. Just in a day. He 
didn’t even get sick and everyone was shocked and cried. The other 
one paid [for the ceremony] and is still alive. 
“Though his son is dead… he agreed to pay [for the ceremony],” Louis added. 
“He accepted to give his part,” Diane intervened: 
But Emile who gave the command refused and said he was a believer, 
he didn’t want to give his money, so I asked him, ‘We all adore God, is it 
written in the Bible that someone should destroy what another person 
adores? Show me the verse, the page in the Bible.’ He said, ‘No.’ And I 
said, ‘You did it, you were told to arrange things. You can arrange for 
someone to give the money for you. You’ve refused and neglected to 
do so, you don’t know how important it is.’ 
Louis continued: 
If only he’d accepted to arrange things,” Louis continued, “but he 
refused, that’s why it happened [Emile died]. Me, I’d forgiven him. I 
explained to him, but he didn’t understand. He told me that he had 
already explained what had happened to the authorities and that he 
didn’t need to do anything more. He said he was a Christian who goes 
to church. He came here twice. He sat there [points to chair]. 
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There were some teenage Bɛbidibɛ present, and they saw them kill the 
crocodile. The teenagers took the crocodile to bury him. They dug and 
buried him. 
“Did they bury him like a human?” I asked. 
“No, they simply buried him,” Louis responded, “The ceremonies came after 
the burial, for both of them [Emile and the security guard] who killed the 
crocodile. We shouldn’t distinguish between the two.” 
“It was done for both of them”, Diane repeated, “so it means that the shrine 
didn’t agree…” 
“…Because Emile didn’t participate,” Louis explicated: 
He didn’t do his part, that’s not good. And the security guard’s son died. 
They’re both from villages here and they knew. They killed the crocodile 
on purpose therefore everyone was affected. If the security guard 
hadn’t paid, he would’ve died too. 
“There are families who eat crocodile, and they would’ve taken him to eat,” 
Diane elucidated. 
“Yes!” Louis continued, “Emile wanted to eat him. He said he didn’t care, he 
would eat, he wanted the meat.” 
“Would he really have had the courage?” Diane asked. 
“Ah ha! If you’re brave enough to kill, what is left?” Louis demanded 
rhetorically. 
“You said that totems protect people, so they’re important and everyone 
who lives in Cobly is under their protection?” I asked. 
“They protect both locals and strangers; they’re all protected,” Diane 
responded. “We questioned both of them. The one who killed the crocodile said, 
‘Ah, I was on guard in front of the shop in town, and he came and told me to 
kill…’” 
“…That he killed the crocodile who came [into town],” Louis interjected. 
“He said he forgot,” Diane resumed: 
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He forgot and reacted because he thought the other one was 
frightened, so he shot and killed [the crocodile]. That truly when he did 
it, he didn’t know and to tell him what he needed to do and he would do 
it. We told him what to do and he agreed to do it as soon as he could 
get the money. We then asked Emile and he affirmed that he had 
ordered the other one to kill, but he wouldn’t give anything as he was a 
believer and went to the protestant church. He even said he’d been to 
the mayor, but the mayor isn’t Ubiidɔ, he isn’t Ubiidɔ. The old mayor, 
that is. Emile said if we threatened him, he would go back to the mayor 
and have us arrested. [Louis chuckles.] So we told him to go. As the 
mayor is also from Cobly, and he’d already told him [what happened], 
that’s the end. Go. 
“The [old] mayor’s Ukɔɔnɔ though,” I stated. 
“Ukɔɔnɔ,” Louis affirmed. 
“When Emile had the crocodile killed, didn’t anyone try to stop him?” I asked 
Roland. 
“There was [an Ubiidɔ] youngster,” Roland answered: 
When [Emile and the others] saw the crocodile, he had come out of a 
hole by the pond, followed the stream, entered the drainage ditch, and 
he was stuck when they saw him. They were preparing to kill him and 
had sent someone to get a weapon and the youngster came and said, 
‘Be careful! Leave him, don’t touch, leave, don’t touch!’ Whilst he went 
to get some adults, the family elders, the others shot and killed [the 
crocodile]. When the youngster returned he found that the crocodile had 
been killed and he started to cry. 
“People say that Emile killed a crocodile”, Idibiènu, the widow in her fifties 
recounted, 
and the crocodile became (kɔnta) a man, then came to Emile’s to eat. 
When he had finished eating, he gave Emile some money, Emile went 
to get change and that’s when it happened. Something pricked his 
stomach and he went, ‘nnn’. Since that day, nobody has seen the man 
who came and ate. People say that he was the crocodile and that’s 
what killed him. The crocodile came to take him. You see, Emile killed 
[the crocodile] and his second came to take vengeance. 
“The day of his death, a few minutes before his death, Emile received a 
banknote from a Fulani,” Grégoire, the teacher in his twenties explained: 
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He went inside to get change and never came out. That banknote 
certainly had a spiritual problem and that’s what killed him. It was a 
banknote of 10,000 [CFA francs]. 
He was implicated in the death of a crocodile. When they saw the 
crocodile, it was Emile who gave the order to kill it. And people said, 
‘Watch out, it might be a sacred crocodile. If he’s not sacred, he 
wouldn’t come here.’ Emile said that he was a believer and he knew 
there was nothing sacred here. So he authorised to kill it and usually 
when you kill a sacred animal, there must necessarily be 
consequences, maybe sickness or death. So if it’s true and he really 
ordered them to kill the crocodile, and it was truly sacred, then it was 
surely responsible for his death. 
Yaaté, the farmer in his early-fifties who is Uhodukpaadɔ, opined: 
Emile killed the territory’s mtakimɛ (identity). We have snakes as 
totems, and the others have crocodiles. The crocodile that Emile killed 
was the mtakimɛ of the territory where Emile lived. He lived there and 
he knew the [Bɛbidibɛ] laws. Disɛnpode (the devil) seduced him and he 
killed the crocodile. 
“The fɛbodimuɔfɛ (animating force-crocodile) is the ditade (community guardian 
shrine),” Hortense added, “It’s the ancestor’s ditade, the fɛbodimuɔfɛ. You don’t 
kill that.” 
“I did tibaakite155 with Emile’s community so the crocodile was his totem. 
According to me”, Christophe, the village deputy chief in his forties expounded, 
the crocodile kept his kɛbodikɛ (animating force). By killing [his] 
fɛbodimuɔfɛ, he killed himself. If you have something as your totem, 
and it’s with you, that’s where your kɛbodikɛ is found. You should love 
it. You shouldn’t try to kill it. If it dies, you must die too. But once Emile 
started going to church, he thought that nothing could harm him. If he’d 
respected the things of his parents, knowing that it was his totem, he 
wouldn’t have accepted that they kill the crocodile.156 
“Those who are evangelical Christians157, they don’t respect such things,” 
Georges, the butcher in his late-thirties added, “If you pray and you’re an 
evangelical Christian, they say that you should eat your totem.” 
                                             
155 As noted above, tibaakite reintegrates children who have been reincarnated 
matrilaterally into the reincarnating maternal ancestor’s community. 
156 Thus, according to Christophe, Emile killed his ani-mate. 
157 Georges referred to evangelical Christians as les pasteurs (pastors). 
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Emile’s wife informed me: 
Emile became a Christian when he was a child. The crab158 is his [true] 
totem, not crocodile, but he ate crabmeat too, as well as crocodile and 
all other meat. My totem animals are dog and python, but I regularly 
prepared dog meat for him too. I don’t have a problem with eating totem 
animals. Things only happen once you start to entertain the idea that 
eating your totem animal is dangerous. 
“Nobody killed him, his hour had come,” Sophie, the mother in her early-thirties, 
contended: 
There’s no link [between his killing the crocodile and his death] because 
when the problem arose, people told Emile and the rifleman that they 
must pay for the things. And the rifleman paid. If the rifleman paid, then 
surely it was Emile who told him to pay or what? Given that the rifleman 
paid, death wouldn’t come and take Emile! They paid, they gave what 
was needed for the sacrifices and the [Bɛbidibɛ] performed the 
sacrifices. Emile, his hour had come, I cannot condemn Emile. 
“I used to look after Emile. Even his death, I was looking after him on the way to 
Tanguiéta [hospital] and he died in my arms. He was my son. All that 
happened, I don’t understand,” Thérèse, the churchgoing meat seller, told me: 
Emile’s mother was my husband’s father’s sister, and I looked after him 
when he was a child. [The day he died] I’d gone to my field. When I 
returned, I saw lots of people and motorbikes. It was a Sunday, or was 
it a Saturday? I’d just come back and I asked, ‘What’s up?’ And people 
told me what had happened. I went to [Cobly] hospital, entered the 
vehicle together with Emile’s wife, and left for Tanguiéta [hospital]. He 
died in Tayacou159. 
Churchgoers and non-churchgoers alike respected Emile. He was thoughtful 
and sensitive towards others. Even though he and his wife no longer paid heed 
to their own totem animals, it seems out of character that Emile would have had 
the crocodile deliberately killed if he knew it would provoke local outrage. Emile 
was a Christian of longstanding and had nothing to prove by killing the 
                                             
158 Emile was from the Bɛyṵɔbɛ community, which is made up of four families, each with 
different totems (see Bebelibe Communities in the Appendices). Although his tikedimɔmɔnte 
(totem-true) was the crab, other Bɛyṵɔbɛ do have the crocodile as their tikedimɔmɔnte. 
159 Six miles from Tanguiéta. 
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crocodile, although – having had it killed – he then had to stand by his principles 
with regard to the ceremonial demands that he was then asked to fulfil. 
Arthur, the protagonist in the next vignette, however, deliberately killed his 
totem animal to demonstrate his newfound faith in Uwienu. 
Vignette Two: 1960s Crocodile Killings 
“Earlier you shared that some people eat [totem animals] without problems as 
they’re not direct descendants [of the founding ancestor],” I reiterated. 
“There are those who eat without problems, and there are those who have 
suffered the consequences!” Timothée, the septuagenarian retired pastor 
answered. 
“And is it always death, or are there other consequences?” I asked. 
“Okay, consequences, it’s not only death, but also, I will explain for you 
something that I saw. I don’t speak of things I haven’t seen. You know Arthur, 
Lucie’s father?” 
“Ah ha,” I affirmed. 
Timothée expounded: 
He, he ate, he ate lots of crocodile, hey. [Chuckles.] When he killed 
one, he brought it [home]. Others brought them, and he ate just until his 
wife got pregnant, hey. Pregnant… she gave birth to two crocodiles! 
The day of her delivery… [whispers] little crocodiles came out, and 
since then she didn’t have more children. I was a pastor at the time. We 
prayed and prayed for her and by God’s grace she – truly these things, 
things were awful – she suffered and she was troubled. We prayed for 
her and asked God, truly, to save her… she survived and finally died in 
her old age. The husband is now dead too. 
“Did you see the babies?” I asked. 
“I saw them, ah ha, I saw. The ears have heard, the eyes have seen,” he 
responded. 
“And you were pastor here or elsewhere?” 
“I was pastor [elsewhere].” 
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“And did he stop eating [crocodile] after what happened to his wife? Did he 
acknowledge what had happened and stop eating afterwards?” I enquired. 
“Did he even [know], when they took [the baby crocodiles], hey?” Timothée 
recounted: 
The crocodiles that came out, they buried them without telling him. They 
didn’t even tell him she’d given birth to crocodiles. The old women who 
were present told us not to tell the husband. Because the husband, he 
didn’t know anything! It was afterwards, when people started to sing 
and he learnt from the songs. People sang about him eating crocodile 
and his wife giving birth to crocodiles. And he always said, ‘No, it’s 
false.’ And he continued to eat crocodile. He continued to eat because 
he was stubborn. 
“So that means he wasn’t a direct descendant of the [founding] ancestor...” 
“…If he was truly direct, he himself would have suffered the consequences,” 
Timothée concluded. 
“I learnt about a man who said he prayed and that it’s not true [that you 
shouldn’t eat your totem]; that they’re stories, that it’s only talk,” Colette, the 
churchgoing seamstress in her late-thirties elucidated: 
That he followed Uwienu ’s word and no longer had a totem; that people 
say that you must have an animal totem, but it’s Uwienu who created 
animals and said we should eat them. So [the man] ate, he killed and 
ate and his wife was pregnant and gave birth to small crocodiles, she 
didn’t give birth to people. I learnt and saw. People pointed him out to 
me when he was still alive. Having seen this, how can I eat crocodile? 
His wife gave birth to crocodiles. Now I’ve heard about it, I could never 
eat crocodile. People sang songs about it. They sang about him by 
calling his name and saying that he prayed and that he no longer had a 
totem, so he went and killed a crocodile to eat and his wife gave birth to 
small crocodiles. That’s what I heard. So I asked my mothers and they 
said it was true, that his wife gave birth to small crocodiles and that they 
had seen the crocodiles before the parents made them disappear. 
“Arthur’s family became Christian and someone reminded them that the 
crocodile was their totem,” explicated Benjamin, the churchgoing university 
graduate in his late-twenties: 
They said, ‘No, we’ve become Christian, we’ll eat and see!’ And they 
ate and that’s how it happened. In fact, they never should’ve eaten it 
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just because they became Christian. Even if you become Christian, it’s 
your totem! You shouldn’t say, ‘I will eat and see,’ but if someone gives 
you crocodile meat and doesn’t say, and you eat, then nothing will 
happen. But it’s as if they tempted [God] by saying, ‘We’ll test God and 
see!’ And then they were troubled and women started to give birth to 
little crocodiles. It’s a true story, it wasn’t invented. Take me for 
example, I became a Christian, but even so, if someone gave me 
crocodile meat, I couldn’t eat it. It’s as if they’re testing me, ‘Ah that, you 
don’t eat it? I want to see.’ But my conscience won’t allow it. 
“What can happen if you eat [your totem animal]?” I asked Lucie, Arthur’s 
daughter, who is now in her fifties. She explained: 
It’s as if we’ve eaten a human, something could happen. In our fathers’ 
time, if you ate and you weren’t a Christian, your stomach would swell 
and you would suffer and die. It’s true. Me, I’ve eaten [crocodile] in 
Uwienu ’s name together with my family, we ate and nothing happened. 
When you kill and take the crocodile home, you’ll see that it’s not 
human meat. It’s an animal that Uwienu created, and he said you could 
eat, so you eat. Our fathers know that the crocodile was a human and 
you shouldn’t eat humans, and that it saved us. We now know that it’s 
Uwienu who saves us. People know that we ate [crocodile]. We did so 
to set an example. We became Christians and the Bible tells us that 
humans shouldn’t have things that Uwienu created as totems, and that 
we can eat. That’s why we set an example by eating [crocodile] so that 
people would know that Uwienu exists. 
“So other Bɛnammucaabɛ, those who are not Christians, they knew that your 
family ate crocodile?” I clarified. Lucie verified: 
They knew, they even sang songs. Don’t you know about this? They 
sang about Arthur, who ate the crocodile when he shouldn’t; that he ate 
because he prayed. He said he prayed to Uwienu and he ate crocodile. 
And my father responded by saying, ‘It wasn’t because I needed the 
meat; I ate to show that Uwienu exists. You need to know this so that 
you can follow Uwienu too.’ They weren’t happy. They thought we 
would die and they wouldn’t come to our homestead. Then they saw 
that we were still alive and many started going to church because of 
this. 
“So nothing happened when you ate crocodile?” I asked. 
“Nothing at all,” Lucie responded. 
“Others told me that one of the things that can happen if you eat crocodile is 
that you could give birth to crocodiles,” I queried. Lucie expounded: 
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Okay, that doesn’t exist. People say that my mother gave birth to little 
crocodiles. But she didn’t have crocodiles. When my father ate 
[crocodile], they said she had twin [crocodiles]. I was no longer a small 
child. They weren’t crocodiles, they were human, but they died. One 
died straightaway and the other a month later. People can’t give birth to 
crocodiles. Those who said these things didn’t even see them. They 
knew my father had eaten [crocodile] and they weren’t happy and they 
didn’t want him eating [crocodile]. So they told this story that he had 
eaten and then gave birth [to crocodiles]. He didn’t respect the laws and 
gave birth to crocodiles. They didn’t see, they only talked. 
“So it was one way to try and discourage the family from eating?” 
“Mmm,” Lucie affirmed. 
“And because the twins died, that reinforced the rumours?” 
“One died the next day, but Uwienu intervened so the other lived for about a 
month and many people saw him.” Lucie continued, “They saw that he was a 
person, not a crocodile. They were witnesses. But others had already lied and 
the story [that they were crocodiles] was out.” 
The next day, I mentioned to another interviewee that Lucie had helped 
care for the twins and was adamant that they were not crocodiles. “Well of 
course she’d say that!” the person exclaimed. 
Gilbert, another septuagenarian retired pastor, explained that his first 
pastoral appointment was to Namountchaga in 1965. He was sent there to 
replace the pastor who had suddenly left due to problems in the church. Some 
members of the congregation had started killing and eating crocodile, the 
Bɛnammucaabɛ community totem. Gilbert filled in some of the details 
surrounding the events. Arthur and his two brothers had become Christians. 
Arthur’s elder brother first had the idea that they should kill and eat their totem 
animal to demonstrate their newfound faith: 
It’s a crazy story, which we need to accept because people know and 
emphasise that totems are essential. Well, when people become 
Christians, they learn that there’s nothing that they cannot eat so they 
eat everything. They say that this is what the Bible says; to eat all that 
you find. So, that’s why [the brothers] said they would eat crocodile to 
prove that they were truly Christian. 
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Gilbert added that the brothers were also selling the skins, which were much in 
demand at that time for making belts, wallets and other accessories. Not only 
did they kill crocodiles in general; they also killed the shrine crocodile, then 
cooked and ate it publicly. People fled so that they would not smell the meat 
cooking. They were also worried; the shrine crocodile assured that the streams 
would flow and oversaw the community’s general wellbeing. Not only this, but 
certain crocodiles are directly linked to individuals and if a crocodile dies, the 
person dies too. Therefore, men from the village came after the brothers with 
guns, but the older brother defied them; surely, the shrine could protect itself? 
Did they need to kill him? The men backed down. 
Gilbert explained that people tried to find other ways to stop the brothers – 
and others – from killing and eating their totem animals. That is why they said 
that Arthur’s wife gave birth to crocodiles. She did not really give birth to 
crocodiles, though, but the twins were abnormal: 
In order to discourage the brothers, to stop them killing crocodiles, 
people sang, ‘These babies here, Arthur and his wife ate crocodile, they 
gave birth to crocodiles, they gave birth to small crocodiles.’ And it 
became a popular story that spread through the whole region. It 
emphasised the serious nature of the problem, as [the brothers] had not 
only abandoned their totem, but had eaten it, and that’s why they gave 
birth to crocodiles. All this happened before my arrival, but the brothers 
continued killing crocodiles [after I came] to sell the skins and eat the 
meat. Their thoughts turned to money and they were making a profit. 
Gilbert confirmed that Arthur’s wife did not have more children after that. 
Despite the songs, Arthur and his wife did not abandon their faith and finally 
died of old age. Rumours spread that other Christian women also gave birth to 
crocodiles, but Arthur’s wife was the only one to have abnormal babies. 
Whatever their abnormality, people opine that it was the shrine crocodile 
avenging its death. Gilbert thinks that this is highly likely, though the community 
ancestors could also be responsible: “If you have faith, that doesn’t mean you 
should betray your customs just because they’re your customs. It’s ancestral 
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history; it’s in the family,” Gilbert explained. “It’s one thing to destroy your own 
idols, but it’s not good to destroy non-believers’ idols. It’s injurious and 
provocative.” 
Meanwhile, Arthur’s eldest brother and his three wives moved to Tanguiéta. 
Shortly after their arrival, a freak wind brought down the roof on one of his wives 
and broke her hip. She subsequently died childless. People said that this too 
was the shrine crocodile’s vengeance. The brother, realising that his killing the 
shrine crocodile would always be held against him, then went to Ghana with his 
two remaining wives and children. 
Arthur’s eldest brother and his family eventually moved back to Tanguiéta. 
The brother died in January 2016. The youngest brother is still alive. During the 
funeral service, he testified about his older brother’s faith and how he killed and 
ate Namountchaga’s shrine crocodile. 
According to Lucie, the babies were normal and the people who circulated 
the stories never saw the babies. Does this mean that Timothée, the retired 
pastor who declared, “I saw them, ah ha, I saw. The ears have heard, the eyes 
have seen,” and Colette, who was not even born when these events took place 
yet stated, “I learnt and saw,” were lying? Other interviewees were equally 
convinced that Lucie’s mother gave birth to crocodiles and affirmed that they 
too had “seen” them. The Mbelime verb ya means “to see” and “to know”. What 
is certain is that Lucie’s family’s actions challenged societal norms and the 
events have become mythologised. Singing about what happened promotes the 
truth of the events as, amongst the Bebelibe, singing reinforces the importance 
and veracity of the message. The events surrounding Emile’s death and the 
resulting stories are further examples of myths in the making. 
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The Role of Myths 
Holbraad (2009) addresses what constitutes truth in his analysis of Cuban 
divination and resulting oracles. Rather than thinking in terms of a “functional 
definition” of truth as “a matter of producing statements that get things right by 
accurately reflecting phenomena” (2009:87), Holbraad suggests that truth 
should also be analysed in terms of “inventive definitions” (2009:87). He 
elaborates: 
Thus, since inventive definitions are defined as inaugurations – as 
inventions of (new) meanings – it follows that, unlike truth-functional 
definitions, inventive definitions are not predicative truth claims. 
My suggestion, then, is that oracles pronounce inventive definitions in 
just this sense. Take the common verdict ‘you are bewitched’ as an 
example. Treating this as an inventive definition implies that being 
bewitched is not a predicate that ‘holds true’ of me. Rather, it is a 
meaning that is being related to me so as to redefine me. The oracle 
transforms me from a person who stands in no particular relation to 
witchcraft into a person who is being bewitched. To ask whether such a 
shift is true or false is fundamentally to misunderstand the ontological 
character of the transformation by confusing it with the epistemological 
question of how the shift may be ascertained (2009:88). 
In a similar vein, it is the ontological character of myths that I consider 
important. It is not a question of whether the myths are factually true or not, but 
how they inventively help people to define and understand the relationships 
they have with others. Kirby, for example, proposes that people create new 
myths and taboos to help deal with social change and that these are “strategies 
for living” (1987:59). Writing about the Anufo of northern Ghana and Togo, Kirby 
(1987) analyses a local myth that explains why they stopped eating frogs. This 
myth is relatively recent as many Anufo remember when they could eat frogs. 
The myth recounts how women took the initiative to prepare a sauce with toads 
they collected from the bathroom, as the men had returned late and empty-
handed from their hunt. Toads, however, have always been considered 
repulsive. When the men learnt what they had eaten, they began to vomit, and 
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an old man declared that they would never eat frog again. Kirby then 
demonstrates that the real reason for the taboo is not because women cannot 
tell the difference between toads and frogs – as suggested by the myth – but 
that by providing meat for the sauce, the women took on roles and 
responsibilities that were originally limited to men. He suggests that the influx of 
new goods, a growing capitalistic economy and changing notions of ownership 
led to rapid social change, which in turn impacted Anufo social structure and 
gender roles. In this instance, the myth appears to be completely symbolic; 
there was no meal as such. Despite this, the Anufo stopped eating frogs. 
In other instances – such as the two vignettes above – the myths elaborate 
the actual events that challenged social norms. In terms of presencing, myths 
demonstrate the “presencing potential” (J. Merz 2014:186) of a given situation 
as they allow people to generate multiple meanings, and increase the “inventive 
definitions” of truth (Holbraad 2009). Myths can thus be considered veracious, 
as they help provide people with the means to deal with ambiguity, and thereby 
negotiate the ontological penumbras they encounter (see also Attala 2017; 
Heneise 2017). 
Gottlieb, for example, explores the “contradictory space” (1986:477) that 
dogs occupy for the Beng of the Ivory Coast. According to one Beng myth, the 
dog is responsible for introducing death to humans, whilst another myth shows 
how the dog protects and identifies with humans. Gottlieb then demonstrates 
how these contradictory positions shape how the Beng treat their dogs. She 
finishes by suggesting that the “path between myth and contemporary society 
must be an open one with conceptual travel possible in both directions [as] 
[a]nimals are creatures that can resonate symbolically in both realms, society 
and art” (1986:485). 
In his article Myth, Totemism and the Creation of Clans, Morphy (1990) 
alludes to the presencing potential of myths and their veracity for those 
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concerned. In his analysis of creation and inheritance myths amongst the 
Yolngu of northern Australia, Morphy explores the dynamic nature of these 
myths and their role in maintaining clan identity and ensuring continuity (see 
also Drummond 1981). He concludes that 
we are not dealing with sets of animal species as labels for human 
groups, but with animals, objects and ancestral beings that have a 
context and a meaning through their incorporation in myths; totemism is 
a system of relations and a set of stories of sequences of events 
(1990:326-327). 
Myths thus help protect and maintain important sociocultural parameters and 
cohesion. 
Finally, myths such as the Bebelibe totem myths above reveal the 
agreements reached between two parties (the ancestor and the totem animal, 
for example) and may be understood as social contracts. In Chapter Four I 
expressed reservations about the idea of social contracts between humans and 
domestic animals, as this suggests a formalised, legal agreement between the 
two parties. I proposed that “understanding” would be more appropriate as this 
can be tacit and not necessarily formalised. Many Bebelibe animal myths 
recount how understandings were reached between different entities. 
Sometimes these understandings are implicit, such as in the myth about how 
hunting began (Chapter Four). At other times they explicate the pact that the 
entities established, such as the totem myths above. The veracious nature of 
myths helps reaffirm the implicit understandings and explicit agreements that 
were reached. People’s experiences and encounters with totem entities – and 
other entities more generally – not only contribute to validating the myths, but 
also create the potential for myths to be modified and new myths to be 
generated, as demonstrated above. 
I also noted that one of the problems that some academics have with the 
idea of social contracts is that they are biased in favour of humans. This seems 
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to be less of an issue with the pacts that Bebelibe myths present, as the 
underlying sociocultural moral norms mean that all the entities concerned have 
the right to seek revenge when the relationship is abused. Thus – in certain 
circumstances – people can and do kill animals when they behave badly, 
including their wild totem entities (see Chapter Five and above), whilst animals 
also have the right to avenge their deaths when not justified (see Chapters Four 
and Five). 
Other recent accounts corroborate the ongoing importance of totemic 
relationships more generally. Morton (1987), for example, re-examines increase 
rituals practised by the Aranda of central Australia, whilst Willerslev and 
Ulturgasheva (2012) demonstrate the interplay between totemic and animistic 
features for the Eveny and Chukchi of northeastern Siberia. There are certain 
analogies between these examples and the case of the Bebelibe. For instance, 
all deal with how these societies relate to their ancestors and think about 
reincarnation and the role that animals play in this, in order to ensure continuity 
of the family and other important entities. They also demonstrate the different 
ways that totemic relationships can be explained ontologically, which results in 
different notions and practices. This being the case, the outworking nature of 
totemism can vary significantly from one society to another. The Aranda, for 
example, eat their totem animals during their increase rituals (Morton 1987). 
Each Eveny individual, meanwhile, has a domestic guardian reindeer that can 
be considered a totemic entity with which the individual is paired. Reindeers per 
se, however, are not totem animals, so they can also be eaten. Moreover, the 
domestic reindeer with which an individual is paired may allow itself to be 
sacrificed in order to protect the individual concerned (Willerslev and 
Ulturgasheva 2012:51-55). Finally, the Chukchi have a totemic relationship with 
their ancestors. This relationship, however, is dangerous and can result in 
madness and death. Like the Eveny, the Chukchi have a special relationship 
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with their domestic reindeer. These are also sacrificed to counteract the 
dangers generated by the Chukchi’s totemic relationships (Willerslev and 
Ulturgasheva 2012:61-65). In all three accounts, the sacrificial death of the 
animals concerned ensure the perpetuation of life. 
 It is these discussions about what exactly constitutes the ontological nature 
of totemism that the debate continues, despite Lévi-Strauss’s (1964 [1962]; 
1966 [1962]) attempts to invalidate it (see Chapter One). Current semiotic 
interpretations of these discourses, however, constrain the full width and 
breadth of what could be happening ontologically. I have attempted to go 
beyond this constraint by examining further how we engage in and with the 
world through presencing and navigate the ontological penumbras we 
encounter. In Chapter Two I presented the idea of the ontological penumbra 
from a methodological perspective. I then proposed that navigating ontological 
penumbras goes beyond methodology, as they are not limited to the 
anthropological epistemological endeavour. I then demonstrated this by drawing 
on my research into human-animal relations amongst the Bebelibe in the 
chapters that followed. My findings indicate that presencing and how people 
negotiate ontological penumbras have important implications and applications 
beyond the Bebelibe setting. I explore these further in the next and final chapter 
where I start by providing a synopsis of my findings and analysis so far, before 
discussing further their relevance more generally. 
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Chapter Eight 
Human-Animal Relations and Their Ontological 
Implications 
In Chapter Three I explained that all beings have kɛbodikɛ (animating force), 
mtakimɛ (identity) and ukuɔnu (body-skin). Ukuɔnu dies when its kɛbodikɛ and 
mtakimɛ leave it definitively. Having negotiated a new upinsihṵ (destiny) with 
Uwienu (God), kɛbodikɛ and mtakimɛ then return to the more-visible parts of the 
world and take on their new ukuɔnu (pl. tikɔnte) by reincarnating (siihḭ ) one, or 
several, new being(s). Thus, what really constitutes an individual being is its 
kɛbodikɛ and mtakimɛ, which are transmaterial. I further illustrated the 
transmaterial nature of kɛbodikɛ and mtakimɛ when discussing body-shifting. 
Following Ingold’s (2000:112-115) and Descola’s (2013a:115-125; see also 
2013b) analytical paradigms, Bebelibe ontology appears to be animic rather 
than totemic. In short, for both Ingold and Descola, it is the relationship between 
a person’s vital force (Ingold 2000:112-115) or interiority (Descola 2013a:115-
125; 232-244; 2013b) and the material environment that determines a given 
society’s predominating ontological stance. Ingold briefly summarises the 
difference between totemism and animism as follows: 
At the most fundamental level, the contrast is about the relative priority 
of form and process. With a totemic ontology, the forms life takes are 
already given, congealed in perpetuity in the features, textures and 
contours of the land. And it is the land that harbours the vital forces 
which animate the plants, animals and people it engenders. With an 
animic ontology, to the contrary, life is itself generative of form. Vital 
force, far from being petrified in a solid medium, is free-flowing like the 
wind, and it is on its uninterrupted circulation that the continuity of the 
living world depends (2000:112). 
For Descola, totemism is “an ontology that stresses the continuity between 
humans and nonhumans both on the physicality axis (common substances) and 
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on the interiority one (common essences)” (2013b:38; see also 2013a:122; 
233). With animism, though, entities share “similar interiorities (continuity of 
souls)” whilst having “dissimilar physicalities (discontinuity of forms […])” 
(Descola 2013a:233), or – putting it another way – “nonhumans are endowed 
with the same interiority as humans, but every class of beings is differentiated 
by the body they inhabit” (2013b:38).160 Both Ingold and Descola state, 
however, that their paradigms should be understood as “orientations” (Ingold 
2000:112) or “modes of identification” (Descola 2013a:233) and both clarify that 
their take on totemism is typified in Australia. This being the case, how can so-
called “totemism” be accounted for amongst the Bebelibe and in Benin and the 
wider region more generally? As noted in Chapter One, Willerslev and 
Ulturgasheva (2012) identify the same issue for the Eveny and Chukchi of 
Siberia, namely that – following Ingold and Descola’s paradigms – the Eveny 
and Chukchi are animists. Yet, they too exhibit totemic features. Willerslev and 
Ulturgasheva propose that totemism and animism are interdependent and that 
their “respective presence depends on who is looking and from where” 
(2012:65). Thus, even though the Bebelibe may initially appear to be animists, 
like the Eveny and Chukchi, there are several ontological orientations at play, 
with one coming to the fore depending on the presencing practices employed. 
These could be totemic, ontonic or animic, for example, as I now demonstrate. 
In Chapter One, I established that the common theme that runs through the 
whole totemism debate is the idea of social identity and belonging, which is 
defined by a relationship with a non-human entity. I also proposed that 
totemism should not be a question of semiotic abstraction or ontological 
typology and the need to go beyond the constraints that these approaches 
                                             
160 As noted in Chapter One, Descola defines two other ontologies: naturalism and 
analogism. He then proposes that analogism is the predominant ontology in West Africa, where 
“discontinuities are assumed on both [the interiority and physicality] axes, with the recognition 
that there exist microdifferences between the components of the world at an infra-individual 
level” (2013b:38). 
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create. By focusing on the Bebelibe, together with examples from some other 
societies who identify animals as totems, I further demonstrated in Chapters Six 
and Seven that these animals play a role in how these societies relate to their 
ancestors and think about reincarnation, and thus ensure family continuity. 
Depending on the situation at the time, members of the given society 
concerned draw on different presencing practices as they interact with their 
totem entities. These practices determine the meanings that people attribute to 
their relationship, which, in turn, govern how people understand and experience 
their totem entities. More generally, presencing not only accounts for how 
people relate to totem entities, but to animals and other entities more generally. 
In Chapter Three I explained that it is the interplay between ontons, symbols, 
icons and indexes and how individuals prioritise them that results in the different 
presencing practices people employ and move between depending on the 
circumstances at the time. Luc, the church leader in his thirties, for example, 
presenced mtakimɛ (identity) and how it relates to animals in two different ways 
during our interview. When I initially asked if animals have mtakimɛ, he 
categorically answered, “No.” But later on, when we were discussing destiny, he 
talked about animal mtakimɛ. Now I was confused. He then explained that there 
is Uwien’ takimɛ (God’s mtakimɛ, which, for Luc, is the Holy Spirit) and birth 
mtakimɛ. When I first asked if animals have mtakimɛ, he thought I was asking if 
they could have Uwien’ takimɛ. In this instance animals represent physical 
beings that cannot be filled with the Holy Spirit, thus Luc primarily draws on 
Pentecostal and scientific presencing practices by separating matter and spirit, 
and thinking of animals in largely material terms. In the second instance, 
though, animals have birth mtakimɛ and he made it clear that they could not 
exist without it. He thus engages with them as ontons and primarily draws on 
transmaterial notions and an ontonic understanding of animals as he presences 
them.  
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Luc is not the only churchgoer who has started to separate matter and 
spirit. With exposure to teaching about souls and spirits, some people now 
spiritualise and thus dematerialise mtakimɛ and kɛbodikɛ. Their understanding 
of how mtakimɛ and kɛbodikɛ relate to the entity’s ukuɔnu (body-skin) has 
shifted from being transmaterial and ontonic to animic. Consequently, rather 
than being integrated with the ukuɔnu, for some people mtakimɛ and kɛbodikɛ 
now exist as separate entities who reside in it; ukuɔnu then takes on a semiotic 
stance as it becomes an icon or symbol for mtakimɛ and kɛbodikɛ (see also J. 
Merz 2014:150-154; 2017b:152-153). Such a shift in understanding about their 
relationship with the ukuɔnu means that following death there is a quick and 
complete separation of mtakimɛ and kɛbodikɛ from ukuɔnu (S. Merz 
2017b:134). 
Another consequence is that some Bebelibe now talk about executive 
possession (when a spiritual being takes over and controls a person, see 
Cohen 2008). Thus, ukuɔnu, mtakimɛ and kɛbodikɛ now directly correspond 
with Ingold’s “three essential components [of] the ordinary living person: the 
physical body, the body-soul and the free-soul” (1986:246), which he identifies 
for the circumboreal peoples of Eurasia and North America. Ingold then 
suggests that a human’s body “is but a ‘placing’ for a vital entity that can just as 
well be placed elsewhere” (1986:248) or a “container [which] is conceived as a 
kind of vehicle” (2000:100) for what really constitutes an individual, therefore 
allowing individuals “to extend the spatiotemporal range of [their] movement, 
influence and experience” (2000:100). Consequently – when individuals think of 
kɛbodikɛ and mtakimɛ as occupying and animating a container – their 
presencing practice is now primarily animic rather than ontonic. 
Willerslev queries how to deal with 
the coexistence of two seemingly contradictory sets of animist beliefs 
about the nature of the soul. On the one hand, the soul is seen as a 
common spiritual essence distinct from the body, which is conceived of 
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as a form of clothing and through which alterity is apprehended as such. 
On the other hand, no clear division exists between body and soul or 
appearance and essence, and each pair can be mutually reversed. Can 
these two apparently opposed conceptions of the soul be understood in 
a coherent way? (2011:516).  
Willerslev’s concern about how exactly the soul relates to the body is thereby 
resolved when these “contradictory sets of animist beliefs” are analysed as 
primarily animic and ontonic presencing practices respectively. Presencing 
therefore accounts for the multiple ways that individuals engage with the world 
ontologically. Thinking about different presencing practices as primarily ontonic, 
animic, totemic, and so on, thereby provides the means to move away from 
reductionist tendencies to classify societies as totemistic, animistic, naturalist, 
and so on, which – in turn – can result in stereotyping and othering (see also 
Fabian 1983:152; Hurn 2012:78). 
Another example of multiple engagement, which can result in apparently 
conflicting ideas, concerns the status of diseede wante (family animals), who 
can change from utedu (non-monetary abundance) to tikpate (monetary wealth) 
and back again, depending on the circumstances (see Commodification, 
Chapter Five). People associate the animals with some sort of wealth in both 
instances. With tikpate the animals symbolise wealth and can be converted into 
cash, thus the symbolic worth of animals predominates and people’s ontonic 
engagement diminishes. Whereas with utedu people primarily draw on ontonic 
presencing practices, as they consider their animals family members who are 
the family’s wellbeing. Naveh and Bird-David (2014) make a similar observation 
for the Nayaka of India: 
When they hunt an animal for sale – that is, for the animal to serve as a 
means for getting something else, and maybe to be consumed by 
remote unknown people – the animal begins its way to incrementally 
‘come into being’ as a thing, within a utilitarian framing. When, however, 
they hunt animals for their own immediate consumption, by their own 
immediate relatives, it still figures predominantly as a subject-person 
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before, while, and in some cases after the hunt takes place […] 
(2014:84). 
Writing about human-animal relations more generally, Mullin also notes that 
[i]ncreasingly, animals serve all at once as commodities, family 
members, food, and the embodiment of ‘nature’; it is therefore no 
wonder that they should be the focus of conflict (1999:215). 
Although Mullin is writing about conflict between people with differing views of 
animals, her quote could equally apply to the inner conflict and ontological 
penumbras that people experience as their moral ideals are confronted by the 
demands of everyday life. This was especially apparent amongst my 
interviewees who are directly involved in animal commerce, many of whom 
shared that they felt they had little choice in what they did, as they needed to 
find the means to live (see Commodification, Chapter Five). Consequently, 
people’s ontonic engagement with their diseede wante (family animals) clashes 
with economic and lifestyle changes more generally, which are increasingly 
driven by tikpate (monetary and material wealth). Primary education, for 
example, is now compulsory. Although there are no school fees as such for 
state primary schools, people still have to pay for school uniforms, sports kits, 
books, stationery, et cetera. Budgetary shortfalls mean that head teachers 
regularly demand parental contributions towards salaries and the construction 
of new classrooms. Children are suspended from school until these costs are 
met. 
People’s ideals are further challenged when they encounter others with 
different sociocultural backgrounds and ideologies. Living in a globalised world 
with increasingly heterogeneous societies means that individuals no longer 
need to travel to have such encounters. Neither is there (nor has there ever 
been) a bounded and static sociocultural norm for one society in the region 
(see, for example, Morris 2000:14-19; Piot 1999; 2001; Werbner 1979). As 
noted elsewhere (S. Merz 2017b:122-123), Bebelibe communities have always 
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been socially engaged in the wider region and exposed to other cultures and 
ideas. Despite this, people in the Commune of Cobly distinguish two eras: 
ubaayɔ (pre-colonial times) and upaanu (colonial and post-colonial times to the 
present day; translated as la modernité (modernity) in French. Many associate 
the transition from ubaayɔ to upaanu as a time of rupture, as people struggled 
to assimilate the multiple changes they were introduced to in quick succession 
(see J. Merz 2017a, for a detailed account). Upaanu continues to be a time of 
rapid sociocultural change, which contributes to the ontological penumbras that 
people have to negotiate. People then draw on a variety of presencing practices 
to make sense of ambiguities resulting from their sociocultural ideals being 
challenged, which can lead to a variety of reactions including othering, 
ethnocentrism and culture shock, even within one’s own country. Over the years 
I have witnessed many Beninese struggle with culture shock as they move 
around the country. This includes people from the south who come to work and 
live in Cobly, and Bebelibe students going to university in the south. Alexis, who 
is studying for his maîtrise, for example, explained that he needed to learn Fon 
– the main language spoken in Cotonou – in order to be accepted as Beninese 
and not be treated as a foreigner. He also started to eat meat every day, as he 
relied on buying street food. He explained that in Cobly you could buy a meal 
without meat, but not in Cotonou. If you ask for rice and sauce without meat, the 
sellers will look at you strangely. “If you don’t want meat, they won’t give you 
sauce, just plain rice,” he explained, “So you’re obliged to buy meat, it’s become 
the rule […] if you don’t ask for meat, it’s as if, well, they’ll say you’re a villager.” 
Alexis’ first year in the south was extremely difficult as he negotiated the 
sociocultural differences he encountered there and the resulting ambiguities 
they created. Such times of ambiguity can be thought of as ontological 
penumbras. As areas “where the self and the other, belief and disbelief, 
ignorance and certainty, possibility and impossibility, as well as the secular and 
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the religious, meet, overlap and intermingle” (J. Merz and S. Merz 2017:9), the 
degree of ambiguity that people experience as they negotiate ontological 
penumbras is further heightened when foundational sociocultural norms are 
challenged. A good example of this is the controversy that the introduction of 
coffins in the 1990s created (S. Merz 2017b). People feared – and many still do 
– that coffins would trap their kɛbodikɛ and mtakimɛ and prevent them from 
reincarnating, as ukuɔnu (body-skin) needs to decompose before kɛbodikɛ and 
mtakimɛ are fully liberated to move on (see Chapter Three). Those who now 
spiritualise and thus dematerialise kɛbodikɛ and mtakimɛ no longer fear this, as 
their understanding of the relationship between kɛbodikɛ, mtakimɛ and ukuɔnu 
is now primarily animic rather than transmaterial and ontonic (see above). 
Accordingly, when ukuɔnu dies, kɛbodikɛ and mtakimɛ leave immediately and 
cannot be trapped. Differing ideas about kɛbodikɛ, mtakimɛ and ukuɔnu ’s 
relationship sometimes result in family disputes about how someone should be 
buried. 
The relationship that Bebelibe communities have with their tikedimɔmɔnte 
(true totem(s), literally “interdict(s)-true”) further epitomises the moral fabric of 
Ubielo society. I base my understanding of the word “moral” on Smith’s 
definition as 
an orientation toward understandings about what is right and wrong, 
good and bad, worthy and unworthy, just and unjust, that are not 
established by our own actual desires, decisions, or preferences but 
instead believed to exist apart from them, providing standards by which 
our desires, decisions, and preferences can themselves be judged 
(2003:8). 
“One of the best ways to reveal the moral character of social institutions,” Smith 
then observes, “is to violate moral norms and observe the reactions” (2003:25). 
The arrival of Christianity in the Commune of Cobly and some of the church 
teaching exemplifies this. I acknowledge that Jesus intentionally challenged, 
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and sometimes defied, several of the sociocultural norms of his time, especially 
when he saw that these norms were unjust. The challenge is to know when, 
who and what should be confronted. The two vignettes in Chapter Seven 
demonstrate that both churchgoers and non-churchgoers alike generally do not 
approve of those who kill totem animals, especially if their goal is to violate the 
community’s totemic norms. In Vignette Two, for example, Colette and 
Benjamin, both churchgoers, shared that they could not eat their totem animal. 
Benjamin then expressed concern that the church pushes Christians to do so. 
Out of all my churchgoing interviewees, only two have deliberately eaten 
their totem animals: Lucie, Arthur’s daughter (see Vignette Two), and Adrien, 
the churchgoing NGO worker in his late-twenties, who felt he was left with little 
choice when he took a course in the south. Adrien’s totem is the crab, which 
was served with every meal. Initially he refused to eat it, but eventually 
capitulated by drawing on the assurance that nothing untoward would happen 
as he is a Christian. Lucie, meanwhile, clarified that she would never eat 
fɛbodimuɔfɛ (animating force-crocodile): 
We ate fɛmuɔfɛ [wild crocodile] to show [we are Christians], whether it 
was fɛbodimuɔfɛ or not, I didn’t ask. You shouldn’t even think about 
eating fɛbodimuɔfɛ. If you do, something will happen in your myammɛ 
(gallbladder).161 You shouldn’t even think or say that you will eat it. No 
one would eat fɛbodimuɔfɛ. If you do, you will die. 
Benoît, the churchgoing young man studying for his BEPC, has never eaten 
python but revealed that he would if the opportunity presented itself: 
Now with modernisation, in other words the church, there’s nothing I 
won’t eat. […] I haven’t yet eaten [python] but if I found, by the name of 
Jesus, I would eat, if possible because God said, ‘Don’t be fearful, all 
that is in the world I authorise you, don’t be fearful, eat.’ Therefore, I 
treat the snake like any other animal that you can eat, such as dog. 
                                             
161 Where one’s emotions and diyammaade (ability to think, reason and make decisions) 
are located. Your decision-making will be affected and the things you do will no longer succeed. 
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Benoît added, however, that although he would openly eat python, he would not 
go around announcing what he had done. 
Besides Colette and Benjamin, other churchgoing interviewees also testified 
that they could not eat their totem animals, despite church teaching to the 
contrary. Henri, the churchgoing carpenter in his late-thirties, for example, 
explained that he was brought up with the idea that he must not eat his totem, 
so he fears doing so. If he ate and then got sick, he would start thinking, “‘Ah, 
as they said that you shouldn’t eat, and I ate, maybe this is why I’m sick,’ and 
your heart [kɛbodikɛ] leaves, and you could die.” Whilst Henri acknowledges 
that God created all the animals and he theoretically could eat crocodile, he 
never will. He then shared about when he was training as a carpenter and lived 
in Natitingou with a Christian family who went to the same church as him: 
I told them that I don’t eat crocodile. The father said, ‘But when you 
become a Christian you must eat everything. You should not have a 
totem anymore. Eat it.’ I said, ‘Since my childhood until now I have 
never eaten it and it wouldn’t please me to do so. Even if I saw it, I 
would vomit. It has no appeal.’ But one day, they did everything they 
could to try and make me eat. They prepared it, I’m not sure exactly 
who – the wife or husband or the children – I don’t know. They gave me 
the sauce, but without the actual meat. I took some cornmeal porridge, I 
wanted to eat, but then I smelt the sauce. I could smell meat. And I 
noticed some fat floating on the top. I said, ‘This sauce had meat in it.’ 
And as I knew that the family killed crocodiles, I said I didn’t want to eat. 
I washed my hands and only ate the cornmeal porridge. I gave them 
back the sauce, and they knew that I knew [what they had tried to do]. 
Idaani, Charles and Timothée also testified that as Christians they too could 
theoretically eat their totem animals, but they are not willing to do so. “When I 
see python meat, I have no desire to eat, it’s as if it isn’t meat,” Idaani shared. 
“The Bible says that God created the animals. He told the man to eat all, eat all 
that you find, all the animals that you see, kill and eat,” Timothée explained. 
Despite this, Timothée will not eat crocodile meat. He explicated that he is a 
direct descendant of his community’s founding ancestor, which means the 
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crocodile is his ani-mate. He then recounted how he almost unwittingly ate 
crocodile when visiting a friend in Tanguiéta. When he went to dip his pounded 
yam in the sauce, it fell from his fingers. “Madame, what have you prepared?” 
Timothée demanded his friend’s wife. “Crocodile,” she replied. “‘Ooh, that’s my 
totem!’ I lie not, I left the room and was sick. The smell had entered me and I 
vomited, vomited, vomited as if I had swallowed it.” 
Robert’s story further exemplifies the ontological penumbras that can result 
from becoming a Christian and the “relational complexities” (Holbraad and 
Pedersen 2017) that this can generate. I now examine Holbraad and 
Pedersen’s analysis of relational complexities following Christian conversion in 
light of Robert’s story. By doing so, I demonstrate where their analysis is lacking 
and how to address this in terms of Bebelibe relational engagements with totem 
entities and other entities more generally. 
Robert’s Story 
“Now I feel as if I’m in the middle and don’t know who I am anymore – I’m 
neither a non-Christian nor a true Christian,” Robert confided in me. As outlined 
in Chapter Seven, Robert has an ani-mate relationship with a python. His father 
had a dikṵnpuode constructed to strengthen Robert’s mtakimɛ when he was a 
baby (see Socialising Crocodiles and Mischievous Monkeys, Chapter Six). 
Robert wore the mtakimɛ-band – in this case a bracelet – that he received until 
he became a Christian: 
Even after what happened to him in 1996, when his father assured him 
that the python came as a friend and not to be afraid, Robert still did not 
know why he wore his bracelet. His python visited him regularly and he 
was no longer afraid. The python never did anything bad and often 
appeared when he needed protecting and to indicate that something 
was about to happen. […] 
Robert became a Christian in 2001. He still did not know why he had to 
wear the bracelet. None of his brothers wore one and they too queried 
why he wore it. He’d never liked having to wear it as it was on the heavy 
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side and sometimes he would hit himself with it when turning over in 
bed, or it got in the way more generally, and could even be dangerous 
when wrestling. So, having become a Christian, he decided to remove 
it. He was also encouraged to do so by his camarades (friends and 
classificatory brothers) from his neighbourhood who were Christians 
and went to the AD church162 in [the neighbouring village]. They told 
him not to be afraid, to burn his bracelet and that he could eat all meat 
safely. 
Meanwhile his father had noticed that Robert had removed his bracelet, 
so he took it for safekeeping, so it didn’t get burnt. It was only once he’d 
taken the bracelet off that his father explained to him why he had it and 
that removing it put his life in danger – he would surely fall sick and 
could die. Robert did, in fact, get very sick. His church, MJB163, prayed 
for him but to no avail. His father and another classificatory father did all 
they could to make him wear it again, but he refused. During the 
discussions he also learnt that he was destined to become the 
community shrine priest, and that refusing this vocation meant he could 
get sick, go mad, or even die. He still refused. In the end his 
classificatory father advised his father to let things be; if he were to die, 
then so be it. His father then performed the necessary ceremonies on 
Robert’s behalf and the MJB church continued to pray for him. He got 
better. 
Serge, a fervent evangelist, was the pastor of the AD church in [the 
neighbouring village]. Robert described him as sauvage and that his 
aggressive stance had eventually resulted in the church leadership 
disciplining him. […] Robert’s AD Christian camarades together with 
Serge, the pastor, told Robert that he wasn’t a true Christian and that 
his python was satanic. […] When they told him that his relationship 
with the python was something diabolical, Robert’s fear of pythons 
returned. ‘Now I feel as if I’m in the middle and don’t know who I am 
anymore – I’m neither a non-Christian nor a true Christian’. On the one 
hand, Robert’s father had assured him the python meant him no harm 
and Robert’s pre-Christian relationship (once he’d got over his initial 
fear) bore this out; on the other hand, he was being told that the python 
was evil. What should he do? As a young Christian he was full of zeal 
from his newfound faith and he couldn’t return to his pre-Christian days, 
yet the python was still present in his life.164 He no longer knows how he 
should relate to his python, especially as it recently started visiting him 
again […] (Journal entry, 21 September 2017). 
                                             
162 Eglise Evangélique des Assemblées de Dieu (Assemblies of God Evangelical Church). 
163 Ministère de Jésus au Bénin (Ministry of Jesus in Benin). 
164 See also J. Merz’s (2008) account of David, a witch who became a Christian but whose 
witchcraft powers remained. He finally came to terms with his situation by deciding that he was 
now a “witch in the Holy Spirit”. 
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Robert now lives in the town of Cobly because of his work. MJB does not have 
a church in the town and Robert refuses to go to the AD church. Nevertheless, 
his Christian commitment to Uwienu continues. 
Relational Complexities and Becoming 
Holbraad and Pedersen (2017:242-281) examine Christian conversion and its 
relational implications in light of the ontological turn. They critique an 
anthropological tendency to analyse Christian conversion and the ensuing 
relational implications as reductionist, given that becoming a Christian entails 
entering a personal relationship with God, whilst severing other relationships 
with both human and nonhuman members of the community. Consequently, 
several anthropologists have concluded that people who become Christians 
become “autonomous individuals” who are no longer “embedded” members of 
their society (2017:251; see also Brison 2017; Chua 2015). In a case study of 
Undraa, an upwardly mobile Mongolian business woman, Holbraad and 
Pedersen (2017:253-264) endeavour to demonstrate that Christian conversion 
results in relational change rather than loss. Undraa explains that her 
conversion was motivated by her desire to have a personal relationship with a 
loving God, coupled with her need to sever relations with some male 
acquaintances, family members and spiritual beings who make negative and 
excessive demands of her. Holbraad and Pedersen then question what actually 
happens to the relations that Undraa wants to escape from; do they simply 
cease to exist? They suggest that these relations become internalised as 
Undraa dialogues with God, is filled with his Holy Spirit who nurtures her faith, 
and renounces the unwanted attentions of those she seeks to distance herself 
from on a daily basis (see also Zetterström-Sharp 2017). They argue that 
Christian conversion […] may thus be theorized as an enfolding or 
involution of human and non-human relations that keeps relational 
complexity intact, but displaces this complexity from an exterior realm 
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we tend to think of as ‘social’ to an interior domain we here shall call 
‘existential’ (2017:256-257). 
“[T]he point is not that there are necessarily fewer social relations than before, 
or that social relations cease to matter,” Holbraad and Pedersen continue, 
rather they are now “modelled on and measured against the internal self-
relations” (2017:259). They conclude that 
the converted self emerges as individual and relational, at one and the 
same time. Christian conversion keeps relational complexity intact, but 
it changes relationality itself by causing interior self-self connections to 
proliferate at the expense of exterior social connections with human and 
non-human others (2017:263). 
Holbraad and Pedersen (2017:245) recognise that their analysis of Christian 
conversion is partial. One aspect that I think they do not adequately address is 
Undraa’s relationship with God before she became a Christian. They state that 
Undraa “found God” (2017:255) and that she eventually told her parents that 
she believed in God (2017:257). They do not, however, explicate what her 
exact notions of God – or gods and other less-visible entities – were 
beforehand, except that she “perceived […] omnipresent spirits” (2017:254). 
Robert was already a monotheist and did not question the existence of Uwienu 
(God) and his role as Supreme Being and creator of all before he became a 
Christian. Robert’s conversion, then, moved him into a relationship that brought 
him closer to Uwienu, whom he could now approach directly rather than through 
intermediaries. Robert’s conversion did not result in his displacing his prior 
relationship with Uwienu – albeit distant and via intermediaries – from an 
exterior to in interior realm though. Robert and Uwienu now relate to each other 
ontonically. Like Undraa, Robert’s dialogues with Uwienu can be internal during 
personal times of prayer. This is possible, as their sibosi and mtakimɛ engage 
with each other ontonically. Thus, it could be said that part of their relationship 
is internal or – to be more precise – transmaterial. Such an ontonic engagement 
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creates the possibility for Robert to kɔnta (become; be transformed) by his 
personal encounters with Uwienu. Despite this, Uwienu also remains part of the 
external network of social relations recognised by the Bebelibe more generally. 
Neither do Robert and other Bebelibe Christians think that their relationship with 
Uwienu (and other less-visible entities commensurate with Undraa’s 
troublesome spirits) changes from self-other to self-self. By suggesting that 
such relations become self-self, Holbraad and Pedersen appear to deny the 
possibility that they could actually exist for the people concerned, which seems 
to counter what they hope to achieve with their book. Whether the relations 
remain externalised or become internalised – or a mix of both – the individuals 
concerned remain part of a social network. Rather than thinking in terms of self-
self versus self-other, Chua suggests that Christian conversation results in 
“vertical” relationships with “God, Jesus and others” which are “dyadic and 
closed off to ‘horizontal’ scrutiny or compulsion rather than simply hierarchical” 
as “what transpires between them and the Divine is ultimately a private matter” 
(2015:348). 
Leaving the self-self part of Holbraad and Pedersen’s analysis to one side 
for the moment, I put forward that their overall explanation of Christian 
conversion can be applied more broadly to any form of religious – and therefore 
relational – conversion, including the move from an overtly religious position to 
an areligious one, such as atheism, for example. In order to disengage means 
one was engaged. Thus, such a move also entails the severing of relationships. 
By moving from a relational position that recognised God’s existence to one that 
denies it acknowledges the potential that he could exist. As I illustrated in The 
Role of Myths (Chapter Seven), presencing potential opens up the possibility for 
people to generate multiple meanings and relational engagements (or 
disengagements) that they consider veracious. Like Undraa, who needs to 
renounce daily the spirits who plague her (2017:257), atheism too seems to 
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require acts of renouncement, whether the atheists concerned have moved 
from an overt belief in some sort of Supreme Being (or beings) to one that 
denies their existence, or whether they grew up as atheists. 
In other words, the meanings that people accord to relationships have the 
potential to be embellished or impoverished as people negotiate the complex 
interplay between different relational connections. Elsewhere I explain that 
people’s underlying understanding of death is embellished by the 
introduction of new things and ideas. This process of ‘embellishment’ 
not only helps to provide continuity, but can also result in new 
understandings, which people build on and which may modify their 
practices or how they interpret them accordingly. At times people’s 
understandings and practices can also appear to be contradictory, as 
they incorporate and negotiate the changes that embellishment 
provokes. Thus, in order to make sense of change, people draw on 
what they already know, and so starts a process of negotiation – 
whether this is conscious or not – as they try to make sense of new 
things, ideas, and associated practices that not only challenge, but 
sometimes result in rupture (2017b:144; see also Howell 1996:137). 
Rupture, then, can also be understood in terms of impoverishment as people 
seek to abandon certain relationships and the underlying moral norms, ideas 
and practices that accompanied them. 
There are two more relational aspects that Holbraad and Pedersen do not 
examine but need to be accounted for, as they further heighten the “relational 
complexity” resulting from Christian conversion: the additional relations – or 
change in relational nature – that result from becoming a member of the 
Christian community and the biblical command to not only love God but to love 
others as yourself: 
One day an expert in religious law stood up to test Jesus by asking him 
this question: ‘Teacher, what should I do to inherit eternal life?’ 
Jesus replied, ‘What does the law of Moses say? How do you read it?’ 
The man answered, ‘“You must love the LORD your God with all your 
heart, all your soul, all your strength, and all your mind.’ And, ‘Love your 
neighbour as yourself.”’ 
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‘Right!’ Jesus told him. ‘Do this and you will live!’ (Luke 10: 25-28)165 
Jesus then tells the parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10: 30-37) who 
showed compassion for a Jew – his enemy – who had been mugged and left for 
dead. According to my interpretation of this passage, Jesus upholds the 
importance of actively working towards good societal relations, rather than 
severing or distancing oneself from those that some may consider undesirable. 
Despite this, the Bible also counsels that there are times when unhealthy 
(usually spiritual) relations do need to be terminated, especially when they 
threaten to compromise people’s relationship with God (see also Chua 
2015:349-350). 
Christian conversion also results in new relations as individuals integrate 
with the Christian community (see also Brison 2017), or existing relations being 
modified such as between Robert and his camarades who were already 
Christians when he converted.166 Robert and the other interviewees cited above 
shared openly about the challenge of dealing with churchgoers who exhort 
them to sever their relationship with those whom they did not necessarily see 
the need to escape, such as their totem entities. Not only does killing and eating 
their totem animals antagonise their relationship with the animals concerned, 
but also with their families and the wider community; relationships that are not 
perceived as negative or evil, and that do not necessarily dishonour Uwienu nor 
overtly violate of the biblical message. Furthermore, killing and eating their 
totem animals contradicts the biblical command to love others. 
Thus, relationships within the Christian community are not always 
straightforward either, and can further add to the ontological penumbra and 
relational complexities that Christians need to negotiate. Another example 
                                             
165 New Living Translation, Anglicised version. 
166 As above, this aspect of relational complexity is also equally applicable to any sort of 
“religious” conversion as well as becoming members of any new community, such as joining a 
club, going to university, and so on. 
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comes from Victor, the churchgoing animal trader in his early-forties. In 
September 2017, Victor preferred to go into debt rather than suffer the shame 
of sending his children to the state primary school. As mentioned above, 
primary education is now compulsory. Many consider state primary schools to 
be inferior to private, often church-run schools. Meanwhile, those attending 
churches that run their own schools often feel obliged to send their children to 
their churches’ schools even when they cannot afford it. Victor has three 
primary school aged children who attend his church’s school. In September 
2017, he needed to pay 50,000 CFA francs (approximately £68) for their 
uniforms and school materials. Despite the superior reputation of privately run 
schools, Victor’s children were not excelling as expected. The fees for the 
church school came to 75,000 CFA francs (approximately £102), which Victor 
could not afford. He had no animals to trade at the time, so he decided to send 
his children to the state school instead. His pastor then took him aside and 
intimated that such an act would be disloyal towards the church. On this 
occasion it was more important for Victor to maintain his relations within the 
external social network of the church, rather than meet his personal family 
needs. 
Christian conversion in the West, meanwhile, often does result in a move 
from self-self to self-other, with a transformation from autonomous individualism 
to community members, where self-other relations proliferate. Thus, Holbraad 
and Pedersen’s analysis provides a good example of othering and alterity. This 
is exemplified by their statement that “the [Christian] converted self emerges as 
individual and relational, at one and the same time” (2017:263). This statement 
is not wrong as such, but is applicable beyond Christian conversion. In the 
Introduction I explained that Ubielo society has an egalitarian ethos that is 
founded on a non-centralised social structure. I also demonstrated in Chapters 
Four and Five that all beings (whether human or nonhuman) have a certain 
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level of autonomy, whilst also being part of a relational web. This being the 
case, all members of Ubielo society – if not all societies – are “individual and 
relational, at one and the same time” (2017:263). Chua makes a similar 
observation for Bidayuh persons of Malaysian Borneo, who “could be viewed as 
both autonomous and relational: as constantly juggling two different but not 
incommensurate sets of values or ideals (individualism and communalism) in 
day-to-day sociality” (2015:343; see also Brison 2017:660-661; Fortes 1966:10; 
Morris 2000:41-68). Accordingly, everybody to differing degrees at different 
times experiences relational change as their social connections with both 
human and nonhuman entities either increase or decrease, whether these 
connections happen to be interior or exterior (or vertical and horizontal). Thus, 
more broadly speaking, it seems to me that Holbraad and Pedersen’s overall 
conclusions apply even when there is no explicit conversion experience as 
such. 
To put it another way, the different presencing practices we draw on either 
heighten or diminish the ontonicity of the other beings we engage with at any 
given moment, which in turn affect the nature of these relationships and the 
potential for ontological penumbras. The general unhappiness that both 
Christian and non-Christian interviewees expressed when people defy their 
totem entities, together with Bebelibe notions of totemism more generally 
presented in Chapter Seven, thus reveal some of the underlying moral norms 
that constitute what many people consider the ideals of Ubielo society. These 
include notions about kinship, empathy and personhood, all of which can be 
understood further by analysing them in terms of shared ontonity and 
presencing. 
When Robert encounters his python ani-mate, Robert engages with him 
holistically as a living entity, as a fellow onton. The being Robert sees in front of 
him and interacts with is a python; a living, relational entity rather than a sign. 
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Robert’s totemic relationship cannot be reduced to a metaphor. Their shared 
ontonity goes beyond that of many other individuals as they have the same 
reincarnating ancestor, and therefore the same kɛbodikɛ and mtakimɛ. Robert 
thus primarily draws on an ontonic presencing practice, just as I do when I 
engage with Johannes when he is materially present. Should Robert body-shift, 
he could further enhance his ontonic experience by encountering his python as 
a fellow python. Robert’s becoming a Christian, however, added another layer 
of complexity to his ani-mate relationship, as his fear of pythons not only 
returned but also was heightened because he started to associate them with 
evil. Robert explained to me that his previous fear was one of respect as his 
parents had counselled him and his siblings to take care in the bush, as wild 
snakes can be dangerous. They taught about venomous snakes, such as 
vipers, as well as wild, human-eating pythons. He thus experiences conflicting 
emotions depending on how he presences his python and snakes more 
generally (see also Attala 2017). This not only adds to the ontological penumbra 
he needs to negotiate, but means that he sometimes contradicts himself when 
talking about pythons.  
The different interviewees’ accounts above further demonstrate that people 
generally presence – and thus consider – their totem entities as fellow ontons 
and kin even when they do not have an ani-mate relationship. It is not 
surprising, then, that the majority of interviewees expressed strong emotions 
when we discussed behaviour that endangers their totem animals. But what 
about other interviewees – such as Lucie, Adrien and Benoît – who have eaten, 
or are willing to eat, their totem animals? Or people’s engagement with animals 
more generally, and how they justify when it is acceptable to kill and eat them? 
Even our shared humanity with other humans does not make us immune to 
killing each other, assuming that we do actually see – or presence – other 
Homo sapiens as humans (see, for example, Guthrie 1993:79; Kohn 2013:215-
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216; Lévi-Strauss 1966 [1962]:166; Praet 2013). How we presence other 
humans and entities more generally, then, also determines our behaviour 
towards them. When we draw on predominantly ontonic presencing practices 
and engage with other beings as fellow ontons, we are less able to harm, kill or 
eat each other. Should we do so, we find ways to justify our actions. 
Conversely, by drawing on presencing practices that are predominantly 
representational or scientific, for example, we can justify such actions more 
readily (see, for example, Joy 2011). Such presencing practices, then, allow us 
to detach and distance ourselves, and as our ontonic engagement diminishes, 
alterity and othering increase. Lucie’s example is illustrative, as she continues 
to presence ibodimuɔhḭ (animating force-crocodiles) primarily ontonically and 
thus stated that nobody should eat fɛbodimuɔfɛ (see above). She also 
explained that ibodimuɔhḭ are not crocodiles but persons, as they are her baakɛ. 
As I noted in Chapter Seven (see Family Status), baakɛ exemplifies the kinship 
relationship resulting from reincarnation and the totem animal’s fatherly role. 
Lucie explicated that – for her – baakɛ means “we are together; we are related”. 
Meanwhile, she is happy to eat imuɔhḭ (wild crocodiles), as they now represent 
a source of meat that Uwienu has authorised her to eat, and doing so 
demonstrates her faith in Him. Lucie’s differentiating between ibodimuɔhḭ and 
imuɔhḭ further demonstrates that the degree to which people presence and 
engage with other entities ontonically also determines the personhood that they 
accord them.167 Hurn also alludes to this: 
Personhood follows from embodied interactions, and the ways in 
which individual humans experience individual ‘others’ will inform 
whether or not they perceive in those ‘others’ the requisite 
characteristics of personhood (2012:32). 
                                             
167 See also Naveh and Bird-David (2014), who explain how the Nayakas’ perception and 
treatment of forest and domestic animals change depending on the “immediacy” of the 
relationship. 
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As with the word “humanity”, I also find the word “personhood” semantically 
restrictive as it too maintains a humanistic perspective. Russell notes that “while 
‘person’ is typically considered as equivalent to ‘human being,’ this is not 
universally the case” (2010:16). She points out that 
some cultures define persons much more inclusively, encompassing 
animals and often what we would consider inanimate and supernatural 
beings; moreover, the boundaries among these kinds of persons may 
be quite fluid (2010:16; see also Hallowell 1960:19-52). 
Despite this, it seems to me that people’s understandings of personhood rather 
express the way they presence other entities. I realise that my discomfort with 
the term largely comes from my linguistic Western perspective and is a question 
of translation. I do not deny the experiential engagements that individuals have 
with other entities and that their terminology, which more-or-less equates to 
“person” and “personhood” when translated from the source language into 
English, does encompass other beings besides humans as demonstrated by 
those who write about perspectivism. As Heneise points out “[n]otions of 
personhood […] are developed by human and nonhuman beings through 
shared, embodied interactions and necessarily maintained in relation to each 
other” (2017:97). Thus, I acknowledge that many people readily presence, 
experience and understand other entities as persons. This is not universal or 
constant, however. Amongst the Bebelibe, for example, although people do 
accord human status to certain entities – such as totem animals – and consider 
them persons, many of my interviewees rather affirmed that humans and 
nonhuman entities alike are beings of equal worth, but not that they are all 
persons. Conversely, how can we as humans be sure that nonhuman entities 
really presence themselves as persons, or know for sure how they presence 
us? Again, this understanding may be based on how we presence their 
presencing of us. Could it be that they rather presence themselves and us 
according to their ontonic self? Kohn’s (2007) article about perspectivism in 
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relation to the Runa of Amazonia and how they relate to their dogs is a good 
example of this. He notes that for the Runa “all beings, and not just humans, 
engage with the world and with each other as selves” (2007:4; see also Kohn 
2013). Kohn (2007; 2013) then examines Runa relationships from a semiotic 
perspective that he suggests “goes beyond the human” (2007:5). He (2013) 
further justifies the need for anthropology to go beyond the human, given that 
our human engagement with other selves further defines who we are. Kohn 
(2007; 2013) also recognises the need to take seriously how other selves – 
such as dogs – represent the world. Thinking in terms of ontons and presencing 
further enriches Kohn’s analysis, as this provides the means to not only go 
beyond the human, but also semiotics.  
Having proposed that we share a common ontonity, I put forward that it is 
rather the degree of people’s ontonic engagement – and therefore how they 
presence the other – that determines the “ontonhood” they accord other 
entities, whether human or nonhuman. Thus, entities – such as humans – may 
well presence other entities as persons and understand ontonhood in terms of 
personhood. Nonhuman entities, however, could equally presence and 
understand themselves and others in terms of lionhood, for example: 
The challenge is to fend off one’s own anthropomorphism so as to 
recognize an otherness that does not know it is other. Against the frank 
projections of human affairs onto beasts that prevail with domesticated 
animals, fairy tales, and totemism, Ludwig Wittgenstein teaches a 
harder doctrine: If a lion could speak, we couldn’t understand him. […] 
We would need to live in a lion’s body and experience the lion’s form of 
life to understand the lion’s speech (Peters 1999:244). 
Viveiros de Castro (2004) may well argue that perspectivism counters Peters’ 
and Wittgenstein’s view as Amazonian shamans “cross ontological boundaries 
deliberately and adopt the perspective of nonhuman subjectivities in order to 
administer the relations between humans and nonhumans” (2004:468). He later 
states that “[o]nly shamans, who are so to speak species-androgynous, can 
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make perspectives communicate, and then only under special, controlled 
conditions” (2004:471). It is not totally evident, however, if shamans actually 
kɔnta (become) animals. Despite this, the shamans do enter into some sort of 
ontonic engagement with other entities. Once they have returned to their human 
state, however, they then mediate and relate their experiences as humans to 
humans. Even Bebelibe body-shifters, who kɔnta the animal in question, 
inevitably interpret and relate their experiences to other Bebelibe from a human 
perspective, should they choose to do so (see Chapter Six). 
The issue is not whether shamans or body-shifters engage as animals with 
animals, but that they then have to rely on human language and its semantic 
limitations when relating these experiences to others. Peters correctly points out 
that “[t]he absence of ‘communication’ has never prevented humans and 
animals from entering into community with each other” (1999:244-245). My 
point is that – as neutral terms that do not privilege one entity over another – 
shared ontonity (instead of shared humanity) and ontonhood (instead of 
personhood) level the playing field, thereby allowing for shared community. Our 
shared ontonity results in a connectedness with other beings with whom we can 
have a deep rapport that anthropomorphism and egomorphism cannot explain. 
In Chapter Two I acknowledged that anthropomorphism is unavoidable, and is 
part of being human. I also demonstrated that Milton’s (2005) egomorphism 
better accounts for human-nonhuman intersubjectivity, as she recognises that it 
is our experiential engagement with others that determines how we perceive 
them and the meaning we gain from our interactions. Or – in other words – how 
we make present and engage in and with the world around us. Egomorphism 
also acknowledges a self-centredness, which is inevitable, as presencing starts 
with the self and builds on what we think we already know. For example, how I 
interpret my dog’s behaviour in certain situations starts as an extrapolation of 
how I might – or might not – behave and react in that situation, and further 
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builds on how I presence him and experience his reactions. As Milton points 
out, I think of him as “‘like me’ rather than ‘human-like’” (2005:261). 
Furthermore, I can never say for certain how others make meaning present; 
how Johannes or my dog presence me for example. Even if two entities share 
the same experience, how they make these experiences meaningful will be 
different. Despite this, we can and do connect with others ontonically. 
Both anthropomorphism and egomorphism seem to be unidirectional (my 
interpretation of others) and do not readily explain how my interaction with 
others can also morph or transform both my understanding of them and of 
myself.168 Thus, my engagement with others not only impacts how I presence 
them but how I presence myself (see also Ingold 2006:10). Or, to put it in 
Mbelime terms, shared ontonity further enables the entities concerned to kɔnta 
(become; be transformed). Thinking in terms of ontonhood and shared ontonity 
allows for relational engagements that are more fundamental and 
multidirectional. Thus, ontonhood and our shared ontonity account for complex 
relational networks, intersubjectivity and empathy between humans and 
nonhumans alike. They also account for our interdependence and 
connectedness as fellow creatures, whether this is a result of a Supreme 
Being’s acts of creation or our evolving together (see also Ingold 2013b:6-9).  
Noske too lamented the unidirectional limitations of, in this case, 
anthropocentrism: 
To point out to [anthropologists] that in addition to a human-animal 
relationship there also exists something like an animal-human 
relationship, and that totally ignoring the latter will lead to a one-sided 
subject-object approach is a waste of time (1993:186, emphasis in 
original). 
Also commenting on Noske, Nadasdy adds that 
                                             
168 See also Hurn’s (2012:125-138; 2016a) discussion of intersubjectivity, empathy and 
symbiotic coexistence. 
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what is notably absent from both ecological and symbolic analyses of 
human-animal relations […] is any consideration of animals as 
intelligent beings with agency of their own who might be active 
participants in their relationships with humans (2007:30). 
Bleakley (2000) also discusses the limitations and problematic nature of 
anthropocentrism and mediating the natural world through language and culture 
and suggests that it is 
because of psychological or linguistic representation, self-presentation 
of animal life is never known directly. The danger of this is that the 
world of the real becomes detached rather than mediated; unhinged, 
forcing us to focus in an introspective manner, and we forget that we 
are embedded in a world that intends us, just as we intend it (2000:xiii). 
Bleakley thus proposes “three realms” of “animal presences”: “the biological 
(literal); the psychological (imaginal), and the conceptual (semiotic, symbolic, 
textual)” (2000:xii). Bleakley’s psychological and conceptual animal presences 
thus draw on a variety of presencing practices, as suggested by the qualifying 
adjectives he employs. His biological animal presence, meanwhile, seemingly 
corresponds with predominantly ontonic presencing practices. Bleakley then 
asks “in what sense might the world of animals construct us in its image, or 
educate our attention(s) to its presence(s)?” (2000:xiii). 
The multidirectional self-other transformations that result from our shared 
ontonity and ontonhood help to address these concerns. Furthermore, I 
propose that entities rather “ontomorphise” by attributing their ontonity and 
ontonhood to others. For humans, this may be expressed anthropomorphically 
or egomorphically, for felines felinomorphically, and so on.  
Our shared ontonity, ontonhood and ability to ontomorphise thus allow for 
multi-directional experiential engagements with other entities and for 
intersubjective and empathetic relationships. Willerslev, for example, 
demonstrates how Yukaghir hunters of northeastern Siberia exploit the 
relationships they establish with their prey through acts of “mimetic empathy” in 
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order to seduce and kill them (2004:646). As noted in Chapter Six (see 
Socialising Crocodiles and Mischievous Monkeys), this is not without risk. 
Willerslev (2004:648) then explains that the empathy hunters establish is more 
than just mimicry and allows them imaginatively to take on other entities’ 
perspectives. Consequently, a hunter runs the risk of “falling in love with his 
prey. Consumed by this love, he cannot think about anything else, stops eating, 
and after a short time dies” (2004:647). The deceased hunter then reincarnates 
as an animal and goes to live with the prey in question. Willerslev recognises 
that hunters can never fully understand the animals’ viewpoint. Despite this, he 
considers “it plausible that, when using their own bodily experiences to achieve 
a vicarious understanding of an animal experience, they can, at least roughly, 
form a conception of what it is like to be that animal” (2004:468). In other words, 
through mimetic empathy, Yukaghir hunters seek to engage with their prey as 
fellow ontons and take advantage of their shared ontonhood by seducing them. 
In doing so, however, the hunters run the risk of themselves being seduced, as 
their empathetic mimicry creates opportunities for multidirectional ontonic 
engagement. Through their shared ontonity, the hunter and the hunted 
ontomorphise one another and thus create a dual susceptibility.  
Our shared ontonity, ontonhood and ability to ontomorphise thus account 
for relational exchanges that allow us to be touched by others and kɔnta 
(become; be transformed). Such relational exchanges also increase presencing 
potential and can exacerbate the ontological penumbras we need to negotiate, 
as I have demonstrated above by sharing how my Bebelibe interviewees 
understand their relationship with totem entities and animals more generally. 
Presencing thereby helps us understand better how people create, express and 
live meaning as they engage in and with the world around them and deal with 
the ambiguities they experience. 
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Conclusion 
[…] in Kuranko clan myths it is the totemic animal’s relationship with the 
clan ancestor which expresses in exemplary form the moral ideal of 
personhood (Jackson 1990:64). 
Like the Kuranko of Sierra Leone, the relationship that the Bebelibe 
communities have with their tikedimɔmɔnte (true totem(s), literally “interdict(s)-
true”) also exemplifies their moral ideals of “personhood” and of the underlying 
moral fabric of Ubielo society more generally. Each community has its myths 
about how the relationship between their founding ancestors and totem animals 
was established, and the ancestors’ decree that the animals concerned should 
never be eaten or harmed in any way. Each founding ancestor and totem 
animal then established a pact in recognition of the events that resulted in their 
being brought together. By making this pact, the founding ancestor and animal 
became one through an inter-ontonic engagement. They then died together and 
went on to reincarnate together. 
Smith (2003:25) points out that violating a society’s moral norms reveals the 
moral character of its institutions. The theme for my thesis resulted from such a 
violation when Emile, a Christian baker, had a crocodile killed in the town of 
Cobly. The crocodile is the tikedimɔmɔnte for the Bibidibɛ community who 
inhabit the town. Emile’s actions, together with his refusal to make amends 
created a huge scandal at the time. Emile then died from a burst aneurism in 
the brain, which many say was a direct consequence of his behaviour. Although 
I knew about the different communities’ myths and tikedimɔmɔnte, it was only 
after Emile died that I realised how important totemic relationships are for the 
Bebelibe. Emile’s story is not an isolated incident. Other events – such as the 
dispute between the Bɛbidibɛ and the Bɛkɔpɛ, and the 1960s crocodile-killing 
scandal – also highlighted the significance of these relationships and the 
profound consequences that can result when they are challenged.  
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In the preceding chapters I have explored human-animal relations amongst 
the Bebelibe of northwestern Benin with a focus on how they relate to their 
tikedimɔmɔnte (true totems). I started with an historical review of totemism, the 
debates it generated and how these contributed to the ontological turn in 
anthropology. The debates took many twists and turns. Scholars initially 
questioned totemism’s origins, its relationship with other -isms such as animism 
and its place in religious and social evolution. Moving away from an 
evolutionary trajectory, scholars then defined totemism, animism and other  
-isms as ontological typologies, which they then used to classify different 
societies. The debates and analyses relied heavily – and continue to do so – on 
semiotics as an underlying principle and thus what totems represent for the 
people concerned.  
I then proposed that the importance of social identity and belonging, which 
are determined by relationships with totemic entities, formed a common theme 
that runs through the debates. I put forward that we need to go beyond semiotic 
abstraction and ontological classification in order to understand these totemic 
relationships properly. I then presented the theoretical ideas of “presencing” 
and the “ontological penumbra” (J. Merz 2017b; J. Merz and S. Merz 2017), 
which I used for my analysis. The “onton”, initially introduced by J. Merz 
(2017b), is foundational to presencing. Ontons are experiential, agentive and 
relational entities that cannot be divided into representations (signifiers) and 
represented (signified) as signs can. Even when an onton comprises several 
material and/or immaterial parts, its transmaterial nature means that these are 
inseparable. Thus, ontons cannot be analysed semiotically as they have no – 
and are not – representations. 
The semiotician Peirce (1940) distinguished three primary signs types, 
namely symbols, icons and indexes. J. Merz (2017b) builds on semiotics by 
proposing the addition of the onton to Peirce’s three sign types. The interplay 
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between symbols, icons, indexes and ontons, as people draw on them in 
various ways, results in diverse presencing practices, which could be primarily 
ontonic, symbolic or scientific, for example. People then employ different 
presencing practices depending on given situations and circumstances at a 
given time. This, in turn, produces multiple ontological understandings and ways 
of engaging with the world around them. This diversity of presencing practices 
not only accounts for ontological differences between people, but helps explain 
why an individual can maintain or entertain apparently contradictory ideas by 
moving between different ontological understandings depending on the way 
they make present and engage with other entities at a given moment. 
Ontological penumbras, meanwhile, are the shadowy spaces of limbo that 
people need to negotiate as part of making sense of their engagement with the 
world. I initially explored the methodological role of ontological penumbras for 
anthropologists as they seek to understand the societies they encounter, which 
necessitates reflecting on their own sociocultural background. Ontological 
penumbras are where self and other, belief and disbelief, the secular and the 
religious, and so on, meet, overlap and intermingle. Ontological penumbras are 
in constant flux and subject to paradoxes, ambiguity, uncertainty, tension and 
negotiation. They can sometimes seem threatening and lead to acute anxiety. 
Consequently, anthropologists need to consciously occupy ontological 
penumbras and engage with them reflexively, emotionally and analytically. 
Such engagement, in turn, leads to productivity and creativity and is important 
epistemologically. 
As a result of the ontological penumbras that I have had to negotiate during 
my time amongst the Bebelibe, together with what I learnt from them about the 
inner conflicts they experience when their moral ideals are confronted, I realised 
that negotiating penumbral issues has broader implications that go beyond 
methodology. Various inner conflicts and ontological penumbras came to light 
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as we discussed issues related to hunting, meat eating, domestication and 
animal commodification, reincarnation, body-shifting and – above all – 
totemism. These ontological penumbras have been exacerbated by what 
people refer to as upaanu (new times or modernity, literally “newness”) and the 
resulting rapid sociocultural change that results from this. For example, people 
shared about the inner turmoil and conflicts that resulted from using their cattle 
for ploughing. Several interviewees indicated that the introduction of ploughing-
cattle was the pivotal event that led to the partial objectification and subsequent 
commodification of their diseede wante (family animals). People directly 
involved in the commodification of diseede wante, (butchers, meat sellers, 
animal traders and commercial farmers) further testified about the dilemmas 
they have to deal with. More generally, people talked about the dangers of 
animal vengeance when human-animal relational norms are not respected. The 
risk of revenge results in further penumbras that people need to deal with as 
they negotiate the demands of modernity whilst seeking to maintain good 
relations with their animals. 
New institutions – such as churches, Western-style healthcare and 
education systems – are also strongly associated with upaanu (new times or 
modernity). As part of my analysis I examined the impact of Christianity on 
human-animal relations by exploring several incidents involving Christians and 
their tikedimɔmɔnte (true totems). These included the incident with Emile, the 
Christian baker who had the crocodile killed; Arthur and his wife who apparently 
gave birth to crocodiles after they ate and killed their totem crocodile; and 
Robert’s testimony about his relationship with his totem python before and after 
becoming a Christian. Robert exemplified the ontological penumbras that 
Christians may encounter, when he shared that he no longer knew who he was 
anymore, as he considered himself neither a non-Christian nor a true Christian. 
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He explained how he felt torn down the middle as a result of other Christians 
challenging the relationship he has with his totem python. 
Even though ontological penumbras can be uncomfortable, our ability to 
negotiate them results from our encounters with one another as ontons. As all 
entities exist within the same ontological world, multispecies – or rather inter-
ontonic relationships – become possible because of our shared ontonity (as 
opposed to shared humanity). Our mutual underlying ontonic nature or ontonity 
not only enables us to encounter other entities as fellow beings, but also means 
that these encounters can be intersubjective and empathetic. Amongst the 
Bebelibe, such encounters are exemplified by individuals who have animal 
mtakimɛ (identity) and upinsihṵ (destiny). The implicit trust and resulting 
empathy that exists between such individuals and their diseede wante (family 
animals) is due to a level of communication and ontonic engagement that 
prevails between their mtakimɛ. Totemic engagement amongst the Bebelibe 
further epitomises such inter-ontonic relationships, which resulted from the 
pacts established between the founding ancestors and their totem animals. 
Today, people and totem animals who are direct descendants of their 
founders continue to form an inter-ontonic pair. These direct descendants are 
those who have been reincarnated by the founding ancestor and the totem 
animal, who – having become one – continue to die and reincarnate together. 
These descendants have an “ani-mate” relationship, as the two entities – the 
person and the totem animal – are animated by the same kɛbodikɛ (animating 
force) and could be considered mates as they are intimately bound together. 
Furthermore, some of these descendants can kɔnta (become) their totem 
animal, and their totem animal can kɔnta (become) human. This happens when 
the person or animal’s kɛbodikɛ and mtakimɛ (identity) leave their primary 
ukuonɔ (body-skin) and suki (put on the shirt) of their alternative ukuɔnu. The 
alternative ukuɔnu that the body-shifter becomes is clearly animated and active 
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in the more-visible parts of the world. Furthermore, the body-shifter’s alternative 
ukuɔnu can also be injured and even killed. When this happens, the body-
shifter’s primary ukuɔnu also sustains the same injury and can die as a result of 
it. The two entities who are in an ani-mate relationship sometimes body-shift in 
order to visit one another. Thus, when a person who has an ani-mate 
relationship with a crocodile body-shifts in order to visit the crocodile, for 
example, at that moment there are three distinct material beings: the person, 
who is in a comatose state, the crocodile that the person has become and the 
crocodile who is the person’s ani-mate. All three beings are simultaneously 
present. Whilst the person’s primary ukuɔnu is in a comatose state, the two 
crocodiles engage with each other as ontons. 
An engagement in the world between different entities in an ontonic and 
thus nonrepresentational sense necessitated my introducing further notions 
including shared ontonity (instead of shared humanity), and ontonhood (rather 
than personhood) and ontomorphism (as opposed to anthropomorphism). I 
justified these terms as they de-emphasise the human and do not privilege one 
entity over another. I demonstrated that our shared ontonity can result in a 
connectedness with other beings with whom we can have a deep rapport that 
anthropomorphism and egomorphism cannot explain. Thinking in terms of 
ontonhood and shared ontonity thus allows for relational engagements that are 
more fundamental and multidirectional. Accordingly, entities ontomorphise when 
they attribute their ontonity and ontonhood to others. 
There are several areas I would have liked to develop further, but proved to 
be beyond the scope of this thesis. For example, I had hoped to explore the 
impact that modern institutions (such as the education system, which is based 
on the French system, and Western-style health care) have on human-animal 
relations.  
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I had also planned to address further people’s understanding and 
engagement with members of the Equidae family, all of whom are considered 
extremely powerful and are accorded quasi-human status (see Participating in 
the Community, Chapter Two; Hunting, Chapter Four and Chapter Six). 
Consequently, to kill a donkey, for example, without just cause is tantamount to 
murder and people fear that the animal concerned will avenge its death. 
Besides horses, mules and domestic donkeys, many of my interviewees talked 
about the kɛmunnaakɛ (pl. simunnaasi ) or l’âne sauvage in French. People 
identified the kɛmunnaakɛ as the most powerful and dangerous bush animal of 
all. The French is ambiguous as it could refer to the wild ass (Equus africanus) 
or feral donkeys (Equus africanus asinus). Wild asses, however, have never 
existed in the region and domestic donkeys are recent arrivals. More research 
is needed to clarify the exact status of these animals and establish if they are 
genuine cryptids or if kɛmunnaakɛ is an alternative name for one of the local 
antelopes. 
One final area that would benefit from further research concerns people’s 
perception of pigs, whom they consider the least intelligent of all the animals, as 
they do not have diyammaade (ability to think, reason and to make decisions). 
Their lack of status means that their meat has no ritual significance. Therefore, 
people now favour pork over other meats (see Chapter Five). 
The need for further research shows that I still have more to learn about the 
Bebelibe of the Commune of Cobly and how they engage in and with the world 
around them. More generally, such research is best achieved by seeking to 
understand how people presence and relate to the different animals and entities 
who populate their world. 
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Appendices 
How the Dog Saved Ukɔɔnɔ 
You need to know that our Ukɔɔnɔ ancestor was known for his 
murderous acts. It was after a series of murders that his younger 
brother, who was Uwuodɔ, decided to leave as he was fed up with his 
brother’s behaviour. He hid far away so he no longer had to witness his 
brother’s acts. 
When our Ukɔɔnɔ ancestor realised his younger brother was gone, he 
went in search of him. Tired and thirsty, he arrived at a homestead, 
where there were several people sitting outside. He left his bow and 
arrows at the entrance with the dog who was accompanying him. He 
then entered the homestead, greeted the owner and asked for water to 
quench his thirst. The people who were sitting outside recognised him 
for the murderer and enemy that he was, as he had killed one of their 
family members too. They decided to take their revenge and plotted to 
kill him. The dog heard what they were planning, so when the man left 
the homestead the dog grabbed his bow and arrows and ran off into the 
bush. Our ancestor chased after the dog. In the middle of the bush, the 
dog stopped and he said to our ancestor, ‘Do you know why I took your 
bow and arrows? When you entered the homestead, the people outside 
started plotting to kill you. This is why I took your things and ran off so 
that you would follow me and I could explain what had happened.’ Our 
ancestor, together with the dog, then escaped his enemies who were 
pursuing him. Our ancestor then swore that he would never eat dog 
meat again as he considered, from that moment on, the dog to be like a 
man as he was capable of saving others. 
Bebelibe Communities 
Communities Represented by Interviewees 
The communities are listed alphabetically according to the singular form of their 
name, which is followed by the plural form. Each community’s animal 
tikedimɔmɔnte (true totem(s)) is in bold, followed by other tikete (interdicts) that 
are respected by extension to other related animals (e.g. those who do not eat 
Rock Python, do not eat other snakes either), or due to a community or family 
alliance. 
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Community’s Name 
 
Principal Villages & 
Neighbourhoods 
Animal Totems 
Ubiidɔ, Bɛbidibɛ Birihoun (Cobly) Crocodile, Bushbuck, 
Rock Python (snakes in 
general) 
Udatienɔ, Bɛdatenbɛ Oudatiénou (Datori) Jackal, Leopard, Genet, 
Crocodile 
Uha̰ntienɔ, Bɛha̰ntenbɛ Serhounga & 
Tassayota 
Namaqua Dove (doves in 
general), Civet, Monitor 
Lizard, Bushbuck, Dog 
Uhodukpaadɔ, Bɛhodukpadibɛ Oroukparé Rock Python (snakes in 
general) 
Uhotuunɔ, Bɛhotuubɛ Oukodoo & Touga Rock Python (snakes in 
general) 
Ukɔɔnɔ, Bɛkɔpɛ Cobly & Ouorou Dog, Rock Python 
(snakes in general), 
Crocodile, Bushbuck 
Ukṵntuonɔ, Bɛkṵntuobɛ Kountori Civet 
Unammucaanɔ, Bɛnammucaabɛ Namountchaga Crocodile, Striped 
Ground Squirrel 
Usiinɔ, Bɛsiinbɛ Sinni Civet 
Utedebinɔ, Bɛtedepɛ Didani, Nanakadé & 
Outanonhoun 
Genet 
Uwiɛnɔ, Bɛwiɛnbɛ Okommo, Yimpisséri Monkey, Crocodile, 
Weidholz’s Banana Frog, 
Tortoise, Dove 
Uyṵɔnɔ, Bɛyṵɔbɛ Ouyon (Tarpingou) Monkey, Crocodile, Dog, 
Crab 
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Other Mbelime-speaking Communities 
Community’s Name Principal Villages & 
Neighbourhoods 
Animal Totems 
Ucɛkɔnkɔ, Bɛcɛkɔnkibɛ Yangou Warthog (pigs in general) 
Ukɔnciɛnɔ, Bɛkɔnciɛbɛ Korontière Striped Ground Squirrel 
Ukuciɛnɔ, Bɛkuciɛbɛ Kèkoutchièke Civet 
Ukuodɔ, Bɛkodibɛ Nanakadé & Dissibili Elephant-snout Fish, 
Buffalo, Dog 
Ukpɛtuunɔ, Bɛkɔtuubɛ Oukotouhoun Bushbuck, Red-flanked 
Duiker 
Unaahuodɔ, Bɛnaahodibɛ Ounahodihoun 
(Kutchatié) 
Crocodile, Striped 
Ground Squirrel, Rock 
Python (snakes in 
general), Namaqua Dove 
(doves in general) 
Unanbuɔnɔ, Bɛnanbɔnbɛ Dinanbonni (Sinni) Dove, Civet 
Upuodɔ, Bɛpodibɛ Dipoli Civet 
Usapuodɔ, Bɛsapodibɛ Dissapoli Leopard (& other cats, 
inc. Genet), Toad 
Utuonɔ, Bɛtonbɛ Dissari Dog 
Uwuodɔ, Bɛhodibɛ Ouorou Rock Python (snakes in 
general), Bushbuck, 
Crocodile, Dog 
Uyɔwa̰anɔ, Bɛyɛwa̰nbɛ Diyowande 
(Tassayota) 
Baboon & Monkey, 
Namaqua Dove (doves in 
general), Civet 
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Homestead Sketches 
Homestead Sketch 1 
S. Merz, Oukodoo, 
February 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Homestead Sketch 2 
S. Merz, Oroukparé, February 2016 
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Homestead Sketch 3 
S. Merz, Oukodoo, February 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Homestead Sketch 4 
S. Merz, Oukodoo, February 2016 
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Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Two female and one male bɛhidibɛ 
J. Merz, Oukodoo, 1995. Used with permission. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Akṵnpe and sorghum beer 
Photo mine, Sinni, 2013. 
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Figure 3: One of Basaadi’s kɛyawedikɛ 
Photo mine, Namountchaga, 2015. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Ditade at base of baobab tree 
A ditade shrine entity (flat stone in centre) surrounded by other ataadɛ. 
J. Merz, Oukodoo, 2011. Used with permission.
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Figure 5: Cow head with knife, meat morsels and cornmeal porridge 
J. Merz, Oukodoo, 1996. Used with permission. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Yan̰ta medicine horns 
Photo mine, Sinni, 2013. 
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Figure 7: Dog roast 
Photo mine, Cobly, 2015. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Soya cheese made by Geneviève and her family 
Photo mine, Cobly, 2016. 
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Sacrifices 
Summary of which animals can be sacrificed when: 
 Chicken Sheep Dog Cow Goat Guineafowl 
Shrine/entity:       
Ataadɛ Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Bɛhidibɛ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes (♀ only) 
Dikṵnpuode Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes (♀ only) 
Event:       
1st Pregancy Yes No No No No Yes 
Unborn child Yes Yes No No No No 
After birth Yes Yes No No No No 
Tibaakite Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes (♀ only) 
Diviner & siyawesi 
installation169 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Marriage Yes Yes No Yes No Yes 
Mya̰kitimɛ 
ceremony 
Yes No No No Yes No 
Death Yes Yes No No Yes Yes (♀ only) 
Initiations:       
Tikɔnte (♂&♀) Yes (♂&♀) No No No No Yes (♀ only) 
Difɔnde (♂) Yes No No No No No 
Ditentide (♂) Yes No No No No No 
Dikṵntide (♀) No No No No No Yes 
 
                                             
169 The animals for a diviner’s and siyawesi installation all need to be black. See S. Merz 
(2017a) for more details. 
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Glossary 
General Terms 
Terms are listed alphabetically. Nouns are ordered according to their singular 
form. The plural form (when there is one) follows the singular in parentheses. 
NB specific animal names are listed separately below. 
baakɛ Tibaakite kin: Maternal uncles who perform the tibaakite 
ceremony (see below) and become second fathers to the 
individuals concerned, who then call their uncles baakɛ. 
dedi To come out (return; to reincarnate): used for cross-
species reincarnation. When a being was not happy in its 
current life, or wants to seek posthumous revenge, it 
reincarnates as another being: human-animal, human-tree, 
animal-human, dog-cat, siyawesi-human, etc. 
dibakide Medicine and armlet that protects men from their enemies. 
Sometimes used by hunters. 
dibotide (abuotɛ) Community: group of related people who share a common 
identity but who do not need to be consanguineous. 
dibuode Forest/extensive woodland found in the wilderness. 
die To overcome (avenge), literally “to mount” the entity who is 
being avenged, i.e. when an animal or human who has 
been killed inappropriately succeeds in “overcoming” their 
killer. 
difɔnde Male initiation ceremony. See also S. Merz (2014:92-99). 
dihuude (awi) Death celebration: this is the second funeral that follows 
burial several months or years later. Today, the word 
dihuude is also used more generally to refer to any 
celebration. 
dikpaade Wilderness: includes dense, impenetrable woodland, more 
open savannah bush land and grassy plains. Where there 
is no human presence/activity (except for hunting) and 
where the larger wild animals live (antelopes, elephants, 
lions, etc.). 
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dikṵnpuode 
(akṵnpe) 
Mtakimɛ shrine: conical in form, this is located outside the 
homestead next to the ukoohṵ (vestibule, literally 
“lineage”). This shrine is constructed for individuals (and 
sometimes a couple) to reinforce and restore balance to 
the person’s mtakimɛ. See also S. Merz (2014:53 & 61) 
and Figure 2. 
dinaacuude 
(anaaciipɛ) 
The vestibule, literally “cow-room”. In fact, it is far too small 
for cows, though it does serve as a shelter for the other 
family animals. 
dinitokitade 
(anitokitaadɛ) 
Family fertility shrine. 
diseduɔde 
(asedɛɛ) 
The extended family, literally “family-big”. 
diseede (asie) This term is used for both the family and the homestead. 
diseede sɛfɛ; 
diseede wɛfɛ 
Family snake (specifically a python); 
My family snake, literally “family my-snake”. Compound 
noun of wɛ̰nnɛ (mine) and fɛsɛfɛ (snake). 
diseede wankɛ 
(diseede wante) 
Domestic animal, literally “family animal”. 
disɛnpode 
(asɛnpuodɛ) 
A malevolent bush-being, now commonly equated with the 
devil. 
ditade (ataadɛ) Stone, this word is used for both the community guardian 
shrine and the shrine entity. See Figure 4. 
ditendokide 
(atendokɛ) 
Inhabited area (hamlets, villages and towns). 
ditenwɛnde 
(atenwiɛnɛ) 
General term for shrine and its shrine entity. 
diyammaade 
(ayammaadɛ) 
Ability to think, reason and to make decisions. 
dota To remove (castrate, pigs and dogs). 
fɛbodimuɔfɛ 
(ibodimuɔhḭ) 
Literally “animating force-crocodile”. Compound noun of 
kɛbodikɛ (animating force) and fɛmuɔfɛ (crocodile) 
haa “Is ploughing”, from the infinitive hɛɛ (to plough) 
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huoni To avenge. Can also mean to quarrel, to dispute or to fight, 
depending on the context. 
kɛbodikɛ (sibosi) Animating force. 
kɛnaatɔɔkɛ Anthrax. 
kɛninkɛ (tininte) General term for “meat” but includes everything that can be 
used in cooking: muscle, skin, fat, cartilage, bone, etc. The 
singular form, kɛninkɛ, is used for a morsel of meat. The 
plural form for several morsels is sininsi. 
kɛpaakɛ (sipaasi) Animals that only live in water (fish, whales and manatees). 
kɛwankɛ (tiwante) General term for “animal”; also more specific term for 
generally larger animals with four feet or no feet and that 
can live or move on land (mammals, reptiles, amphibians 
and snails). 
kɛyawedikɛ 
(siyawesi) 
Bush-being who mediates between diviners and Uwienu. 
See also S. Merz (2017a) and Figure 3. 
kɛya̰kibeekɛ 
(siya̰kibeesi) 
Medicine-bracelet often carried by hunters. Compound 
noun of uya̰nku (medicine) and kɛbeekɛ (bracelet). 
kɛya̰kiyadikɛ 
(siya̰kiyasi) 
Medicine-axe often carried by hunters. Compound noun of 
uya̰nku (medicine) and kɛyadikɛ (axe). 
kɔnta To become: to change your identity in some way or 
another. This could be through circumstances (e.g. to 
inherit money and become rich); further training (to 
become a doctor, policeman, etc.) or through body-shifting 
(to become a monkey). 
mbɛlimɛ Mbelime, the language spoken by the Bebelibe. 
mbidimu Sand. 
mceyɔ̰mmɛ Intelligence: used for someone who is ingenious, astute, 
perspicacious and/or cunning. 
mnannammɛ Something extraordinary or miraculous. 
mɔnta To separate a human killer (hunter, for example) from the 
wild animal that has been killed. 
mtakimɛ Identity: includes an entity’s destiny, relational abilities and 
character, thus making each individual unique. 
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mtakitiɛmɛ Bad mtakimɛ, literally “mtakimɛ-bad”. This accounts for 
abnormalities such as bad or strange behaviour, character, 
etc. of a person, animal and other beings. 
mtiɛmu Badness. Christians use this word for “sin”. 
myammɛ Gallbladder or bile. This is where a being’s diyammaade 
(ability to think, reason and make decisions) and emotions 
are located. 
mya̰kitimɛ Reconciliation ceremony to remove words spoken in anger. 
po To kill. 
sɛdi To respect: the notion of fear or awe is implicit as there will 
be consequences if your respect is lacking. 
siihḭ To reincarnate. 
soya 
naabesikanka̰nde 
(naabesikanka̰anɛ) 
Soya cheese (fromage de soja in French). The word for 
cheese is literally “cow-milk-curdle”, which is a compound 
noun of fɛnaafɛ (general term for cattle), mbesimɛ (milk) 
and ka̰nta (to curdle). See Figure 8. 
sɔnni To take care of (ask forgiveness). Verb can be employed in 
several ways: 
- For living family animals: to take good care of the animals 
(provide shelter, food, water, etc.) 
- When someone kills family animals: to take good care of 
the animal ceremonially, so it cannot seek vengeance, i.e. 
“ask forgiveness”. 
- When two people need to be reconciled; to take care of/ 
restore the relationship. 
suki To put your shirt on; also used to describe act of changing 
bodies when body-shifting. 
sukita To take your shirt off; also used to describe act of changing 
bodies when body-shifting. 
tibaakite Ceremony performed for children reincarnated by a 
maternal ancestor of their father or grandfather. The 
ceremony integrates children into the maternal ancestor’s 
community so that their mtakimɛ will be at ease. Once 
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integrated children are considered members of the 
community and need to respect the community’s totems. 
tikete Taboo, interdict. General term for something forbidden 
(food, drink, actions, relationships, etc.). People also use 
this when talking about totems (both their own and those 
that are respected due to an alliance with another 
community). 
tikedimɔmɔnte Totem: literally “taboo/interdict-true”. More specific term 
used for a person’s actual totem(s). Not used in any other 
context. 
tikpate Wealth/affluence: rich with money and possessions. Used 
specifically when discussing economic, commercial and 
material wealth. Also used for political power. 
timuɔte The bush: general term for land that is not inhabited; all 
that is outside village/town boundaries. Can also be used 
more specifically to refer to land where there is still human 
activity such as farming. 
timuɔte wankɛ 
(timuɔte wante) 
Bush (wild) animal. 
tipaninpaate Behaviour. 
tisusukite Tops: clothes only worn on main torso, such as shirts, 
jumpers, jackets, etc. 
tiwanpoote takimɛ Butcher mtakimɛ, literally “animals-kill” mtakimɛ. 
Tiwanpoote is a compound noun of tiwante (animals) and 
po (to kill). 
tiyɔsite Restoration; also word used for sacrifices and ceremonies 
that are performed to maintain and restore relationships 
between humans and other entities. 
tɔɔ denbɛ Fathers. Often used when referring to fathers and 
forefathers and translated as les parents in French. Denbɛ 
is a plural marker for words that do not have nominal class 
markers. 
Ubiɛlɔ (Bɛbɛlibɛ) Ubielo (Bebelibe), the auto-ethnonym of those who speak 
Mbelime. 
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ubɛbihṵ (tibɛbite) Creepy-crawly(ies); animals that have more than four feet 
or no feet (insects, arachnids, crustacea and worms). 
ubaayɔ Ancestral times, literally “ancestor-past”, before the whites 
arrived. Term used when referring to pre-colonial times. 
Also pronounced ubɔɔyɔ. 
ucaatɔ (bɛcatibɛ) Hunter(s). 
udekitiwaabu Commerce, literally “money-search”. Compound noun of 
fɛdekitifɛ (money) and waani (to search). 
uhedihṵ (tihedite) Pelt: when talking about an animal that has fur or feathers, 
people use the word uhedihṵ (fur/feathers) rather than 
ukuɔnu (body-skin) and explain that this is what 
distinguishes them from humans. 
uhiidɔ (bɛhidibɛ) The dead: this can be the body of a deceased person or 
the ancestor shrine. People normally refer to the shrine in 
the plural form, however, to distinguish it from a corpse. 
Several bɛhidibɛ can also be present in one shrine. The 
shrines are located in the vestibule (ukoohṵ). See Figure 1. 
uhonhuonɔ 
(bɛhonhuonbɛ) 
Seer(s): derived from the verbal phrase u n buo “he who 
sees” (bɛ n buo “they who see”). 
ukoohṵ (tikoote) The vestibule, literally “lineage”. Some people – especially 
the younger generation – call it ukoyaahṵ (tikoyaate), 
literally “lineage-male”.  
The bɛhidibɛ (dead) reside in the vestibule of the 
homestead of the most senior man of the family. Other 
entities – such as the siyawesi bush beings – also reside in 
this room. This is where various ritual items are also kept, 
and where hunters put the horns and skulls of the animals 
they have killed. As noted above, it also serves as a shelter 
for family animals and is sometimes referred to as the cow 
room (dinaacuude). 
ukuɔnu (tikɔnte) Body-skin: the two words are conflated in Mbelime as no 
distinction is made between the body and the skin. The 
influence of French and schooling means that many people 
now say that ukuɔnu is the body, whilst tikɔnte is the skin. 
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uniitɔ (bɛnitibɛ) Human(s). 
unitipuohɔ̰ 
(bɛnitipuobɛ) 
Woman, literally “person-who-kills”. Compound noun of po 
(to kill) and uniitɔ (human). The word for “wife” is upuohɔ̰ 
(bɛpuobɛ) “she-who-kills”. Women have the power to either 
create or destroy and are called “persons-who-kill” out of 
respect. 
unɔdihṵ (tinɔɔte); 
kɛnɔdikɛ (sinɔsi) 
Animals with two feet and that fly (birds and bats). 
upaanɔ (bɛpanbɛ) Modern person, literally “person-new”. 
upaanu New times, literally “newness”, since the whites arrived. 
Term used for colonial and post-colonial times, as well as 
all things new. Translated as la modernité in French. 
upaasɔ (bɛpasibɛ) Diviner(s). Their divination is guided by the siyawesi, who 
mediate between the diviner and Uwienu. See also S. Merz 
(2014; 2017a). 
upinsihṵ (tipinsite) Destiny; also the fontanel and the crown of the head, and 
linked with respiration. 
usaanɔ (bɛsanbɛ) Stranger: this includes newborn babies, new wives, family 
or friends that you have not seen for a while and people 
who you have never met before. 
usɔbaanɔ 
(bɛsɔbaabɛ) 
Community shrine priest, literally “person of the python 
who guards it”. Compound noun of usɔkpɛnhṵ (African 
Rock Python) and baani (to guard), with “person” noun 
class markers. 
usɔcudɔ 
(bɛsɔcudibɛ) 
Community shrine priest, literally “person of the python 
who throws sorghum paste at it”. Compound noun of 
usɔkpɛnhṵ (African Rock Python) and cudi (to throw 
sorghum paste), with “person” noun class markers. The 
sorghum paste is made by mixing sorghum flour and 
sorghum beer together. 
usɔha̰dɔ 
(bɛsɔha̰dibɛ) 
Community shrine priest, literally “person of the python 
who sits on it” (i.e. who governs it). Compound noun of 
usɔkpɛnhṵ (African Rock Python) and ha̰di (to sit), with 
“person” noun class markers. 
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utedu Wealth/abundance: used for someone who has lots of 
children or animals or a good harvest, for example, but not 
used for material richness or money. 
utenyiɛnɔ 
(bɛtenyanbɛ) 
Earth priest, literally “earth-owner”. Compound noun of 
utenhṵ (earth) and uyiɛnɔ (owner) with “person” noun class 
markers. The earth priest is ritually responsible for the land 
that his community occupies. See also S. Merz (2014). 
uyuɔsɔ (bɛyuɔsibɛ) Shrine priest, literally “person-who-fixes”. Usually a male 
who the diviner designates for more day-to-day sacrifices, 
though sometimes a paternal aunt may be chosen. See 
also S. Merz (2014). 
uyuɔsɔ kpiɛmɔ 
(bɛyuɔsibɛ kpɛnbɛ) 
Community shrine priest, literally “person-who-fixes big”. 
The community shrine priest is responsible for the 
community’s ataadɛ, and performs the more important 
ceremonies and sacrifices needed for the community’s 
wellbeing. See also S. Merz (2014). 
Uwienu God, Supreme Being, creator of all; also the sun. Today, 
the two are often separated, with the sun being described 
as “uwienu that gives light”. Some people, though, still say 
that the sun is Uwienu’s ukuɔnu (body/skin), so it is 
probable that the two were not differentiated in the past. 
Today, a growing number of people materially identify 
Uwienu with the Bible (J. Merz 2014:119). 
uyiɛnɔ (yanbɛ) Owner, lord. Someone who is responsible for or the head 
of something. Often used in compound nouns to indicate 
the person’s exact responsibility, for example the head of 
the household is useyiɛnɔ, literally “family/homestead-
owner”. Compound noun of diseede (family) and uyiɛnɔ 
(owner) with “person” noun class markers. 
wɛpu or wɛbita To crush the testicles (cattle, goats, sheep).  
ya To see and to know. 
ya̰nta Literally “To make [person] drink”. Ceremony to separate a 
human killer from the human victim, whether the death was 
intentional or not. During the ceremony, the person is 
administered a medicine that separates him or her from the 
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victim. Anyone who was somehow involved in the victim’s 
death and burial should perform yan̰ta, including those who 
witnessed the victim’s death. The ceremony is performed 
with powerful medicine horns. These are antelope horns 
stuffed with roots and leaves. The person officiating 
prepares the medicine that the perpetrator will drink by 
taking some of the leaves and roots from one of the horns, 
placing them in a calabash and mixing them with water. 
The perpetrator places his (left) foot or her (right) foot on 
the horn and confesses his or her crime, or tells what he or 
she witnessed. The officiator then holds the calabash to 
the person’s mouth and flicks the medicine into his or her 
mouth with stiff grass stalks. 
Men who have undergone ya̰nta dance with and play the 
medicine horns by scraping along their length with a ron 
palm (Borassus aethiopum) nutshell during the burial and 
subsequent funeral of a man who has died a good death. 
The men place the horns tip down in the ground when they 
are not playing them (see Figure 6). 
yuɔsi To fix, resolve, repair, restore order, etc. Often interpreted 
as “to sacrifice” in French, when discussing ceremonies. 
Also used in other contexts such as tidying the house and 
repairing a bicycle. 
Animals 
Below is a list of the Bebelibe animals who feature in this thesis. 
difa̰nkide (afa̰nkɛ) Pig (Scrufus spp.). 
dipikide (apikɛ) Olive baboon (Papio anubis). 
diwanmɔnde (awanmuɔnɛ) Patas monkey (Cercopithecus [Erythrocebus] 
patas), literally “monkey-red”. 
fɛconfɛ (icuoni) Elephant-snout fish (Mormyrinae mormyrus). 
fɛdodifɛ (iduodi) General term for genet. Two species present locally: 
common & blotched genet (Genetta genetta 
senegalensis & Genetta maculata). 
fɛha̰nfɛ (iha̰ani) Helmeted guineafowl (Numida meleagris). 
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fɛhefɛ (ihie) Domestic (Muscovy) duck (Cairina moschata 
domestica). 
fɛmatɛdifɛ (imatiɛdi) Weidholz’s banana or leaf-folding frog (Afrixalus 
weidholzi). 
fɛmuɔfɛ (imuɔhḭ) West African or desert crocodile (Crocodylus 
suchus). Also known as uwuonu yiɛnɔ (stream 
owner/master). 
fɛnaafɛ (inaahḭ) General term for cattle, including males (castrated 
or not), females, young, etc. Usually shorthorns 
(Bos brachyceros). 
fɛnaahaakifɛ (inaahaaki) Ox/bull used for ploughing, literally “the cattle-that-
are-ploughing”. 
fɛkpanaafɛ (ikpanaahḭ) Western African buffalo (Syncerus caffer 
brachyceros), literally “wilderness-cattle”. 
fɛkpiifɛ (ikpiihḭ) Leopard (Panthera pardus). 
fɛponfɛ (ipuoni) African civet (Civettictis civetta). 
fɛsefɛ (isie) Kanki or western hartebeest (Alcelaphus 
busalaphus major). 
fɛsɛfɛ (isiɛ) General term for all snakes; also used for pythons 
and guardian entities. 
fɛsɔfɛ (isua) Sheep (Ovis spp.). 
fɛtadiha̰nfɛ (itadiha̰ani) Helmeted guineafowl (Numida meleagris), literally 
“mountain-guineafowl”. 
fɛtɔɔdifɛ (itɔɔdi) Bushbuck (Tragelaphus scriptus scriptus). 
fɛwanfɛ (iwaani) General term for monkey. 
fɛyɔfɛ (iyua) West Africa Nile monitor lizard (Varanus stellatus). 
kɛbakɔnkɛ (sibakɔnsi) West African lungfish (Protopterus annectens). 
kɛbuokɛ (sibuosi) Goat. People typically have West African dwarf or 
pygmy goats (Capra aegagrus hircus). 
kɛbuɔkɛ (sibuɔsi) Dog (Canis spp.). 
kɛdodikɛ (sidosi) Common warthog (Phacochoerus africanus). 
kɛhodikɛ (sihosi) General term for duiker (Cephalophini ). 
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kɛhodimɔnkɛ (sihodimɔnsi) 
dihodimɔnde (ahodimuɔnɛ) 
Red-flanked duiker (Cephalophus rufilatus). 
kɛhudikɛ (sihusi) General term for tortoise. 
kɛkodikɛ (sikosi) General term for chicken (Gallus gallus 
domesticus). 
kɛkɔɔkɛ (sikɔɔsi) Striped ground squirrel (Euxerus erythropus). 
kɛkṵndankɛ (sisṵndansi) Namaqua dove (Oena capensis). 
kɛkṵnhedikɛ (sisṵnhedisi) General term for dove. 
kɛmunkɛ (simunsi) Donkey (Equus africanus asinus). 
kɛmunnaakɛ (simunnaasi) 
umunnaahṵ (timunnaate) 
Literally “donkey-who-flattens”, as they like to roll in 
the dirt, therefore flattening the ground. People call 
this l’âne sauvage in French. The French is 
ambiguous as it could refer to the wild ass (Equus 
africanus) or feral donkeys (Equus africanus 
asinus). It may also be the female waterbuck 
(Kobus ellipsiprymnus defassa). As yet there is no 
consensus about the Mbelime term for waterbuck.  
kɛnɔntikɛ (sinɔntisi) Cat (Felis spp.). 
kɛsa̰nkɛ (sisa̰nsi); sa̰nminte 
(sa̰nminte denbɛ) 
Horse (Equus ferus caballus spp.). 
kɛsṵɔkɛ (sisṵɔsi) General term for fly. 
kɛtadikodikɛ (sitadikosi) Stone partridge (Ptilopachus petrosus), literally 
“mountain-chicken”. 
kɛtubuɔkɛ (situbuɔsi) General term for jackal, literally “termite-dog”. Two 
species present locally: common & side-striped 
jackal (Canis aureus & Canis adustus). 
kɛyṵɔkɛ (siyṵɔsi) Double-spurred francolin (Francolinus bicalcaratus). 
kɛyṵɔnkɛ (siyṵɔnsi) General term for crab. 
Ukunaahṵ (tikunaate) Ostrich (Struthio camelus). 
umuntunhṵ (timuntunte) Lion (Panthero leo). 
unɔnbidihṵ (tinɔnbite) Mopane bee or fly (Plebeina hildebrandti), which is 
black, stingless and makes honey. Also known as 
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the sweat bee or fly. 
usɔkpɛnhṵ (tisɔkpɛnte) 
fɛsɔkpɛnfɛ (isɔkpiɛni) 
fɛtɛnponfɛ (itɛnpuoni) 
African rock python (Python sebae). 
utɛdihṵ (titɛte) General term for toad. 
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